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THE

CAMBRIDGE
ANCIENT HISTORY

VIII

ROME AND THE
MEDITERRANEAN
TO 133 B.C.

THE CAMBRIDGE
ANCIENT HISTORY

SECOND EDITION
VOLUME VIII

Rome and the Mediterranean
to 133 B.C.

Edited by
A. E. ASTIN

Professor of Ancient History,

The Queen's University, Belfast

F. W. WALBANK F.B.A.

Emeritus Professor, formerly Professor of Ancient
History and Classical Archaeology, University of Uverpool

M. W. FR EDERIKS EN
R. M. OGILVIE

H Cambridge

UNIVERSITY PRESS

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First published 1930
Second edition 1989
Seventh printing 2006

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British Library Catabguing in Publication data
The Cambridge Ancient History -
2nd ed. Vol. 8, Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 b.c.

1. History, Ancient
I. Astin, AE. 930 D57

isbn o 521 23448 4

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

CONTENTS

List of maps page x

List of text-figures x

Preface xi

1 Sources i

by A. E. Astin, Professor of Ancient History, The Queen’s

University of Belfast

i Introduction i

ii Historians 3

hi Non-historical literature 1 1

iv Non-literary evidence 1 3

2 The Carthaginians in Spain 17

by H. H. Scullard, formerly Emeritus Professor of Ancient

History, King’s College, London

1 Punic Spain before the Barcids 17

11 Hamilcar and Hasdrubal 21

in Hannibal and Saguntum 32

3 The Second Punic War 44

by John Briscoe, Senior Lecturer in Greek and Latin, University

of Manchester

1 The causes of the conflict 44

11 The war in Italy 47

in Spain 56

iv Sicily and Sardinia 61

v The final campaign in Africa 62

vi The war at sea 65

vii The war and politics at Rome 67

viii Manpower and finance 74

ix Subjects and allies 75

x Conclusion 78

Additional note: The elections for 216 b.c. 79

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CONTENTS

4 Rome and Greece to 205 b.c. 81

by R. M. Errington, Professor of Ancient History, Philipps-
Universitat , Marburg

1 The earliest contacts 81

11 The Illyrian wars 85

m The First Macedonian War 94

5 Roman expansion in the west 107

by W. V. Harris, Professor of History, Columbia University

1 Introduction 107

11 The subjugation of Cisalpine Gaul 107

hi Spain 1 18

iv Rome and Carthage 142

6 Roman government and politics, 200—134 b.c. 163

by A. E. Astin

1 The constitutional setting 163

11 The nature of Roman politics 167

in Oligarchic stability 174

(a) The politics of competition 174

(b) Mores 1 8 1

iv Forces for change 188

v Conclusion 196

7 Rome and Italy in the second century b.c. 197

by E. Gabba, Professor of Ancient History, University of Pavia

1 The extension of the ager publicus 197

11 The role of the Italian allies 207

in Migration and urbanization 212

iv Military obligations and economic interests 221

v Roman intervention 225

vi The transformation of agriculture 232

vn Social consequences and attempted solutions 239

8 Rome against Philip and Antiochus 244

by R. M. Errington

1 The east after the Peace of Phoenice 244

11 The Second Macedonian War 261

in Antiochus the Great 274

9 Rome, the fall of Macedon and the sack of Corinth 290

by P. S. Derow, Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford

1 Rome, Philip and the Greeks after Apamea 290

11 Perseus 303

m The end of Greek freedom 319

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CONTENTS

Vll

10 The Seleucids and their rivals 324

by C. H abic ht, Professor in the Institute for Advanced Study,

Princeton

I Asia Minor, 188-158 b.c. 324

(a) The Attalid monarchy at its peak 324

(b) Rome’s rebuff to Eumenes 332

II The Seleucid monarchy, 187-162 b.c. 338

(a) Seleucus IV 338

(b) The early years of Antiochus IV 341

(d) Antiochus and the Jews 346

(e) Antiochus in the east 350

(f) Antiochus V 353

ill The decline of the Seleucids, 162-129 b.c. 356

(a) Demetrius I 356

(b) Kings and usurpers 362

iv Asia Minor, 158-129 b.c. 373

(a) The last Attalids and the origin of Roman Asia 373

(b) Rhodes after 164 b.c. 380

v Epilogue: Roman policy in the east, 189-129 b.c. 382

11 The Greeks of Bactria and India 388

by A. K. Narain, Professor of History and South Asian Studies,

University of Wisconsin

1 Introduction 388

11 The early rulers 394

hi Menander 406

iv Successors of Menander 412

v Conclusion 415

Appendix I The Graeco-Bactrian and the Indo-Greek kings 420

in chronological and genealogical group arrangements
Appendix II Territorial jurisdictions of the Graeco-Bactrian 420
and Indo-Greek kings

12 Roman tradition and the Greek world 422

by Elizabeth Rawson, Fellow of Corpus Chris ti College,

Oxford

I The Roman tradition 422

II The Hannibalic War 426

hi Contacts with the Greek world in the early second century 434

iv Reaction and acceptance 448

v From the battle of Pydna to the fall of Corinth 463

vi Conclusion 475

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Vlll

CONTENTS

13 The transformation of Italy, 300-133 b.c. The evidence of

archaeology 477

by Jean-Paul Morel, Professor at the Universite de Provence
( A ix en Provence), and Director of the Centre Camille jullian

I Before the Second Punic War 47c )

(a) The first quarter of the third century 479

i. Introduction 479

ii. Production and trade 479

iii. Art and architecture 481

(b) From the surrender of Tarentum to the beginning of

the Second Punic War, 272—218 b.c. 483

i. Production and trade 484

ii. Architecture and town planning 487

iii. Art 491

II From the Second Punic War to the Gracchi, 218—133 b.c. 493

(a) A new context 493

(b) Production 495

i. Agricultural production 495

ii. Craft production 498

i. General observations 502

ii. Architecture 503

iii. Plastic arts 5 1 1

iii Conclusion 5 1 5

Three Hellenistic dynasties 517

Genealogical tables 5 1 8

Chronological table 523

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations 543

A General studies and works of reference 548

B Sources 549

a. Commentaries and other works concerning ancient authors 549

b. Epigraphy 551

c. Numismatics 552

d. Excavation reports and archaeological studies 555

e. Other. 557

C Rome and Carthage 5 5 8

D Rome, Greece and Macedonia 560

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CONTENTS

E The Seleucids and their neighbours 562

a. Seleucids and the Seleucid kingdom 562

h. Andochus the Great and the war with Rome 564

c. The Attalid kingdom (including Aristonicus) 564

d. Rhodes 565

e. Palestine and the Maccabees 565

f. Other 567

F The Greeks of Bactria and India 569

G The Romans in Spain 577

H Rome and Italy 578

a. Constitutional studies and the nature of Roman politics 578

b. Political and public life 579

c. Biographical studies 581

d. Social life and institutions 581

e. Rome and the Italians 583

f. Cisalpine Gaul 584

g. Roman literature and culture: Greek influences 585

h. Roman and Italian culture: archaeological evidence 587

i. Other 589

I Miscellaneous 590

Index 593

NOTE ON THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography is arranged in sections dealing with specific topics, which
sometimes correspond to individual chapters but more often combine the
contents of several chapters. References in the footnotes are to these sections
(which are distinguished by capital letters) and within these sections each book
or article has assigned to it a number which is quoted in the footnotes. In these,
so as to provide a quick indication of the nature of the work referred to, the
author’s name and the date of publication are also included in each reference.
Thus ‘Gruen 1984, 1.40: (a 20)’ signifies ‘E. S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and
the Coming of Rome (Berkeley, 1984), vol. 1, p.40, to be found in Section a of the
bibliography as item 20’.

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CONTENTS

MAPS

1 Carthaginian Spain page r 8

2 Italy and Sicily in the Second Punic War 48

3 Campania 5 2

4 Spain in the Second Punic War 58

5 North Africa 64

6 The Adriatic 82

7 Northern Italy 108

8 Spain in the second century b.c. 120

9 North Africa at the time of the Third Punic War 144

10 Carthage 158

11 Greece and Asia Minor 146

12 Macedonia and Greece 292

13 Asia Minor and Syria 326

14 The Greek lands of central and southern Asia 390

15 Bactria and North-western India 392

16 Italy and Sicily 478

TEXT FIGURES

1 The inscription on the sarcophagus of L. Cornelius Scipio

Barbatus page 483

2 Potters’ marks from Cales, third century b.c. 486

3 Potters’ marks on relief- ware from Cales 487

4 Profiles of ‘Greco-Italic’ amphoras 488

; Plan of the forum of Paestum 489

6 Plan of the sanctuary at Pietrabbondante 490

7 Profiles of Dressel I amphoras 497

8 Typical profiles of thin-walled pottery of the Republican period 500

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

PREFACE

The span of time embraced by this volume is short. Some who could
recall personal memories of its beginnings - perhaps the news of
Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, or of the disaster at Cannae - witnessed
events not far from its close; such people witnessed also an astonishingly
rapid and dramatic sequence of developments which gave Rome the
visible and effective political mastery of the Mediterranean lands. The
beginnings of this change lie far back in the history of the Romans and of
other peoples, in events and institutions which are examined in other
volumes in this series (especially in Volume vri.2); but the critical period
of transition, profoundly affecting vast territories and numerous peo-
ples, lasted little more than half a century. In one sense a single episode, it
nonetheless comprised a multiplicity of episodes which varied greatly in
scale and character and in the diversity of those who, whether by conflict,
by alliance, or by the passive acceptance of new circumstances, passed
under Roman domination. Furthermore, the Romans themselves experi-
enced change, and not merely in the degree of power and surpemacy
which they enjoyed. That power, along with the material fruits and
practical demands of empire, brought consequences of great moment to
their own internal political affairs, to relationships within their society
and between them and their Italian neighbours, to their cultural life and
to the physical expressions of that life.

It is this elaborate complex of fast-moving change which is examined,
aspect by aspect, in the chapters of this volume. A survey of the sources
of our information is followed by discussions of the Second Punic War
and of the first involvements of the Roman state with people across the
Adriatic Sea. There follows a chapter which examines Roman expansion
in the West in the subsequent decades, looking successively at Cisalpine
Gaul, Spain and Carthage, and concluding with the final destruction of
that city in the Third Punic War. After two chapters devoted to the
government and politics of Rome itself and to the interaction between
Rome and her Italian neighbours, two more consider the contemporary
expansion of Roman power in the East. The first of these deals with the
great wars against Philip V of Macedon and the Seleucid king Antiochus

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PREFACE

xii

III, the second with the overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom and the
failure of the final efforts of some of the Greeks to assert a degree of
independence, bringing with it the destruction of Corinth in the same
year as Carthage. Yet, at least to the east of the Aegean Sea, Roman
intervention, albeit on a growing scale, was still only one aspect of the
vigorous and often volatile affairs of the diverse peoples of the eastern
Mediterranean. The Seleucids and their rivals are discussed at length, in
great measure from their own point of view rather than as a mere adjunct
to Roman history, though the constantly expanding role of Rome looms
ever larger. The Greeks of Bactria and India (upon whom the shadow of
Rome never fell) were indeed rivals of the Seleucids but are discussed in a
separate chapter which adopts the rather different approach required
both by their unique history and by the exiguous and uneven source
material. The volume concludes with two chapters which explore the
interaction between Roman and Italian tradition on the one hand and
the Greek world on the other. The first of these concerns itself mainly
with intellectual and literary developments, the second with the material
evidence for such interaction at many levels ranging from the basics of
economic production to architecture and major works of art.

A few topics have been deliberately omitted from this volume with the
aim of avoiding fragmentation and concentrating discussion in other
volumes where these topics must occur in any event. Ptolemaic Egypt is
examined at length in Volume vn.i and later events in its history have
been assigned to Volume ix, as has consideration of the Bosporan
kingdom. Events in Italy between the First and Second Punic Wars are
dealt with in Volume vn.2 in a context where they belong naturally, and
are not rehearsed again in this volume. Some matters discussed in
Chapters 6 and 7 of the present volume necessarily look forward to the
tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus in 1 3 3 b.c., but the full consideration of
that episode, including a review of developments leading up to it, is
reserved for Volume ix. Similarly, while Chapter 1 2 discusses aspects of
religion and of literature, the reader who seeks more extended treatment
is referred for the former to the appropriate chapters of Volumes vri.2
and ix and for the latter to The Cambridge History of Classical Literature. On
the other hand the same policy has resulted in two chapters in the pres-
ent volume having much wider chronological limits than the remainder.
These are the chapters devoted respectively to the Greeks of Bactria and
India and to the archaeological evidence for the transformation of Italy.
In both cases the aim is to preserve the coherence of material which
would lose much of its value, not to say its intelligibility, if it were
divided.

Two more points of editorial policy require mention. First no obliga-
tion was placed upon contributors to conform to an overall interpret-
ation or methodological approach, even in broad terms, though each was

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PREFACE

xiii

asked to signal in text or notes major departures from views which are
widely accepted. Second, although each contributor was given the same
guidance about footnotes it was felt that differences not only of style but
of subject matter, of evidence and of the state of scholarship made it
impracticable to insist upon very close conformity to a single model. The
resulting variations may not be ideal in aesthetic terms but to a consider-
able degree they do reflect the requirements of different contributors and
the varying character of their subject-matter.

During the preparation of this volume, which has been in train for
some time, two events were the cause of especial sadness. Martin
Frederiksen, who died in consequence of a road accident in 1 980, was the
member of the original editorial team who had accepted special
responsibility for this volume. Its overall concept and plan and the
particular briefs given to most of the contributors owed much to his
insight, his care and his enthusiasm. It is a source of much regret that he
did not live to nurture and bring to maturity a project which owes so
much to his scholarship and wisdom. Less than two years later the
grievous blow of Martin Frederiksen’s death was compounded by a
second tragedy, in the sudden and equally untimely death of Robert
Ogilvie. He too was one of the original editorial team and contributed
substantially to the initial planning. Thereafter, though he had been less
directly involved with this particular volume, it benefited from his
general guidance and his perceptive comments on several contributions.
Yet another loss which we record with deep regret is that of one of the
contributors, Professor H. H. Scullard.

The editors wish to place on record their thanks to several persons, not
least to contributors for their patience in the face of the delays attendant
upon the completion of a composite work of this nature. Some contribu-
tions were received as early as 1980, and the majority by 1984, when there
was an opportunity for revision. A. K. Narain consented at a late stage to
contribute Chapter 11, agreeing at uncomfortably short notice to add
this to an already considerable burden of commitments. Chapter 7 was
translated from the Italian by J. E. Powell; thanks are due also to
Professor M. H. Crawford, from whose expertise this chapter has
benefited greatly. Chapter 13 was translated from the French by Mrs
Elizabeth Edwards. Chapter 10 was written in English but Professor C.
Habicht acknowledges the assistance of Dr A. S. Bradford. The maps in
this volume have been drawn by David Cox of Cox Cartographic Ltd.
The index was compiled by Mrs Barbara Hird. Special thanks are due to
our sub-editor, Ann J ohnston, for her great care and vigilance, and to the
staff of the Press for their patience and their unfailing support and
encouragement throughout.

A.E.A.

F.W.W.

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CHAPTER 1

SOURCES

A. E. ASTIN

I. INTRODUCTION

The period covered by this volume saw a vast expansion of Roman
power, an expansion which extended Roman military and political
domination over virtually the entire Mediterranean world, from west to
east, from Spanish tribes to Hellenistic kingdoms. At the beginning of
the period the cities, leagues and kingdoms of the Hellenistic world
which lay to the east of the Adriatic lived a largely separate existence, as
yet barely touched by Rome; by the end, although (except in Macedonia)
the imposition of Roman administration still lay in the future, effective
Roman political control was an established fact. This outcome had a
profound influence upon the nature of the literary sources which yield
both the framework and much of the detail of our knowledge; for the
greater part of them have Rome at the centre of their interest and show us
the rest of the Mediterranean peoples, both of the west and of the east,
primarily in relationship to Rome. Thus although in the western lands
there is much archaeological evidence, revealing military constructions,
habitations, and a multitude of artifacts, the historical context to which
this has to be related is almost entirely Roman. In the east, though the
nature of the material is somewhat more complicated, it is still difficult to
build up independently of Roman affairs a picture which has much
coherence and detail, even for the early part of the period. Admittedly
some help can be obtained here from the considerable body of numis-
matic and of epigraphic evidence. The evidence of coins is particularly
useful in resolving a number of chronological problems, especially in
connection with some of the dynasts and usurpers whose reigns were
short, while for certain of the more remote Hellenistic kingdoms it is
fundamental; and the survival of numerous inscriptions, especially in-
scriptions erected by Hellenistic cities, casts many shafts of light - usually
narrow but often intense - upon matters of chronology, political alle-
giance, administration and royal policies . 1 Nevertheless both coins and
inscriptions acquire much of their value as evidence when they are

1 Section iv below.

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SOURCES

related to contexts which must be derived largely from literary sources;
and for the Hellenistic world, particularly in affairs unrelated to Rome,
these are sparse and often fragmented, and frequently permit the recon-
struction of only a sketchy outline of events.

Aside from the accidents of loss, which, though erratic, grievously
afflict the records of every period of Ancient History, there are two
particular reasons for this state of affairs in relation to this period. Firstly,
although the Hellenistic world was a world well acquainted with litera-
ture and literary composition, and although in the third century it had
had a number of distinguished historians of its own, there followed a
long period, including the years covered by this volume, during which it
produced little major historical writing apart from the work of Polybius,
whose central interest was the growth of Roman power and who in
several respects was clearly a special case. Admittedly a very large
number of local histories and some other monographs on special topics
were written in the Hellenistic age 2 and it is plausible to assume that some
of them were written in the period now under discussion (all are lost and
many cannot be dated); but by their nature these had very limited subject-
matter and many probably had only a modest circulation. So apart from
these local histories there did not exist for the use of later historians or for
transmission to us a substantial body of contemporary historical writing
concerned primarily with the Hellenistic world. Secondly, for writers of
later generations, living in a Roman empire, it was entirely natural that in
the main their concern with this period should revolve around the affairs
of Rome.

A partial exception to this widespread practice of treating Hellenistic
history simply as an aspect of Roman history is to be found in the work of
Pompeius Trogus. Trogus, who in the time of Augustus wrote in Latin a
‘universal history’ which he entitled ‘His/oriae Philippicae ’ , dealt with the
Hellenistic period in no less than twenty-eight of his forty-four books.
The work is lost but is known in outline from surviving tables of
contents (prologi ) of the individual books and from an epitome made by a
certain Justin, probably in the third century a.d. Trogus himself, inevi-
tably and properly, devoted several books to Rome’s wars in the east, but
even when dealing with the second century b.c. he managed to devote a
good deal of space to affairs of the Hellenistic powers in which Rome was
not involved. Fora numberof events these summaries of Trogus are the
only evidence; more importantly their sketchy narrative plays a key part
in establishing the overall framework of events.

2 It is reasonable to bracket with these the concluding sections of the history of Phvlarchus and
the memoirs of Aratus, both of which were concerned with European Greece down to 2 20 b.c. Both
were drawn upon by Polybius for his introductory material in books 1 and 11, which covered events
to that year.

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H I S T O R r A N S

There is another notable exception to the general pattern of evidence
for the period. The uprising of the Jews under the Hasmonaeans against
Seleucid domination is an episode of Hellenistic history which is almost
entirely outside the orbit of Roman history but which is recorded at some
length and in considerable detail. It is the subject of the first two books of
Maccabees and is also dealt with in the writings of Josephus. Yet even the
First Book of Maccabees , which was probably written by a Palestinian Jew
c. ioo b.c. and is much the more valuable of the two, covers only the years
1 75 — i 35, while the later, more derivative Second Book of Maccabees con-
fines itself to 176-161. Thus although these works provide coherent and
fairly detailed accounts (and also throw some incidental light on other
aspects of Seleucid history), their subject-matter is limited in time as well
as in place, and is a reflection of the importance of the uprising in the
Jewish tradition rather than a more general Hellenistic historical record.
Much the same may be said of Josephus’ accounts of the episode in the
introduction to his Jewish War and, at greater length, in his Antiquities ,
both written in the Flavian period and both dependent in considerable
measure upon I Maccabees.

The fact remains, despite these special cases, that the greater part of the
evidence for the Hellenistic world in this period is derived from authors
who deal also with Roman history and for whom, even in the context of
‘universal history’, Rome is the true focus of their interest. That is neither
surprising nor wholly misleading, for as the period proceeds this point of
view approximates more closely to the actual situation which was
developing. The history of the Hellenistic world was becoming steadily
less distinct and independent, Rome impinged more and more upon it,
and the interaction between the two became one of the major political
and historical realities of the time, to be superseded by the reality of
unchallengeable Roman domination of the whole. All this was to find
early expression in both the person and the writings of Polybius, who
played a major role in the collection and transmission of much of the
information that has reached us.

II. HISTORIANS

Polybius of Megalopolis, 3 born c. zoo, was one of the thousand leading
men of Achaea who were deported to Italy after the battle of Pydna in
168; he was released only in 1 50 - as also were the others who survived so
long. Polybius himself, however, had become well acquainted with P.
Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus and Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, both
of whom were sons of the victorious Roman general at Pydna, L.

3 Polybius, like all the authors named in this chapter, is the subject of a special article in PW. See
also Walbank 1972: (b 59), and, for detailed commentary, Walbank 1957-79: (b 38).

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SOURCES

Aemilius Paullus. When the other detainees were assigned to various
Italian towns these influential young men arranged that Polybius should
remain in Rome itself, and before long his relationship with Scipio in
particular developed into a close and enduring friendship (Polyb.
xxxi. 23. 1-25. 1). Thus he found himself living in the city, at the heart of
the state which within his own lifetime - and he was still only in his
thirties — had spectacularly changed the power-structure of the world
from which he came; and he was in close touch with men who were likely
to be well informed about affairs there and elsewhere. He was stimulated
to ask himself how in the short space of time from 220 to 167 Rome had
come to dominate the whole Mediterranean world, and he determined to
answer this question by writing a history. Although the greater part of
that history is now lost, it is, directly and indirectly, a major source of our
knowledge and understanding of the period, while for Rome’s relations
with the Hellenistic states it is the principal source.

The first two books of the history outlined events from 264 to 220 as
an introductory background. Sketchy though these are by comparison
with the main body of the work, they are invaluable to the modern
scholar because of the loss of so much other work dealing with events
prior to 220. Polybius’ original plan was to write thirty books in all, but
some time after he had started he decided to add a further ten books and
to take his account down to 146 (Polyb. 111.4). The reason given for this
change of plan is that he wished to show how the victors used the power
they had won, but the surviving passages from the later books do not
seem to reflect this intention particularly well and it has often been
viewed with a degree of scepticism. There must be a suspicion that he was
motivated in part by a desire to include events with which he himself had
been closely associated, for in 1 5 1 he accompanied Scipio Aemilianus on
a campaign in Spain, and shortly after his formal release from detention
he was summoned to assist the Romans during the siege of Carthage.
Moreover after the disastrous folly of the Achaean war against Rome in
146, which led to the destruction of Corinth, Polybius played a role of
great prominence, first as a mediator between the Achaeans and the
Romans and then in regulating relationships among the Achaean cities
following the withdrawal of Roman troops. Whatever his true motives
for the extension, however, the whole history undoubtedly constituted a
monumental work which must have taken many years to compile and
compose. Indeed the final books were probably published only after
his death, the date of which is not known but which may have been as late
as 1 18.

Polybius brought to his history two key concepts, both of which
contribute substantially to the value of his work as a source for the period
and both of which were facilitated by the circumstances in which he

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HISTORIANS

found himself. The first is that though history may be entertaining it is
above all a practical, utilitarian matter, intended for the instruction and
enlightenment of statesmen and men of office. There is thus a bias (not
quite totally sustained) against dramatization and towards solid reliabil-
ity, with information gleaned as directly and as accurately as possible
from actual participants in events. The second is that Polybius’ principal
theme — the unifying of his world through the imposition of Roman
power — required ‘universal’ history, in other words the recording of
events at every stage in all the areas which were to have this unity of
domination imposed upon them. It is no surprise that fulfilment of this
ambitious objective was uneven or that it was applied most extensively to
Greece and the major Hellenistic kingdoms. Nevertheless it did mean
that Polybius was seeking out and recording a broad range of informa-
tion much of which would otherwise not have been passed down.
Moreover for both these aspects of his task - indeed for the task as a
whole — he was peculiarly well situated. His detention placed him close to
the centre of world power; he was in touch with men who were
exceptionally well informed about current events and who often were
leading participants in them, and after his release he maintained these
contacts; in some events he himself had participated in a significant way;
he had opportunity to talk with many who had played leading roles
earlier in his period; he had access to at least some memoirs, treaties, and
other documents, in addition to the earliest histories written by Romans
— Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus (both of whom wrote in
Greek) - and monographs devoted to the Punic wars; and he could meet
and talk with many of the envoys, including many Greeks, who now
streamed to Rome as the ultimate source of authority and assistance.

Polybius thus had both incentive and opportunity to be well informed
and reliable over a broad range of material; and in general his reputation
in these respects stands high so far as factual matters are concerned,
though inevitably a few particulars are questionable or demonstrably
incorrect. The reliability of his judgements and assessments, however,
has been the subject of greater debate. First, there is unmistakable
evidence of partisanship, apparent for example in the obviously
favourable view taken of the Achaeans and the equally obvious dislike of
the Aetolians. One instance of a glaring distortion induced by partisan-
ship is the absurd assertion that fear and cowardice were the motives
which in 152 induced M. Claudius Marcellus to recommend acceptance
of a peace settlement with the Celtiberians. Marcellus, thrice a consul and
twice a triumpkator, was one of the ablest generals of the day; but among
the many who disapproved of his conciliatory policy towards the
Celtiberians was Polybius’ friend and patron Scipio Aemilianus (Polyb.
xxxv. 3. 4, xxxv. 4. 3 and 8). Once it is recognized, however, that at least in

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matters very close to him Polybius’ judgement may be affected by
vigorous partisanship it is not difficult to exercise the necessary caution.
More controversial has been Polybius’ pervading view that the expan-
sion of Roman power was the product of a conscious desire on the part of
the Romans to extend their domination over other peoples, and that on
certain occasions decisions were taken specifically towards that end. By
and large, however, what is in dispute is not whether Polybius held that
view but whether it is a correct interpretation and accords with factual
information which he himself provides; it is a question about the nature
of Roman imperialism rather than about the value of Polybius’ work as
source-material, and as such it is discussed elsewhere in this volume.

In another sense, however, this is but one facet of another question:
whether this Greek ever really understood the character, the motivation,
the ethos of the Romans. In his sixth book, a substantial portion of which
survives, he described and evaluated Roman institutions, including in
this his famous analysis of the Roman constitution as a ‘mixed’ constitu-
tion. Many features of this analysis have prompted discussion and
argument, but however they may be interpreted it remains evident that
the realities of Roman political and constitutional behaviour differed
significantly from the models set out by Polybius in this account. Partly
because Polybius directs attention to formal powers and institutions
rather than to actual behaviour, the highly effective oligarchic manipu-
lation of both executive office and ‘popular’ organs is lost to sight behind
an appealing picture of a neatly balanced combination of monarchic,
aristocratic and democratic elements, each contributing their own
strengths and checking undesirable tendencies in the others. It is a
picture which conveys little of the actualities of Roman aristocratic
government. Yet it would be unwise to infer too readily from this
constitutional section that Polybius did not understand the nature of
Roman politics and government, or that his assessments elsewhere of
Romans and Roman motives are to be suspected of having been distorted
by Greek preconceptions. He would not be the last writer by a long way
to have created a theoretical model in which his own enthusiasm and
abstractions were allowed to override realities which in day-to-day life he
understood perfectly well. It would be surprising if Polybius were never
mistaken, if he always understood Romans correctly; but for very many
years he lived not just in Rome but in close touch with aristocratic and
political circles. It seems reasonable to treat his judgements with con-
siderable respect.

Only a relatively small part of Polybius’ great history has survived.
Apart from fragments of lost books, we have much of book vi, with
Polybius’ discussion of Roman political and military institutions, and the
whole of books i-v. The introductory nature and the special value of the

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HISTORIANS

first two books has been mentioned already; books iii-v deal with events
from 220 to 2 16, including a great deal of Greek and Hellenistic material
which otherwise would be unknown to us. The breaking-off of this
continuous narrative in 216 (approximately with the battle of Cannae)
results in a sharp change in the precision and detail of our knowledge
thereafter, especially in respect of the Hellenistic world. (The record of
Roman affairs is much less seriously affected until Livy’s narrative also
breaks off with 167.) Nevertheless a significant amount of Polybius’
material from book vii onwards has survived. This material takes the
form either of fragments — extracts and quotations - directly ascribed to
Polybius or of passages, some of them of considerable length, in authors
who are known to have drawn heavily upon Polybius for certain sections
of their own writings, though these two types of Polybian material are
not always sharply distinct from one another. The majority of the
fragments are derived from sets of extracts from Polybius (and from
other historians) made in the Byzantine period, in several cases in order
to illustrate a particular theme, such as ‘Virtues and Vices’, ‘Plots against
Kings’, and ‘Embassies’. Such extracts are by their nature isolated and
many of them are deficient in indications of context and chronology; on
the other hand within each set they are normally in the order in which
they occurred in the original text, and the main substance of each extract
tends to preserve the wording of the original more exactly than ancient
custom regarding quotation would normally require. 4 These sets are
therefore a major source for the recovery of material lost from Polybius -
and indeed from many other historians who wrote in Greek.

Other fragments are really quotations from Polybius which survive in
the works of subsequent writers. Such quotations tend to be less exact
than the Byzantine extracts, but they are often related to a definite
context and they are fairly numerous, for later writers drew heavily on
Polybius’ material, especially those who were writing in Greek or were
concerned with Hellenistic affairs. Among the Greek writers were
Diodorus of Sicily, who in the first century b.c. wrote a World History,
and Dio Cassius, a Roman senator from Bithynia who in the Severan age
wrote a vast history of Rome down to his own day. It happens that for the
period covered by this volume the text of both these works is lost, so we
are dependent upon quotations and Byzantine extracts, mostly very
similar to those which we have for Polybius himself. Not surprisingly
there is a considerable duplication of material which is found also in
fragments of Polybius or in Livy, or in both; but there is some informa-

4 These points can be demonstrated by an examination of extracts taken from books which are
still extant, both of Polybius and of other authors. For the corpus of surviving extracts: Boisscvain
and others, 1905-10: (b i).

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tion which has not survived elsewhere, especially for the years after 167,
when Livy’s text breaks off.

Another Greek writer who preserves quotations from Polybius is
Plutarch, who in the late first century a.d. wrote his ‘Parallel Lives’ of
Greeks and Romans. Six of the ‘Lives’, five Roman and one Greek, are
relevant to this volume. 5 Plutarch’s principal interest is in the moral
characteristics and the personality of each of his famous men. Deeds and
sayings are narrated to exemplify these qualities, but he is less concerned
with achievements as such, and scarcely at all with policies, political
analysis or specific military activity. This is reflected in his choice of
material, in the manner in which it is presented, and in the relative
importance he assigns to various items. To the frustration of the modern
enquirer — especially the political historian — he provides a good deal of
minor personal information and anecdote, while other matters are
treated with a disappointing vagueness and lack of detail. He usually
follows broadly the main sequence of his subject’s career but otherwise
has no interest in time and date; consequently he provides few
chronological indicators and scarcely any which are at all precise. Yet
Plutarch is not to be despised. He records a great deal of information, by
no means all of which is mere duplication of what can be found
elsewhere; and his wide reading enabled him to draw upon many sources.
At the same time, in the six ‘Lives’ presently in question a substantial
proportion of his material, including most of that which concerns affairs
east of the Adriatic, undoubtedly goes back directly or indirectly to
Polybius.

Ancient authors, not sharing the modern horror of plagiarism, by no
means always named predecessors upon whom they were drawing,
whether for specific statements or for substantial bodies of material.
Diodorus, Dio and Plutarch, and others, all have considerable amounts
of material which they or intermediaries have taken from Polybius
without ascription to him. In some cases this can be established because
such a passage has been taken from a section of Polybius which happens
to survive, and in this way it is possible to form some idea of the extent of
a writer’s debt to Polybius and of the manner in which he used Polybian
material. By far the most important surviving work which is indebted to
Polybius in this way is Livy’s history of Rome, surviving books of which
include those dealing with the years 2 1 9-167. Comparison with passages
of Polybius leaves no doubt that the latter was Livy’s main source for
eastern affairs, that for a very large amount of material concerning
Rome’s relationships and activities east of the Adriatic he drew directly,
extensively, and principally upon Polybius. Moreover, although Livy’s

5 Fa hi us Maximus , Mar cell us, Cato the Elder, F laminin us , Aemiiius Paullus, Philopoemen.

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HISTORIANS

version is not an exact translation of the Greek into Latin, he normally
remains close to the content and general structure of his original, despite
the touches of vividness and vigour imparted by his own artistry. Thus
very substantial amounts of material in Livy dealing with eastern affairs,
though not acknowledged to be Polybian, do preserve fairly accurately
Polybius’ version of events; and, while inevitably there are sections of
which the ascription is disputed, the Polybian origin of a great deal of this
material can be assumed with considerable confidence. Thus much of
Livy’s information on these matters goes back to an unusually well-
informed writer of the second century b.c. who was a contemporary or
near-contemporary of many of the events he describes; and the value of
Polybius as a source extends well beyond the actual books and fragments
which have survived. 6

Livy’s massive history of Rome from its origins to his own day was
almost literally a lifetime’s work. 7 So far as is known Livy did not engage
in public affairs but devoted himself entirely to literary matters, above all
to the writing of his history which is known to have occupied him for
virtually the whole of the reign of Augustus. Arranged on a year-by-year,
annalistic scheme, it grew in scale as it progressed and ultimately
comprised no less than one hundred and forty-two books, of which
thirty-five survive. These extant books are i-x, which take the history of
292 b.c., and xxr— xlv, which deal with 219-167 and therefore with a
major part of the period covered by this volume. Indeed, since they deal
with the Second Punic War and with Rome’s major wars against the
Hellenistic powers - the very period which Polybius initially took as his
subject — they are of exceptional importance, the more so since they are
the principal vehicle for much of Polybius’ own account. From the lost
books (of which xx and xlvi-lvii are relevant to this volume) there are
only a small number of fragments, but there are epitomes. One of these
epitomes, generally known as ‘the Periochae’, is a very brief summary of
the main items (as they seemed to the compiler) in each book; the result is
longer but not a great deal longer than a table of contents might be
expected to be, and precise chronological indications are usually lacking.
Nevertheless these summaries exist for all 142 books except cxxxvi and
cxxxvn. Portions of a different epitome, similar in type but somewhat
briefer, were found in a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus. Though much
damaged, this included summaries of books xxxvii-xl (which are
extant) and of books xlviii— lv. In addition several other short historical
works are derived from Livy to such an extent that they are not far

6 Nisscn 1865: (b 23) is the foundation study of this relationship between Polybius and Livy.

7 Klotz 1 940-1: (b 13); Walsh 1961: (b 40); Ogilvic 1965, 1-22: (b 25); Luce 1977: (b 15).
Commentaries relevant to this period: Weissenborn-M uller 1880-191 1: (b 43); Btiscoc 1973: (b 3)
and 1981: (b 4) (books xxxi-xxxni and xxxiv-xxxvii).

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removed themselves from being epitomes. These include the relevant
parts of Eutropius’ Breviarium and of Orosius’ Historiae adversum Paganos,
and the biographical De Viris Illustribus attributed to Aurelius Victor.

Livy’s principal intention and achievement was artistic - the creation
of a grand design and its realization in a lively, polished and often
powerful narrative. Only rarely did he engage in the primary research
which his modern counterparts regard as an essential function of a
historian. His method for any particular episode was to follow one
account selected from those available to him, with only occasional
mentions of variants found in other accounts. Generally he seems to have
followed his chosen account quite closely, but to have re-written it in his
own accomplished style and to have given it some vivid and dramatic
expression — as he did with Polybius. For the period of this volume he
used especially (apart from Polybius) two of the so-called ‘Sullan
annalists’ of the early first century b.c., Valerius Antias and Claudius
Quadrigarius, though there are traces of other sources, such as the
account of the military campaign of Cato in Spain in 195 which certainly
goes back to Cato himself. Since Valerius and Claudius were both prone
to exaggeration and elaboration (not to mention cavalier alteration) in
the interests of dramatic effect, family glory, or Roman chauvinism,
there has been a tendency to treat with scepticism any material in Livy
which does not come from Polybius, and in some extreme cases to
discount completely all such material. It is more realistic, however, while
maintaining a sensible degree of caution about such details as casualty
figures and highly dramatic battle scenes, to recognize that Valerius and
Claudius were themselves drawing upon a great body of second-century
material, much of it well informed and derived from contemporary
accounts and records. The broad framework can be taken to be generally
sound, and so can much of the detail. Year by year, for example, Livy
reports elections, the allocation of provinces, recruitment and assign-
ment of troops, triumphs, donatives, booty, dedications of temples, and
prodigies and their expiation. Much of this is probably derived from the
annales maximi , the public record made by the Pontifex Maximus , the
archive of which was probably written up and published in the later
second century.

Livy’s twenty-five books are not, of course, the only source of
information for the great age of Roman expansion. Apart from the
fragments of Polybius and such authors as Diodorus, Dio and Plutarch,
there are other minor historical works and, scattered through a great
variety of literature, a substantial number of anecdotes. Nevertheless the
role played by Livy’s account in the work of the modern historian of that
period is central, indeed it is fundamental. Its importance is well brought
out by comparing the periods before and after Livy’s text breaks off.

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NON-HISTORICAL LITERATURE 11

After 167 there is no continuous narrative, except for the Third Punic
War and some wars in Spain, nor is it possible to reconstruct such a
narrative or even a truly coherent picture of events. Information is
particularly thin and fragmentary for the years between 167 and 1 54, and
there are many uncertainties of sequence and chronology. Some im-
provement in chronology and structure is evident from about 154
because of Rome’s record of warfare. From that date until 1 3 3 Rome was
engaged in an almost unbroken sequence of wars in Spain, and from 149
to 146 she was committed also to her final war against Carthage, the
Third Punic War. We have narratives of these wars written by Appian.
Appian, a Greek of the second century a.d., wrote accounts of Rome’s
wars, arranging them on a geographical or ethnic basis (Italian, Samnite,
Macedonian and Illyrian, Syrian, etc.). Although much of his work is lost
some books and a number of fragments survive, including the Iberica and
Libjca. For the years prior to 167 he has little of value which is not also in
Livy or Polybius, but his narratives of these later wars provide both a
valuable framework and much useful detail. Although his treatment of
the Spanish wars fluctuates in scale and detail it does seem to be in the
main reliable and chronologically accurate, while his account of the
Third Punic War is close to that which was given by Polybius, from
which it is almost certainly derived through an intermediate source.
Apart from Appian, the outline of events after 1 67 is derived largely from
the epitomes of Livy, already mentioned, and such brief histories as those
of Eutropius and Orosius, which themselves are based largely upon
Livy’s work. Thus even for the years after 167 such record as has come
down to us is still strongly influenced by Polybius and Livy, even though
the actual text of each is lost.

III. NON-HISTORICAL LITERATURE

The sources considered so far have been largely the historical literary
works which constitute the principal basis for the political and military
history to which the greater part of this volume is devoted. However, the
volume also contains substantial sections dealing with the social, eco-
nomic and cultural history of Rome and Italy, 8 and even for political and
military history not all the sources are literary and not all the literary
sources are historical. Naturally historical and narrative works contrib-
ute much information regarding social, economic and cultural matters,
just as non-historical works of all types and of all periods contain
numerous anecdotes and incidental details relating to the political and
military affairs of this period; but the contemporary non-historical

8 Aspects of social and economic history in the Hellenistic world are discussed in CAbP vn.i.

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Roman literature does require some separate mention, even though it
receives extended treatment in Chapter 12.

In the later third and second centuries b.c. Rome experienced a literary
awakening and a cultural transformation of very considerable magni-
tude. This resulted in a substantial output of Roman literary composi-
tions, the bulk of which are now lost except in so far as there are
quotations and comments in writings from the late Republic onwards.
This included many historical works, beginning with the histories in
Greek written by Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus, and proceeding a
generation later to Cato’s Origines which initiated a vigorous and fast-
expanding historical tradition in Latin; but there was also a great output
of verse and drama, most notably from the versatile genius of Quintus
Ennius, and the first steps in non-historical prose literature, including
published speeches and various handbooks. All this historical writing, all
the verse, much of the drama, and nearly all the other prose writings are
known to us only in fragments or at second-hand ; 9 of complete works we
have only twenty-one comedies by Plautus, six comedies by Terence, and
a handbook concerned with agricultural matters by Cato. Yet the total
volume of what survives, whether complete, in fragments, or by way of
comment, though only a small fraction of what once existed, is quite
considerable and constitutes an acceptable basis for studying the literary
and intellectual aspects of Roman cultural history in the period.

How far these sources contribute to our knowledge of social and
economic history is more debatable. On the one hand the fragments offer
little in their substance and frequently lack adequate context (many
survive as quotations only because they illustrate interesting points of
vocabulary or grammar). On the other hand Cato’s agricultural hand-
book illuminates many aspects of the organization and practice of
agriculture, and also of economic and social attitudes, though it must
always be kept in mind that it is a work with limited purposes and
markedly particularist tendencies which leaves quite untouched many
more aspects of agriculture as well as of social and economic life . 10 The
value of the comedies in this respect, however, is the subject of perpetual
controversy. They are all known to be adaptations of Greek originals;
how much ‘Romanization’ has there been, then, in the portrayal of details
of everyday affairs, of life-styles, of economic transactions and resources,
and, above all, of social relationships? Some modification there certainly
was, if only in consequence of the use of the Latin vocabulary with its
own connotations, but whether the resulting picture is reliable remains
highly debatable. Indeed it may be asked how far it is realistic to expect
even a moderately faithful reflection of contemporary Roman life in

9 Peter, HR Rel. i z : (b 27), and ORP: (b 16) for fragments of historical works and speeches
respectively. 10 White 1970 passim: (h 120); Astin 1978, chapters 9 and 11: (h 68).

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NON-LITERARV EVIDENCE

1 3

comedy of the type presented by Plautus and Terence. The fact is that the
greater part of the literary material for Roman social and economic
history of the period is found in the historical works discussed in the first
two sections of this chapter, or in anecdotes and incidental items in the
main body of Latin literature from the Ciceronian age onwards; and this
is supplemented by the non-literary evidence.

IV. NON-LITERARY EVIDENCE

The main categories of non-literary evidence available to the historian of
the ancient world are documents written on papyrus, coins, inscriptions,
and the enormous range of material remains, from great buildings to tiny
domestic articles, which are recorded and studied by archaeologists.
Papyrus documents, which survive almost exclusively in Egypt, are of
relatively little importance for this volume and may be passed over
here . 11 Similarly, not a great deal need be said here concerning the
material evidence supplied by archaeology - though for very different
reasons. By its nature it is found everywhere, exists in vast quantities, and
varies enormously in kind, physical magnitude and state of preservation.
It can illuminate numerous facets of history: economic conditions, means
of production and cultivation, trade, social organization, urbanization,
prosperity (or otherwise) reflected in the scale and type of public
buildings, military methods as reflected in equipment and constructions,
and even the working of political institutions as reflected in their physical
setting. However, this type of evidence is not always as easy to interpret
and apply as might be expected at first sight. Frequently there are
problems of dating, of a sequence of building, of identification of
context, of establishing the relationship between items from the one site
or from adjacent or similar sites; accurate record-keeping is not easy and
has not always been as assiduous or sustained as might be wished; and
usually such evidence cannot supply its own historical setting but yields
its full evidential value only when it can be related to contexts supplied
from literary sources.

Coins, too, are found almost everywhere . 12 They were issued by all the
major states of the Mediterranean world and by many of the minor ones;
and they can yield a variety of information which is of interest to the
historian, though to determine it with sufficient reliability often requires
a great deal of specialized and complex study. They can play an important
role in resolving problems of chronology. In many instances, a careful

11 For discussion of papyrus as evidence in the Hellenistic period see CAbP vn.i. 1 6— 1 8 and
118-19.

12 Coinage of the Roman Republic: Crawford, j 974: (b 88). Hellenistic coinage is poorly served in
consolidated publications but there are numerous specialized studies of particular aspects: see the
Bibliography, esp. section b(c).

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examination of die-marks, mint-marks and stylistic features has enabled
numismatists to determine the correct sequence of issues, and when these
results are combined with the evidence of associated finds, whether of
other coins in hoards or of other datable articles, at least approximate
dates and sometimes quite precise dates can usually be determined. A
minority of Hellenistic coins actually have a particular year indicated on
them, by reference to a local era. Coins whose actual or approximate
dates have been determined can then be used to fix termini for the dates of
other objects found with or over them; or sometimes they yield even
more direct information, such as the date of the death of a ruler or the
length of his reign. The designs used on coins are often useful testimony
to special concerns or ideals, whether political, religious or general ethos,
of the issuing states, and in the case of an autocratic ruler the choice
of symbols is often a guide to aspects of his policy or to the ‘image’ of
himself that he wishes to promote among his subjects. All these aspects
of coinage are particularly relevant to many events discussed in Chapters
io and ii below. The volume of a particular coinage, provenance,
variations in the magnitude of issues, and changes in the production or
even the structure of a coinage can all be reflections of important
economic or political developments. Thus the radical restructuring of
Roman coinage in the late third century is in great measure a response to
the pressures and demands created by the Second Punic War. Neverthe-
less, numismatic evidence has to be used with considerable caution and is
fraught with uncertainties and controversies. Interpretations which
relate the results to a historical context often have substantial subjective
and conjectural elements, and frequently the historical evidence is illumi-
nating the numismatic at least as much as vice versa.

Lastly there are inscriptions, writing which was displayed on wood,
stone or metal, though naturally most of those which survive are on
stone or metal . 13 Metal, in the form of bronze sheets, was more often used
in Italy than in the east, especially for the publication of formal state or
city documents; which is one reason why comparatively few such
documents survive in the west, whereas they are common in the Greek-
speaking world. However, there was almost certainly a more fundamen-
tal difference in practice in this period, for we have only quite a small
number of inscriptions of any kind from Rome and Italy until the late
Republic, and it is under the Principate that they really proliferate. The
contrast clearly represents something more than an incidental difference

13 Cl L i collects Latin inscriptions of the Republican period; ILLRP is the most important
selection of these. New publications are listed in U Annee epigraphique. For Greek inscriptions IG and
IG 2 include Europe only. OGIS is a basic collection of eastern inscriptions, but many Hellenistic
documents are most accessible in collections for particular localities: see Bibliography, esp. section
B(b).

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NON-LITERARY EVIDENCE

in survival rate (often related to the extent and nature of re-use in more
recent times) or in intensity of exploration, though these are certainly
relevant to some of the differences in numbers of inscriptions we have
from various towns and areas in the Hellenistic lands.

The numerous inscriptions surviving from the Hellenistic areas,
though only a small part of what once existed, throw much light on both
private and public affairs. There are many types. Some were erected by
individuals - epitaphs, dedications, thank-offerings; others by public
authorities, which usually means city authorities (even in the kingdoms)
— dedications, public notices and regulations, decrees and resolutions
(including those honouring distinguished persons), treaties, and in some
cases even communications and instructions received from rulers. This
last group, which began with letters from kings , 14 came in time to include
also letters and edicts from Roman magistrates and decrees of the Roman
Senate, with the paradoxical result that most of the surviving examples of
documents of this kind from the period of the Republic are Greek
translations . 15 These contribute substantially to the understanding of
Roman attitudes and policies in the east, and also of Roman institutional
procedures. The range of topics illustrated or illuminated by other
inscriptions is extremely wide: technical points of chronology, city
organization, royal interference, taxation, trade, prices, social ideals and
values, relationships between cities, political allegiances, and policies of
kings and dynasts - all from contemporary documentation undistorted
by literary adaptation or by transmission at the hands of a succession of
copyists.

Like every other class of evidence, inscriptions have their limitations
and often require the application of special expertise. Many are not
closely dated; lettering is often worn and difficult to read; and most are
damaged with resulting loss of part of the text, sometimes a substantial
part, not infrequently leaving many or most of the surviving lines of
writing incomplete. Such problems are eased by the expert’s familiarity
with the language, conventions and style used in inscriptions, and with
the stereotyped phraseology that constantly recurs and enables many
gaps to be filled by ‘restoration’; but the damage remains considerable,
and in any case by far the greater part of the inscriptional documentation
that once existed has been lost totally. Furthermore, almost all inscrip-
tions, especially public inscriptions, are in a sense isolated documents.
We hardly ever have other documents to fill out the particular chain of
action or the detailed circumstances to which they belong, and if literary
sources supply a context at all it is nearly always a broad context, lacking
specific detail to which to relate the particular document and by which its

14 Collected and studied by Welles 1934: (b 74). 15 Sherk 1969: (b 73).

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full significance might be identified. This is why it was said earlier in this
chapter that the shafts of light cast by inscriptions are usually narrow but
often intense. In that intensity, however, lies their particular value. They
afford glimpses of detail which are scarcely ever provided by the literary
sources and which often afford a closer insight into organization and into
prevailing attitudes and motivation. Inscriptions figure extensively in
several chapters of this volume and it will quickly be seen that their
contribution is both important and distinctive.

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CHAPTER 2

THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN'

H. H. SCULLARD

I. PUNIC SPAIN BEFORE THE BARCIDS

The story of the expanding and often conflicting interests of Phoeni-
cians, Carthaginians, Greeks and Etruscans in the western Mediterra-
nean has been told in earlier volumes. With the decline of Tyre the string
of trading posts, which the Phoenicians founded from Gades on the
Atlantic shore of Spain round to Malaca, Sexi and Abdera along the
south-west Mediterranean coast, gradually passed into Carthaginian
hands. The process was apparently peaceful, but to us is quite obscure in
detail. The Phoenician decline afforded greater freedom to the Spanish
kingdom of Tartessus in the middle and lower Baetis valley. This rich
realm which flourished in the seventh and sixth centuries b.c. derived its
wealth from its great mineral resources and its control of the tin trade-
route to Brittany and Cornwall. It traded with Phoenicians and
Carthaginians, and especially with the Greeks. The Phocaeans in particu-
lar had good relations with the Tartessian ruler Arganthonius, and
founded a colony at Maenake, but the shadow of Carthage over the west
gradually grew longer.

After the failure of Pentathlus of Cnidus to drive the Phoenicians
completely out of western Sicily, Carthage gradually took over from the

1 The literary sources for early Punic expansion in Spain are extremely meagre. This is due in large
measure to the success of Carthage in excluding the Greeks from the southern parts of the peninsula,
which therefore remained largely unknown to their writers (only a tiny chink in the curtain is
provided by the Greek navigator Pytheas, whose Perip/us is reflected in Avicnus’ Ora Maritime ).
The archaeological material is also sparse and difficult to interpret: is it the result of sporadic trade, or
settlement, or domination? For the conquest by the Barcids (237-218 b.c.) we have Polybius’ brief
accounts which are pro-Barcid (11. 1.5-9, * 3 > 3^, in. 8-1 5, 17, 20-1, 29-30, 33-5, 39), together with
some further details, mainly based on the later annalistic tradition, in Diodorus, Appian, Dio
Cassius, Zonaras, Livy, Valerius Maximus, Frontinus, Nepos, Justin, Orosius, Plutarch, Polyacnus
and Strabo. Polybius drew on the Greek writers who recorded the Flannibalic War; though he
contemptuously dismissed Chacrcas and Sosylus as gossip-mongers, he probably relied largely on
Silenus, who like Sosylus had accompanied Hannibal on his campaigns. On the causes of the
Hannibalic War Polybius quoted and criticized Fabius Pictor whose view reflected the position of
the anti-Barcid faction at Carthage. Both Silenus and Fabius were probably used by Coelius
Antipater, on whom Livy and the annalistic tradition in part depended. The literary sources are
collected in Schultcn 1935, in: (b 33).

1 7

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PUNIC SPAIN BEFORE THE BARCIDS I 9

Phoenicians and became the champion of the Semitic settlements against
the Greeks. Their Punic leader, Malchus, checked the Greeks in Sicily
and then went to Sardinia, where Phoenician settlements existed at
Caralis, Nora, Sulcis, and Tharros, while a strong hillfort was built c. 600
b.C. on Monte Serai a few miles inland from Sulcis. Malchus suffered a
serious defeat at the hands of the native population; there is also evidence
that the fort at Monte Serai was damaged. However, it was soon rebuilt
and the Carthaginians established their control over the Phoenician
settlements. But their penetration of the island was slow (though they
succeeded in preventing any Greek colonization), and even by the early
fourth century their grip was much weaker in the east than in the south
and west. Sardinia was valuable as a source of minerals, agricultural
products and manpower, and also as a staging-post on the way to Spain.
An even nearer foothold was provided by the Balearic Islands: the
Carthaginians sent a settlement in 654 to Ebusus (Ibiza), where they seem
not to have been preceded by the Phoenicians.

A turning-point in Carthaginian relations with the Greeks was the
battle of Alalia ( c . 535), where with their Etruscan allies they smashed
Phocaean sea-power: one result was that the Phocaeans together with
other Greeks were barred from Tartessus and southern Spain, though
they retained their influence along the coast of Catalonia and southern
France. All this time Carthage was also extending her control in North
Africa itself, until before the end of the fifth century it stretched from
Cyrenaica to the Atlantic, although the stages of this advance unfortu-
nately cannot be traced in detail. However, the terms of her first treaty
with Rome in 509 demonstrate that before the end of the sixth century 2
she was able to close the Straits of Gibraltar to all foreign shipping and
had established a commercial monopoly in the western Mediterranean.

In southern Spain the Carthaginians entered into the inheritance of
Tartessus and the Phoenicians. They had apparently destroyed the centre
of the Tartessians by the end of the sixth century, but how far they and
the Phoenicians before them had penetrated into the Guadalquivir valley
is uncertain. Finds on the coast at Toscanos and Almunecar, with
Phoenician settlements of the latter part of the eighth century and fresh
settlers arriving early in the following century, reveal the importance of
this area to Phoenicians and Carthaginians. From here their influence
spread inland to the Guadalquivir valley, as finds (such as alabaster jars,
splendid carved ivories, and Phoenician pottery) at Seville, Carmona and
Osuna indicate, but it is uncertain how far this reflected an actual
movement of population or merely penetration by traders; many of the
burials in which these goods were found are native Spanish, but some

2 For the date see CAhl 2 vn.ii, ch. 8.

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

possibly are Phoenicia^. 3 Nor can we judge the extent of assimilation
between native and intruder or the degree of the later Carthaginian
political control, if any, in the Baetis valley. The Atlantic coast of
Andalusia also received Phoenician goods and settlers. Whether
Tartessus lay in the area of Gades (with which the ancient writers
identified it) or further north at Huelva, there appears to have been no
Phoenician settlement at Gades before the eighth century: its great days
belong to its development by the Carthaginians in their exploitation of
the Baetis valley and the Atlantic trade-routes. Two incidents have been
related to the downfall of Tartessus. 4 Vitruvius (x. 1 3), in discussing the
invention of the battering-ram, records how it was used by the
Carthaginians in capturing a fort near Gades: here perhaps Gades has
been confused with Tartessus. Secondly, the difficult trade-route over
the mountains from Maenake to Tartessus, mentioned by the Massiliote
Periplus (Avienus, Ora Maritima 87), looks like an attempt to secure the
continuance of trade when the Carthaginians had closed the easier sea-
route through the straits. However, whatever resistance the Carthagin-
ians encountered, they succeeded in destroying both Tartessus and
Maenake so thoroughly that their names disappeared from history, to be
succeeded by Gades and Malaca.

The development and exploitation of Carthaginian control in south-
ern Spain for the next two centuries or so remain very obscure. Their
tightening grip is indicated by their second treaty with Rome: whereas in
the earlier agreement of 5 09 the Romans were forbidden to sail along the
African coast west of the Fair Promontory, in the second they agreed not
to plunder, trade or colonize beyond the Fair Promontory in Africa and
Mastia (Cartagena) in Spain. Thus the Carthaginians claimed control of
the southern coast of Spain as far north as Cabo de Palos; north of the
Cape, however, Massilia in the fifth or fourth century was able to found
two new colonies, Alonis and Akra Leuke (Alicante). Gades became the
centre of Punic control in Spain and probably enjoyed some special
privileges, such as Utica had in Africa. The Blastulo-Phoenician towns of
Malaca, Sexi and Abdera (so-called after the neighbouring native Iberian
tribe) also had some degree of freedom. The Iberian tribes of Andalusia
probably enjoyed much the same conditions as they had under the ‘rule’
of Tartessus. What the Carthaginians wanted from them was their
manpower: in all the great battles fought between the Carthaginians and
the Greeks in Sicily in the fifth and fourth centuries Iberian mercenaries
played a major part. So too they exploited the mineral wealth of Andalu-
sia: gold, copper, iron and especially silver — later one mine alone at
Baebelo provided Hannibal with 300 lb of silver a day. Natural products

3 Cf. Whittaker 1974, 6off.: (c 65).

4 See Schulten 1922, 44-5: (b 5 3); CAH X vn, 775; Schulten and Bosch Gimpera 1922, 87: (b 34),
on lines 178-82 of the Ora Maritima of Avienus.

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HAMILCAR AND HASDRUBAL 21

included corn, oil, wine, esparto grass and salt-fish. Their stranglehold
on the straits allowed them to seek the tin of Brittany and the gold and
ivory of West Africa, but occasionally they appear to have allowed
controlled access beyond the Pillars of Heracles: at any rate the famous
voyage of Pytheas (in the 320s b.c.) which started from Gades is not
likelv to have been launched without their permission. But in general for
some two centuries Pindar’s words ( Nem . iv.69) were true: ‘we may not
go beyond Gadeira toward the darkness’. Thus the Greeks knew and
recorded little about Punic Spain and so our ignorance also is great.

The Carthaginians maintained their command of the sea (until chal-
lenged by Rome), but they appear for a time to have lost their grip on
southern Spain. If the fate of an empire can depend on a single preposi-
tion they will have lost all their influence, since Polybius (11. 1.6) records
that in 237 Hamilcar Barca ‘set about recovering ( dveKraro ) the
Carthaginian possessions in Iberia’. The date and extent of this diminu-
tion of power cannot be determined. Perhaps Andalusia successfully
asserted her independence during the First Punic War, but Gades seems
to have remained in Punic hands, since when Hamilcar sailed there we
hear of no resistance. The loss of the Spanish mines in particular was a
severe blow and is reflected in the debased quality of the silver coins that
Carthage issued during her first war with Rome. But it may be that often
too strong a contrast is drawn, and that in the earlier centuries southern
Spain should not be regarded as part of a Carthaginian empire, still less as
an epikrateia in the sense of a province, but rather as a sphere of influence
or a protectorate, while the word ‘empire’ is first really applicable only to
the military conquest by the Barcids.

II. HAMILCAR AND HASDRUBAL

When the First Punic War ended Hamilcar Barca remained undefeated in
Sicily and was then given full powers by the Carthaginian government to
negotiate a peace settlement with Rome. During the subsequent war
against the rebellious mercenaries in Africa he won the confidence of the
army and overshadowed his political rival, Hanno the Great, although
the latter had a share in the final success. According to the annalistic
tradition they then conducted a joint campaign against the Numidians,
but Hamilcar’s political intrigues led to a threat of impeachment which
he averted by leading his army to Spain without the authority of
Carthage. This alleged charge against Hamilcar, which is not recorded by
Polybius, should be rejected as part of the anti-Barcid tradition. 5 The

5 See Appian, Hisp. 4-5. 15-18, Hartn. 2.3-4; Diod. Sic. xxv.8; Ncpos, Ham. 2.5. This account of
Hamilcar’s activities is regarded by De Sanctis 1907-64, in. i. 3380. 16: (a 14), as a reduplication of a
temporary overshadowing of Hamilcar immediately after the end of the First Punic War. Cf.
Walbank 1957-69, 1.151: (b 38).

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

development of Hamilcar’s political rivalry with Hanno cannot be traced
in detail, but he had the support of Hasdrubal, a popular leader and his
own son-in-law, and as the Barca family seems to have been ‘new men’,
some personal and political clashes were probable. Hanno and his
supporters may well have wished to limit Carthaginian expansion to
Africa, but the idea that Hamilcar went to Spain against the wishes of the
Carthaginian government must be rejected. The loss of Sicily and
Sardinia had weakened the economic life of the city; fresh sources of
minerals and manpower must be sought, and where better than in Spain
where they abounded? Such a move would not be likely to antagonize
Rome since Spain was far from her sphere of interest. No doubt
Hamilcar’s personality was the driving force that secured the adoption of
this policy, but it was certainly not carried against the wishes of a
majority of his fellow-citizens, and any opposition that existed would
soon be weakened when money and booty began to pour in from the
peninsula.

Equally suspect is the tradition that Hamilcar deliberately planned to
build up Punic power in Spain as the first step towards a war of revenge
against Rome. True, this view is advanced by Polybius (hi. 9. 6-10.7),
who finds the three ai’rtat of the Hannibalic War in the wrath of
Hamilcar, the Roman seizure of Sardinia, and the success of the
Carthaginians in Spain. 6 The belief that Hamilcar decided to use Spain as
a base of operations against Rome (rather than merely as a means of
compensating for recent Carthaginian losses) gains some support in the
story that before setting out for Spain Hamilcar, after sacrificing to Zeus
(Baal), asked his nine-year-old son Hannibal whether he wanted to go on
this expedition with him, and when the boy eagerly agreed he bade him
take an oath at the altar that he would never be the friend of Rome
(lirjSeTTOTe 'Pat^alois ewor/aeiv). The story was later told by Hannibal
himself to Antiochus III of Syria, and (by whatever channels it ultimately
reached Polybius) there is no good ground to reject it. Rather, its
negative form should be noted: ‘not to be well disposed to’ is very

6 According to Fabius Pictor (Polyb. in. 8), the causes of the Hannibalic War were the attack on
Saguntum by Hannibal and the ambition of Hasdrubal (Hamilcar’s son-in-law) which led him to
govern Spain independently of the Carthaginian government, as did Hannibal later; thus Fabius
blames not Hamilcar but his successor Hasdrubal (for his love of power) and Hannibal (for his attack
on Saguntum). This anti-Barcid Fabian view may derive from the attempted self-justification of
those Carthaginians who, after the war had been lost, tried to blame Hannibal and Hasdrubal for
having caused it (and it would gain favour when in 195 the anti-Barcid party were plotting to exile
Hannibal). Polybius rejects Fabius’ view (including his suggestion of Hannibal’s independence of
Carthage) and pushes the causes of the war further back to the time of Hamilcar. He also (in. 6. iff.)
records that ‘some authors who have dealt with Hannibal’s activities’ (probably the second-century
senatorial historians at Rome) alleged that the causes of the war were Hannibal’s attack on Saguntum
and his crossing the FLbro; but Polybius regarded these episodes as merely the beginnings (dpx° 0 »
not the causes (airt'at) of the war.

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HAMILCAR AND HASDRUBAL

different from the oath of eternal enmity which the later tradition records
(e.g. aoveioTos exOpos or hostis ). 1 Whatever Polybius may have thought,
an attempt to re-establish Punic influence in the western Mediterranean
was not necessarily the same as planning a war of revenge against Rome,
a view for which Hamilcar’s subsequent conduct in Spain supplies little
evidence.

To whatever extent Punic power in southern Spain had been lost, the
Carthaginians decided to regain, consolidate and extend it. Gades was
still in their hands and thither Hamilcar Barca sailed in 237, taking young
Hannibal and his son-in-law Hasdrubal with him. In the course of the
next nine years (until 229) he proceeded to conquer or reconquer
southern and south-eastern Spain, but Polybius gives little detail of his
campaigns: ‘he reduced many Iberian tribes by war or diplomacy to
obedience to Carthage [not, be it noted, to himself] and died in a manner
worthy of his great achievements’ (n. 1.6-8). Diodorus (xxv.10.1-4)
adds more: Hamilcar defeated the Iberians, Tartessians and some Celts
and incorporated 3,000 survivors into his own army; he then routed an
army of 50,000 men, tortured the captured commander but released
10,000 prisoners. He founded a large city which he called Akra Leuke
from its situation. While besieging Helike he sent most of his army and
his elephants to winter in Akra Leuke, but was tricked by a false offer of
friendship by the king of the Orissi who had come to help the besieged.
He was routed, but in his flight he saved the lives of his sons, Hannibal
and Hasdrubal: he diverted the pursuit by plunging on horseback into a
large river where he perished. Akra Leuke is usually located at modern
Alicante, and Helike at modern Elche (ancient Uici). This identification
has, however, been questioned on the ground that Hamilcar would
hardly have founded Akra Leuke at Alicante which is only some 12 km
north-east of Elche while the latter was still unconquered, nor would he
have leap-frogged past Cartagena which was a much stronger position
than Alicante (although it should be noted that we do not know whether
he was seeking the best possible harbour or a reasonably good site as far
north as possible). Further, the Orissi lived in the area of Castulo on the
upper Baetis. Thus, it has been argued, Akra Leuke should be placed in
this mining area in the interior. If this view is accepted, it would mean
that Hamilcar had not advanced further north along the coast than the
old Punic ‘frontier’ at Cartagena, which had been mentioned in the
second treaty with Rome in 348 (Polyb. m.24.4). The question must

7 Appian, Hisp. 9.34; Livy xxi.1.4. Errington 1970, (c 15), in rejecting ‘the wrath of the
Barcids’ as a cause of the Hannibalic War, argues that this view was part of an oral tradition (it was
not in Fabius or Silenus) which circulated in Rome about the time of Polybius. He is inclined to
accept the basic fact of Hannibal’s oath (unless the story was invented by Hannibal himself in order
to persuade Antiochus of his genuine hostility to Rome), but agrees with those who believe that in
any case it isevidencc only for Hannibal’s hatred of Rome and not for Hamilcar’s intentions in Spain.

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

remain open unless fairly secure sites can be established for Akra Leuke
and Helike in the Castulo area. 8

The Romans took little interest in these events in Spain until, accord-
ing to one writer alone (Dio Cassius xn.fr. 48; a damaged text), in 231
they sent ambassadors to investigate. Hamilcar received them courteous-
ly and neatly explained that he was fighting the Iberians to get money to
pay off the remainder of his country’s war-debt to Rome; the Romans
were left somewhat nonplussed. This episode should not be dismissed on
the ground that, because the Carthaginians had agreed in 241 to pay their
indemnity in ten years, their obligations were completed in 2 3 1 , since we
do not know how the extra indemnity imposed in 237 after the cession of
Sardinia was to be paid: ten annual instalments seem more probable than
a lump sum. How the story reached Dio is uncertain: it was not in
Polybius (and therefore presumably not in Fabius), but it could derive
from Silenus via Coelius; indeed, since it involved a rebuff to Rome it is
more likely to have been recorded by Silenus than by Fabius. But
whether true or false, it should not be used to suggest any keen Roman
interest in Spain at this date, since Dio expressly states the contrary:
p.-q 8 ev fxr)8e7T0i> t<1)v 'IfirjptKojv a<f>iai TTpooTjKOvrujv . 9 If true, however, it
points to Massilian rather than any Roman concern. Massilia had long
been a friend of Rome, at least from early in the fourth century; later this
friendship was sealed in a formal alliance, probably between the First and
Second Punic Wars, possibly earlier but certainly before 218. Now
Massilia had commercial links with the Spanish tribes, especially through
her trading colonies in Emporion, Alonis (near Benidorm), Rhode and
Hemeroscopium (near Denia), the last of which, originally a Phocaean
settlement, was some fifty miles north of Alicante; she would not
welcome the prospect of Carthaginian expansion northwards. Rome’s
interest in Massilia was not commercial (indeed it was Rome’s lack of
overseas trading interests that made her so acceptable a friend to
Massilia), but rather as a source of information about the Gauls whose
threatening movements were giving Rome increasing anxiety from 237
onwards. Conflicts with the Ligurians and a thrust by the Boii against
Ariminum (236), not to mention troubles in Sardinia and Corsica, forced
Rome to consider the defences of her northern frontier. Massilia was in

8 For the rejection of the identification of Akra Leuke with Alicante: Sumner 1967, 2o8ff.: (c 56),
who tentatively suggests Urgao (quae s\lba cognominatur. Plin. HN iii.io) between Cordoba and
Castulo, and for Ilici he suggests l(n)lucia in Oretanis ( Livy xxxv.7.7). These seem possible, but what
then was the ancient name of Alicante?

9 It has been accepted by the majority of modern scholars, but rejected by Holleaux 1921, 125: (d
53), and recently by Errington 1970, 32/f.: (c 1 5), though not by Sumner 1967, 2oj/f.: (c j6). Badian
1958, 48: (a }), and Hoffmann 195 1,69^.: (c 25), are agnostic. Two differing views of Roman policy
towards Spain are given by Errington, who believes that ‘it was directed by nothing more potent
than apathy’ (p. 26), and Sumner, who thinks that it was ‘entirely concerned witli the curbing of
Carthaginian expansion 5 though Roman interest in Spain was ‘not strong or sustained 5 (p. 243).

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2 5

an excellent position to provide Rome with news of current movements
and would be glad if Rome cleared the Tyrrhenian Sea of pirates. She may
well therefore have drawn her friend’s attention to the activities of their
potential common enemy in southern Spain in 231, as she almost
certainly did in 226. If so, Rome could scarcely refuse the token gesture of
sending an embassy to Hamilcar. Spain may have lain far beyond the
practical limits of Rome’s political horizon and Carthage was weak, but
some Roman senators at least may have thought it prudent to keep a
weather-eye open, even though the stories that Carthage was trying to
stir up trouble for Rome in Sardinia are almost certainly later annalistic
inventions. 10

Hamilcar had laid a solid base for a Carthaginian empire in Spain. His
personal position, as a colonial governor, accepted by the home-govern-
ment, was vice-regal. His increasing success is emphasized by the coinage
which he minted at Gades. At first he could issue only debased billon
coins and some bronze, but before long he had acquired sufficient wealth
by mining and plunder to enable him to issue a coinage of fine silver,
together with some gold and bronze; these mostly copied normal
Carthaginian types, though the gold boldly displays a head of Greek
Victory, while the execution of the bronze varies between very good and
crude. It was reserved for his son Hannibal to place the father’s portrait in
the guise of Heracles-Melkart on the magnificent silver issued later at
New Carthage. 11

At some point the Iberian city of Saguntum made an alliance with
Rome, doubtless not without some Massilian prompting or co-oper-
ation. Some of those scholars who accept the Roman embassy to
Hamilcar in 23 1 also place this new concordat in this year. 12 The precise
date is of less importance than whether it fell before or after the ‘Ebro
treaty’ of 226, since this inter-relationship vitally affects the whole
tradition regarding the causes of and responsibility for the Second Punic
War. A terminus ante quem of 220 is implied by Polybius in. 14.10; in
another passage (in. 30.1), he is unfortunately vague and merely places
the alliance ‘several years before Hannibal’s time’ (nXilooiv ereair 17877

10 Zon. vii. 1 8; Eutropius 11.2.2; Orosius iv.12.2 {Sardinia insula rebellavit, auctoribus Poenis). This
tradition is rejected by Meyer 1924, 11.385-6 and 387 n. 2: (c 37). Nor should the closing and speedy
re-opening of the temple of Janus (traditionally in 23 5) be connected with a renewed Roman fear of
Punic intrigues, as is argued by Norden 19 1 5, 53^.: (b 24). He probably rightly applies Ennius’ lines
* post qua m Disco rdia taetra Belli ferratos postes portasque ref re gif to this event, but it does not follow that
Ennius saw a Carthaginian threat arising as early as 235. In any case the Janus incident, through a
confusion between T. Manlius Torquatus {cos. 235) and A. Manlius {cos. 241), may belong rather to
24 1 and apply to the end of the First Punic War and the revolt of Falerii. See further: Meyer 1924,
11.389: (c 37);Fraenkel 1945, !2ff.:(H 1 79); Timpanaro 1948, s flf. : ( b 37); Latte 1960, 132 m 3: (h 205).

11 See Robinson 1956, 34ff.: (b 130) and n. 37 below.

12 E.g. Taubler 1921, 44: (c 58); Schnabel 1920, 11 1: (c 52); Otto 1932, 498: (c 40); Ocrtcl 1932,
22 iff.: (c 39); Gelzer 1933, 156: (h 45).

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26 THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

TTporepov tu>v kclt ’Avvtfiav xaipiov), which could mean either before
Hannibal became commander in 221, or before he had dealings with
Saguntum, or before the Hannibalic War. But the exact meaning of this
phrase is of little importance, since Polybius is clearly saying ‘some time
before 221— 2 19’. The crucial problem is whether nXetoatv ereai. refers to a
time before or after 226, the year of the Ebro treaty. Since Rome was
involved with a Gallic invasion in 225/4 and is unlikely to have con-
cerned herself with Spanish affairs then, the Saguntine alliance probably
fell in or before 226 or else in 223/2. In favour of a date after 226 is
Polybius’ remark (11. 13.3) that the Romans took an interest in Spain only
after the treaty. 13 On the other hand Polybius as we shall see, refers to
later Roman intervention in Saguntum as a short time (/l uk/joi? xpovcns)
before 220/19. 1 ° vlew of the contrast between piKpois and rrXeiooi it
seems difficult to refer the latter to a period as recent as 223/2 for the
Saguntine alliance, though some scholars accept this: 14 a date earlier than
226 may seem preferable.

However, not only the date but also the nature of this agreement with
Saguntum is controversial. For long it was regarded as a full formal
treaty, a foedus , but this makes it difficult to understand Rome’s later
delay in going to Saguntum’s aid during its protracted siege by Hannibal
in 219: could Rome have neglected her formal legal obligations for so
long? All that Polybius actually says (m.30.1) is that the Saguntines had
placed themselves in the pistis ( =fides) of the Romans, as proof of which
he advances the fact that atthe time of an internal dispute they sought the
arbitration of Rome and not of Carthage. A deditio in fidem imposed no
legal obligations on Rome and left her free to decide how to react to any
future requests for help. Thus earlier during the Mercenary War Utica, in
rebellion against Carthage, had asked for Rome’s help, though in vain.
When Saguntum appealed, Rome may well have thought it was wise to
have a foothold in Spain which committed her to nothing beyond her
own wishes, and if the initiative came from Saguntum, it is easier to
explain Rome’s otherwise somewhat strange commitment. Indeed it has

13 Heichelheim 1954, 2 1 1 ff.: (c 24), argued for a later date on the supposition that the Saguntine
coinage was influenced by the Roman victoriatc and by Massiliotc types which were later than 226.
But this argument is weakened now that the issue of victoriates has been shown to start only c. 2 1 1
rather than soon after 229: see Crawford 1974, 7#., 22#., 2 8fT. : (b 88). Thus the Saguntine silver may
also date only from the period of the Roman recovery of the city in 211. However, the assumption of
the priority of the victoriatc may be wrong and it may even be of Spanish origin and based on the
early Saguntine silver: cf. Hill 1931, 120 (b 96); Crawford considers (p. 33) that one early victoriate
(his no. 96) was issued by Cn. or P. Scipio in Spain before 21 1. Further, the remarkable Saguntine
coin (H ill, pi. 21, no. 1 2), bearing a head of Heracles, is obviously influenced by the Barcid silver; it
would seem therefore to belong to the period of Punic occupation (2 1 9-2 1 2), and it is significant that
its weight corresponds to that of the victoriatc standard (3.41 g; cf. Hill, p. 121). Jenkins, however,
would date it in the early to mid second century (SNG Copenhagen: Spain and Gaul (1979), nos. 25 1-5),
but why should the Saguntines have revived a Barcid type then?

u E.g. Reid 1913: (c 45); Badian 1958, 48#., 92—3: (a 3).

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HAMILCAR AND HA 5 DRUBAL 27

even been argued that the Saguntines came into Roman fides in some less
formal way than by a strict deditio. In any case, if there was no foedus ,
Rome incurred moral, but no legal, obligations. Provided that the word
ovfj.fj.axoi, which Polybius applies to the Saguntines, does not necessarily
presuppose a foedus, then a deditio is likely. 15

Hamilcar was succeeded in the governorship ( orpaTrfyla ) of Spain by
his son-in-law and admiral, Hasdrubal, who was first chosen by the
troops and afterwards received confirmation of his appointment from
the people of Carthage (Diod. Sic. xxv.i 2). Fabius Pictor (Polyb. 111.8.2)
believed that Hasdrubal’s love of power was one of the causes of the
Hannibalic War and records that after he had acquired great Svvaoreia in
Spain he crossed to Carthage and tried to overthrow the constitution and
establish a monarchy, but the leading politicians united to force his
return to Spain, where he then governed without any regard to the
Senate at Carthage. This attempted coup will fall soon after Hasdrubal’s
appointment to Spain in 226 if Bvvaoreta means his command ( imperium )
as it probably does, or else later in his governorship if the word means ‘a
great empire’. But the story is doubtful and could have arisen from the
fact that on one occasion after 237 Hasdrubal had already been sent back
to Carthage to crush a Numidian uprising. 16 However, if Hasdrubal’s
monarchic attempt be questioned, the story may reflect something of the
political and constitutional tensions that had been emerging during the
Mercenary War when the election to a supreme military command had
already been left to the army. In the famous chapter (vi.51) in which
Polybius compares the constitutions of Rome and Carthage, he observes
that just before the outbreak of the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian
constitution was weakening because the function of deliberation was
shifting from the Council to the people. 17 The nature of these political
reforms and popular movements escapes us, but they may reflect the
power of the Barcid faction. The anti-Barcid tradition has clearly exag-
gerated the ambitions of this group in depicting their leaders in Spain as
completely independent rulers, and it may be in this hostile context that
Hasdrubal’s alleged coup should be placed.

On assuming his command in Spain Hasdrubal first avenged

15 No foedus-. Reid 1913, 1 79fff: (c 45); Badian 1938, 49fT., 293: (a 3); Errington 1970, 4 iff.: (c 13).
Deditio : Dorey 1959, 2-3, 6-7: (c 13). No formal deditio : Astin 1967, 5 89fF. : (c 2). Polybius (1.40.1)
docs applv ovunaxoi to the people of Panormus, though it was a civitas libera (Badian 1958, 293: (a
3)), but in a general military rather than a legal context, while he applies the word to Saguntum
(nr. 1 5.8, 2 1. 5) in a context of legal obligation. Polybius of course may not have fully understood the
position. But non liquet.

16 Diod. Sic. xxv. to. 3. So De Sanctis 1907-64, m.i. 409 n. 5 5: (a 14). ButTaublcr 1921,711(0 58),
accepts both episodes and thinks the account told by Polybius (Fabius) represents an attempt by
Hasdrubal to seize the orparrjyia of Africa which Hamilcar had held during the Mercenary War.

17 Polyb. vt. 5 1.6. See Pocchl 1936, 6 iff.: (h 19); cf. Brink and Walbank 1954, 1 17-18: (b 2), and
W'albank 1957-79, 1*734: (b 38).

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

Hamilcar’s death by a punitive expedition against the Orissi which took
him to the upper Guadiana. The extension of his control enabled him
ultimately, it is said (Diod. Sic. xxv. 1 2), to increase his forces to 60,000
infantry, 8,000 cavalry and 200 elephants, but he also strengthened his
position by diplomacy. He married an Iberian princess, established good
personal relations with many of the chiefs, and moved his headquarters
from Akra Leuke to Mastia, where he founded Carthago Nova
(Cartagena) on a peninsula which commanded a fine harbour; here his
communications with Africa were easy and there were rich silver mines
close by. In the new city on a hill (Monte Molinete), commanding the
entrance to a lagoon, he built himself a fine palace and his power was
certainly vice-regal. It is possible that, like a Hellenistic monarch, he even
issued silver coins with a diademed portrait of himself and on the reverse
a Punic warship. If so, he was the first of the Punic commanders in Spain
to make so bold a proclamation, but the coins may well have been issued
later by Hannibal’s brother, Mago, and thus it would be safer not to use
them as evidence for Hasdrubal’s regal pretensions. 18 However, he
certainly consolidated and extended the Carthaginian hold over Spain,
before he was killed in 22 1 by a Celt who had a personal grudge (or else by
an Iberian slave who was avenging his own master). 19 He had probably
not reached as far north as the Ebro, but this river became the central
point of negotiations which he carried out with the Romans at their
request.

Late in 226 the Romans ‘sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty
(avvdrjKas) in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the
Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms {e-nl TroXifjuo)’. Such
is Polybius’ meagre statement (hi. 15.7) about an episode which has
provoked much discussion both in antiquity and among modern schol-
ars. It will be best to consider Polybius’ view first, unencumbered by the
allegations of later writers, since their accounts are often confused by
propaganda and misunderstanding arising from recriminations about
the dispute over Saguntum and the causes of the Hannibalic War. 20

18 This rare issue is attributed by Robinson 1956, 37-8: (b i 30), to Hasdrubal and a mint at New
Carthage, but the distribution of the finds (two from Seville and one each from Malaga, Granada and
Ibiza, with none from the three large hoards of Barcid coins discovered near Cartagena) suggests the
likelihood of a mint at Gadesand the attribution to Mago, who later campaigned in this area (at Ilipa
and the Balearic Islands). True, Hasdrubal had been trierarch to Hamilcar, but perhaps he would not
wish to express his earlier subordinate position. Mago too was involved in naval operations.

19 Celt: Polyb. 11.36.1. Iberian: Diod. Sic. xxv. 12 and Livy xxi.2.6, etc.

20 It is not possible here to refer to all the minor distortions and variations given in the
‘apologetic’ Roman annalistic tradition. Only the main differences from the better tradition will be
mentioned. The historical fact of the treaty is accepted here despite the doubts expressed by Cuff
1973, 1 6 3 ff - : (c 10), who is inclined to dismiss it as a fabrication of Roman propaganda, whose
purpose will have depended on its date, ranging from 220 to provide a formal ground for hostilities
or a deterrent to aggression, to second-century Catonian propaganda.

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HAMELCAR AND HASDRUBAL 29

First, the nature of the contract. It was clearly negotiated between
Hasdrubal and a senatorial commission, but was it accepted by the
Carthaginian and Roman states? In later arguments the Carthaginians
refused to discuss it, denying either its existence or their ratification of it
(Polyb. in. 21. i); the Romans in reply brushed aside the question of
ratification but bluntly underlined the fact that Hasdrubal had made the
treaty (opoAoyias) with full authority (avToreXcos: 111.29.3). If the
Carthaginians had granted Hasdrubal such authority, they may have
done so for convenience and in good faith, but it was in fact a useful
device by which they could later repudiate any such agreement (a trick
which the Romans themselves often used later in Spain when the Senate
repudiated agreements made by Roman generals, such as Hostilius
Mancinus, with Spanish tribes). The instrument may from the Carthag-
inian side have been a ‘covenanted’ form of oath ( berit ), a
unilateral pledge, given with or without conditions. The form of such an
understanding is revealed in the contract between Hannibal and Philip V
in 215, and differs from the earlier treaties between Rome and Carthage
which were bilateral agreements confirmed by the oaths of both parties.
E. J. Bickerman, who made this suggestion, 21 recalls how Laban set up a
pillar to delimit his and Jacob’s boundaries; neither should pass over the
mark ‘for harm’ and Jacob swore by the Pachad of his father Isaac
(Genesis 31.53). If this view is accepted, Hasdrubal’s agreement did not
bind the Carthaginian government, but the Romans may well not have
understood this practice. Since they themselves later insisted on regard-
ing it as a valid treaty, it must presumably have been ratified in Rome,
though the procedure can only be surmised. If it contained no corre-
sponding commitment on the part of Rome, there was nothing for the
Roman people to swear to, and it may have been transmitted to Rome in
the form of a statement by Hasdrubal concerning the negotiations and
his undertaking. The Roman commissioners presumably reported to the
Senate in writing or in person. Since the Senate regarded it as a binding
treaty, they may have ordered a copy (in bronze?) of Hasdrubal’s letter to
be lodged in the Roman Record Office for keeping with the copies of the
earlier treaties with Carthage. Thus some reliable information was
presumably available to Polybius when he investigated all the treaties
between the two states, and his factual statement of its content must be
accepted even if his interpretation may be questioned. 22

Polybius’ bare statement of the content, however, affords room for
much speculation. Has he given the complete text or only the part which
he considered relevant to his argument? Was there some quid pro quo,
either formal or informal, such as a reciprocal clause which limited

21 Bickerman 1952, iff. and esp. \ (c 5).

22 Cf. Errington 1970, 34ff.: (c 13), and for the lodging of treaties Scullard, CAH 2 vn.ii.

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

Roman activity south of the river (as recorded by Livy xxi.2 and Appian,
Hisp. 7.27, though in Harm. 2.6 and -L ib. 6.23 Appian follows Polybius in
giving only Hasdrubal’s obligation)? 23 Even if the undertaking was
given unilaterally by Hasdrubal, was it granted only conditionally? If
there was no formal reference to Spain south of the river in the agree-
ment, may not the Romans have unofficially assured Hasdrubal by a
gentleman’s agreement that they had no interest south of the river and
would not interfere there? And when the Carthaginians agreed not to
cross the Ebro in arms, was the ban purely military, with the implication
that they could cross for peaceful purposes into an area where Massilia
had active commercial interests? Such questions make it difficult to see
why both parties agreed to this rather strange arrangement. If Hasdrubal
had no actively hostile intentions against Rome and if his conquests were
still well to the south of the river, he presumably felt that a recognition by
Rome of a Carthaginian empire which might reach to the Ebro was a
satisfactory settlement, particularly if in fact he had no intention of trying
to incorporate the area between the Ebro and the Pyrenees.

Polybius’ explanation of Rome’s attitude seems to combine truth and
error. He says (11.13.3-6) that the Romans suddenly woke up to
Hasdrubal’s increasing power, but were at the moment unwilling to
challenge this because of the threat of a Gallic invasion of Italy; they
therefore decided to conciliate him while they dealt with the menace to
their northern frontier. The falsity of this explanation is the implication
that Hasdrubal was becoming a threat to Rome: this is part of the
propaganda story of ‘the wrath of the Barcids’, and there is no evidence
that he was plotting with the Gauls. On the other hand the Romans were
facing a crisis which culminated in the Gallic invasion of Italy and its
repulse at Telamon in 225. At such a time the Romans might be thought
not to want to bother about Hasdrubal unless they had any reason to
regard him as an urgent threat. But there was another interested party,
namely Massilia, who, if the Roman embassy of 231 is accepted, had
already jogged Rome’s elbow about events in Spain. In 226 the position
was more urgent for both Massilia and Rome. Massilia had more to fear
in Spain, where Hasdrubal was consolidating a powerful empire on the
foundations laid by Hamilcar, and Rome, faced by a more serious menace
from the Gauls, could not afford to offend Massilia. Thus, although no

23 Heichelhcim 1954, 217#. (c 24), accepts the clause in App. Hisp. -j.z-j that bound the Romans
not to attack the tribes south of the river (fiT)T€ ’Pwfiaiovs rot? 1 repav rouSc rou 7rora^ou noXcfiov
€K(j>€p€Lv) because he detects a Semitism in this phrase which derived, he believes, from the
original Punic text. Badian 1980, 1641(0 3), accepts Polybius’ denial that any concessions made by the
Romans were connected with Spain: rather they might concern trading concessions or remission of
the indemnity.

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HAMILCAR AND HASDRUBAL JI

ancient source specifically says so, it was almost certainly Massilian
pressure on Rome that led her to send the embassy in 226.

The choice of, and agreement upon, the Ebro as a limit for Hasdrubal
has also caused surprise. Why was a river so far north chosen, when the
Massiliotes obviously would want to keep him as far south as possible
and to maintain control over as many of their coastal colonies as they
could? Some scholars have been so puzzled by this point that they have
supposed that the Hiberus of the treaty was not the Ebro but another
river of the same name further south, but the attempt to substitute the
Jucar (of which the usual ancient name was Sucro) can be considered to
have failed, while the hunt for a Hiberus among the streams around Cabo
de la Nao is very speculative. 24 It must be supposed that the Ebro was
agreed as the result of some hard bargaining and a compromise. If the
Romans really did not consider Hasdrubal a potential menace to them-
selves, they might have been content to agree to the Pyrenees as a line of
demarcation, though in the interest of general security they would no
doubt like to keep him at arm’s length. But on behalf of their Massiliote
friends they had to press for a line as far south as possible. If Hasdrubal
insisted on the Ebro, they had at least won security for Massilia’s most
northerly colonies at Emporion (Ampurias) and Rhode (Rosas). An
unknown factor is how far northwards Hamilcar’s power did in fact
stretch. It is generally assumed to have been confined to the south of say
Cabo de la Nao; if so, Hasdrubal won a considerable concession by
receiving implicit agreement to his expansion to the Ebro. On the other
hand he may well have already been probing north of Alicante in
sufficient strength to suggest a growing interest in this wider area, which
included Saguntum. This city cannot have been mentioned in the treaty
in the light of Polybius’ explicit statement that southern Spain was not
referred to. Naturally if Rome had not at this time accepted the friendship
of Saguntum, no specific reference would be relevant, whereas if the
friendship had been formed before the Ebro treaty, Saguntum’s position
must have been passed over in tactful silence in the agreement itself
whatever may have been said unofficially in the preceding discussion.
The status of the city became a burning issue only when it was threatened
by Hannibal: it was then soon enveloped by a confusing cloud of
propaganda which has distorted the later tradition by asserting either
that it was included in the Ebro treaty or else that the city lay north of the
river, beyond the limit set in the treaty.

24 Jucar: Carcopino i9S5:(c7)and 1961, 1 8fT.: (a i i). Rejected by Walbank 1957-79,1.171: (b $8)
and id. JRS 5 1 (1961) 228-9; Cassola 1962, 250: (h 55), and Sumner 1967, 222ft.: (c 56). Sumner,
however, though rejecting Carcopino, has sought a Hiberus in the vicinity of Cabo de la Nao ( 1 967,
228ft.).

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

3 2

III. HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM

On the death of Hasdrubal in 221 the army in Spain enthusiastically
conferred the command on Hannibal, now aged twenty-five, and this
appointment was quickly confirmed by the Carthaginian government by
a unanimous vote (fju a yvwiirj): Polybius thus emphasizes (ill. 13.4),
against the view of Fabius Pictor, the support that Hannibal received in
Carthage. But Hannibal, who had enjoyed Hasdrubal’s confidence in
Spain, reverted to the more warlike policy of his father, although he
followed Hasdrubal’s example of marrying a Spaniard, a princess from
Castulo. There is no good reason to suppose that Hannibal was at this
moment determined on war with Rome: he was following Hamilcar’s
policy of empire-building in Spain itself. He at once launched an attack
on the Olcades who lived around the upper Guadiana (Anas) and
captured their chief city, Althaea. 25 After wintering in New Carthage he
turned in 220 against the highland tribes of the central plateau and
advanced northwards over the Sierra Morena on a line later taken by the
Roman road via Emerita (Merida) to Salmantica (Salamanca). He de-
feated the Vaccaei, captured Salamanca and reached theDouro, where he
successfully besieged Arbacala (modern Toro). 26 Plutarch tells how after
the surrender of Salamanca on the terms that all the free population
should leave, wearing only one garment apiece, the women managed to
smuggle out some arms and then pass them to their menfolk, who
succeeded in fighting their way to freedom. However, though they were
ultimately rounded up, Hannibal, impressed by the courage of the
women, restored the town to the inhabitants. From this northerly point
he then turned south, taking a more easterly route than on his approach,
through the territory of the Carpetani and neighbouring tribes who faced
him in battle at the Tagus near Toledo. Soon after he had crossed the
river he found the enemy were close behind him, so he doubled back
northwards and faced his opponents as they tried to get across. His
cavalry caught some of the Spaniards in the river itself, while his forty

25 So Polyb. in. 1 j. 5 ; Li vy (xxi. 5 .4) names the town Cartala. Both historians derive their accounts
of Hannibal’s Spanish campaigns from a common source, probably Silenus who accompanied
Hannibal, though Livy used an intermediary, probably Coclius Antipater. In opposition to the usual
location of Althaea, Gomez 1951, (c 19), places it at Aldaya some 22 km north of Valencia and
25 km from the coast.

26 Polybius (in. 14. 1) gives ’ EXpavTiK-q and * Ap^ovKaXt); Livy (xxi.5.6) gives Hermandica and
Arbocala. Plutarch (Mor. 248e= Polyaenus vu.48) gives a fuller account of the capture of
EaX^LariK-q, which he derived perhaps from Hannibal’s other companion chronicler, Sosylus, since
the form of the name differs from that in Polybius ( = Silenus?). Clearly Salamanca is meant. Gomez
195 1, jjff.: (c 19), however, removes Hannibal’s campaigns from central Spain and believes that he
was conquering the area behind Saguntum. He places Eimantica and Arbacala near Chclva, which
lies some 60 km west of Valencia, and the battle of the Tagus ( = the Valencian Tajo) a little further
east.

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HANNIBAL AND SACUNTUM

elephants patrolled the bank and trampled to death the others as they
endeavoured to struggle out. He then re-crossed the river himself and
routed the whole surviving force, whether or not they numbered the
100,000 attributed to them. 27 Central Spain was thus conquered and
although the loyalty of the V accaei and Carpetani was guaranteed mainly
by the hostages that Hannibal held, and though the Celtiberians of the
upper Tagus and Douro and the Lusitanians were still unvanquished,
nevertheless Hannibal and his predecessors had won a vast empire from
which they could draw immense supplies of manpower and mineral
wealth.

Hannibal’s next move was not to plan an attack upon Italy, but to
expand his empire up to the Ebro, as the Romans had allowed Hasdrubal
to contemplate. But there was one overriding difficulty: Saguntum,
where a clash of Punic and Roman interests had flared up. It was an
Iberian city of the Arsetani, as the Iberian character of its coinage shows,
though the Romans might believe that its name indicated that it was a
colony of Greek Zacynthos. However, it shared one weakness of Greek
cities: it suffered from stasis in a clash of policy between pro-Roman and
pro-Punic factions. An episode led to the need for external arbitration
and, though the Carthaginians were close at hand, the pro-Roman party
naturally turned to their Roman allies. A settlement followed in which
‘some of the leading men’ (that is, leaders of the pro-Punic faction) were
put to death. Polybius gives no details of the cause of this episode beyond
attributing to Hannibal, in a subsequent report which he sent to Car-
thage, the complaint that the Saguntines (i.e. of course the pro-Roman
faction), relying on their Roman alliance, were wronging some of the
peoples subject to Carthage (Polyb. hi. 1 5 .8). For more detail we have to
rely on later authors. Appian ( Hisp . 10.36-38) names the wronged tribe
as the (otherwise unknown) Torboletae (the Turdetani, given by Livy
xxi. 6. 1, are too far from Saguntum; possibly the Edetani are meant).
He alleges that the incident was provoked by Hannibal, who persuaded
the Torboletae to complain to him that they were being attacked by the
Saguntines; when the latter insisted that Rome rather than Hannibal
himself should be the arbitrator, he used their rebuff as an excuse to
attack the city. Whatever be thought of Hannibal’s part in provoking the
episode, the factor which led the Saguntines to ask for Roman arbitration
was clearly a quarrel with a neighbouring tribe which, if not settled
quickly, might, so they feared, have serious consequences.

Polybius dates this episode ‘a short time before’ (/aotpofs efxTrpoadev

27 Polyb. in. 14. 5-8. Livy’s account (xxi. 5. 8- 1 6), though probably deriving from the same source
as Polybius, is confused and has misunderstood the movements of the armies. See Walbank 195 7-79,
1.318: (b 38). The attempt by Meyer 1924, ir.403 n. 1: (c 37) to reconcile the two versions is hardly
conclusive.

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

Xpovois) the events of the winter of 220/19 which he is describing
(nr. 1 5.7). It should therefore be placed not earlier than 221 and it should
not be regarded as the occasion of Rome’s first alliance with Saguntum.
This original agreement had been made, as we have seen, several years
(7rAetoCTi erecu) before Hannibal’s time, as Polybius states when he reverts
to Saguntine affairs in a later chapter (30.1). In this latter passage
Polybius is referring back to the arbitration episode of 15.7 when he
records that the Saguntines in a state of stasis (araaiaaauTes) turned for
arbitration to the Romans rather than to the Carthaginians, although the
latter were ‘quite near’ (iyyuso vrtuv). The proximity of the Carthaginians
again suggests that the incident was recent (e.g. 221 or 220). To sum up,
Polybius seems to believe that many years before 220/19 (whether earlier
or later than the Ebro treaty of 226 he unfortunately does not specify)
Saguntum had made an alliance with Rome, and relying on this agree-
ment had appealed to Roman arbitration in c. 22 1 /20 at a time of internal
stasis, and as a result some leading Saguntines were put to death.

The subsequent course of events is difficult to determine amid much
misunderstanding and misrepresentations by the ancient sources.
Polybius records that in the past the Saguntines had sent frequent
messages to Rome (auvexcDj): as allies, they duly kept Rome informed of
any developments in Spain. But the Romans had paid little attention until
they acted as arbitrators in the Saguntine stasis-, in 220 a message arrived
which induced them to send an embassy to investigate and to meet
Hannibal when he returned to his winter quarters at New Carthage after
his very successful campaign. If the arbitration can be placed as late as
220, it could have been handled by these ambassadors on their way to
New Carthage, 28 but it perhaps falls better into 221. At any rate the
Romans were at last stirred to confront Hannibal in person: according to
Polybius (rrr.15.5) they requested him to keep his hands off Saguntum
(ZaKavdaicov anexeadai), which was protected by their fides (nioTis), and
not to infringe Hasdrubal’s treaty by crossing the Ebro. Since the main
issue was Hannibal’s attitude to Saguntum which lay 100 miles south of
the river, it would have been needlessly offensive of the Roman ambassa-
dors to have brought the Ebro into the discussion, and Polybius is
probably wrong in saying that they did. His error, if such it be, could
have arisen from a false transference to the negotiations in 220 of a similar
request made at Carthage in 218 (see below); it is less likely that he was
confused by the later annalistic tradition which, in an attempt to brand
Hannibal as a treaty-breaker, falsely linked his attack on Saguntum with
his crossing of the Ebro by the barefaced placing of the city to the north

28 Cf. Sumner 1967, 232#.: (c 56). Livy, Appian and Zonaras place the Roman embassy in 219
after Hannibal had started to besiege Saguntum, but Polybius’ date of the autumn-winter of 220/19
before the siege should be preferred.

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HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM

of the river (though some scholars do believe that in a later passage,
hi. 30. 3, he may for the moment confusedly have implied that Saguntum
was north of the river). But whatever the reason for Polybius’ slip, it is
better to eliminate any reference to the Ebro treaty in these earlier
discussions, the more so since Polybius himself records no reference to
this treaty in the reply of Hannibal, who confined himself to blaming the
Romans for interfering in Saguntum which they had seized treacher-
ously: TrapeaTTOvSrjfsevovs probably implies a breach of faith rather than
of a legal treaty, since it is difficult to establish that any formal treaty was
in fact broken. However, although the Ebro treaty contained no refer-
ence to southern Spain, Hasdrubal may have been led to believe that the
Romans had no intention of interfering there (see above pp. 29-30). On
the other hand, Hannibal knew very well that Saguntum was an ally of
Rome and that any threat to it would involve Rome’s concern. He there-
fore reported to Carthage that the Saguntines trusting in their Roman
alliance had attacked a tribe under Punic protection, and he sought
instructions. He received unanimous support, apart from the opposition
of Hanno (Livy xxi.ioff.), and was apparently given a free hand.
Polybius adds (in. 15.12) that the Roman envoys, who now believed that
war was inevitable, also went to Carthage to make the same protest there,
but the tradition of this visit is very confused and is open to question. 29

Hannibal would no longer tolerate Roman interference in an area
where they had apparently given his predecessor a free hand. Embittered
by the bullying to which Carthage had been subjected at the time of the
seizure of Sardinia, he determined not to see his country humiliated a
second time. In the spring of 219 he therefore advanced against
Saguntum as champion of the cause of his subjects, the wronged
Torboletae. Relying on help from Rome, the Saguntines refused to
surrender, but tragically for them no help came: although Rome’s
northern frontier had just been secured against Gallic threats, she was
involved with the Illyrians. The Senate was unwilling to face war on two
fronts, and decided to clear up the Adriatic, where Demetrius of Pharos
was attacking Illyrian cities which were under Roman protection. Thus
the two consuls of 219 were sent to Iilyricum, not to Spain. Saguntum lay
on a steep plateau about a mile from the coast (it is now some three miles
distant, owing to coastal changes); it ran for some 1,000 yards from east

29 Cic. Phil, v.27; Livy xxi.6.4ff., App. blisp. 11.40-45; Zon. vm.21. Confusion may have
arisen from a later Roman embassy to Carthage and also from a muddle between Carthago and
Carthago Nova. Sec Sumner 1967, z 3 8 ff . : (c 5 6), who also suggests that Livy’s unlikely account
(xx1.19.6ff.) of how the final Roman embassy to Carthage in 218 returned to Italy by way of Spain
and Gaul may be a false transference of the return of the ambassadors from New Carthage in 220/19
(on the assumption that they had not gone to Carthage itself). Livy’s whole account of the Saguntinc
affair is chronologically muddled, since he places the Saguntine embassy to Rome in 218 instead of
220. He himself tried to straighten out the general chronological confusion in xxr.15.5ff.

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56 THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

to west but was only some 120 yards wide. The weakest point in its
almost impregnable walls was at the western end; there was a slightly
more accessible approach just to the west of the citadel, and here
Hannibal concentrated his attack (as did Marshal Suchet in 181 1). The
blockade continued for eight months without thought of surrender,
though Hannibal was ready to offer relatively lenient terms. At one point
Hannibal himself left to overawe the Oretani and Carpetani who, an-
noyed at his severe levying of troops, had seized his recruiting officers
(Livy xxi. 1 1. 1 3). The siege continued relentlessly, however, and more
than heroism and desperation were needed to resist the assault indefi-
nitely: Saguntum fell in the late autumn of 219.

What happened when news of the fall of the city reached Rome is open
to doubt. According to Polybius (111.20.1—6) there was no senatorial
debate on the question of war (it had been agreed a year earlier, he adds,
that Carthaginian violation of Saguntine territory would be regarded as a
casus belli), and he dismisses as barber-shop gossip rather than history the
statements of Chaereas, Sosylus and other historians who recorded such
a debate. Rather, the Romans immediately ( napaxprjfj.a ) appointed am-
bassadors and sent them in haste (Kara arrov Sr/v) to Carthage to deliver
an ultimatum: either Hannibal and other Carthaginian leaders must be
handed over or else war would be declared. But Polybius can hardly be
accepted at his face-value. In the first place it is extremely unlikely that in
2 1 9 the Senate had agreed to regard an attack on Saguntine territory as a
casus belli. If it had done so, its inactivity throughout the whole siege and
the following winter until at the very earliest 15 March 218 (the first
possible date for the despatch of the final embassy to Carthage) is difficult
toexplain. True, both consuls of 2 19 became involved in the Adriatic and
it might not have been easy to switch some forces to the western
Mediterranean (though the war was effectively over by late June when
Pharos was captured). Since the consuls of 218 did not start for their
provinces until late August, there is a very long gap between Roman
words and Roman deeds. Behind Polybius’ statement may lie the fact that
many Roman senators, perhaps a majority, felt that an attack on
Saguntum might or should lead to war, but a clearcut vote for war in such
circumstances is not likely to have been taken in 219 even before
Hannibal advanced against Saguntum. Further, the sudden burst of
energy after months of allowing Saguntum to resist unaided, as reported
by Polybius, looks suspiciously like an attempt at self-justification. If
therefore the question of war had not been irrevocably decided by the
Senate in 219, and since senatorial opinion can hardly have been com-
pletely unanimous, some debate is likely on reception of news of the
city’s fall, and in fact such a debate is recorded by Dio Cassius (fr. 5 5.1-9;
Zon. vm. 22). This tradition appeared not only in pro-Carthaginian

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HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM

historians such as Sosylus but also (since Dio’s source is pro-Roman) in
the Roman annalistic accounts and could have reached him by way of a
writer such as Coelius Antipater. Livy may well have omitted to record
the debate either because he could not believe Rome could have hesitated
when once Saguntum had fallen or out of respect for Polybius’ criticism.

In the debate, according to Zonaras, L. Cornelius Lentulus, probably
the consul of 237, urged an immediate declaration of war and the sending
of one consul to Spain, the other to Africa, while Q. Fabius Maximus
counselled a more cautious approach and the despatch of an embassy.
Not only the debate, but even the names of the speakers may well be
historical facts: it is unnecessary to suppose that Dio’s source has
invented a Cornelius and a Fabius as prototypes of P. Cornelius Scipio
and Fabius Cunctator who later in the war urged an offensive and
defensive strategy respectively. Internal political differences in Rome
cannot be considered at length here, but the Cornelii may have been
eager to start the war as soon as it appeared inevitable (the Cornelii
Scipiones certainly pressed forward its vigorous prosecution later in
Spain and Africa), while it has been suggested that their political allies,
the Aemilii, stimulated by Massiliote pressure, had long urged the
checking of Punic aggrandizement in Spain, both in 23 1 and 226 (and the
Scipios, at any rate later, had personal links with the Massiliotes: nostri
clientes , Cic. Rep. 1 .43). 30 A more cautious policy was advocated by Fabius
who, while perhaps agreeing with the general opinion that Hannibal’s
activities constituted a ground for war, nevertheless wished to attempt
negotiations on the basis of disavowal of Hannibal by Carthage before
war was finally declared. 31 The prospects of success for such a move
might seem small, but some latent, if not open jealousy and opposition to
Hannibal must have survived at Carthage, and an appeal to Hanno and
the anti-Barcid faction might help to weaken the city’s resolve at so
critical a moment. At any rate Fabius may have thought so and personal
contacts may have provided him with the means to learn something of
current political feeling at Carthage, since he is said to have had a
paternum hospitium with the father of Carthalo who later commanded the
Punic garrison at Tarentum in 209 (Livy xxvn.16.5). Further, another
Fabius, the historian Pictor, took the anti-Barcid view (which Polybius
strenuously rejected) that Hasdrubal and Hannibal had been acting
independently of the Carthaginian government (see n. 6 above). This or
other possible debates probably involved discussion of the wider ques-
tion of the ultimate objective of Roman policy: was this to be limited to
crushing Hannibal and Punic power in Spain and then a negotiated
peace, or was it to aim at the destruction of Carthage as a Great Power? At
any rate Fabius’ attempt at compromise was finally accepted to the extent

30 Sec Kramer 1948: (c jo). 31 Fabius’ policy: Rich 1976, 109IT.: (H 10 ).

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that war should be declared only if Carthage refused to disavow
Hannibal. Five senatorial legati were sent to Carthage to convey the
ultimatum which Polybius wrongly asserted was despatched immedi-
ately after news of the fall ofSaguntum had reached Rome. If the Romans
had acted more speedily the war might have been fought in Spain or Gaul
rather than in Italy. The legation chosen was a weighty one: it was led
probably by M. Fabius Buteo rather than by Q. Fabius Maximus; 32 in 2 1 8
Buteo, the oldest living censorius, and perhaps the princeps senatus, had
greater authority than Fabius Maximus. He was accompanied by the two
consuls of 219, M. Livius Salinator and L. Aemilius Paullus, together
with C. Licinius (probably the consul of 236) and Q. Baebius Tamphilus,
one of the commissioners sent to Hannibal in 220.

The interval between the reception of the news of the fall of Saguntum
and the despatch of the embassy has been much debated: the longer the
delay, the less credit to the Senate. The extremes of the time-gap are 1 5
March 218 (the two consuls of 219 could not serve as legates until their
consulships had ended) and a date late in August when at last the consuls
for 218 left for their provinces. 33 One suggestion is that news of
Saguntum’s fall did not reach Rome until mid-February and the ulti-
matum was sent soon after 1 5 March, thus reducing the Senate’s delay to
about a month, while on another view the Senate normally regarded
itself as entitled to postpone wars until the new consuls entered office ( ad
novos consules). M On the other hand, a possible reason for placing the
despatch of the embassy late in this period between mid-March and late
August has been found in the puzzling insistence on the Ebro treaty by
the Roman embassy when it met the authorities in Carthage: Polybius
(in. 21. 1 ) says that the Carthaginians refused to discuss the treaty (on the
grounds that either it did not exist or else had not been made with their
approval) and therefore implies that the Romans wished to discuss it. But
why? It was not relevant since it was not violated by Hannibal’s attack on
Saguntum (the two were only linked in later misrepresentations which
placed the city north of the Ebro). It has therefore been suggested that
the embassy did not leave Rome until news came (in J une?) that Hannibal
had in fact crossed the Ebro probably in late May or early June. 35 On this

32 Fabius Buteo: Scullard 1973, 274: (h 34).

33 Calculations arc hampered by uncertainty about the state of the calendar. Thus the position
would be complicated if 218 happened to bean intercalary year, which is quite uncertain, or if in 218
the Roman calendar was a few weeks ahead or behind the Julian. See Sumner 1966, 12: (c 55);
Errington 1970, $4ff.: (c 15). Nor is it certain whether a trinundinum was obligatory between
promulgating a rogatio for war and voting on it: cf. Sumner 1966, 20: (c 5 5), and Rich 1976, 29: (h 20).

34 Sec respectively Astin 1967, 5 77fF-: (c 2), and Rich 1976, 2off., 28ff., to7ff.: (h 20).

35 See Hoffmann 1951, 77ff.: (c 25) (despite the objection that Polybius believed (m.37.1) that
news of the discussion in Carthage reached Hannibal just before he left New Carthage). Scullard
1952, 2 1 zflF. : (c 54), suggested a modification of this view, namely that the Roman embassy may have
left late in May when news came that Hannibal was on the war-path, having left New Carthage (late
April or early May) with a large army, and was heading north towards the Ebro.

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supposition the silence of the Carthaginians becomes clear: they obvi-
ously would not wish to discuss a treaty which Hannibal had just broken.

Whatever the exact date of the delivery of the Roman ultimatum, the
Carthaginians replied to the brusque alternative of disavowing Hannibal
or accepting war by refusing all discussion of the Ebro treaty and
concentrating on the treaty of 24 1 which they claimed covered only those
who were allies of either Rome or Carthage at the time of the treaty. To
prove this they read out the terms of the treaty several times (the actual
list of allies probably formed an annexe to the treaty), 36 and the name
Saguntum certainly did not appear. There was no question that Rome’s
‘alliance’ with Saguntum was made after 241, but the Romans brushed
the matter aside and said that now Saguntum had fallen their ultimatum
must be accepted. Polybius has clouded the issue when he says (hi. 2 1.6)
that a treaty had been broken by the capture of Saguntum. He then turns
aside to examine all the earlier Romano-Punic treaties, and when he
returns to discuss the Roman embassy of 218 he says (29. 1) he will give
not what the Roman ambassadors actually said at the time, but what was
usually thought to have been the Roman case (as argued in 1 52-1 50
b.c.?). This was to harp on the validity of Hasdrubal’s covenant and to
assert that peoples who became allies after the treaty of 24 1 were covered
by it since otherwise it would have specifically forbidden all future
alliances or laid down that subsequent allies should not enjoy the benefits
of the treaty. As to war-guilt, therefore, Polybius condemns the
Carthaginians in regard to Saguntum, but he equally condemns the
Romans for their previous unjust seizure of Sardinia. Amid so many
confusing claims and arguments, at least the outcome of the embassy is
clear: Fabius dramatically declared that he carried war and peace in the
folds of his toga. When the presiding sufete told him to offer which the
Romans wished and when Fabius said ‘war’, the majority (nXeiovs) of the
Carthaginian council cried out ‘we accept’.

Meanwhile Hannibal had wintered in New Carthage and had sent
some of his Spanish troops on leave. He visited Gades to pay his vows to
Heracles-Melkart and also had been issuing a large amount of silver
coinage to pay his troops. The first series, from triple to quarter shekels,
showed the laureate head of Heracles-Melkart with what are almost
certainly the features both of Hamilcar (bearded) and Hannibal himself
(beardless); on the reverse was an African elephant. These magnificent
coins were followed by shekels and triple shekels with Hannibal’s head,
without laurel wreath and Heracles’ club, and the ordinary Carthaginian
type of horse and palm-tree on the reverse (this series may possibly have
been issued by his brother Hasdrubal after Hannibal’s departure). The

16 See Taubler 1921, 63#.: (c 58).

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

Barcas were displaying themselves as Hellenistic rulers, with even a
suggestion of the divine. 37 In order to secure the loyalty of Spain and
Africa, Hannibal interchanged some troops between these two countries
and thereby separated the soldiers from their own people; Africa was
thus apparently within his command. He instructed Hasdrubal to
administer Spain in case he might be separated from him (eav avros
Xwpi^TjTai nov); does this rather naive expression suggest that Hannibal
was trying to keep his future movements as secret as possible? He had
also been in touch with Gallic tribes, both in Cisalpine Gaul and in the
Alps, and when he heard that they were willing to co-operate, he set forth
from New Carthage in the spring of 2 1 8 (late April or early May) with a
large force which, however, probably fell short of the 90,000 infantry,
12,000 cavalry and 37 elephants attributed to him. He crossed the Ebro
when the spring flooding had subsided. 38 His avowed and immediate
objective must have been north-eastern Spain between the Ebro and the
Pyrenees. If his intention at this point was to reach Italy, as it may well
have been, he will not have advertised the fact: the Romans must be kept
guessing. In the event he took two and a half months to reduce much of
northern Spain and he did not succeed against the coastal cities of
Tarraco and Emporiae. It remains uncertain whether this long period
was owing to unexpectedly tough resistance or to a deliberate delaying
tactic to hoodwink the Romans and then to make a hurried dash forward
at the last moment just before the winter closure of the mountain passes.
In any case he must have masked his intention of attacking Italy as long as
possible, and he could not of course have carried it out that year if his
campaign in northern Spain had not ultimately been successful. By the
end of July or early August he had reached the Pyrenees, and the road to
Rome stretched out before him.

Hannibal left behind in Spain an immensely strong base. The wealth that
he and his predecessors had acquired in the peninsula was spectacular; it
was the reply of Carthage to the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. The resources
of Numidia and Mauretania would have been easier to develop, as some
Carthaginians such as Hanno seem to have argued, but this area lacked
the mineral wealth that Spain could offer and in the Barca family

37 See Robinson 1956, 39: (b i 30). This view, that these and other heads with very individualized
features (cf. nn. 18 above and 41 below) represent the Barcids, has been accepted by Richter 1965,
28i:(b 192), Blazquez 1976, 3 9^". : (b 81), and many others, but rejected by dc Navascues 1961-2, iff.:
(b 120), and Villaronga 1973: (b 14 1). It is difficult to believe that the great variation of feature and
the presence or absence of symbols (e.g. diadem or club) can refer only to Heraclcs-Melkart
simpliciter.

38 In view of the necessary preparations Proctor 1971, 1 3ff.: (c 44), sets Hannibal’s departure
from New Carthage not earlier than mid-June, after assembling the army at the end of May. But the
prolonged interchange of troops may not have been confined to the winter of 2 1 9/ 1 8: see De Sanctis
1907—64, 111.ii.13 n - 2I: ( A l 4)*

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HAN'NIBAL AND SAGUNTUM 41

Carthage found the instruments to conquer, administer and exploit the
peninsula. The political opponents of the Barcids might accuse them of
building a ‘private empire’ in Spain, but despite their semi-regal position
they remained loyal citizens of their motherland, and if Hannibal’s
practice was not a novelty they often consulted a council ( ovvebpiov )
which seems to have contained representatives of the Carthaginian
government. 39 Spain, however, was sufficiently far away from Carthage
to allow the Barcids to act with reasonable independence, and far enough
away from Rome to prevent the Senate becoming unduly interested.

The Barcids seem to have lost no time in exploiting the mineral wealth
of Spain to the full: at any rate Hamilcar’s first debased billon coinage was
soon replaced by silver and even gold. Though the gold mines of north-
west Spain were far from his direct control (and indeed were not fully
worked until the Augustan conquest), there was also gold in Andalusia:
Strabo (111.2.8) enthuses over the great abundance of gold, silver, copper
and iron in Turdetania, and his statement that gold was previously
obtained from what in his day were copper mines is confirmed by
modern analysis of the ancient slag heaps at Rio Tinto which contained
13 grains of gold per ton (indeed the modern mining company at Rio
Tinto has obtained gold and silver ores, as well as its main production of
copper). 40 The result of this exploitation is seen in the wealth accumu-
lated in the capital of New Carthage when stormed by Scipio in 209 b.c.:
he captured 276 golden plates, each weighing about a pound, 1 8,300 lb of
silver in bullion and in coin, a large number of silver vases and quantities
of copper and iron, besides a vast amount of munitions, armour and
weapons (Livy xxvi.47). As we have seen, one mine (Baebelo) alone
provided Hannibal with 300 lb of silver a day; this was in the area of New
Carthage which in Polybius’ time produced at least 2 5 ,000 drachmas per
day.

This great wealth provided the sinews of war, both equipment and
mercenaries. The growth of the Barcid armies in Spain cannot be traced
in detail, but Hasdrubal is said to have had 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry
and 200 elephants (Diod. Sic. xxv. 1 2), Hannibal in 219/18 interchanged
some 14,000 infantry, 1 ,200 cavalry and 870 Balearic slingers from Spain
with a roughly similar force from Africa: he is said to have started en route
for the Pyrenees with 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. He also left
in Spain a fleet of 50 quinqueremes (though 18 lacked crews), 2
quadriremes and 5 triremes. The army figures, though seen by Polybius

39 Polyb. m,20.8, 71.5, 85.6, vn. 9.1, ix. 24. 5.

40 See Rickard 1928, 1298"., esp. 152-3: (g 26); and for Roman workings see Richardson 1976,
159 ff.: (c 24). Healey 1978, 26: (1 20), provides a diagram of the San Dionisio lode at Rio Tinto,
showing a thin gold and silver lode above the copper. Strabo explains how the inhabitants of
Turdetania also obtained gold from the dry auriferous sand.

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THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN

himself on the inscription left by Hannibal on the Lacinian Cape, may be
slightly exaggerated, and the proportion of Spanish mercenaries cannot
be estimated, but they indicate the general level of the Barcid achieve-
ment. But more than mere numbers was needed. Among the Spanish
tribesmen the unit of loyalty was small; it could be strong (as witness the
desperate resistance of Saguntum to Hannibal), but there was no inde-
pendent Iberian nation and little national feelings so that the
Carthaginians found it easy to recruit them as mercenaries. Further, it
was a Spanish tradition (noted by Caesar and Plutarch) for bands of
followers ( devoti ) to swear total allegiance to a leader, to serve as his
bodyguard and never to survive him. Ennius (fr.503 v) seems to have
emphasized the loyalty of a Spaniard who refused a Roman demand to
abandon the Carthaginian cause. Thus with good pay and charismatic
leadership the tribesmen might be welded into a fine and loyal fighting
force, since they apparently had no difficulty in accepting a leader from
overseas (thus after his capture of New Carthage and the battle of Baecula
they readily hailed Scipio Africanus as king: Polyb. x.40). Carthage
meant less to them than did their Barcid commanders, who in the later
years of occupation placed their portraits - and that in a divine setting -
on the coins which their troops received as pay. Hasdrubal Barca had a
gold shield bearing his portrait, which was later captured by the Romans
and dedicated in the Capitoline temple. 41

For years the Barcid conquest of Spain had been accomplished by
diplomacy and assimilation as well as by war: both Hasdrubal and
Hannibal had married Spanish wives, while Hannibal had lived in the
country for 19 years. Fie may not indeed have been averse to trying to
increase his prestige by appealing to the superstitions of the natives. He it
was who was probably responsible for the first issue of the coins
depicting his father and himself in the guise of Heracles-Melkart, and the
story that before he crossed the Ebro he dreamed that he received a
promise of divine guidance may have been told to enhance his authority
still further. The story was recorded by Silenus, who was with him at the
time, and it may well have circulated among his troops in 218. 42 But

41 Cf. n. 37 above. Gold shield: Plin. xxxiv.14. Livy (xxv.39.17) refers to such a shield of silver,
weighing 1371b. The coins with a laureate diademed head of Melkart, and an elephant on the reverse
(Series 8 of Robinson 1956, 52-3: (b 130)) arc recognized by Robinson as Barcid. A hoard found
fairly recently in Sicily confirms that they certainly belong to the later years of Hasdrubal, but raises
some (though not insuperable?) difficulties in the assumption that they portray the features of
Hasdrubal Barca: cf. Scullard 1970, 252-3: (h 77).

42 See Cic. Div. 1.49; also Livy xxi.22.5— 7; Val. Max. 1.7. ext. 1; Sil. Itai. 111.163#.; Dio Cassius
xm. 56.9. Polybius (at 111.47.8, 48.9) may have been alluding indirectly to this as well as to similar
stories of divine guidance for Hannibal. The view of Norden 1915, 1 i6ff.: (b 24), that the council of
the gods figured in Ennius is not very probable. The story told how Hannibal was summoned to a
council of the gods, where Jupiter ordered him to invade Italy and provided a divine guide who
warned Hannibal when on the march not to look back. Hannibal disobeyed and saw behind him a

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HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM

whether or not supported by any popular belief in their divine mission,
the Barcids doubtless lived like princes, if not as Hellenistic monarchs (in
whose tradition Hamilcarand Hasdrubal had founded cities). The latter,
in his palace on the citadel of New Carthage, in command of a great army
and fleet, with his ships in one of the best harbours in the whole
Mediterranean, in control of the local silver mines and holding hostages
from many Spanish tribes, must have appeared an impressive figure to
his contemporaries, while all the Barcids made a strong impact on later
generations. Thus, for instance, Polybius rejected the anti-Barcid tra-
dition of Fabius Pictor, praised the gallantry of Hamilcar, and on the
whole judged Hannibal with impartiality, and even Cato, the bitter
enemy of Carthage, said that no king was worthy of comparison with
Hamilcar Barca . 43 But however spectacular the achievement of the
Barcids, in the event the rich resources of the peninsula were denied to
Hannibal fighting unaided in Italy, thanks to the brilliant initiative of
members of another family, the Cornelii Scipiones, and to the strength of
the Roman navy: the efforts of his brothers Hasdrubal and Mago to keep
him supplied from Spain were too little and too late.

trail of destruction caused by an enormous beast: his guide told him this meant the desolation of Italy
and he was to go on unworried ( ne laboraret). However, Meyer 1924, 11. 368ft 1 .: (c 37), thought that
Hannibal’s disobedience must have led to his destruction which therefore originally figured at the
end of Silcnus’ account; in consequence the story was suppressed by later Roman writers (starting
with Coclius). But we do not know that Silcnus’ history went down to 202 b.c. (the latest attested
event is in 209), and it is unlikely that as a companion of Hannibal he would have told a story which
implied that Hannibal was responsible for his own downfall. Meyer has been influenced by the tragic
legend of Orpheus’ disobedience which he cites, but in fact in its original form this story may have
had a happy ending, namely the recovery of Eurydice, and Orpheus’ backward look and its
consequence may be only an addition by an Alexandrian poet: cf. Guthrie 1 93 5 , 3 1 : (1 17), and Bowra
1952, 1 17ft.: (h 1 71). In any case, in Hannibal’s dream we are in the realm of Hellenistic invention
rather than of primitive taboo, of the gods of Olympus rather than of the underworld, and it is not
impossible that a story that Hannibal’s march had been commissioned by a council of the gods was
circulated to encourage the troops, and then written up by Silcnus in the more extravagant vein of
Hellenistic invention which Polybius condemned.

43 Polyb. ix. 2 1-26, xl. 19; Plut. Cat. Mai. 8.14.

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CHAPTER 3

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

JOHN BRISCOE

I. THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 1

In 241 Carthage had no alternative to accepting the Roman peace terms
and surrendering possession of the whole of Sicily to Rome. Three years
later the Senate took advantage of Carthage’s difficulties in the Mer-
cenary War to seize Sardinia. 2 Polybius rightly regarded the latter action
as unjustified and the subsequent Carthaginian resentment as a major
cause of the Second Punic War. 3 But even without that additional
provocation many Carthaginians, and particularly Hamilcar Barca, the
father of Hannibal, would not have been prepared to accept the outcome
of the First Punic War as definitive. It was Hamilcar who laid the
foundations for a new Carthaginian offensive by re-establishing
Carthaginian power in Spain. In 229 Hamilcar died and was succeeded in
Spain by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, with whom Rome concluded the
Ebro treaty in 226, which made the river Ebro the northern limit of
Carthaginian power in Spain and, implicitly at least, renounced Roman
claims south of that limit. The treaty, however, contained the seeds of a
new conflict, for its terms were flatly inconsistent with the Roman
alliance with Saguntum, concluded several years before the Ebro treaty. 4
Saguntum lay south of the Ebro, and while Rome was to claim that the
alliance overrode the Ebro treaty, the Carthaginians saw the Ebro treaty
as giving them the freedom to proceed against Saguntum. 5

Hannibal succeeded his brother-in-law in 221. In 220 the Saguntines,
fearing an attack, asked Rome for help and the Senate, which had ignored
several previous appeals from Saguntum, sent an embassy to Hannibal
urging him to refrain both from attacking Saguntum and from crossing
the Ebro in defiance of the treaty. 6 Hannibal countered by accusing

1 The events leading to the outbreak of the Second Punic War have been dealt with at length in
the previous chapter. What is presented here is a brief and necessarily dogmatic statement of the view
which underlies this chapter. 2 See CAH 2 vn.ii, ch. n (e).

3 Polyb. in. 10.4, 15.10, 28.2, 30.4. 4 See pp. 25-7.

5 Several writers, including Polybius himself on certain occasions (see especially m.30.3), twisted
the facts by placing Saguntum north of the Ebro; see pp. 34—5.

6 Polyb. hi. 1 5. For most of the events preceding the declaration of war references are given to
Polybius alone. Livy xxi.4-15 is based on a totally confused chronology and is best left out of
account.

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THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

Rome of interfering in internal Saguntine affairs. We need not doubt that
Hannibal was looking for a reason to reopen the conflict with Rome and
as soon as he was sure that the rest of the Carthaginian empire in Spain
was secure, 7 he was happy to take the opportunity of attacking
Saguntum. The Senate had concluded the Ebro treaty partly as a security
against the possibility of the Carthaginians joining the Gauls in an
alliance against Rome. It could now reassert the validity of the Saguntine
alliance, and the Senate was confident that the conflict, when it came,
would take place in Spain and that its timing could be controlled by
Rome. 8

The Roman embassy had gone on to Carthage to repeat the message it
had delivered to Hannibal. In the spring of 219 Hannibal embarked on
the siege of Saguntum; it fell eight months later. 9 Polybius vehemently
denies that the Senate took time to decide its response and asserts that it
immediately despatched an embassy to Carthage to declare war unless the
Carthaginians agreed to surrender Hannibal and his leading officers. 10 In
fact it seems very likely that a debate took place, with one side, led by
L. Cornelius Lentulus {cos. 237) wanting an immediate declaration of
war, the other, led by Q. Fabius Maximus, the future Cunctator, urging
negotiations. 11 The result - effectively a victory for Lentulus, not a
compromise - was that a conditional war-vote was passed and five
ambassadors despatched to present the ultimatum. 12

The Roman failure to help Saguntum earlier was criticized by Roman
writers themselves, and to many it has seemed strange that complete
inactivity during the siege should have been followed by a declaration of
war once the town had fallen. In fact once Hannibal had begun to besiege
Saguntum there was little that Rome could do. The consuls had already
gone to Illyria 13 and it would have been difficult to raise a sufficient force
and get it to Spain in time to be of any use. The Senate clearly did not
envisage Hannibal moving outside Spain and in that case it was up to
Rome to make the first move. There is nothing particularly surprising in
the decision to go to war being postponed until the beginning of the
following consular year: decisions to embark on wars seem regularly to
have been taken at the beginning of a consular year. 14

Hannibal had probably already resolved on taking the initiative by
marching on Italy, whether or not Rome declared war. 15 He had sent

7 Polyb. hi. 14.10. 8 Polyb. hi. 15. 3.

9 Polyb. 111.17.1. For the chronology see Walbank 1937-79, 1.327-8: (b 38). I am not convinced by
the argument of Astin (1967, 5 8 3 ff. : (c 2)) that the siege may have begun as late as May 219, with the
news of the fall of Saguntum not reaching Rome until shortly before the Ides of March 218.

10 Polyb. iu. 20.

11 Dio fr. 55; Zon. vm.20. The story is rejected by Harris 1979, 269-70: (a 21).

12 Polyb. 111.20.8; cf. Livy xxi. 18.1—2. 13 See p. 93.

14 See in particular Rich 1976, 5 8fF. : (h 20).

15 I reject the view of Hoffmann 1951: (c 25) that the embassy to Carthage was sent only after
Hannibal had crossed the Ebro.

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

messengers to Gaul before he had heard of the Roman ultimatum to
Carthage. 16 The Senate, however, thought that the initiative still lay in
their hands. No further decisions were taken until the return of the
embassy from Carthage. It was then decided that one of the consuls,
P. Cornelius Scipio, should go to Spain, the other, Ti. Sempronius
Longus, should proceed to Sicily and launch an invasion of Africa. 17 At
this point the Senate may still not have realized that Hannibal’s ambitions
extended outside Spain. Once it was known that Hannibal was in fact
marching on Italy, there wasno advantage in trying to meet him in Spain,
which may explain the fact that Scipio did not leave until July at the
earliest — if, indeed, the delay did not arise merely from practical
problems in raising his army, caused particularly by the diversion of the
legions originally assigned to him to deal with a Gallic attack on the
settlers of Placentia and Cremona. 18

We can do no more than speculate on the plans that Hannibal had
when he began his march. It is clear from subsequent events that he had
no intention of destroying Rome as such. He did not march on Rome
after his victories at Trasimene and Cannae in 217 and 216 respectively, 19
and doubtless realized that to capture the city would be a very different
proposition from victory in the open field. We may note that the treaty
between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon (Polyb. vn.9) clearly envis-
aged Rome’s continuing existence after a Carthaginian victory. He
wanted, no doubt, to bring Rome to a position where he could conclude a
settlement that would recover Sicily and Sardinia for Carthage and
ensure that Rome would not again be able to hinder Carthaginian
expansion in the western Mediterranean. What is not clear is whether
Hannibal intended to do this by significantly weakening Rome’s degree
of domination over Italy. In the early battles he went out of his way to
treat captured Roman citizens and allies in different ways, 20 and he may
have realized that permanent limits could not be set on Roman expansion
if she retained control over the whole of Italy. But it is unlikely that he
had any very detailed knowledge of the political geography of Italy or
any very precise idea of the system to be established when Rome had been
defeated.

The Carthaginian reaction to Rome’s ultimatum had shown that
Carthage accepted full responsibility for Hannibal’s actions. But
Hannibal cannot have been certain of the degree of continuing support
he would receive from the home government once he had arrived in

16 Polyb. in. 34; Waibank 1957-79, 1-36 5 : (b 38). Cf. Livy xxi.23.1.

17 Polyb. m. 40. 2. Polybius’ statement that these decisions were taken only after it was known that
Hannibal had crossed the Ebro is to be rejected: see Sumner 1966, 14: (c 55).

18 Rich 1976, 37: (h 20); on the Gallicattack see Polyb. 111.40.6-14; Livy xxi.25— 26.2; Waibank

1957-79. '-J75-7: (b 38)-

19 Polyb. in. 86. 8; Livy xxn.5 1. 1-5; cf. Lazcnby 1978, 85-6: (c 31). 20 See n. 169.

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THE WAR IN ITALY

Italy. The Barcids had powerful opponents in Carthage, and even if
Hannibal felt confident that peace would not be concluded over his head,
he must have realized that for military reinforcements he might have to
rely on the support he could attract in Italy and whatever further troops
his brother Hasdrubal could send from Spain . 21

The narrative that follows treats the operations in the different
theatres of war separately. It is hoped that the gain in clarity will
compensate for the loss of a synoptic view of each year’s events. The
sources for the war, mainly Polybius and Livy, are full and detailed,
though when we do not have Polybius as a control Livy’s narrative must
be treated with caution. References to other sources are given only when
they add something to the information provided by Polybius and Livy . 22

II. THE WAR IN ITALY

Hannibal left Carthago Nova, it seems, sometime in May, and reached
the Rhone in September . 23 Scipio, with an army destined for Spain,
arrived by sea at the mouth of the Rhone at the same time. Hannibal,
however, succeeded in crossing the river well inland - probably at
Beaucaire rather than further north 24 - and the only military contact was
a cavalry skirmish of which the Romans got the better. Scipio now sent
the major part of his forces to Spain under the command of his brother
Gnaeus, while he himself returned to Italy . 25

There has been enormous controversy about the route by which
Hannibal crossed the Alps. The balance of probability is in favour of the
view that Hannibal arrived in Italy in the area of Turin (in mid-October,
about a month-and-a-half after crossing the Rhone), and if this is so the
choice for Hannibal’s pass lies between Mt Genevre, Mt Cenis and, the
solution preferred by the two most recent writers, the Col de Clapier . 26
Hannibal had incurred considerable losses on his journey from Spain,
though, as so often with troop numbers, the precise extent of the
casualties cannot be measured . 27

The Gauls that Hannibal had encountered on his journey had demon-
strated a mixture of friendship and hostility. Those of the Po valley, only

21 See below, p. 56.

22 The best detailed military narrative is that of De Sanctis 1907-64, m.ii: (a 14). See also Lazenby
1978: (c 51).

23 Proctor 1972, 1 jff.: (c 44), has shown that to date the start of the march in April, with the
arrival in Italy in September (thus Walbank 195 7—79, 1.565: (b 58)), does too much violence to
Polybius in. 5 4. 1. But Proctor himself pushes that passage too far in insisting on applying it to the
middle of November. For the dates here suggested see Rich 1976, 55: (h 20).

24 Lazenby 1978, 55-6: (c 31); for other views cf. Walbank 1957-79, 1.377-8: (b 38).

25 Polyb. 111.41—46, 49.1-4; Livy xxi.26.3-29, 32.1-5.

26 Proctor 1972, 1 6 5 ff. : (c 44); Lazenby 1978, 3 3!?.: (c 31); cf. Walbank 1957-79, 1.382^: (b 38).

27 For details see Walbank 1957-79, 1.366: (b 38).

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Map i. Italy and Sicily in the Second Punic War (for Campania see Map 3).

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THE WAR IN’ ITALY

recently subjugated by Rome, welcomed him as a liberator. The Boii and
the Insubres had already revolted, attacked the Roman settlers at
Placentia and Cremona and besieged them in Mutina. 28 The first clash
with Roman forces took place at the River Ticinus near Pavia, a skirmish
of cavalry and light-armed troops of which the Carthaginians got consid-
erably the better and in which Scipio himself was wounded. The Romans
retreated eastwards to Placentia where Scipio was joined by Sempronius
Longus, who had been urgently recalled from Sicily. A little west of
Placentia there occurred the first major battle of the war, at the River
Trebbia (December 2 1 8— January 2 1 7). The result was a major victory for
the Carthaginians and well over half the Roman army was destroyed. 29
Livy’s story 30 of an attempt by Hannibal to cross the Appennines immedi-
ately after the battle of the Trebbia and of a drawn battle between
Hannibal and Sempronius is to be rejected.

Sempronius returned to Rome to preside over the election of C.
Flaminius and Cn. Servilius Geminus as consuls for 217. Flaminius took
up position at Arretium (Arezzo) but Hannibal proceeded over the
Appennines, along the River Arno and past Flaminius southwards to-
wards the heart of Etruria. Flaminius pursued him but Hannibal con-
cealed his army in the hills at the north-east corner of Lake Trasimene
and, with the assistance of early morning fog (the date in the Roman
calendar was 21 June, probably 8 May (Jul.)), the Roman army was
caught in an ambush. It was, as the praetor urbanus announced at Rome, a
great defeat. Flaminius was killed and some 1 5,000 of his army died with
him. The battle was the last time until 207 that Roman and Carthaginian
forces met in the northern part of the peninsula. 31

Rome was faced by a major crisis. One consul was dead, the other at
Ariminum (Rimini) cut off from the capital. 32 It is now that there begins
the period of Roman strategy dominated by Q. Fabius Maximus, the
period of attrition and of avoiding full-scale battles. Initially Fabius’
conception was not unchallenged but from the defeat at Cannae in 216
until 210 it was on Fabian principles that the campaign in Italy was
conducted. That is not to say that there were no formal battles in this
period. It was only in the immediate aftermath of Trasimene and Cannae
that the Fabian strategy was applied in its most extreme form. The policy
was rather that pitched battles were to be avoided in circumstances
chosen by Hannibal and favourable to him. It would not have precluded

28 For the attack on the colonists see n. 1 8; for the welcome for Hannibal from the Gauls of
northern Italy: Polyb. 111.60.11; Livy xxi. 59. 5. Some, however, were unwilling to commit them-
selves completely to Hannibal (Polyb. 111.69.1 iff.; Livy xx1.52.5ff.), and later Hannibal was afraid of
Gallic attacks on his life (Polyb. 111.78. 1-4; Livy xxn.i.j).

20 Polyb. 111.64-74; Livy xxi. 46-48, 52-56. 30 xxi. 5 8-59.9.

31 Polyb. in. 77-85; Livy xxn.2-6. For the date cf. Ovid, Vast. vi.76jff.; for the problems
associated with the battle sec Walbank 1957-79, 1.41 5 ff. : (B j8), Lazenby 1978, 62ff.: (c jt).

32 Livy xxii. 8. 6, j 1 .9.

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

a full-scale battle in circumstances chosen by the Romans and where
Hannibal would have been at a disadvantage - but Hannibal was too
good a general to allow thatever to happen. Fabius’ natural caution made
him extremely reluctant to commit himself, but M. Claudius Marcellus,
though a supporter of the fundamental strategy, showed much more
initiative in taking opportunities when they arose. In both 21 5 and 214 he
was not afraid to engage Hannibal when the latter was attempting to
capture Nola in Campania, and in the years following 210 he was clearly
determined to force Hannibal into accepting a battle. But the basic view
was that Hannibal could not be defeated decisively in open conflict. After
Cannae the aim was to concentrate on winning back towns and areas that
had defected, and by putting a vastly increased number of troops in the
field to force Hannibal either to divide his own forces or to leave his allies
without support. If Hannibal were unable to replenish his army from his
allies in Italy, and as long as Rome continued her maritime domination
and her armies in Spain could prevent reinforcements coming to Italy by
land, Fabius could be confident that eventually Hannibal’s forces would
be so reduced that either the Romans would be able to defeat him by
overwhelming numerical superiority or Hannibal would be forced, prior
to such a defeat, to abandon Italy. But the cost of the policy was heavy. It
meant enormous demands on Roman and Italian manpower, enormous
financial sacrifices, and it meant accepting that Hannibal could not be
prevented from ravaging large parts of the Italian countryside, the loss in
corn production being met by imports from Sicily, Sardinia and, eventu-
ally, Egypt. 33

Immediately after the battle of Trasimene Fabius was appointed
dictator with M. Minucius Rufus as his magister equitum. As the surviving
consul could not come to Rome, Fabius and Minucius were appointed
directly by the people, instead of the dictator being nominated by a
consul and the magister equitum by the dictator. 34 Hannibal proceeded
from Trasimene to the Adriatic coast and it was in Apulia that Fabius
embarked on his strategy, keeping close to Hannibal but avoiding a
pitched battle. From Apulia Hannibal moved into Samnium and thence
into the ager Falernus , the plain between the River Volturnus and Mount
Massicus. Fabius remained in the mountains watching him ravage the
plain. But when Hannibal had to leave the plain to find winter quarters
elsewhere, Fabius succeeded in blocking all his exits and it was only by
the extraordinary stratagem of driving a herd of oxen, with blazing

33 Compare the perspicacious assessment of the Fabian strategy by De Sanctis 1907-64,
m.ii.zzoff.: (a 14). Relations between Fabius and Marcellus: p. 70; Marcellus’ positive attitude:
De Sanctis, op. cit. Z87, 473. For the events of zi 5 and 214 referred to see Livy xxni.44 and xxiv. 17;
for the imports of grain: Thiel 1946, 56 : (h 60).

34 Polvb. hi. 87. 6-9; Livy xxii.8.6-7; Walbank 1957—79, 1 . 422 : (b 38).

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THE WAR IN ITALY

faggots tied to their horns, up a mountain, and thus diverting Roman
attention, that Hannibal was able to escape with the main part of his
army. 35 Fabius followed Hannibal back to Apulia, but was then sum-
moned to Rome, allegedly to deal with religious business. The latter may
well have been a pretext, discontent with Fabius’ policy, particularly the
fact that it involved allowing Hannibal to ravage the ager Falernus at his
will, being the real reason. Fabius left Minucius in charge with instruc-
tions not to take any risks. But Minucius was eager to discard the Fabian
strategy and succeeded in winning a minor victory. 36 Opposition to
Fabius’ policy, both in the field and at Rome, was increased by this
success, and the assembly took the extraordinary step of conferring on
the magister equitum an imperium equal to that of the dictator. 37 When
Fabius returned to Apulia, he chose to divide his army rather than accept
Minucius’ alternative suggestion that the two men should command on
alternate days. It was, of course, not long before Hannibal was able to
entice Minucius into a rash venture, from which he had to be rescued by
Fabius. 38

The six-month term of the dictator elapsed before the end of the
consular year, and the armies of Fabius and Minucius reverted to the
consuls M. Servilius Geminus and C. Atilius Regulus (who had been
elected to replace the dead Flaminius). 39 For 216 the new consuls were
L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro. 40 Polybius reports that it was
decided to give the consuls a force of eight legions of 5,000 men each,
which, with the same number of allied troops, meant a total force of
80,000. There is no need to doubt these figures and it is the size of the
Roman army that made the third Roman defeat particularly devastating.
Hannibal occupied Cannae, by the River Aufidus, an important supply
base for the Romans in Apulia. Hannibal was thus able to draw the
Romans into battle on flat terrain that favoured the Carthaginian superi-
ority in cavalry. In the battle, which took place at the end of J une, Paullus
fell, and out of the huge Roman army only 14,500 escaped death or
captivity. 41

Polybius, perhaps misled by the desire of the Scipionic family to
absolve Paullus (Scipio Africanus’ father-in-law and Scipio Aemilianus’
grandfather) from blame for the disaster at Cannae, makes Varro respon-
sible for the decision to engage, against the advice of Paullus. Livy goes

35 Polyb. nr.88-94.6; Livy xxn. 12-17. On these events see Ungern-Stcrnberg 1975, 1 iff.: (c 59).

36 Polyb. hi. 94. 7-10, 100-102; Livy xxii.18, 23-24.

37 Livy xxn. 2 5-26, to be preferred to Polybius’ statement (in. 103.4) that Minucius was ap-
pointed a second dictator. See Dorey 1955: (c 12); Walbank 1957-79, 1434: (b 38). Sec further p. 70
below. 38 Polyb. hi. 103.5-105^ Livy xxn. 27-30.

39 Livy xxn. 3 1.7, 32.1-3, to be preferred to Polyb. ih.io6.i-z.

40 See further p. 69 and Additional Note p. 79.

41 Polyb. in. 106-117; Livy xxn. 41-50.

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

further and portrays Varro as the spiritual successor of Minucius, bitterly
opposed by Paullus who wanted to continue the policy of Fabius. But it is
clear from Polybius (m. 106.7, 108. 1) that it was the Senate as a whole
which took the decision to face Hannibal again in a pitched battle, and
that if there was any disagreement between the consuls, it was purely
tactical, not strategic. The hostile picture of Varro is belied by the
Senate’s vote of thanks to him after the battle, in sharp contrast to the
treatment of those soldiers who escaped death or captivity, and to his
employment in a number of responsible positions in subsequent years. 42

The battle was not only a disaster in itself, but also led to the defection
to Hannibal of a large part of southern Italy, including part of Samnium.
The peoples who defected did not, for the most part, fight for Hannibal,
but their resources were no longer available to Rome. 43 The defection of

42 Vote of thanks: Livy xxn.61.14, other references in MRR 1.247. Subsequent employment:
Walbank 195 7—79, 1.448: (b 38). Add his presence on diplomatic missions in 203 and 200 and his
membership of the iiiviri for the supplementation of Venusia in the latter year. On the legiones
Carmen ses see n. 157.

43 Polvb. hi. 1 18.3 and Livy xxi.61.1 1, but both lists arc anachronistic and contain peoples who
did not defect immediately after Cannae. At the extreme tip of Italy Rhegium remained loyal to
Rome throughout the war. For details of the status of various cities and peoples see De Sanctis 1 907-
64, m.ii.2 1 iff., 2 2 3 ff • > 274: (a 14); Walbank 1957-79, 1.448, 11.29, loo: ( B 38), Salmon 1967, 299: (h
MO-

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THE WAR IN ITALY

Capua, narrated at length by Livy, caused the greatest anger at Rome. 44
In Campania Atella, Calatia, and the Sabatini followed Capua and
Hannibal captured Nuceria, Acerrae, and Casilinum. But Nola held out
and the Roman forces under the dictator M. lunius Pera and the praetor
M. Claudius Marcellus did their best to restrict Hannibal’s successes.
Varro meanwhile returned to Apulia to attempt to hold the position
there. 45 Hannibal was anxious to gain control of a port but repeated
attempts on Naples and (the following year) an assault on Cumae by
Capua and the Carthaginians were all unsuccessful. 46

The firmness with which the crisis was met prompted Polybius to
devote the whole of book vt of his history to explaining the qualities of a
constitution of a state that was able to climb out of such an abyss. If we
may believe Livy, the Senate refused to ransom those captured at Cannae
and took emergency measures against a possible attack on Rome itself.
As we have seen, however, that did not form part of Hannibal’s plans. 47

L. Postumius Albinus, who was already holding a praetorship, and Ti.
Sempronius Gracchus, lunius Pera’s magister equitum, were elected to the
consulship for 215, but before Postumius could take up office, he was
killed in a battle with the Boii in the Silva Litana, north of Bologna.
Fabius Maximus was chosen to replace him. 48 The year opened with
Rome holding her position. As we have seen, an attack on Cumae failed
and several towns in Campania and Samnium were recovered, though an
attempt to retake Locri was unsuccessful. Hannibal failed in his renewed
attempts to capture Nola - though the substantial victory over Hannibal
ascribed to Marcellus by Livy is open to grave suspicion. 49 It was soon
afterwards, however, that Syracuse defected.

For 214 Fabius was re-elected to the consulship with M. Claudius
Marcellus as his colleague. Matters in Italy were now in a position of
stalemate. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus defeated Hanno near Beneventum
but later suffered a reverse in Lucania. A further assault on Nola by
Hannibal was repulsed by Marcellus and he and Fabius together captured
Casilinum. Fabius also had a number of successes in Samnium and
Hannibal’s hopes of taking Tarentum were foiled. In the following year,
when Gracchus held a second consulship in company with Fabius’ son,
the Romans recaptured Arpi in Apulia. 50

44 Livy xxni. 2-10. See Ungcrn-Stcrnbcrg 1975, 25#.: (c 59).

45 Livy xxii. 61. 1 1, XXIII. 1 4. 5 ff., 15.2-3, 17.1-6, 19-20.3, 22.1 1, xxvi. 16.5, 33.12.

46 Livy xxiii. 1. 5 fT., 14.5, 1 5.1-2, 3 5—37.9 (2 1 5). xxiv. 1 3.7 (2 14).

47 Livy xxi 1. 5 5-61. 10. See p. 46. 48 See p. 70.

49 Livy xxm.37.10-1 3, 39.6ff., 41.10-14, 4 3 .6fT. For the defection of Locri in 216 cf. Livy
xxiii. 30.8. Livy xxiv. 1. 2- 1 3, dating the defection to 2 1 5, should be rejected. On Marcellus* alleged
victory sec De Sanctis 1907-64, m.ii. 255 n. 104: (a 14).

50 Livy xxiv. 1 4- 1 6, 1 7 (for doubts see Dc Sanctis 1907-64, 111.ii.260n. 1 19: (a 14), 19, 20. 1 2 (for
doubts sec De Sanctis, op. cit. 274 n. 135), 20.3-5, 20.9-15,46-47.11 (for doubts about the details of
Livy’s account sec Dc Sanctis, op. cit. 273 n. 132).

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

The Roman recovery in the years 2 1 5—2 1 3 had been remarkable and in
three years Hannibal had achieved little. Early in 2 1 2, however, he scored
a significant success with the capture, by stealth, of Tarentum, and this
was followed by the defection of Metapontum, Thurii and Heraclea. But
the citadel of Tarentum remained in the hands of the Roman garrison,
under the command of M. Livius, and since this could control the inland
harbour (the Mare Piccolo), Hannibal was deprived of a substantial part
of the advantage of the possession of Tarentum. 51 The consuls, Ap.
Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, began to besiege Capua.
Fulvius had earlier inflicted severe losses on Hanno, who had been sent
north by Hannibal to thwart the consuls’ plans, and had fought a drawn
battle with Hannibal himself. On the debit side Ti. Sempronius Gracchus
was killed in an ambush in Lucania. 52 An indication of the Roman
recovery is that from the winter of 212/11 onwards, with one possible
exception, Hannibal retreated to the extreme south of Italy at the end of
each year’s campaign. 53

The next year, the consulship of P. Sulpicius Galba and Cn. Fulvius
Centumalus saw more dramatic events. In an attempt to raise the siege of
Capua Hannibal undertook the march on Rome which he had forgone
after Trasimene and Cannae. He had no serious hope of taking the city
and when he discovered that Rome was adequately defended without the
armies of the consuls of the previous year being withdrawn from Capua,
he rapidly returned to the south. Soon afterwards came the fall of Capua,
symbolically the most important reversal of Hannibal’s successes after
Cannae. Meanwhile, the citadel of Tarentum was still in Roman hands
and an attempt by a Punic fleet to cut off its supplies failed. 54

In 210 Marcellus held a third consulship with M. Valerius Laevinus,
who had been the Roman commander against Philip of Macedon since
215 and had just concluded the important alliance with the Aetolian
League. 55 The Romans recaptured Salapia in Apulia and two Samnite
towns. But Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, the consul of the previous year, was
killed in an attack by Hannibal at Herdonea. A Roman fleet was defeated
by the Tarentines but the garrison under Livius continued to hold out in
the citadel. Meanwhile Marcellus was eager to bring Hannibal to a fixed
battle. After an indecisive conflict in Lucania Marcellus pursued him

31 Pol. viii. 24-34; Livy xxv. 7.10-1 1 # 15.6-17; App. Hann. 34-35, 142-149.

32 Livy xxv. 1 3-14, 16-17, 19- 1-8, 22.5-13. The story of the defeat of the praetor Cn. Fulvius
Flaccus at Herdonea (Livy xxv. 21) is to be rejected as a doublet of the defeat of Cn. Fulvius
Centumalus in 210: Dc Sanctis 1907-64, m.ii.459: (a 14); Brunt 1971, 65 2: (h 82). The story of one
M. Ccntcnnius obtaining a force of 8,000 men from the Senate and losing virtually all of it in a battle
with Hannibal in Lucania (Livy xxv.19.5- 17) is also highly implausible (cf. Munzcr, P W 111.1928).

33 Dc Sanctis 1907-64, in. ii.470: (a 14) thinks that Hannibal spent the winter of 210/9 in Apulia.

54 Polyb. ix.3.1-9.11; Livy xxvi.4-14, 20.7—11. 55 See pp. 97-100.

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THE WAR IN ITALY

through Apulia, though remaining careful to avoid any possibility of an
ambush. 56

In 209 Fabius held his fifth consulship, Q. Fulvius Flaccus his fourth.
Fabius recaptured Tarentum, though afterwards he was nearly caught in
an ambush by Hannibal. Marcellus was still looking for the chance of a
full-scale engagement with Hannibal: when he obtained one he was
defeated. Livy’s story of a subsequent victory that was nec incruenta
probably conceals an indecisive result. Hannibal then returned to
Bruttium. 57 In the following year Marcellus was again consul with T.
Quinctius Crispinus as his colleague. Their principal aim was the recap-
ture of Locri. But first a Roman force sent from Tarentum to Locri was
ambushed by Hannibal near Petelia, and then the consuls themselves
were caught in another ambush near Venusia. Marcellus was killed
immediately and Crispinus fatally wounded. Hannibal obtained posses-
sion of Marcellus’ signets, but his attempt to use them in order to retake
Salapia was foiled. He was, however, able to raise the siege of Locri and
the Roman forces in the south, though numerically superior, made no
attempt to confront him. 58

The year 207 was a critical one and the last in which engagements of
moment took place in Italy. The consuls were C. Claudius Nero and M.
Livius Salinator. Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal, who had escaped from
Spain after the battle of Baecula, was marching towards Italy, and Rome
was again faced with the prospect of fighting in the north. Claudius was
appointed to face Hannibal, Livius Hasdrubal. The aim of the two
brothers was to meet in Umbria. But Hasdrubal’s messengers were
intercepted and Nero, who had begun by fighting not unsuccessfully
against Hannibal at Grumentum and Venusia, took the bold decision to
march with part of his forces to join Livius in the north. When Hasdrubal
discovered that he was facing the combined forces of the two consuls, he
decided to avoid a battle and instead to attempt to proceed down the Via
Flaminia to his planned meeting-place with Hannibal. The Roman
armies pursued him and at the battle of the River Metaurus the
Carthaginian forces were massacred and Hasdrubal himself fell. Immedi-
ately after the battle Nero returned to the south and Hannibal retired to
Bruttium, unable to embark on any further aggressive actions. 59

In 206 there was virtually no military activity in Italy, but Lucania
returned to Roman control. In 205, while Scipio was in Sicily, his
colleague in the consulship, P. Licinius Crassus, faced Hannibal. But

56 Livy xxvi. 38. 6-39, xxvn, 1-2. Cf. n. 32. 57 Livy xxvn.12.2, 12.7-1 5.1, 15.4-16.

58 Polyb. x. 32-33; Livv xxvn. 2 5.1 1-28. On the unwillingness of the Roman commanders in the
south to launch a united and full onslaught on Hannibal see De Sanctis 1907-64, 111.ii.476, 488
(concerning 207): (a 14).

59 Polyb. xi. 1-3.6; Livy xxvu.38-51. Cf. Lazenby 1978, 182#.: (c 31).

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56 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

both armies were afflicted by disease and no conflicts occurred. Alarm
was caused, however, by the landing of an army under Mago at Genua
and the making of an alliance between Mago and the Ligurian tribe of the
Ingauni. Two Roman armies were sent north to meet the threat. In the
south Scipio recovered Locri, despite an attempt by Hannibal to save the
city. The subsequent behaviour of his legatus Q. Pleminius almost
destroyed Scipio’s career and ambitions. In 204 the consuls M. Cornelius
Cethegus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus inflicted a reverse on Hannibal
in Bruttium and regained a number of towns, including Consentia
(Cosenza). In 203 Roman forces defeated Mago and the Carthaginian
commander was seriously wounded. Soon afterwards both he and
Hannibal were ordered to return to Africa to face the army of Scipio.
Before Hannibal left, the consul Cn. Servilius Caepio had regained
further areas of Bruttium. The war in Italy was at an end. 60

III. SPAIN

We have seen that the Senate’s original expectation was that the war as a
whole could be fought in Spain. 61 That hope was soon dashed but when
P. Cornelius Scipio failed to prevent Hannibal from crossing the Rhone
he nevertheless sent the greater part of his troops on to Spain under the
command of his brother Gnaeus. 62 The immediate aim now was to keep
the Carthaginian forces in Spain occupied and thus prevent reinforce-
ments being sent to Hannibal. 63 In fact the campaigns in Spain, with the
exception of the catastrophe of 211, represented an unbroken run of
success and the result was to drive the Carthaginians right out of the
country and leave a considerable area under Roman control. In 218
Gnaeus Scipio brought the area north of the Ebro, both the coastal strip
and the hinterland, into Roman control and defeated Hanno, the
Carthaginian commander in the area. Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal,
who had been left in overall command in Spain, came north, killed a
number of soldiers and marines wandering in the fields near Tarraco and
perhaps attempted, without success, to secure the defection of some of
the tribes that had just joined Rome. 64

60 Livy xxviii. 1 1. 1 1-1 5 , 46.7-1 3, 1 5, xxix. 5-9, 16.4-22, 36.4-9, 38. 1, xxx. 1 8-19.6, 19.10-20. On
Mago’s departure from Spain see p. 60.

61 See p. 45. For events in Spain see particularly Scullard 1970, 3 2ff.: (h 77); Lazenby 1978,

1 2 5 ff. : (c 31). 62 Polyb. hi. 49. 4; Livy xxi. 32. 3.

63 Cf. Polyb. hi. 97. 3. Livy’s statement (xxi. 3 2.4) chat the aim in 218 was to drive Hasdrubal out of
Spain is exaggerated and anachronistic.

64 Polyb. in. 76; Livy xxi. 60-1. I follow De Sanctis 1907-64, m.ii. 240-1 n. 59: (a 14), and
Walbank 1957-79, 1.409: (b 38) {contra Walsh 1973, 235: (b 41)) in regarding Livy xxi.61.4-1 1 as a
doublet. But I prefer to make Hasdrubal’s incitement of revolt among the llergetes and others part of
his first expedition north of the Ebro rather than to reject it altogether.

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SPAIN

In 217 Hasdrubal launched both naval and land expeditions north of
the Ebro. Gnaeus, helped by a Massiliote contingent, defeated the Punic
fleet at the mouth of the Ebro and captured twenty-five ships. He
followed up this victory with lightning raids which took the Roman fleet
south of Carthago Nova and to the island of Ebusus (Ibiza). But Livy’s
claim that subsequent land expeditions went as far as the saltus
Castulonensis (the Sierra Morena) is open to serious doubt. The inhabi-
tants of the Balearic Islands (Mallorca and Minorca) sent embassies to
Gnaeus seeking peace. Subsequently the llergetes revolted and
Hasdrubal recrossed the Ebro but was diverted by an invasion by the
Celtiberians acting at Scipio’s behest. On news of the naval battle of the
Ebro the Senate sent Publius Scipio to join Gnaeus and the two brothers
advanced to Saguntum. 65 In 2 16 the Carthaginian position became even
more difficult. Hasdrubal, who had retreated to south-west Spain, had
first to deal with a rebellion among the Tartessii and was then ordered by
the authorities in Carthage to join Hannibal in Italy, Himilco being sent
to Spain as a replacement. The Scipios’ task was to keep Hasdrubal in
Spain, and when the two armies met just to the south of the Ebro, the
Romans won a convincing victory which put an end to any prospect of
Hasdrubal joining his brother in the immediate future and consolidated
the Roman position in Spain. 66

The events of the next four years are not easily determined. It seems,
though, that in 214 and 213 a revolt by Syphax of Numidia led to a
considerable part of the Carthaginian forces being withdrawn, thus
enabling the Scipios to make further headway in southern Spain. In 212
Saguntum was recaptured and either then or earlier the important town
of Castulo joined Rome. 67 Thus in seven years the Scipios had not only
prevented the Carthaginians from sending reinforcements from Spain to
Italy but had succeeded in extending Roman control deep into the
territory under Carthaginian domination.

The next year, however, disaster struck. Now faced by three separate
Carthaginian armies, under Hasdrubal, his brother Mago and another
Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, the Scipios decided to split their armies,

65 Sosylus, h'GrH 176P1; Polyb. in. 95-96. 6; Livy xxn. 19-22. On the alleged expedition as far as
the saltus Castu/oncnsis cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, in. ii. 242-3 n. 62: (a 14). It was while the Scipios were
near Saguntum that the Saguntine Abclux defected to the Romans and, deceiving the Carthaginian
commander at Saguntum, succeeded in bringing to the Roman camp all the Spanish hostages held at
Saguntum by the Carthaginians. The episode is, however, given unwarranted prominence by the
sources: cf. Walbank 1957-79, 1.432: (b 38).

66 Livy xxiii. 26-29. I sec no need to follow Dc Sanctis 1907-64, in. ii. 244-5, 246 n. 7: (a 14) in
placing the events described in chs. 28-9 in 215 nor in rejecting the statement that Hasdrubal was
ordered to join Hannibal in Italy.

67 App. Hisp. 1 5-16, 57-61, to be preferred to Livy xxm. 49.5-14 (s.a. 2 1 5), xxiv.41-42 (s.a. 214),
xxiv.49.7-8 (s.a. 213). Sec De Sanctis 1907-64, in. ii. 247-8 n. 76: (a 14). Livy (xxiv.42.9) dates the
capture of Saguntum to 214, but also says that it was in its eighth year under Carthaginian control.

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SPAIN

Publius at Castulo taking on Mago and Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, and
leaving Gnaeus at Urso to face Hasdrubal the brother of Hannibal. The
Romans were relying on the support of a large number of Celtiberian
mercenaries and these Hasdrubal persuaded to desert. Publius, attempt-
ing to cut off a force of Ilergetes and Suessetani who had come from
north of the Ebro to join the Carthaginians, was caught by the
Carthaginian generals; in the ensuing battle Scipio himself was killed and
his army fled. Gnaeus, guessing what had happened, attempted to retreat
but was pursued by all three Carthaginian armies, and he too met his
death, though much of his army, together with that part of Publius’
forces which had not been involved in the latter’s final battle, survived.
But the work of seven years had been undone and had it not been for the
work of an eques Romanus, L. Marcius Septimus, in organizing the
remains of the Roman armies, the Romans might have been driven out of
Spain entirely and the route to Italy left open. 68

A new commander had to be found. Initially C. Claudius Nero was
sent and he appears to have succeeded in holding the situation. 69 In 2 10 it
was decided that the assembly should elect a privatus cum imperio to the
Spanish command, and the young P. Cornelius Scipio, son and nephew
of the two dead commanders, was chosen. He arrived in the autumn and
held an assembly at Tarraco of the peoples under Roman control. 70 In
209 Scipio embarked on his first major campaign, the siege of Carthago
Nova, the main Carthaginian supply base in Spain and itself of great
strategic importance. Scipio captured the city by sending a wading party
across the lagoon that lay to the north of the city and which, as Scipio had
discovered, frequently ebbed in the evening. Before the attack he told
his troops that in a dream Neptune had promised his aid, an episode that
played an important part in the development of the ‘Scipionic legend’.
Scipio’s success meant the capture of a huge amount of booty, both
material and human, and eighteen ships. The human booty included a
considerable number of artisans who had worked in the Carthaginian
armouries. The Carthaginians had been holding their Spanish hostages at
Carthago Nova and these Scipio released. Several Spanish chieftains,
including the Ilergetan leaders Andobales and Mandonius, now defected
to Scipio. 71 In 208 Scipio advanced inland and met Hasdrubal at Baecula,
north of the River Baetis (the Guadalquivir). Scipio was victorious but

68 Polyb. x. 6.2-7. 1; Livv xxv. 52-59; App. Hisp. 16.60-65, Dc Sanctis 1907-64, 44 5 ft". : (a 14). For
the date ibid. 446 n. 4. The achievements of Marcius have perhaps been exaggerated: Walbank 1957-
79, 11.136: (b 38). ft9 Livy xxvi. 1 7; App. Hisp. 17.65-67.

70 Livy xxvi. 1 8-20.6; on the chronology cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, m.ii.454 n. 18: (a 14).
Polyb. x.2-2o; Livy xxvi. 4 1-5 1; on the chronology cf. Dc Sanctis 1907-64, m.ii. 468-9 n. 58:
(a 14); Walbank 1957-79, 11.14- 15: (b 58); on the Scipionic legend see n. 147.

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

Hasdrubal was able to escape with most of his army and, despite a guard
put on the Pyrenees, reach Gaul and the route to Italy. 72

In 207 Hasdrubal was replaced by Hanno, who joined Mago in
Celtiberia. Scipio sent Iunius Silanus against them and in the ensuing
battle Hanno was captured. Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo had split up his
army and retired to Gades (Cadiz). Scipio sent his brother Lucius to
attack the town of Orongis (Jaen), south-east of Castulo. In 206 came the
decisive battle at Ilipa, just to the north of Seville. Hasdrubal fled to the
west coast, and reached Gades by sea. What remained were mopping-up
operations. Ilourgeia and Castulo, which had gone over to Carthage in
211, were captured. Ilourgeia had slaughtered refugees from the armies
of the Scipios and received the severest punishment. 73 Further south
Marcius Septimus captured Astapa, whose inhabitants committed mass
suicide. At this point Scipio fell ill and rumours of his death caused both a
revolt by Andobales and Mandonius and a mutiny in the Roman army.
When the rumours proved false the Ilergetan leaders abandoned their
plans and the mutiny was quelled, the ringleaders being executed.
Meanwhile the remnants of the Carthaginian forces in Spain were at
Gades under the command of Mago. Another Hanno had collected some
Spanish mercenaries, but he was defeated by Marcius, while C. Laelius
inflicted a naval defeat on Adherbal. Hopes of the surrender of Gades
itself, however, were thwarted. News of the severity of the punishment
of the mutineers led to another outbreak by Andobales and Mandonius
and a punitive expedition by Scipio. After the defeat of Andobales, he
and Mandonius again asked for Roman mercy and, somewhat surpris-
ingly, were granted it, a conclusion which casts doubt on Livy’s state-
ment that Scipio set out ad caedem llergetum . 74 Scipio, who had earlier
crossed to Africa to visit Syphax, next went to the west of Spain to meet
Massinissa. 75

Mago now received instructions from Carthage to sail to Italy. On
reaching Carthago Nova he attempted to attack the city, but was severely
repulsed and forced to return westwards. Gades, however, refused to
admit him and he eventually crossed to Minorca (the inhabitants of
Mallorca would not allow him to land) and from there to Genua. Gades
surrendered to the Romans. 76

Scipio returned to Rome to stand for the consulship of 205. In Spain
the command was taken over by L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius

72 Polyb. x. 34-40; Livy xxvii. 1 7-20; on the chronology cf. Dc Sanctis 1907-64, in. ii. 468-9 n. 38:
(a 14); on Hasdrubal’s escape see Walbank 1957—79, 11.252: (b 38).

73 Polyb. xi. 20-24; Livy xxviii. 1-4.4, 12.10-16, 19-2 1 . On the identification ofllourgeia, called
Iliturgi by Livy, see Walbank 1957-79, 11.305: (b 38).

74 Polyb. xi. 25— 33; Livy xxviii. 22-34.

75 Syphax: Polyb. xi. 243.4; Livy xxviii. 17.10- 18. Massinissa: Livy xxvii. 16. 12, 35. See below

pp. 62-3. 76 Livy xxviii. 36-7; on Mago in Italy see p. 56 above.

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SICILY AND SARDINIA 6 I

Acidinus. Andobales and Mandonius revolted yet again and were yet
again defeated. This time Andobales was killed in battle and Mandonius
executed. Until 200 there is no further information on events in Spain. 77

IV. SICILY AND SARDINIA

Sicily and Sardinia were the prizes won by Rome as a result of the First
Punic War and its aftermath. They were finally organized as provinces in
227 but in Sicily the kingdom of Syracuse, like the city of Messana,
remained an independent state, bound to Rome by treaty. 78 The loyalty
of the Syracusan king Hiero to Rome was unwavering. In 218 he
intercepted Carthaginian ships and warned the Roman commander of a
plan to capture Lilybaeum. In 216 and 21 5 he provided corn, money and
light-armed troops, and urged Rome to invade Africa. In 216
Carthaginian ships ravaged his kingdom. 79 But in 2 1 5 Hiero died and was
succeeded by his son Hieronymus. The latter, inspired by two of his
advisers, made approaches to Hannibal, who in his turn sent Hippocrates
and Epicydes, two Carthaginian citizens of Syracusan origin, to conclude
an alliance. Before long (2 14), however, Hieronymus was assassinated. 80
Accord was eventually reached between the various factions in Syracuse,
but Hippocrates and Epicydes claimed that the council were planning to
deliver the city into Roman control and Adranadorus, who had been the
power behind Hieronymus, was killed on suspicion of plotting a coup. In
the election of new magistrates Hippocrates and Epicydes were chosen.
By now (late 214) M. Claudius Marcellus had been appointed to com-
mand in Sicily, and as the result of a complex series of events Hippocrates
and Epicydes eventually overcame the desire of the upper-class leader-
ship to maintain peace with Rome, and Syracuse declared for Carthage.
In spring 213 Marcellus began to besiege the city. In addition a
Carthaginian force under Himilco had landed in Sicily, captured
Agrigentum, and was seeking to bring about the defection of other
towns. In 212 Marcellus captured Syracuse, aided by a plague which
virtually destroyed the Carthaginian army. The treatment of the city was
harsh, the booty enormous. 81 There remained only mopping-up oper-
ations against Carthaginian forces in Agrigentum (spring 2 1 1). Follow-
ing Marcellus’ return to Rome a new Carthaginian force landed and
secured the allegiance of several states, but they were soon recovered. 82

77 Livv xxvill. )8. 1, xxix. 1. 19-3.5. It is uncertain how far a permanent organization of Spain was
undertaken at this time, but at least some peoples were probably paying a fixed tribute in these years.
Cf. Schulten 1930, 3o8ff.: (c 28) (for financial payments see Livy xx1n.48.4ff.).

78 CAH 2 vn.ii, ch. n (b). 79 Livy xxi.49.2-6, xxn.37, 56.7. xxm.21.5, 38.13.

80 Polyb. vil. 2-5; Livy xxiv.4-7.9. For the chronology see Walbank 1957-79, 11.2: (b 38).

81 Polyb. vn. 14b, vin. 3a. 3-7, 37, ix. 10; Livy xxiv.21-39, xxv.23-31.11, xxvi.21. 1-13; Plut.
Marc. 13-21. For the chronology see Walbank 1957-79, 11.3.5-8: (b 38).

82 Livy xxv. 40. 5-4 1. 7, xxvi. 2 1.14-17.

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Marcellus’ treatment of Syracuse gave rise to an embassy of protest to
Rome, but although many senators seem to have agreed that Marcellus
had gone too far, the Senate voted to ratify his actions. 83

Little happened in Sicily after this. In 210 M. Valerius Laevinus,
through the treachery of the Numidian Muttines, recaptured
Agrigentum and transported to Rhegium a number of exiles who had
been engaging in brigandage in Sicily. Laevinus also devoted his atten-
tion to the re-establishment of Sicilian cereal farming. 84

As far as Sardinia is concerned, there were clearly many people who
were discontented with Roman rule, and in 2 1 7 the consul Cn. Servilius
Geminus demanded hostages. In 215, on the initiative of anti-Roman
forces in the island, the Carthaginians sent Hasdrubal ‘the Bald’ to attack
it, but his fleet was wrecked by a storm off the Balearic Islands. Later in
the same year Manlius Torquatus defeated the Sardinian leader
Hampsicora, and when Hasdrubal’s fleet eventually arrived Manlius
won a victory over the combined Carthaginian and Sardinian forces.
Another attack on Sardinia came in 210, but nothing more than ravaging
was achieved. 85

V. THE FINAL CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA

Until 204 Roman activity in Africa itself was confined to a series of
lightning raids. 86 A full-scale invasion by Ti. Sempronius Longus had
been planned for 218 but Hannibal’s arrival in Italy had prevented its
implementation. 87 The policy of taking the war to the enemy, even if it
had been possible after 218, was one entirely alien to the Fabian strategy,
and in 205 Scipio’s plans for an invasion of Africa were vehemently
resisted by both Fabius and Q. Fulvius Flaccus. 88

Before we come to the details of Scipio’s campaigns something must
be said about the tangled history of the Numidian princes Massinissa and
Syphax. In 2 14 or 2 1 3 the Scipios made an alliance with Syphax, king of
the Masaesyli, who had revolted from Carthage. In the ensuing conflict
the Carthaginians were aided by Gaia, king of the Massyli and father of
Massinissa. 89 In 2 1 o Syphax sent an embassy to Rome which was warmly
received while Massinissa was active in the service of Carthage. In 206
both Scipio and Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo visited Syphax in person to
solicit his support. Syphax pledged his loyalty to Scipio, but later married
Hasdrubal’s daughter and transferred his allegiance to Carthage. Fortu-

83 Livv xxvi. 26. 5-9, 29-52; Plut. Marc. 25: see below p. 78.

84 Polyb. ix. 27.11; Livy xxvi.40.

83 Livy xxii. 5 1. j, xxiii. 54. 10-17, 10-41. 7, xxvn.6.1 3-14. 86 See below pp. 66-7.

87 Polyb. hi. 40. 2, 41.2—3, 61. 8-10; Livy xxi.17.6, 51.6-7.

88 Sec below p. 73. 89 Sec above p. 57.

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THE FINAL CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA

nately for Rome, however, Massinissa had also changed sides. In 206 he
had made approaches to the Romans and met Scipio himself, though
without openly proclaiming his defection from Carthage. Before long,
however, Syphax, inspired by the Carthaginians, occupied the kingdom
of the Massyli and Massinissa was forced to flee with only a small band of
supporters. 90

In 205 Scipio had been assigned Sicily with permission to cross to
Africa if he saw fit. In that year the invasion was restricted to another in
the series of lightning raids, under the leadership of C. Laelius.
Massinissa urged Laelius to persuade Scipio to launch a major invasion as
soon as possible. 91 In 204, following the episode at Locri, Scipio did
invade and landed near Utica. A cavalry force under Hanno was defeated
by Massinissa and Scipio began to besiege Utica. In the following spring
the decisive series of events began. Hasdrubal and Syphax had camped
near Scipio, who had had no alternative to placing his winter quarters on
a narrow, rocky peninsula. 92 Their camps, however, were constructed of
wood or reeds. The details of the camps were discovered in the course of
counterfeited peace negotiations, and a night attack on them resulted in
the camps being destroyed by fire and large numbers killed. The
Carthaginians recruited fresh forces and persuaded Syphax to rejoin the
conflict. The armies met at the ‘Great Plains’, about 120 km west of
Carthage, and Scipio was victorious. After the battle Laelius and
Massinissa pursued Syphax and captured him. Massinissa was restored to
his kingdom.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians had taken the twin decisions to recall
Hannibal and Mago from Italy and to launch their fleet against Scipio’s
ships, which were engaged in the siege of Utica and quite unprepared for
a naval battle. Scipio, who had camped in sight of Carthage at Tunis, was
forced to use a wall of transport ships in defence. Sixty transports were
lost but a major disaster was averted. 93

Carthage now opened peace negotiations and a provisional agreement
was reached. Carthage was to abandon all claims to Italy, Gaul, Spain,
and the islands between Italy and Africa. Her rights to expand in Africa
itself were to be limited and Massinissa’s possession of both his own
kingdom and parts of that of Syphax were to be recognized. In addition
Carthage was to surrender prisoners and deserters, give up all but twenty

1,0 Polyb. xi. 24a. 4; Livy xxv.34.2fT., xxvn.4.5-9, 5.1 1, 20.8, xxvm.16.1 1, 17.10-18, 35,
xxix.29.5~33; App. blisp. 37.149-150. It should be emphasized that the initial approaches to the
Romans by Massinissa preceded Syphax’ attack and that it was not until 204 that Syphax declared
publicly against Rome (Livy xxix.23). In 205 Scipio was hoping for support from both Syphax and
Massinissa; cf. Brisson 1973, 277: (c 6). For the chronology cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, m.ii.5 19 n. 122:
(a 14). 91 Livy xxvnt. 45. 8, xxix. 3.6-5. 1. See below p. 67.

92 Livv xxix. 2 3-29.3, 34-35. On Scipio’s exposed position in the winter of 204/3 cf- e.g. Scullard
1970, 123-4: (h 77). 93 Polyb. xiv.i-io; Livy xxx.3-15.

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ships and pay a substantial indemnity. The Senate accepted the terms but
during the truce the Carthaginians, who were suffering from an acute
shortage of food, attacked a convoy of Roman supply ships which had
been driven ashore near Carthage, and followed this with an attack on the
ship carrying the Roman envoys sent by Scipio to protest about the
earlier incident . 94

Hannibal had now returned to Carthage, and at a meeting with Scipio
he offered peace on the terms of Rome possessing Sicily, Sardinia, Spain,
and the islands between Italy and Africa. But Scipio was determined that
Carthage should be weakened enough to eliminate the possibility of any
further aggressive actions, and so rejected Hannibal’s offer. There
followed the final and decisive conflict, the battle of Zama . 95

The peace settlement concluded after the battle contained the follow-
ing terms. Carthage was to remain free within boundaries as they were

94 Polyb. xv. 1-2; PRy/- 491; Livyx.xx.i6, 21.1 1—25.10; App. Pun. 32.1 34—1 37. Livy wrongiysays
that the Senate rejected the terms. Sec Walbank 1957-79, 11.441—2: (b 38). On the terms cf. De Sanctis
1907-64, hi. ii. 535-6: (a 14).

95 Polyb. xv.4-14; Livy xxx.29-35. For the problems associated with the battle see Walbank
1 95 7 — 79» n-446ff.: (b 38); Lazenby 1978, 22off.: (c 31).

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THE WAR AT SEA

before the war. Restitution was to be made of the goods seized during the
earlier truce. Prisoners and fugitives were to be handed over and
Carthage was to surrender all her elephants and her fleet, with the
exception of ten triremes. Carthage was to launch no attack outside her
own territory without Roman permission. Massinissa was to have all
lands possessed by his ancestors- the seed of later disputes. An indemni-
ty of 10,000 talents was to be paid in fifty annual instalments. 96 Despite
some resistance Hannibal persuaded the Carthaginians that there was no
alternative to accepting these terms. There was also opposition at Rome
from the consul of 201, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, eager to command in
Africa himself. But the assembly ratified the peace and ordered that
Scipio should administer it. 97

VI. THE WAR AT SEA 98

Unlike the First Punic War the Hannibalic War was primarily a land
conflict: for the most part the activities of the Roman and Carthaginian
fleets form part of the story of the various theatres of land engagements
and several have already been mentioned as such. It would be wrong to
conclude, however, that sea-power was not an important factor in the
war. Indeed, it is clear that Rome’s continuous numerical dominance in
the western Mediterranean was of vital importance to the whole course
of the war. It was this dominance which made it impossible for Hannibal
to transport his army by sea in 2 1 8, and equally impossible for Hasdrubal
to do so ten years later. Only once did reinforcements reach Hannibal by
sea but Rome could transport her troops to Spain and safely import
supplies of grain from Sicily, Sardinia and Egypt. 99

Neither side, however, made the best of its naval resources. The only
year when Carthage made a major maritime effort was in the Sicilian
theatre in 212, and then the Carthaginian admiral Bomilcar completely
failed to exploit the fact that, for once, the Roman fleet was outnum-
bered. 100 In the years following the recapture of Syracuse persistent
rumours of a major new Carthaginian naval offensive failed to material-
ize. Partly, no doubt, Carthage was simply unable to find the manpower
for new ships, but another factor may well have been sheer lack of
confidence in their ability to match the Romans at sea. 101 In 204, again,

96 Polyb. xv. 18; Livy xxx.37.1-6; App. Pun. 54.234-238; Walbank 1957-79, 11.466-71: (b 38).

97 Polyb. xv. 19; Livy xxx.37.7-12, 40.7-16, 42.11-43.4.

98 The fullest and most penetrating account of naval matters during the war is Thiel 1946, 32-199:
(h 60).

99 Livy xxin. 41. 10; Thiel 1946, 64,71-2: (h 60). The only other (unsuccessful) attempt to send
reinforcements to Hannibal by sea was in 205 (Livy xxvin.46. 14; App. blann. 54.226-227; Thiel, op.
cit. 150). On grain imports see n. 33.

100 On the naval side of the siege of Syracuse see Thiel 1946, 79-90: (n 60).

101 Livy xxvn.5.13 (210), 22.8 (208); Thiel 1946, 109-11: (h 60).

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Carthage failed to use her fleet to attack Scipio’s exposed camp near Utica
and even in 203 they launched their attack on Scipio’s fleet too late. 102

As to the Romans, they may be criticized for allowing Bomilcar to sail
unchallenged into the harbour of Syracuse on several occasions in 213
and 212, for the fact that Mago was able to make an attack on Carthago
Nova in 206 with a fleet consisting largely of transports, and for making
no effort to prevent either Mago from reaching Genua in 205 or
Hannibal from crossing to Africa in 203. 103 In fact the number of ships
actually in commission in 206 and subsequent years dropped sharply. In
part this may have been owing to the Senate’s belief that victories over
the Carthaginian fleet in 208 and 207 had removed all threat from the
Carthaginian navy. It is certainly true that the Romans did not have a
‘naval mentality’. They naturally thought in terms of land engagements
and saw the maritime arm as something to be employed only when they
were forced to do so by the actions of the enemy. But as far as the latter
years of the war are concerned it may be that Rome simply could not raise
the manpower needed to put all the ships it possessed into active
service. 104

It will be convenient to mention here some of the more significant
naval events which have not been touched on in other contexts. Of
particular importance is the fleet which was based at Lilybaeum - from
217 until his death in 21 1 under the continuous command ofT. Otacilius
Crassus. In 217, according to Livy, a Punic fleet making for Lilybaeum
and Italy was scattered by a storm. Three ships were captured by Hiero,
who warned the praetor M. Aemilius that a further thirty-five ships were
on their way to Lilybaeum. This fleet was then defeated by Aemilius off
Lilybaeum. Subsequently the Romans captured the island of Malta
which was held by a Carthaginian garrison. In 217, after the Roman
victory in the naval battle of the Ebro, a Carthaginian fleet tried to make
contact with the land army near Pisa and captured some Roman transport
vessels off Cosa. They were deterred from further actions, however, by a
Roman fleet under the consul Cn. Servilius Geminus, which sub-
sequently ravaged the island of Cercina off the African coast, raided the
coast itself, and placed a garrison in Cossura (Pantelleria). In 216, after
Cannae, one Carthaginian fleet attacked the territory of Syracuse, while
another stood off the Aegates Isles, ready to move on Lilybaeum if
Otacilius went to the assistance of Syracuse. Later the praetor P. Furius
Philus made a raid on Africa in which he was wounded. In 2 1 5 another
raid on Africa was launched by Otacilius and he subsequently captured

102 Ibid. 159-66. 103 Ibid. 8off., 89, 143-4, 148—9, 171—3.

104 Ibid. 1 3 9flf. ; Brum 1971, 666ff.: (h 82). Brum also suggests that in earlier years the ‘paper
strengths’ of the various squadrons were well above the actual numbers in commission. He may have
a point, but his own estimates of the numbers seem too low.

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THE WAR AND POLITICS AT ROME

seven Carthaginian ships. Otacilius’ next raid was in 212 when he
captured a large number of grain transports. 105 After Otacilius’ death the
Lilybaeum squadron was placed under the command of M. Valerius
Laevinus, the consul governing Sicily as a whole, and he launched a
further attack on Africa under the command of M. Valerius Messalla. 106
In 208 rumours of a Carthaginian naval assault on Sicily and Italy led to
an increase in the size of the Roman fleet but the alarm proved un-
founded. 107 In both this year and 207 further raids were made, and in both
years considerable victories were achieved over Carthaginian fleets. 108 In
205 Carthaginian transport ships were captured off Sardinia 109 and in 203
the Sardinian squadron intercepted some of Mago’s transports on their
return journey to Africa. 110

VII. THE WAR AND POLITICS AT ROME

There were, of course, no political parties at Rome, and political analysis
must investigate the activities and positions of individuals or groups of
individuals. Modern writers have taken widely differing views of the
nature of political divisions during the war and what follows cannot
claim to be more than a personal picture of the situation. 111

The discussion proceeds from a number of assumptions.

(i) Political activity is not something that can be carried on in isolation
and individuals are bound to group together, even if, as at Rome, such
groups are not necessarily long-lasting and there may be a constant
kaleidoscopic process of persons joining and leaving such groups.

(ii) Committed adherents of these political groups were only a minor-
ity in the Senate and no group could command a consistent majority
there. Similarly the number of votes that each group could control in the
comitia (in the case of elections, in the upper classes of the comitia
centuriata ) was limited. To secure support for a particular view, to secure
the election of a particular candidate, were things that had to be worked
for on each occasion. It has been claimed that during the Second Punic
War the assembly chose consuls simply on the grounds of military
ability, and that a choice between different groups did not come into the
matter. 112 The arguments which follow are sufficient, it is hoped, to

105 Polyb. 111.96.7- 1 4; Livy xxi.49-5 1.2 (Thiel’s doubts (44#.) concerning the authenticity of the
events described in this passage do not seem to me to be justified: Thiel 1946, 44ff.: (h 60)),
xxii. 3 1.1-7, 56.6-8, xxin. 2 1.2, 41.8-9, xxv. 5 1. 12—15; Thiel, op. cit. 52-4, 58-9, 70, 86.

106 Livy xxvii.j.8-9; Thiel 1946, 115-14: (h 60). 107 Sec n. 101.

108 Livy xxvii. 29.7-8, xxvi 11.4. 5-7; Thiel 1946, 130-2, 134-5: (h 60). 109 See n. 99.

1.0 Livy xxx. 19.5. A Carthaginian fleet had plundered Sardinia in 210 (sec p. 62) and it was not
protected by a standing squadron until 208 (Livy xxvn.22.6-8).

1.1 On the politics of the period see particularly Patterson 1942: (c 41); Scullard 1955: (h 24) and
1973, 39-88: (h 54); Cassola 1962, 259ff.: (h 35); Lippotd 1963, 1 4 7fi*. : (h 13).

1.2 Patterson 1942: (c 41).

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

refute this position. What is true, however, is that no group could hope
to secure the election of someone who was believed to be militarily
incompetent and that proven military ability might well help a candidate
to secure election even though other factors favoured his opponents. In
2 1 7 the lex Genucia forbidding iteration of the consulship within ten years
was suspended for the duration of the war. 113 This made the election of
untried men more difficult and helps to explain the political pattern
which will be outlined below.

(iii) In the pre-Gracchan period it is reasonable to regard th egens as an
important political unit and to assume, as a working hypothesis, that
those closely related to each other worked together politically. But such
an assumption cannot be extended to all the members of long-established
and, by the late third century, widely spread families such as the Cornelii
or the Sempronii. We shall see that Sempronius Longus, the consul of
218, has a different allegiance to that of Sempronius Gracchus, the consul
of 2 1 5 and 213, and that in 201 a Cornelius Lentulus is clearly opposed to
Cornelius Scipio. 114

(iv) Though individual cases of collegiality or succession in office can
prove nothing (and in particular the influence of presiding officers at
elections must not be overestimated 115 ), when members of two different
gentes are found a number of times in close connection with one another,
that does constitute evidence for association between the two families.

(v) Though the main aim of political groups may often have been no
more than securing office for their members, there may be occasions
when they differed on matters of substance and when the comi'tia , in
voting for candidates for office, were choosing between policies as well
as between men.

From the point of view of Roman strategy the war falls into three clearly
defined phases. First, the period of meeting Flannibal in open conflict
with the three disasters of the T rebbia, Trasimene and Cannae. Secondly,
the period from Cannae until 205, when Roman policy was fundamen-
tally defensive, and thirdly, the final period of the invasion of Africa, first
planned, it will be recalled, in 2 1 8. The significant point is that it is in the
first and third of these periods that the consulship is held by the Scipios
and those associated with them. In the intervening period, there is only
one instance, and that not certain, of a ‘Scipionic’ consul. This should not
be regarded as a coincidence, and we may conclude that the ‘forward
strategy’ was that advocated by the Scipios and opposed by other leading

1.3 Livy xxvii. 6. 7.

1.4 For both the importance of the gens and the limits of its influence see particularly Livy
XXXV. 10.9.

n5 On the role of the presiding officer see particularly Rilinger 1976: (h 21).

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THE WAR AND POLITICS AT ROME 69

families. In 205 Scipio’s proposal to invade Africa met with strong
opposition from Fabius and Q. Fulvius Flaccus. 116 That does not mean,
however, that all those opposed to the Scipios were members of one
group: all that united them was opposition to the Scipios and the failed
strategy. (It is not, of course, being suggested that in the immediate
aftermath of Cannae supporters of the Scipios were still arguing in
favour of the strategy that had failed. But both the strategy and those
who had supported it were discredited.)

We may now examine the consular colleges of the war in more detail
(see Table, pp. 525-8). In 2 1 8 the consuls were P. Cornelius Scipio and Ti.
Sempronius Longus: the sons of the two shared the consulship in 194.
The original plan, as we have seen, was to fight the war outside Italy -
Scipio was to go to Spain and Sempronius to invade Africa. Fabius,
moreover, may well have been opposed to going to war at all. 117 The
consuls of 217 were C. Flaminius and Cn. Servilius Geminus, of 216
L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro. Nothing can be surmised
about the allegiance of Servilius, but Paullus’ daughter was married to
Scipio Africanus and in the second century the close relationship be-
tween Aemilii and Cornelii Scipiones is beyond doubt. 118 We have
already noticed the unacceptability of the picture of Varro presented by
both Polybius and Livy, 119 and Livy’s portrayal of Flaminius as an
upstart demagogue opposed by virtually the whole of the rest of the
nobility 120 is equally unconvincing. In fact both Flaminius and Varro
may well have had the support of the Scipios. 121 It is probably true that
they were men willing to make a wider popular appeal - at least to those
whose votes mattered in the comitia centuriata - than was normal for the
governing class and that the Scipios were less opposed to this than were
their political opponents. Flaminius was certainly no friend of Fabius,
with whom he had clashed violently over his law for the viritane
assignation of ager public ns in Picenum in 252. 122 M. Minucius Rufus, the
magister equitum of 217, whose views on strategy were clearly close to
those of the consuls of 218-216, may also be linked with the Scipios. 123
There is nothing strange in both Fabius and Minucius being elected at
the same time by the assembly, any more than in two consuls of different

1,6 Livy xxviii. 40-45. 1,7 See above p. 45.

1.8 See in general the genealogical table in Scullard 197}, 309: (h 54). Observe that the father of
Paullus’ daughter-in-law, C. Papirius Maso, and Scipio’s brother-in-law M. Pomponius Matho were
consuls together in 231 (sec further Additional Note pp. 79-80).

1.9 See above pp. 5 1—2. Notice also that Polybius seeks to put the blame for the Trebbia on to
Sempronius Longus and to absolve Scipio: 111.70.1fT.; Walbank 1957-79, 1.404: (b 38). For the
complex issue of the elections for 216 see Additional Note pp. 79-80.

120 Livy xxi.6j, xxii. 1. j-8.

121 I accept in its essentials the view of Scullard 1973, 44fT.: (h 54). 122 Cic. Sen. 11.

123 Another Minucius, Q. Minucius Thcrmus (/r. pi. 201, cos. 193), was a strong supporter of
Africanus at the end of the war (Livy xxx.40.9-16, 43.2-3).

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7°

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

views or factions being elected as colleagues. Nor should we reject the
story of the equalization of the imperium of Fabius and Minucius: 124 in an
emergency constitutional oddities are always possible. The unpopularity
of Fabius’ strategy, together with Minucius’ broader appeal, produced a
situation where there was enough support to downgrade Fabius but not
enough for the complete deposition of a man of proven military ability.
The bill for the equalization of imperium was tribunician and was there-
fore passed in the tribal assembly where support for Minucius may have
been stronger than in the comitia centuriata 125 (we may note that it was
proposed by a Metilius and that in 220 Flaminius as censor had given his
support to a lex Metilia de fullonibus 126 ).

We now move into the period when the offensive strategy is com-
pletely abandoned and in which, until the second consulship of M. Livius
Salinator in 207, there is no consul whom there is any reason to link with
the Scipios. But it would be wrong to think that all the consuls of this
period were closely linked to and supported by the great Cunctator. It
does appear that in the first three years after Cannae Fabius was able to
ensure that the consulship was held by himself or his close associates. In
215, following the death of the consul-elect L. Postumius Albinus, M.
Claudius Marcellus was elected as colleague for Ti. Sempronius Grac-
chus, but was subsequently declared vitio creatus by the college of augurs,
of which Fabius was the senior member (he had been elected in 265), and
Fabius himself was elected in Marcellus’ place. In 214, when it appeared
that T. Otacilius Crassus and M. Aemilius Regillus were about to be
elected, Fabius intervened and secured the election of himself and
Marcellus instead. 127 Otacilius was married to Fabius’ niece, while
Otacilius and Marcellus were half-brothers. 128 It is reasonable to think
that Marcellus accepted his removal from office in 21 5 on the assurance
of Fabius’ support for the elections for 214. As for Otacilius, he may well
have been no more than a competent second-rater whom Fabius, despite
his relationship to him, did not regard as of sufficient calibre for the
consulship. 129 In 21 3 Fabius’ son held the consulship together with Ti.
Sempronius Gracchus. As Gracchus had been consul with Fabius him-
self in 215, we may classify him as a Fabian ally.

It is at this point that a break comes. The three years of Fabian
dominance meant that senior members of other leading families, though
serving as praetors, had not held the consulship. This naturally led to
resentment, and the lack of any striking success by Fabius helped to

See above p. 51. 125 Livy xxn.25.3. Sec further p. 73 below.

126 Pliny, HN xxxv.197. ,r? Livy xxm.31.1 2-14, xxiv.7. 1 2-9.3.

128 Livy xxiv. 8. 11; Plut. Marc. 2. iff.

129 The claim attributed to Fabius (Livy xxiv.8. 14-16) that Otacilius had been incompetent as
fleet commander at Lilvbacum is not justified. Sec Thiel 1946, 71 n. 117: (h 60).

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THE WAR AND POLITICS AT ROME 7]

create a change. It is wrong, however, to think of the non-Fabian consuls
of 2 1 2-2 10 as a united group. They were: in 2 1 2 Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who
had held his first consulship as long ago as 237, and Ap. Claudius
Pulcher, the senior member of the senior branch of the patrician Claudii;
in 211 Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and P. Sulpicius Galba; and in 210
M. Valerius Laevinus (whose colleague was M. Claudius Marcellus).
These consuls have been described as constituting a ‘Fulvio-Claudian’
group, 130 but though relations between Fulvii, Sulpicii and Valerii
Laevini 131 can be traced over a considerable period - the consul of 212
was married to a Sulpicia and the son of the consul of 210 was the half-
brother of M. Fulvius Nobilior, the consul of 1 89 132 - there is no reason
to link the Claudii, and Ap. Claudius Pulcher in particular, with them.
The consuls of 2 1 2 may have been united by nothing more than common
rivalry with Fabius. We may note their strong differences over the
treatment of the leaders of the Campanian revolt following the fall of
Capua. 133 Claudius and Fulvius probably canvassed for office with a
pledge to achieve more than Fabius and his friends, but there was no
difference in their basic approach to the war. 134

Marcellus’ success at Syracuse made him a political force in his own
right and his election to the consulship of 2 1 o need not be seen as a Fabian
success, particularly as Fabius himself seems to have been defeated by M.
Valerius Laevinus. The accusations of the Sicilians against Marcellus
were supported by M. Cornelius Cethegus, which causes no surprise, and
Marcellus was criticized in the Senate by T. Manlius Torquatus, who had
withdrawn from consideration for the consulship of 2 10. 135 Manlius’
political position must be left uncertain. 136

In these years Marcellus appears to have been eager to confront
Hannibal in a pitched battle and eventually met his death in an ambush in
208. 137 But of course the dangers of open conflicts were by now far less

130 Scullard 1973, 6ifT.: (h 54).

131 These three families, together, with the Postumii and the Manlii, form the core of what I have
elsewhere called the ‘Fulvian group’. Relations between members of this group, and opposition to
the Scipios and their supporters, can, I believe, be traced over a period of more than fifty years. (The
refusal of Laevinus to nominate Fulvius Flaccus as dictator in 2io(Livy xxvii.5.1 jff.) is probably to
be regarded as pique at the rejection of his proposal to nominate M. Valerius Mcssalla and is not a
counter-indication to the picture here presented.)

132 Cf. Munzer, PIP' VH.246 (Sulpicia); Polyb. x.xi. 29.11 (Fulvius and Valerius Laevinus).

133 Livy xxvi. 15-16.4; cf. p. 77.

134 The feeling that new men were needed perhaps explains why Sulpicius who had held no
previous curule office could be elected for 2i 1 and why P. Licinius Crassus could become pontijex
maxintus and censor in 212 and 210 respectively (see below).

135 Livy xxvi.22.12, 26.8, 32.1.

136 In 231 both Manlius and Fulvius Flaccus were deprived of their censorship by the augural
college. Scullard 1973, 37: (h 54), thinks this alienated Fulvius, but strangely regards Manlius as still
‘Fabian’ (5 8, 65). The only reason for regarding him as ‘Fulvian’ is the position of other Manlii in the
second century. 137 See p. 55 above.

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JZ THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

than they had been after Cannae and, though Fabius himself held a fifth
consulship with Q. Fulvius Flaccus in 209, both the need for a Fabian
strategy and the period of Fabian influence were coming to an end.

The first overt sign of change 138 is the election of M. Livius Salinator
to a second consulship in 207. He had been consul in 219 with L.
Aemilius Paullus and convicted of peculatus during the Second Illyrian
War. C. Claudius Nero, his colleague in 207, had been a prosecution
witness at his trial and Paullus too had nearly been brought down. 139 The
Livii and the Aemilii seem to have had close links over a long period 140
and it is reasonable to see the trial as an anti-Scipionic move. Livius,
though, may have felt that his allies had not done enough to help him at
his trial, and he is not necessarily to be viewed as a whole-hearted
Scipionic supporter in the latter years of the war. In 203 Salinator
advocated delaying discussion of Scipio’s peace terms until the return of
one of the consuls. 141 (Little can be made of the fact that it was Laevinus
and Marcellus, the consuls of 210, who brought him home from self-
imposed exile, whilst the Scipionic censors (see below) made him return
to public life. Nor is it easy to see what significance is to be attached to the
fact that Salinator was the son-in-law of Pacuvius Calavius, the leader of
the revolt of Capua 142 .) Nevertheless the news that Hasdrubal was on his
way meant that an open battle could not be avoided and that would create
a desire to make use of the services of an experienced consular who had
not been involved in the defensive strategy of the Fabian period. The
Fabians and Fulvians perhaps found Livius, with his now much looser
ties with the Scipios, more acceptable than a younger man from the heart
of the Scipionic bloc, and the Scipios did not have sufficient strength to
impose their own choice on the assembly.

But though Livius is the first consul with the slightest Scipionic links
since 216, the resurgence of the Scipios in other ways begins earlier. In
212 P. Licinius Crassus, who had not yet held the praetorship, became
pontifex maximus , defeating two senior consulars, Q. Fulvius Flaccus and
T. Manlius Torquatus, for the post, and in 210 he was elected censor. 143
He was Scipio’s colleague as consul in 205 and all his actions as pontifex
maximus show him in conflict with those who, on other grounds, can be
regarded as opponents of the Scipios. 144 In 210, as we have seen, the

138 I am unable to assess the position of T. Quinctius Crispinus, consul in 208.

139 Livy xxn. 35. 3, xxvii. 34. 10.

140 The first Livius to hold the consulship had M. Aemilius Paullus as his colleague. The next is
our Livius, with L. Aemilius Paullus as his colleague. In 236 M. Livius Salinator was decemvir sacris
faciundis with M. Aemilius Lepidus. In the next generation there is a M. Livius Aemilianus, possibly a
son of Paullus adopted by his colleague. This is a case where evidence of collegiality can properly be
used to demonstrate links between a major and a minor family. 141 Livy xxx.23.1.

142 Livy xxni. 2.6, xxvii. 34.5-6. 143 Livy xxv.5.2— 4, xxvii. 6. 7 - 18 .

144 See Briscoe 1973, 80, and 1981, 22—3: (b 3 and 4).

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future Africanus was elected to the command in Spain. It may be that
there was no opposition, and the prestige of his father and uncle
increased his attractiveness. But the decision did mean the replacement of
C. Claudius Nero and the appointment cannot be regarded as anything
other than a Scipionic success. The election was made in the tribal
assembly which was, in principle at least, more democratic than the
comitia centuriata. ui It was suggested earlier that the Scipios had a broader
‘popular’ appeal than their opponents and it is remarkable that though
Scipionic successes in the centuriate assembly were rare, they had a great
deal of success in the election of aediles held in the tribal assembly. Of the
ten known patrician curule aediles between 2 17 and 213 six are Cornelii.
Between 216 and 202 we know the names of 13 curule aediles from
plebeian gentes and six came from families closely connected with the
Scipios.

In 206 comes the real resurgence of Scipionic control of the consulate.
In that year the consuls were Q. Caecilius Metellus, a consistent sup-
porter of Scipio against his opponents in the final years of the war, 146 and
L. Veturius Philo, son of the man who had held the censorship with
Crassus. In 205 come Scipio and Crassus, and in 204 P. Cornelius
Cethegus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus. The latter’s position is uncer-
tain: no other Sempronius Tuditanus can plausibly be regarded as
Scipionic and the allegiance of the Sempronii Longi cannot prove
anything about a Tuditanus.

Scipio was determined to carry the war to Africa, but, as we have seen,
his plan was strongly opposed by Fabius and Fulvius Flaccus. They were
doubtless alarmed by the growth of Scipio’s personal prestige, and the
stories of Spaniards saluting Scipio as a king and the popular belief that
he was divinely inspired increased that alarm. 147 But there is no need to
doubt that Fabius and Fulvius genuinely believed that an invasion of
Africa would create unnecessary dangers and that the first task was to
drive Hannibal out of Italy. The following years see a series of attempts
by his opponents to deprive Scipio of the final victory. In 204 Fabius
wanted him recalled because of the Locri scandal, in 203 Cn. Servilius
Caepio attempted to cross to Sicily, in 202 both consuls wanted the
command in Africa, and in 201 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus obstructed the
confirmation of the peace concluded with Carthage by Scipio. 148
Throughout, tribunes loyal to Scipio defended his interests and carried
the matter to the tribal assembly which gave him continual support. It

H5 See p. 70 above. 146 Livy xix.20. i, xxx.23.3, 27.2.

147 Cf. p. 68. On the salutation see Polvb. x. 10.2-9; Livy xxvn.19.3-6. On the Scipionic legend:
Scullard 1970, 2 3 3 fiT. : (h 77); Walbank 1967: (h 79).

M8 Livy xxtx.19.4ff., xxx. 24. 1 1 (though the story is not above suspicion), 27. 1 (Livy’s statement
that Claudius Nero was given imperium par to that of Scipio should be rejected), 40.7#.

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

would be wrong, chough, to think that the consuls of 203-201 were
motivated merely by personal ambition and animosity towards Scipio. A
consul could reasonably expect to command in a major theatre of war and
the continued prorogation of Scipio’s command negated this principle.

It will be noticed that the consuls of the last three years of the war
included a Cornelius Lentulus and two Servilii, a family which had had
close links with the Caecilii Metelli 149 and one of whose members had
held the consulship in 217. It may be that in fact neither the Lentuli nor
the Servilii had been Scipionic supporters at any point during the
Hannibalic War. But it could be that though they had earlier been
connected with the Scipionic group, the growth of Scipio’s personal
prestige and power led them to join his opponents.

VIII. MANPOWER AND FINANCE

There can be no doubt that one of the vital factors in Rome’s eventual
success in the Hannibalic War was her reserves of manpower from
Roman citizens, Latins and Italian allies, especially in comparison with
the difficulties which the Carthaginians had in recruiting their own
citizens and their over-dependence on foreign and mercenary troops. 150
The unreliability of casualty figures and uncertainties about the number
of legions in action year by year 151 - though the basic authenticity of the
legion lists in Livy should not be doubted - make it impossible to form a
meaningful estimate of the total number of men under arms during the
war, but a recent calculation suggests that the total at any given time,
including those serving with the fleet, reached a peak (in 212) of about
240,000. 152 That is not to say that the figure was reached easily. Many
legions may have been under strength and, as we have seen, lack of
manpower provides part, at least, of the explanation for Rome’s failure to
realize the full capacity of its fleet. 153 Many emergency measures were
taken: after Cannae criminals, debtors and slaves (yolones) were enrolled,
and in both 2 14 and 2 10 the rich were compelled to give their own slaves
to the state as rowers and to provide their pay as well. 154 In 216 and 212
those under the normal military age were enrolled and Livy’s language
suggests that the minimum census qualification was ignored (it was
doubtless in the course of the Second Punic War that the minimum

149 Badian 1964, 36: (a 4). 150 Cf. Livy xxix.3.12.

151 For the different views cf. Toynbee 1963, 11.6471?'.: (a 37); Brunt 1971, 645 ff.: (h 82).

152 Brunt 1971, 422: (h 82); cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, m.ii.288: (a 14).

153 See above p. 66.

134 Livy xxii. 57. 11, xxiii. 14. 3, xx1v.11.7-9, xxvi.35, xxxiv.6. 1 2-1 3. I see no reason to believe
rhar Roman proletarii , other than freedmen, were not utilized for na val service, as claimed by Thiel
1946, 1 2 n. 28: (h 60).

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SUBJECTS AND ALLIES

qualification for the fifth class was lowered from 1 1,000 asses).' 55 In 208
maritime colonies not normally liable for military service were com-
pelled to provide soldiers. 156 The demands made by the Senate in relation
to losses suffered bore particularly heavily on communities liable to a
fixed levy. In 209 twelve Latin colonies claimed that they were unable to
provide the soldiers demanded from them. 157

The war was expensive of money as well as men. It was the shortage of
silver and bronze that was responsible for the reform of the Roman
monetary system about 21 2. 158 We have seen that the masters who
provided slave rowers had to pay them as well. Heavy imposts of tributum
were levied throughout the war, 159 but even that did not give the aerarium
sufficient for all its military needs. In 215 the Scipios had to find the
money to pay their troops by levies on Spanish peoples. For other
supplies needed for Spain the companies of publicani submitted bids on
condition that the state would pay when money was available. The
contractors were dispensed from military service and the Senate agreed
that the state should bear any losses arising from storms (two publicani
were said to have taken advantage of this last condition by using old ships
and falsifying the records of the goods being carried in them). The
following year contractors offered of their own accord a similar pro-
cedure for the upkeep of temples and the provision of horses for
magistrates. Owners of slaves manumitted as volones similarly offered to
wait until the end of the war for their money, and trustees of the property
of widows and orphans loaned money to the treasury. In 210 voluntary
contributions were made by all sections of the Roman people and use was
made of a previously untouched gold reserve. 160 In 204 it was agreed to
treat these contributions as loans and repay them in three instalments. 161

IX. SUBJECTS AND ALLIES

Polybius and Livy give lists of the Italian communities which defected
from Rome in the aftermath of Cannae. The lists contain the names of a
number of peoples whose defection in fact occurred later than 216, but
the immediate toll is still formidable. 162 The remarkable thing, though, is
that it was not more serious. In Italy the defections were limited to the

155 Livv xxn. 57.9, xxv. 5.7-9. The census figure for the fifth class attributed to Servius Tullius in
Livy 1-43.7 is plausibly regarded as the Second Punic War figure. By the time of Polybius (vi. 19.2) it
was 4,000 asses. 156 Livy xxvn.38.3-5.

157 Livv xxvn.9.7— 10. io, xxix. 1 5. In these circumstances it seems impossible to believe that the
remnants of those defeated at Cannae, later joined by those defeated under Cn. Fulvius Ccntumalus
in 2 10, were really forced to remain in Sicily for the duration of the war without being permitted to
see active service. See Brunt 1971, 654-5: (h 82).

158 See Crawford 1964 and 1974, i.28ff.: (b 86 and 88). 159 Livy xxvi.35.5.

160 Livy xxiii. 48. 5, 48.6-49.4 (cf. Badian 1972, i6ff.:(H 32)), xxiv.18. 10-1 5, xxv.3.8-4, xxvi.36,
xxvii.io.ii. 161 Cf. Briscoe 1973, 91: (b 3). 162 See n. 43.

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76 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

south, together with some but not all of the Samnites. 163 Despite
complaints about the demands that the war was making on them, no
community of Roman citizens, no Latin town joined Hannibal. 164 Not-
withstanding Hannibal’s victory at Trasimene, Etruria remained funda-
mentally loyal: in the later years of the war there were constant suspicions
of attempts at defection in Etruria and military precautions were taken,
but nothing of any substance occurred. 165 Nor did Hannibal gain all that
much military assistance from the states that did defect. This was largely
because their own resources were fully stretched in resisting Roman
efforts to recapture them, but that apart they saw Hannibal as a means of
gaining their independence from Rome: they were not willing to fight
outside their own territory for Hannibal’s interests. 166 Similarly, though
the Gauls of the Po valley welcomed Hannibal as a liberator in 21 8 167 and
the control established in that region by Rome in the 220s was lost, they
made no independent attempt to embarrass Rome and did not even
succeed in capturing Placentia and Cremona, the twin symbols of Roman
occupation, during the course of the war. 168 Hannibal enrolled Gallic
troops in his army at the beginning of the war, but after Cannae, when he
was operating entirely in the south of Italy, it was impossible for further
reinforcements to reach him from the north.

From the point of view of both manpower and supplies the loyalty of
the allies was essential to Rome’s survival. Hannibal realized this as well
as anyone, and we have seen that in the early battles he went out of his
way to treat captured Roman citizens and allies in different ways. 169 But
his attitude to those who resisted him was uncompromising. One may

163 On the Samnites see Salmon 1967, (h 151) (with a list of southern peoples who

remained loyal to Rome).

164 Complaints: Livy xxvit.9. The assertion attributed by Livy (xxm.12.16) to Hanno that no
individual Roman or Latin had defected is exaggerated. Roman citizens were clearly among
deserters from the army: sec n. 18 1.

165 Sec in particular Harris 1971, 1 3 iff.: (h i 36); contra Pfiflig 1966: (c 42). I am not convinced by
the argument of Thiel 1946, 147: (h 60), and Pfiflig 1966, 2o5ff.: (c 42) (following Mommsen) that
the voluntary contributions from Etruscan cities for Scipio’s fleet (Livy xxvm.43.14ff.) were really
penalties imposed on these cities for actual or presumed disloyalty.

166 See Salmon 1967, 298: (h i 5 1), quoting the agreement between Hannibal and Capua that no

Capuan should serve with Hannibal against his will. Sec also Hannibal’s guarantee to Tarentum
(Polyb. vili. 2 5. 2; Livy xxv.8.8). One may note that not a single Nuccrine was willing to serve with
Hannibal (Livy xxm.i 5.5). There arc indications that in some cases the upper classes remained loyal
to Rome (Livy xxm.14.7, xxiv.2.8, 3.8,47.12; Plut. Marc. 10.2), but it would be wrong to sec the
choice between Rome and Carthage as a class issue. Cf. in general Ungern-Stcrnberg 1973, 5 4ff.:
(c 59). 167 But cf. n. 28.

168 See Briscoe 1973, 84: (b 3). For Gallic support for Mago cf. Livy xxix.5, xxx.18. That the
Cauls of the Po valley gave their support to Hasdrubal is not specifically attested but can be assumed.

169 Polyb. 111.69.2, 77.3, 85.3; Livy xxi.48.10, xxn.50.6, 58.2, xxin. 1 5.4,8. The story of
Hannibal’s crucifixion of the guide who took him to Casilinum instead of Casinum (Livy xxii. i 3.5-
9) is not a counter-example, as the story itself is highly suspect: cf. De Sanctis 1907—64, m.ii. 125: (a
14); Ungern-Sternberg 1975, i8ff.: (c 59). For Hannibal’s reputation for cruelty see Walbank 1967,
1 5 1 : ( H 79)-

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SUBJECTS AND ALLIES

mention in 218 his massacre of the Taurini; in 217 his slaughter of all
those of military age who came into his hands in Umbria and Picenum
and his massacre of the inhabitants of Gerunium; in 216 his destruction
of Nuceria; in 2 1 3 his treatment of the family of Dasius Altinus, who had
fled from Arpi to the Roman camp; 170 in 210 his devastation of those
parts of Italy which appeared about to rejoin Rome following the
recapture of Capua 171 and his destruction of the town of Herdonea, the
population being transplanted to Metapontum. 172

But the record of the Romans’ treatment of defectors is far grimmer
reading yet. Roman policy was to deter by punishment, not to conciliate
by humane treatment. In 216 Nolan traitors were executed by Marcel-
lus, 173 in 212 Thurian and Tarentine hostages at Rome who had escaped
from captivity were recaptured and thrown from the Tarpeian rock: the
severity of this action seems to have been an important factor in the
subsequent defection of Tarentum. 174 Laevinus sold all the inhabitants of
Agrigentum into slavery, Fabius did the same to 30,000 Tarentines. 175
But it was for Capua that Roman anger was particularly intense. 176
Despite the doubts of his colleague Ap. Claudius Pulcher, Q. Fulvius
Flaccus ordered the execution of the leaders of the rebellion in Capua and
other Campanian towns. The Senate decided that Capua should cease to
be a self-governing community and all its land was declared ager publicus
populi Komani. Later the Senate decided that the populations of the
secessionist towns in Campania should be transplanted, some beyond the
Liris, others beyond the Tiber. 177 Though some Campanian land was let
or sold, what we know of Campania in the second century b.c. indicates
that in fact this massive transplantation was never carried out. 178

Scipio was as fierce as anyone in wreaking retribution on Rome’s
enemies. He ordered his troops to kill all they encountered in Carthago
Nova. 179 Ilourgeia, whose inhabitants had killed those who had fled
thither after the defeat of the Scipios in 2 1 1 , was razed to the ground and
every living human being butchered. 180 It was Scipio, too, who executed
the leaders of the Locrian rebellion and who went so far as to crucify
Roman citizens among the deserters handed over by Carthage as part of
the peace treaty after the battle of Zama. 181

The hesitation of an Ap. Claudius Pulcher was unusual, and the

170 Polyb. hi. 60. 10, 86.11, 100.4; Livy xxm.15, xxiv.45 . 1 5-14.

171 Livy xxvi. 3 8. 1-5; Diod. Sic. xxvn.9; cf. Polyb. ix.26; Dc Sanctis 1907-64, ni.ii.457: (a 14);
Salmon 1967, 500 n. 2: (h 151).

172 Livy xxvii. 1. 14. Appian ( Hann . 57.259) states that the town of Petclia was given to the
Bruttians, but does not record the fate of the original inhabitants.

173 Livy xxiii. 17.2. 174 Livy xxv. 7. 10-8.2. 175 Livy xxvi.40. 13, xxvii. 16.7.

176 Livy xxvi. 1.5, 15.9. 177 Livy xxvi. 1 5-16, 33-34. 178 Cf. Briscoe 1973, 152: (b 5).

179 Polyb. x. 15.4-5. 180 See above, p. 60.

181 Livy xxix. 8. 2, xxx.43.1 3 (the corruption at the beginning of the sentence cannot cast doubt on
Romani in crucem sublati).

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

execution of leaders of a rebellion was not something that would be
challenged in the Senate. The accusations against M. Claudius Marcellus
which found some sympathy at Rome concerned his carrying off large
quantities of works of art from Syracuse . 182 Fabius behaved with more
circumspection at Tarentum, though his treatment of the inhabitants was
far more severe than that inflicted by Marcellus on the Syracusans . 183

Despite their utter dependence on the support of their Italian allies the
Senate would not countenance any change in the existing structure of the
Italian confederation. After Cannae a proposal that two senators from
each Latin town should receive Roman citizenship and become members
of the Roman Senate was, Livy says, shouted down . 184 To the Roman
governing class, it seems, any change in the existing situation would have
been a partial victory for Hannibal. It was, moreover, on allied land that
most of the fighting took place. When troops were no longer operating
on ager Romanus the Senate was concerned to see that Roman citizens
could resume agricultural production - ut in agros reducendae plebis curam
haberent , 185 It is perhaps not mere chance that there is no mention of
doing anything to help the allies in a similar situation.

x. conclusion

It would go far beyond the scope of the present chapter to attempt an
assessment of the results of the Second Punic War. The effect on agrarian
developments in the second century of the devastation of large parts of
Italy and the continuous absence on military service of many small
farmers will be treated elsewhere. The fact that Rome won the war
without making a single concession to her allies doubtless helped to
harden the Senate’s attitude towards any changes in subsequent years.
Despite the differences between individuals and groups the war was won
by the traditional governing class. The overall direction of the war
belonged to the Senate, and its eventual success will go a long way to
explaining the increasing power of the Senate in the second century. All
the successful commanders in the war were members of established
nobilis families. It may not be entirely coincidental that in the second
century the domination of the consulship by those with consular ances-
tors is particularly striking . 186

As to foreign policy, some will hold that the victory over Carthage led
the Senate to look immediately for fields for fresh conquests. Those, like

182 See above p. 6 1.

183 Livy xxvii. >6.8. One may note that L. Pinarius received no criticism for forestalling a possible
rebellion at Cnna by butchering its citizens at an assembly (Livy xxiv. 3 7-39.9: aut malo aut necessario
facinore (xxiv.39.7) is, of course, Livy’s own comment). 184 Livy xxm.22.4— 9.

185 Livy xxviii. 1 1.8. 186 Cf. Scullard 1973, 9: (h 54).

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THE ELECTIONS FOR 2 l6 B.C. 79

the present writer, who incline to the view that the declaration of war on
Macedon in 200 was not undertaken for reasons of aggressive imperial-
ism, see a different link with the Hannibalic War. The presence of
Hannibal on Italian soil for sixteen years, winter and summer, made a
profound impression on the minds of the Senate, and fear of another
foreign invasion was uppermost in the minds of many senators not only
in 200 — when it was not entirely irrational - but also at other critical
moments in the next 50 years, though after 196 it is highly unlikely that
any of Rome’s potential enemies seriously considered launching an
invasion of Italy.

ADDITIONAL NOTH: THE ELECTIONS FOR 216 b.c.

Livy’s account of the election of C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paullus as
consuls for 216 (xxii.3 3 .9 — 3 5 .4) has given rise to a great deal of controversy. 187 It
is not possible here to discuss the different views in detail; the following merely
sets out the problem and the interpretation accepted by the present writer.

(i) Livy begins by saying that the Senate wrote to the consuls asking one of
them to come to Rome for the elections. The consuls replied that this was not
possible and suggested elections under the presidency of an interrex. The Senate,
however, preferred a dictator to be appointed. L. Veturius Philo was appointed
and he chose M. Pomponius Matho as his magister equitum. They, however, were
declared vitiocreati, and resigned on their fourteenth day in office. An interregnum
then began.

The fact that the consuls could have held the elections shows that we are still
in the consular year 217/16. But when at 53.12 Livy says ad interregnum res rediit
the year is at an end, as is confirmed by the following sentence consulibus
prorogatum in annum imperium . It is, then, probably that the consuls suggested that
the elections should be held by an interrex because they did not think there was
sufficient time for a dictator to hold them. The dictator and his magister equitum
are clearly Scipionic supporters. Philo was censor in 210 with the young P.
Licinius Crassus, his son consul in 206 with Q. Caecilius Metellus. Africanus’
mother Pomponia was probably the sister of Matho, and the latter’s consular
colleague in 2} 1 was C. Papirius Maso, whose daughter married the son of L.
Aemilius Paullus. The responsibility for declaring that the dictator and his
magister equitum had been vitio creati will have lain with the augural college, and
the influence of Fabius must be suspected. His motive will not have been so
much to avoid the election being conducted by a Scipionic supporter, for, as we
have seen, the influence of the presiding officer must not be exaggerated. There
was, rather, a positive advantage in having the election conducted by an interrex.
For it seems that an interrex put one name to the comitia at a time, which had to
accept or reject it. The process would continue until someone obtained a
majority. 188 It was thus easier to block an election than to get someone elected,

131 For bibliography see Sumner 1975, 210 n. 1: (c 57). Gruen 1978 (c 2 oa).

"* Accepting the arguments of Staveley 19)4-5: (n 26) (though not his interpretation of this
election).

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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

and Fabius may have hoped that he would have to step in at the last moment.

It cannot be excluded, however, that Livy’s statement that the dictator and his
magister equitum had to resign because they were vitio creati is mistaken. There is
no mention of their abdication in the Fasti , and it could be that they simply failed
to hold the elections before 14 March when their office came to an end with the
consular year. 189

(ii) Livy goes on to say that the elections were held under the second interrex
P. Cornelius Asina. Varro, strongly opposed by the patres , was gaining support
by his attacks on Fabius, but was defended by his relative, the tribune Q. Baebius
Herennius. None of the three patrician candidates (P. Cornelius Merenda, L.
Manlius Vulso and M. Aemilius Lepidus) could gain a majority and Varro alone
was elected. Against his will L. Aemilius Paullus was persuaded to stand and,
under Varro’s presidency, was elected. Now the Baebii are a family linked with
the Aemilii over a long period, 190 and Baebius’ support for Varro constitutes
further evidence for the view that Varro had the support of the Scipionic group.
We can, then, reject Livy’s picture of the conflict as one between plebsand nobiles
and with it that part of Baebius’ speech which is a wholesale attack on the nobiles,
though it is probable enough that Baebius should have criticized the invalida-
tion of Philo’s dictatorship (54.10).

The first interrex could not hold the elections. 191 Livy’s words proditi sunt a
patribus appear to apply to both interreges , but at v.} 1.8 he clearly envisages each
interrex nominating his successor. If that happened in 216, it may seem puzzling
that C. Claudius Centho should have nominated a Cornelius. Claudius, however,
may have been more hostile to the Fabii than to the Scipios and again the
influence of the interrex should not be overestimated: there is no need to hold
that the interrex himself decided whose names to put to the comitia. w 2 After the
election of Varro, the interregnum was at an end and Paullus was elected in the
ordinary way. The two original Scipionic candidates, P. Cornelius Merenda and
M. Aemilius Lepidus, will have retired in his favour, though he may still have
been opposed by L. Manlius Vulso.

189 Cf. Sumner 1973, 232: (c 57). q- B r j scoe 1973, 70-1: (b 3).

191 Asconius p. 43c. 192 Thus Stavelev 1954-;, 207: (h 26).

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CHAPTER 4

ROME AND GREECE TO 205 B.C.

R . M . E R R I N G T O N

I. THE EARLIEST CONTACTS

The Romans had had state-to-state contacts, both friendly and un-
friendly, with Greek communities and kings of the Greek world east of
the Adriatic for many generations before the first trans-Adriatic military
adventure in 229 b.c. At a different level, Italian traders were no
strangers to the opposite coast of the Adriatic, and Greeks had main-
tained regular contacts with Italy even before the founding of the first
permanent colony in Italy at Cumae in the mid eighth century b.c.; the
Greeks of the colonial foundations of Italy had long been naval allies
(socii navales)\ many Greek cities of Sicily were since 241 part of the first
Roman province. Greek culture, the Greek language, the Greek way of
life were thus all familiar to many, above all upper-class, Romans long
before serious political engagement on the Balkan peninsula was even
contemplated.

One must nevertheless beware of overemphasizing the nature and
intensity of the earliest contacts with the eastern Greeks. Before 229 there
was no Greek state east of Italy with which Rome had a contact which
was more intense than amicitia - and amicitia was a global term for
relationships which extended from the level of polite and distant friendli-
ness to something approaching a recognition of common interests, in
which case the relationship might conceivably be defined by a treaty.
Amicitia could mean much or little; but for the eastern Greeks before 229
it meant without exception little.

At the religious and cultural level Rome was not above making a
dedication in the Greek shrine at Delphi in 394, after her success at Veii.
The dedication was made in the treasury of Massilia, which later claimed
to have maintained a friendship with Rome since the Phocaean settlers
put in at the mouth of the Tiber on their way to Massilia in the early sixth
century. 1 And the contact with Delphi was not forgotten: it was (among
other places) to Delphi that Rome turned for help in the dark days after

1 Livy v. 28.1-5; Diod. Sic. xiv.93.3-4; Justin xun.3.4, 5.1-3.

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THE EARLIEST CONTACTS 83

the battle of Cannae, when the future historian Fabius Pictor was
despatched to consult the oracle.

Experience of a quite different kind had been gathered with the
northern Greek monarchies of Epirus and Macedon. Alexander I of
Epirus had crossed to Italy in 333/2 b.c. while his brother-in-law
Alexander of Macedon (Alexander the Great) was invading Persia. His
proclaimed aim was to help the Greek city Tarentum against its native
neighbours, which he duly did; in the course of this he is also alleged to
have made a treaty and amicitia with Rome, though his premature death
prevented this from becoming effective. 2 Rome doubtless regarded this
as an Italian affair, but the ease of Alexander’s crossing and his contact
with the Greek cities of southern Italy will have served to make Rome
more aware of this overseas neighbour. Contacts of a diplomatic charac-
ter are also alleged for Alexander the Great. According to Strabo,
Alexander sent a complaint to Rome about pirates operating from the
Roman colony of Antium, a complaint which was apparently taken
seriously by the Romans only when repeated several years later by
Demetrius Poliorcetes. Clitarchus recorded that a Roman embassy, of
which neither purpose nor date is mentioned, was sent to Alexander.
This has often been regarded as a late invention, but the presence of
Alexander of Epirus in Italy might well have stimulated the Roman
Senate’s curiosity about the activities of his brother-in-law. 3 However
this may be, rather more than fifty years later another king of Epirus,
again in the first instance claiming to be aiding Tarentum, gave Rome a
shock which must have ensured that in the future events and develop-
ments across the Adriatic would be watched: Pyrrhus’ invasion of Italy
and Sicily threatened for a while the whole structure of the Roman
system of controlling southern Italy and stimulated a treaty of mutual
help with Carthage. The danger did not last long; but while it lasted it
seemed serious enough. One side-effect of the defeat of Pyrrhus was that
it put Rome on the map for the Greek world. Ptolemy II Philadelphus
was sufficiently impressed to choose this time to send presents to the
Senate and to form an informal friendship; the Romans returned the dip-
lomatic gesture. Around 266 the Greek city of Apollonia on the eastern
coast of the Adriatic, for reasons which are unknown to us, sent envoys
to Rome, who were officially received and officially well treated by the
Senate: their visit was remembered and recorded as a famous occasion on
which the Senate protected the rights of foreign ambassadors even
against insulting behaviour by its own members. 4

2 Justin xn.2.1-15.

3 Strabo v.3.5 c 232; Pliny, HN hi. 5 7 ( = Jacoby. FGrhl 137 f 31).

4 Dion. Hal. xx.14; Liv. Per. xiv; Zon. vm.6.11 (Ptolemy); Val. Max. vi.6.5; Diox, fr. 43; Liv.
Per. xiv.

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8 4

ROME AND GREECE TO 205 B.C.

A feature common to all these contacts, with the exception of the
alleged embassy to Alexander the Great, is that the initiative in each case
seems not to have come from Rome. The Roman role was essentially
passive; and this will doubtless have been the case also with the earliest
friendly contacts with the Greek island of Rhodes about 305 . Rhodes was
a trading state and will have regarded it as useful to be on friendly terms
with the most powerful state in Italy. 5 Nor, it seems, was anything
specific demanded of Rome by those who sought these contacts. It was
sufficient that the friendship was established. Thus, even by the end of
the First Punic War (241), during which Rome had established control
over the greater part of Sicily and was in alliance with Hiero of Syracuse,
who ruled the rest of the island, her official contacts with Greek states
beyond the geographical limits of Italy and Sicily remained very limited.
This did not mean, however, that the Senate was blind to developments
across the Adriatic: the experience of the two Epirote kings, Alexander
and Pyrrhus, had made this impossible henceforth; and no doubt the
frequent crossing of Italian traders to the Balkans and the friendship with
Apollonia will have served as sources of information. Moreover, the
long war in Sicily and the development of the Roman navy which this
caused had made the Senate more than ever aware of the potential
importance for Roman security also of territories which, though not
physically part of the Italian mainland, were near enough to be danger-
ous; this, still in a Carthaginian context, expressed itself very soon after
the end of the war in Sicily in the conquest of Sardinia and Corsica, which
until then had been controlled by Carthage. The Straits of Otranto are,
however, no wider than the distance from Corsica to Italy: for a Senate
which had had its eyes opened to the possibilities of naval power, the
eastern coast of the Adriatic must have become more interesting.

Rome was not the only state to have learned from the events of the
Pyrrhic War and the war in Sicily. If Rome had learned that overseas
territories were also neighbours who not only provided profits for
traders but also needed watching or protecting, the inhabitants of such
territories had also become more aware of Rome. Our source tradition is
very fragmentary, but we still have the examples of Apollonia and
Ptolemy Philadelphus, who soon after the Pyrrhic War took the initiative
in opening formal friendly relations with Rome. Contacts of another
kind also began to develop. One of the factors which had led to the

3 Polyb. xxx. 5. 6-8. This interpretation owes most to Schmitt 1957 iff.: (e 77). Polybius depicts
the Rhodians in 1 68/7 as claiming that they had participated with the Romans in their most glorious
and finest achievements for some 140 years without a treaty. In this exaggerated form the claim is
patently untrue, but since all attempts to amend the text are unconvincing it seems necessary to
assume an initial contact between the two states c. 305 , perhaps in connection with Demetrius’ siege
of Rhodes, which the Rhodian ambassadors to Rome in 168/7 (or Polybius on their behalf) inflated
into major active co-operation throughout the whole period. For detailed commentary see Walbank
1957-79. ( B 3 8 )-

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THE ILLYRIAN WARS

opening of the First Punic War was the appeal of the Mamertines of
Messana, which Rome rather surprisingly had accepted. The acceptance
and readiness to act on this appeal were noted by the historiographers
and later written up into an integral part of a view of Roman foreign
policy, much in favour at Rome, whereby Rome’s desire to help the weak
who appealed was depicted as being a major factor in Roman decision-
making in the field of foreign policy.

It was unlikely that the example of the Mamertines would remain
isolated, once it had been seen to be successful; and the Senate could
reasonably expect other similar more or less reasonable and hopeful
appeals to arrive in Rome. This development is in detail uncertain and
not undisputed. It is, however, unlikely that our very fragmentary
sources for the third century record all instances, particularly if no
Roman action followed. But even the few instances where we do have a
mention in a source are not so clear that they are undisputed. A very late
source, Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus, records a garbled and
rhetorical account of an appeal by the Acarnanians, a western Greek
people, who were being attacked by their neighbours the Aetolians. The
precise date is uncertain, but seems to be in the thirties of the third
century. According to this account the Senate sent legati, who unsuccess-
fully tried to negotiate and then returned home . 6 Many scholars have
regarded this episode as apocryphal and more particularly (after Maurice
Holleaux) as a confusion with some of the events of Rome’s war against
the Aetolians early in the second century. But as long as we do not
attribute political aims to the Senate, it seems at least conceivable that
Justin may have preserved a real event which was not mentioned by
Fabius Pictor (who is probably Polybius’ chief source for this period)
because of its relative triviality, because of the lack of success for the
Romans, and because, in a critical phase of political developments in 2 1 2,
Rome allied with Aetolia at the cost of Acarnania. It was normal practice
in the Greek world for a threatened community to seek the intervention
of a Great Power; since Rome’s defeat of Pyrrhus and Carthage and as a
result of the regular activities of Italian traders doing business across the
Adriatic, Rome was no longer a strange and unfamiliar state to the
Greeks of western Greece, but - in a moment of panic, as the Mamertines
in Sicily had found - almost a natural source of help. The Acarnanian
appeal and the Roman attempt to conciliate thus seem not impossible.

II. THE ILLYRIAN WARS

No far-reaching aspect of Roman foreign policy is affected by acceptance
or rejection of the Acarnanian incident. At the most we have to do with a

6 Justin xxviii. 1 . 1 - 2 . 14 .

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ROME AND GREECE TO 2QJ B.C.

nuance of the Roman attitude towards playing the ‘honest broker’ in
disputes in which Rome had no essential interest. The next case, how-
ever, is of more substance, since it is directly related to the first Roman
military intervention across the Adriatic which is known as the First
Illyrian War. 7 Before discussing this it will be advisable to indicate the
political situation on the east coast of the Adriatic at this time. Through-
out the third century the dominant political feature of the western
Balkans had been the kingdom of Epirus: it was kings of Epirus,
Alexander and Pyrrhus, who had invaded Italy; it was the kingdom of
Epirus which controlled the coastline south of Oricum, that is, con-
trolled the eastern coastline at the Straits of Otranto, where the Adriatic
is narrowest, where Italy is nearest. In 232 the dynasty which had
provided the kings of Epirus, the Aeacides, died out and Epirus
changed, not without severe internal difficulties, into a federal republic.
At about the same time, possibly under pressure from movements of
Celtic tribes, which in the 220s also threatened Italy, the Illyrian monar-
chy of the Ardiaei under King Agron, which occupied the Dalmatian
coast southwards from near Split, began to extend its regular raiding
activities to the south. We hear of raids on Messenia and Elis in the
Peloponnese, of support (paid for by Macedonia) for Acarnania against
the Aetolians, and of a plundering attack of major importance, verging
on warfare, on the young Epirote Republic, whereby Phoenice, the chief
city of one of the federal units, the Chaones, was taken and plundered.
There can be no doubt that the Illyrians represented a considerable factor
in the affairs of the communities of the southern sections of the eastern
Adriatic seaboard and, insofar as events around the Straits of Otranto
could not be totally ignored by the Roman Senate, in Roman affairs.
Roman interest became particularly active when, at the capture of
Phoenice, many Italian traders who were in the town at the time were
killed or taken as slaves; and the appeals of the Italian trading community
to the Senate, which in the past had not been taken seriously, were
listened to at last.

Our sources offer different versions of Roman reasons for taking
military action against the Illyrians in 229; and modern historians vary
equally, depending on which ancient source they prefer to follow. The
accounts are unfortunately incompatible. Polybius, whose version is the
lengthiest and is probably based both on Greek sources and on the
history written by the Roman senator and historian Fabius Pictor, links
Roman actions to the appeals of the Italians after the capture of Phoenice.
According to his version, the Senate sent two of its members, the
brothers C. and L. Coruncanius, whose father had ended his distin-

7 Sources for the First Illyrian War are: Polyb. H.2-12; App. ///. 7.17-8.22; Dio xn, fr. 49; Zon.
viii. 19; Florus i.2i ( 11 . 5 ); Orosius iv.13.2; Eutropius 111.4.

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THE ILLYRIAN WARS

guished career as pontifex maximus, to investigate. They travelled to the
island of Issa, which was being besieged by Queen Teuta, who had
succeeded her husband Agron towards the end of 230. Teuta received
them haughtily and replied that she could not control the private affairs
of her subjects, though she was willing to control the public sphere. The
younger Coruncanius replied, in a virtual declaration of war, that Rome
would teach her the necessity of also controlling their private affairs. As
the Coruncanii were sailing away, Teuta gave orders for the younger,
who had spoken the threats, to be murdered. She then sent out an
expedition to the south, which captured Corcyra, where Demetrius of
Pharos was put in charge of the garrison, and began to blockade
Epidamnus. This blockade and the siege of Issa were still going on when
the Roman expedition arrived at Corcyra.

Appian’s version, based on Roman sources which we cannot identify,
is different. Agron had, before his death, already captured part of Epirus,
Corcyra, Epidamnus and Pharos and had begun the siege of Issa. The
people of Issa appealed to Rome with accusations against Agron, and the
Senate sent out ambassadors. The ships carrying the Issaeans and the
Roman ambassadors were intercepted on the high seas by Illyrian pirates
and the leader of the Issaean delegation, Cleemporus, and a Roman,
Coruncanius, were killed. As a result of this incident the Romans sent
their military expedition. At about the same time Agron died and
entrusted the kingdom to Teuta, who was to serve as regent for Pinnes,
his infant son by another woman. It was thusagainst the newly appointed
Teuta that the Romans fought.

There are aspects of these two accounts which are incompatible, and,
were Appian’s account the only one we had, it would, though brief, be
convincing enough. It has no room for the interview of the Coruncanii
with Teuta; Appian gives the ambassador from Issa, Cleemporus, a name
which is rare but also on another occasion attested for Issa, which is a
reasonable indication of authenticity. 8 On the other hand, Polybius
shows neither here nor elsewhere knowledge of Pinnes. These details
cannot have been invented by Appian or his source, since in themselves
they serve only to complicate an otherwise quite brief report: a simplifier
or abbreviator might well have left them out, but would hardly have
invented them. Polybius’ version, on the other hand, has the hallmark of
having been ‘written up’, particularly the dramatic confrontation be-
tween the Coruncanii and Teuta, where Teuta is depicted with all the
prejudices of the hellenistic female-stereotype, as wilful, passionate,
thoughtless and proud. Moreover, Polybius is not very well informed
about Illyrian affairs before the outbreak of the war, above all he does not

See Derow 1973: (d zo).

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ROME AND GREECE TO 20$ B.C.

know about Pinnes and he makes Agron die before the Romans reach
Issa for their interview, which then takes place with Teuta. Plausible
reasons for the variations between Polybius and Appian may be imag-
ined if Appian is right and Polybius wrong, but not vice versa. Teuta was
the chief person against whom Rome fought, therefore it would not be
unnatural for someone who was not well informed in detail to depict
Teuta also as a secondary cause of the war, if he thought Agron was
already dead. The omission of the appeal of Issa may be attributed either
to ignorance or to the fact that Rome took so long before helping Issa,
despite her military operations in Illyria, that Fabius wished to disguise
the delay in responding to the appeal. But in any case, even Appian does
not make the appeal of Issa into a cause of the war. It thus seems likely
that in certain critical areas Polybius’ source was guilty of romanticizing
his ignorance . 9

What, then, seems to have happened? The appeals of the Italians after
the capture of Phoenice were doubtless real enough, and may well have
influenced the Senate, particularly since Phoenice lay just in that critical
area of Epirus near the Straits of Otranto which the Senate needed to
watch. This, however, does not mean that when Agron attacked Issa the
people of Issa did not appeal to Rome, the only power which might be
willing and able to help; nor that Rome did not use the opportunity given
by the appeal to investigate the suspicious activities of the Illyrians. The
appeal could, under the circumstances, be regarded as tailor-made. When
the ships were attacked and Cleemporus and one of the Coruncanii
(doubtless the younger, as Fabius Pictor will have known) were killed,
the nuisance-value - and potential danger - of the Illyrian pirates was
demonstrated in a dramatic way which also affected the Senate inti-
mately. The disrespectful, overly powerful neighbour needed to be
punished and above all weakened. In the last resort, therefore, the picture
is not greatly changed by accepting Appian’s facts against Polybius’. The
Senate’s ultimate motivation was precisely that suspicion of strong
neighbours which had played a significant role in the development of
Rome’s position of dominance within the Italian peninsula and which
(much more recently) had led to Rome’s taking control of Sardinia and
Corsica from Carthage. Illyria cannot of course be compared with
Carthage; but the principle of making apparently strong neighbours
weaker, especially at a time when militarily there was not much else for
the consuls to do, was equally applicable.

9 This account is a modified form of the results of a recently re-opened discussion over the relative
value of Appian’s and Polybius’ versions of these events, through which Appian’s version has been
at least partially rehabilitated and the weaknesses of Polybius’ made clearer: see Pctzold 1971: (d 49);
Derow 1973: (d 20). The best earlier discussion with the older literature is Walbank 1957-79,
<-M3 ff - : ( B 3 8 )-

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THE ILLYRIAN WARS

The importance of the Straits of Otranto to Roman thinking and the
limited aims of the war emerge from the course of events. The consuls of
229, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and L. Postumius Albinus, were both sent
out with forces appropriate to their status and to the Senate’s perhaps
exaggerated view of the difficulties of the Illyrian objective: in all 20,000
soldiers, 2,000 cavalry and 200 warships were engaged. The Romans did
not head straight for Issa, where the Illyrian royal forces were occupied
with the siege, but concentrated in the first instance on the straits:
Fulvius sailed to Corcyra, which was immediately betrayed by its Greek
commandant Demetrius of Pharos, who seems to have estimated for
himself good chances of benefiting from co-operation with Rome, just as
he had earlier joined the Illyrians when his Greek neighbour Issa resisted
them. From Corcyra Fulvius sailed to Rome’s old friend Apollonia,
where Postumius joined him with the army. Apollonia had no alternative
to strengthening its friendly connection and through an act of deditio ,
which implied a formal unconditional surrender to Roman discretion
( 'Jides ), put itself at the disposal of the Romans. They did not, however,
delay at Apollonia, but pressed on to Epidamnus, where the Illyrians
were driven out and the town was also formally received into Roman
jides. The inland tribes of the Parthini and the Atintanes were also
impressed by Rome’s presence and secured themselves Roman favour by
offering submission in terms which the Romans interpreted as deditio.
Only then did the Romans go to Issa and deal with Teuta, on the way
taking several Illyrian towns. Their mere appearance at Issa put an end to
the siege; Teuta fled to the fortress of Rhizon (on the Gulf of Kotor) and
the war was effectively over. Fulvius returned to Rome in the autumn
with the larger part of the fleet and the army, leaving Postumius to spend
the winter in Illyria and organize a settlement with Teuta. They clearly
did not expect that this would require the presence of large forces of
Roman troops.

Our sources vary in detail over the terms of the treaty. Polybius’
version is handicapped by his knowing nothing about Pinnes; he thus
concentrates solely on Teuta, whereas Appian does not mention Teuta as
a party to the treaty at all. Appian records the explicit renunciation by the
Illyrians of Corcyra, Pharos, Issa, Epidamnus and the Atintanes, and the
provision that Pinnes should retain ‘the rest of Agron’s kingdom’ and be
amicus of Rome. ‘The rest of Agron’s kingdom’ must, however, have
been restricted by the fact that Demetrius of Pharos was given ‘some
places’ as a reward; Polybius adds that Teuta was also granted ‘a few
places’ on condition that she withdraw from Illyria, and he mentions an
agreement to pay a tribute (phoros ). This latter no doubt relates to the
kingdom of the Ardiaei under Pinnes, from which Teuta was to with-
draw. A last clause, which both authors record, and on which Polybius

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9 °

ROME AND GREECE TO 205 B.C.

comments that ‘this affected the Greeks most of all’, stated that the
Illyrians were not allowed to sail south of Lissus with more than two
unarmed lembi (the lembos was their own type of light ship).

If we put all this together we gain a picture of a Roman attempt to
weaken and obtain influence in Illyria, but not to destroy or to control it.
Demetrius was a friend of Rome and was given some territories, doubt-
less near Pharos; the energetic Teuta was removed from the regency and
confined to a few less important places, probably around the Gulf of
Kotor; the independence of the kingdom of the Ardiaei was weakened by
its having to make payments to Rome (which, even if these were merely a
war-indemnity, also brought Rome some profit from the operation), by
the Roman recognition of Pinnes as Rome’s friend, and by the provision
that warlike or piratical expeditions south of Lissus were not to take
place. South of Lissus, in the strategic area around the eastern shore of
the Straits of Otranto, Rome now had a group of friendly states, all of
which had formally put themselves at Rome’s disposal: Epidamnus,
Apollonia, Corcyra (these being critically important harbour towns), the
Atintanes and the Parthini. They would doubtless be quick to report a
breach of the treaty by the Illyrians or other threatening activities in the
area. The federation of Epirus, whose coasts controlled the narrowest
part of the straits and which under severe pressure had allied with Illyria
shortly before the Romans arrived, was too weak to require special
treatment.

When the agreement was complete and before leaving for Rome
Postumius sent envoys to the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues to explain
the terms of the treaty. These were the most powerful states in southern
and western Greece and they had tried to help Epirus against the Illyrians
before the Romans arrived. Shortly afterwards the influential cities of
Corinth and Athens also received visits from Roman representatives. At
Corinth they were present, no doubt deliberately, at the time of the
Isthmian Games in spring 228. This was one of the major Panhellenic
festivals, where Greeks from the whole Greek world would be present;
Polybius records that the Romans were even allowed to participate in the
games which, if true, amounted in effect to their recognition as ‘honorary
Greeks’. The defeat of the Illyrians and the solution imposed by Rome
would, with this publicity, rapidly become known in every Greek state.

Rome’s interest in Illyria was limited and the settlement seems in
general to have functioned, though it did not prevent a further short
Roman intervention from being necessary ten years later. The key was
the separation of powers: Demetrius, Teuta, Pinnes and the Ardiaei, the
friends of Rome, all were intended to keep a check on each other and to
ensure than any threat in the area would be recognized in time to prevent
its becoming serious. The weakest aspect of these separated powers was

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THE ILLYRIAN WARS

9 1

the ambition of Demetrius of Pharos. The sources record a series of
events and incidents, unfortunately only in an inadequate chronological
framework, which illustrate how Demetrius ‘stretched’ the terms of the
settlement — the phrase which crops up more than once in our hostile
sources is ‘abused Roman friendship’, and this doubtless represents the
Roman point of view - through a series of incidents, of which none in
itself would have justified Roman action, but which cumulatively pro-
voked the brief military action in 219, on the eve of the Hannibalic War,
which is known as the ‘Second Illyrian War’. 10

Some time during these ten years Demetrius married Triteuta, the
mother of Pinnes, and formally took over the regency of the Ardiaei.
Demetrius’ own influence was thereby greatly extended, and the funda-
mental weakness of the Ardiaei after 228 - that there was no competent
regent for Pinnes - was relieved. But one of the pillars of the separation
of powers, which was the heart of the Roman settlement, was demol-
ished. Demetrius then renewed the Illyrians’ now traditional friendly
contact with Macedonia and contributed a body of 1 ,600 men to the army
of allied Greek states which in 222, under the Macedonian king Antigo-
nus Doson, fought and defeated Cleomenes III of Sparta at Sellasia,
where the Illyrians played an important part in the allied victory. This
event in itself was not contrary to the Roman settlement of Illyria; but the
fact that not only the Illyrians but also Epirus and Acarnania, who had
been allies of Agron, contributed troops to the Macedonian army will
presumably have been reported back to Rome by the Greek friends.

During the 220s Rome was seriously occupied in Italy by the Gallic
invasion; and the Senate was also observing events in southern Spain,
where the Carthaginians were successfully rebuilding their influence and
power. Under the circumstances the Adriatic could attract serious atten-
tion only if an actual major breach of the treaty, or events which could be
interpreted as such, took place. After the war with the Gauls the Romans
made an expedition against the Histri in Istria in 221 - and it was said at
Rome, though perhaps later than 219, that Demetrius had had something
to do with the activities of the Histri which provoked Roman action. 11
Despite the obvious readiness of Rome to engage in Adriatic affairs
Demetrius seems to have seen no implication for his own position. In
220, together with another Illyrian dynast Scerdilaidas, he sailed with a
fleet of 90 lembi not only south of Lissus but as far as Pylos in Messenia.
Here the two leaders split their forces. Demetrius sailed round the
Peloponnese to the Cyclades with 50 ships, where he plundered and
ravaged the islands; Scerdilaidas with the remaining 40 returned home.
Polybius, reflecting the Roman view of his source Fabius Pictor, de-

,0 Sources for the Second Illyrian War: Polyb. 111.16, 1 8-19; Dio xn, fr. j 3; Zon. vm.20. 1 1-1 3;
App. ///. 8.23-24. 11 App. III . 8.23.

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9 2 ROME AND GREECE TO 205 B.C.

scribes this as a clear breach of the treaty; and indeed, even if the ships
counted as being Demetrius’ and Scerdilaidas’ own, raised from the
subjects of their own territories (which is not related by any source),
Demetrius, as successor of Teuta in the regency for Pinnes and thereby
effectively the ruler of the Ardiaei, must have been regarded by the
Senate as being bound by the ‘Lissus clause’. The two dynasts seem to
have been aware of this and to have tried to keep their provocation as
slight as possible, in that although they sailed south of Lissus, they seem
to have made no attack on any friend of Rome. Their first recorded
landfall is Pylos; and Demetrius’ raiding expedition into the Aegean, far
from the normal haunts of the Illyrians, may have been intended in the
same sense, as an operation so far away from the area of Roman interests
that, although the treaty was technically broken, it was broken in such a
way that the Senate might not feel obliged to retaliate.

If we knew more about a further area of Demetrius’ activities we
might understand better why he thought Rome would not react to his
breach of the treaty. Polybius accuses him of ravaging and destroying
‘the cities of Illyria subject to Rome’. This phrase can only mean the
towns in or near the territory of Rome’s friends, the Parthini and the
Atintanes, which counted as being Illyrian (although the Atintanes had
from the time of Pyrrhus to the end of the Epirote monarchy constituted
part of the state of Epirus). 12 Names which recur in the later events are
Dimallum (or, in Polybius, Dimale) 13 near Antipatreia, and Eugenium
and Bargullum, whose precise location is unknown. Polybius clearly
exaggerates by saying that Demetrius destroyed these places: he says that
in 219 Demetrius garrisoned Dimallum and was able to expel his
opponents and instal his friends in ‘the other cities’ - which excludes
their previous destruction. But the time-scale of this political and mili-
tary activity among Rome’s friends is quite uncertain. It could be
connected with Demetrius’ first contacts with Macedonia, which may go
back to 224 or 225; or it might be quite a recent development arising out
of his successful co-operation with Macedonia in 222, perhaps, as
Polybius’ phrasing seems to imply, as late as autumn 220. 14 We know for
certain merely that it was before 219, since he was then in control of
Dimallum and was able to provoke coups d’etat in the other cities. If,
however, this activity which, if successful, would effectively destroy
another separatist pillar of the Roman settlement of 228, had in 220
already been going on for some years and had provoked no Roman

12 Hammond wishes to distinguish between Illyrian Atintani and Epirote Atintanes (1967, 600:
(d 5 i a)); but see Cabanes 1976, 78-80; (d 12).

13 The precise location of Dimallum and the correct form of the name are now established by the
find of stamped tiles at the fort of Krotine: see Hammond 1968, 12-15: (d 32).

14 Polyb. hi. 16.2 with Walbank 1957—79, 1.325: (b 58).

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THE ILLY RIAN WARS 93

reaction, this would help to explain why he and Scerdilaidas had risked
sailing south of Lissus with a large armed fleet in 220.

The precise reasons why in 219 the Senate decided to send both
consuls of the year, L. Aemilius Paullus and M. Livius Salinator, to
Illyria, why it decided that now and not later (or earlier) the moment had
come to chastise Demetrius, we shall never know. The fact that all recent
consuls had enjoyed military command and that no other sector was
available where the consuls of 2 19 could do likewise - affairs in Spain had
not yet reached the point where war with Carthage was certain - may
easily have helped to exaggerate the danger of Demetrius. Polybius adds
the thought, which however must have been developed in the light of
later events, that they saw that Macedonia was flourishing and acted for
this reason. But Macedonia was not particularly flourishing in 219. The
recently acceded young king Philip V was still labouring under
beginners’ difficulties; and in the event Macedonia was not involved in
the war, which was once again solely concerned with Illyria: merely to
remove Demetrius of Pharos from Illyria and to take no further action
would be a remarkably inadequate way of responding to a perceived
threat from Macedonia. We have, in fact, no reason for disbelieving the
Roman tradition - Fabius Pictor was a contemporary senator - that the
Senate, doubtless under the influence of the well-connected and militari-
ly eager consuls, decided that Demetrius had abused his position as
Rome’s friend. The thought that, should war with Carthage break out in
Spain, it would be helpful to have the Adriatic made safe may have also
played a part.

The events of the war were brief and unspectacular, though the
consuls had sufficient influence in the Senate to persuade their peers that
triumphs would be appropriate. Dimallum, which had been garrisoned
by Demetrius while he himself went to defend Pharos, fell after a seven-
day siege, whereupon ‘all the towns’ also gave up - this can only mean
those which had recently come into the control of Demetrius’ friends.
The Romans then sailed to Pharos, where they took the town by a
stratagem and, according to Polybius, destroyed it (though he probably
means just the military installations, since Pharos crops up later as a
Roman possession). Demetrius, however, escaped to Macedonia. With
the capture of Pharos and the flight of Demetrius the status quo of 228 was
automatically restored. No new principles were employed in settling
affairs in 219: the damaged Pharos and captured Dimallum joined those
communities which had a special friendly relationship ( amicitia ) with
Rome and were expected to behave as Rome’s friends; the kingdom of
the Ardiaei remained under Pinnes, who may have been required to pay
another indemnity or to raise his tribute payments. Otherwise nothing
changed: the restoration of the separation of powers in Illyria had been

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ROME AND GREECE TO 205 B.C.

achieved by defeating Demetrius and undoing his work of consolidation.
Roman objectives had been met.

III. THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR

The total defeat of Demetrius of Pharos had restored the status quo in
Illyria; but Demetrius had escaped the fiasco of Pharos and had found
refuge at the Macedonian court. Philip V, who in 221 at the age of
seventeen had succeeded Antigonus Doson, was in 219 heavily engaged
on two fronts. The first was military. The Greek League which Doson
had created in order to fight against Cleomenes of Sparta continued to
exist after Cleomenes’ defeat and Doson’s death; and in 220 Philip
undertook to lead it against the Aetolian League (the ‘Social War’). This
war was in its second year when Demetrius joined Philip. Philip’s second
front was an internal political one. He had inherited advisers from
Doson, and it was presumably they who had encouraged him to under-
take the Social War, so continuing Doson’s hegemonial policy among
the Greeks: but Philip felt himself increasingly controlled and dominated
by them. In 218 Philip equipped a fleet and operated with it against
Aetolia in the Adriatic; and this tactical change may possibly have
resulted from Demetrius’ advice. In the same year his dissatisfaction with
his inherited ‘friends’ broke out into a serious dispute, in which the most
irritatingly influential of Doson’s advisers were eradicated. Thereafter it
quickly became clear that Philip’s aspirations were more grandiose than
Doson’s. Even a total defeat of the Aetolians could bring him little
power or glory, and this began to seem increasingly unlikely. The very
next year showed the direction of his thoughts: as soon as the news of the
Roman defeat at Trasimene reached him, he began negotiations to end
the Aetolian war, which he managed to do on the basis of the status quo in
the ‘Peace of Naupactus’. His hands were then free to involve Macedonia
in the great events of the Mediterranean world. As Polybius records, he
was in this doubtless closely advised by Demetrius of Pharos, who had
largely taken the place of the Macedonian advisers.

Macedonia had in the past never seriously tried to control the coast of
the Adriatic. The Pindus Mountains were such a major barrier in the west
that whenever Macedonia had extended its direct control over neigh-
bouring areas, it had been to the south into Greece, to the east into
Thrace or to the north into Paeonia, but not to the west. The
Epirote monarchy had usually been a friendly neighbour, a tradition
which after 232 the Federation continued; the Illyrians could be (and
were) used as mercenaries or allies; and from a further control of the lands
west of the Pindus, it seemed, Macedonia had little to gain. But the
Aetolian war, the war between Carthage and Rome and Demetrius’ self-

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THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR

interested advice combined now to direct Philip’s attention to the
Adriatic. Another factor may also have played a part. Scerdilaidas, the
Illyrian dynast based perhaps at Scodra, who had participated with
Demetrius in the expedition south of Lissus in 220, had, like Demetrius,
been allied with Macedonia, and in 218 had helped Philip during the
Social War. The Social War produced little profit for him, however, and
in 217, doubtless under pressure from his men but possibly resenting
Demetrius’ influence over Philip — it was scarcely in his interest that
Demetrius be restored to Illyria, should Philip have this in mind - he
began raiding not only with ships in the Adriatic but also by land in the
Macedonian border districts of Dassaretis and Pelagonia, where he took
several towns.

Scerdilaidas could not anticipate that the war with Aetolia would end
virtually overnight, as happened in late summer 217; he thus could not
expect that Philip would quickly be able to retaliate. Before the winter
Philip recovered the territories which had been occupied by Scerdilaidas
earlier in the year and captured some more towns. At about the same time
the Senate, despite the serious contemporary events in Italy, showed that
it had not forgotten the lands east of the Adriatic. Li vy records for 217
embassies to Philip, asking for the delivery of Demetrius, which Philip
refused, and to Pinnes, reminding him that an instalment of indemnity
had not been paid and offering to accept hostages, should he prefer to
postpone payment even further. 15 It is possible that the Roman reminder
about the Illyrian payments may have caused Scerdilaidas’ sudden breach
of his alliance with Philip and his search for funds in piracy and his raids
on Macedonia. He clearly had a good relationship with Rome, which he
did not wish to jeopardize: he had not been punished by the Romans in
219, despite having sailed south of Lissus with Demetrius in 220; in 216
he appealed to Rome for help against Philip. After 217 Pinnes is not
mentioned again in our sources, instead the dynasts Scerdilaidas and his
son Pleuratus seem to be the only recognized powers in Illyria; and their
status as Roman friends might well go back to 219. This raises the
possibility that Scerdilaidas himself might have suggested to Rome the
danger which Demetrius represented in 217 as adviser to Philip.

In any case, the key to Roman interest lay as before in the Illyrian coast:
as long as Hannibal was in Italy, it was important that the Straits of
Otranto remain in friendly hands; and should Philip abandon traditional
Macedonian policy and, following the self-interested advice of Rome’s
enemy Demetrius, engage in Illyria, the Senate must inevitably take
notice of his activities. Events of 216 seemed to suggest that Philip was
trying to replace the Illyrians as the effective power on the Adriatic

15 Livy xxii. 53. 3, 5. Livy has perhaps made two embassies out of one.

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ROME AND GREECE TO 20J B.C.

seaboard. He even followed Demetrius’ advice about the type of ship
which he should construct: a fleet of too Illyrian-type lembi was built
duringthe winterand deployed in spring 2i6in the Adriatic. Scerdilaidas
informed the Senate about this, and they detached a mere ten ships from
the fleet which was now stationed at Lilybaeum in Sicily. Philip, who
seems to have been hoping to take Apollonia, panicked when he saw the
Roman ships arriving and abandoned his plans. There was no engage-
ment: he simply went home. With an informant as vulnerable and reliable
as Scerdilaidas there was no need for the Roman ships to stay in eastern
Adriatic waters. A detachment of 25 ships was detailed off to guard the
Italian coast between Brundisium and Tarentum; but their main purpose
will doubtless have been to guard against any development of
Carthaginian naval authority. Should Philip unexpectedly seem to be
dangerous, they would also be in a position to deal with him. 16

Had Philip been content to restrict himself to Illyria the situation
might not have seriously changed for a long time, though Rome would
doubtless have protected her strategically situated friends if necessary.
But in 2 1 5 a single incident changed the Roman appreciation of Philip’s
activities. During the summer the Roman fleet guarding Calabria inter-
cepted a suspicious ship which was sailing eastwards. It turned out to be a
Macedonian ship; on board were an Athenian, Xenophanes, and three
high-placed Carthaginians, Gisgo, Bostar and Mago. A search of their
possessions brought documents to light, the most important of which
was the draft of a treaty between Hannibal and Philip. The Romans thus
learnt at an early stage of planned co-operation between Philip and
Hannibal. Polybius records the oath of Hannibal in a Greek translation
of the Punic original. We have no reason for believing that it is not
authentic, and it must represent either the copy of the draft document
which was captured with Xenophanes (though it is not clear why a non-
Roman draft document should have been preserved in the Roman
archives), or, perhaps more likely, the official Macedonian copy, plun-
dered from the Macedonian archives in 168 by the victorious Romans
and made available to Polybius through his friendship with Scipio
Aemilianus. 17

The contents do not give much idea of the balance of power between
the two generals, though it would be reasonable, with the source
tradition, to see the initiative as lying with Philip. Even after Cannae
Hannibal could be grateful for a diversion of Roman strength to Illyria, if
it were offered, though there is no reason to believe that he would have
gone to much trouble to organize it. But the preserved document
contains no promise of action, either by Hannibal in Illyria or by Philip in

16 Polyb. v.io9; Livy xxm.52.17.

17 Sources and exhaustive literature in Schmitt 1969, no. 528: (a 52).

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THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR

Italv. It comprises only a series of very general clauses which committed
neither side to any immediate action. A general ‘friendship’ clause ruled
that neither party nor his allies nor subjects might act in a hostile way
against the other party, his allies or subjects, and that they were to be
allies in war against the Romans ‘until the gods give us the victory’.
Philip was to help ‘as necessary and as we shall from time to time agree’.
The only concrete measures which were foreseen concerned the estab-
lishment of the peace treaty after the victory. Here the interests of Philip
were finally to find recognition: the Romans were to be bound not to
wage war against Philip, they were no longer to ‘possess’ (xvpiovs eivai:
here the hostile interpretation of Rome’s trans- Adriatic friendships)
Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimallum, the Parthini and
Atintania; Demetrius of Pharos should receive back all his friends and
relatives who had been interned in Italy since 219. The substantive part
of the treaty ends with a pledge of mutual support in any future war with
Rome and in general, so long as existing treaties with other ‘kings, cities,
peoples’ were not affected by it.

The treaty thus represents merely a framework within which friendly
co-operation could take place. Hannibal bound himself to nothing until
he had won the war with Rome; and Carthage, it seems, possibly not even
to this, since Philip’s envoys appear not to have visited Carthage and it is
a moot point whether Hannibal and his councillors who swore the oath
(which Polybius also records) had bound the Carthaginian state at the
same time . 18 The interests of Philip and Demetrius were to be taken care
of in the peace treaty with Rome, which Hannibal hoped to be able to
dictate. This did not amount to very much, though it doubtless reflects
Hannibal’s confidence after Cannae. Nor did the Roman Senate appar-
ently think that it amounted to much, although it certainly required that
more attention be paid to Philip than hitherto. There was, however, no
panic action nor reason for it. The fleet in Apulia was strengthened by the
addition of thirty ships and was put under the direct command of the
praetor M. Valerius Laevinus. Laevinus was instructed that, should
investigations confirm Philip’s plans to co-operate with Hannibal, he
was at once to cross ‘to Macedonia’ and ensure that Philip stayed there.
Appropriate funds were also made available . 19 This reaction was typi-
cally sensible and to the point: the possibility that Philip would cross to
Italy was remote, but if the evidence of the documents proved correct, it
had to be taken into account. The modest and practical response of the
Senate contrasts sharply with the later Roman tradition, which Livy’s
Roman sources related. They, clearly without knowledge of the docu-
ment itself, invented treaty-terms to suit an exaggerated fear and perhaps

18 This is denied, with some probability, by Bickcrman 1952: (t 7).

19 Livy xxm, 5 8.7.

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ROME AND GREECE TO 2QJ B.C.

to justify Rome’s later severe treatment of Macedonia: according to this
version Philip was to attack Italy with 200 ships; when the war was over,
Italy and Rome should belong to Carthage and Hannibal, and Hannibal
would sail to Greece and wage war with whomever the king wished; all
states and islands which neighbour on Macedonia should become part of
Philip’s kingdom. The exaggeration is obvious; the Senate’s disposition
of a mere fifty ships in case of need, recorded by the same Livy, is
sufficient comment.

Events showed that the Senate had been right not to over-estimate the
danger from Philip. The fifty ships were adequate to achieve the limited
Roman aims. In the spring Philip moved again into Adriatic waters, this
time with 120 lembi. He first attacked and took Oricum, but not before
the people of Oricum had sent an appeal to Laevinus. In accordance with
his instructions from the Senate, he crossed the Adriatic and chased
Philip’s small garrison without difficulty. At the same time news arrived
that Philip was attacking Apollonia; Laevinus managed to put some of
his men into the town, who succeeded in beating off Philip’s attack with
such thoroughness that Philip felt it necessary to burn his new fleet at the
mouth of the River Aous and to retreat overland to Macedonia. The only
thing he had achieved was the permanent stationing of the Roman fleet in
Illyrian waters: Laevinus wintered at Oricum. 20

Philip’s burnt boats prevented his undertaking a naval expedition in
213. Lembi were in any case no match for the heavy Roman
quinqueremes, as he had already decided at Apollonia. But he had, it
seems, no difficulty in withdrawing home overland in 214 and was loath
to let one disaster colour his strategic thinking. It is not certain whether
Demetrius was still alive; but he had clearly recommended his Illyrian
plan so convincingly that Philip seems to have felt fully committed to it.
Probably in 2 1 3 he crossed the Pindus Mountains again, managed to take
control of the Parthini, Dimallum and the Atintanes, and crowned his
achievement by capturing the fortress of Lissus, which may have been
part of Scerdilaidas’ territory. In any case, these successes, which neither
Laevinus, who had few land troops, nor Scerdilaidas was able to prevent,
put a land-barrier between Scerdilaidas and the Roman base at Oricum;
and Lissus was in any case of great strategic importance. But despite
these ostensible successes, Philip could not join Hannibal without a fleet;
and insofar as Laevinus controlled the sea, so he continued to fulfil his
function. The question was, however, how long Roman credibility in the
area would survive when, despite a substantial Roman naval presence,
Philip was able without difficulty and without provoking retaliation, to
take control of some of Rome’s friends and of a major fortress.

20 Livv xxiv. 40.

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THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR

If effective resistance were to be offered, the Romans had two possi-
bilities: either Laevinus’ force must be strengthened, above all by the
provision of adequate numbers of legionaries who could tackle Philip on
land; or Rome could look for new local allies, since her inland friends
were obviously alone unable or, without effective Roman help, unwill-
ing to offer serious resistance to Philip. Under the strained circumstances
of the Hannibalic War, when fighting was already going on in Italy,
Spain and Sicily, the second alternative was the obvious one for the
Balkan sector. This, however, if it were to be effective, meant alliance
with a major Greek power already hostile to Philip; and this implied that
Rome would run the risk of becoming involved in the political struggles
of the Greek states. No Greek opponent of Philip could be expected to
share the extremely limited Roman war objectives. Within Greece the
struggle against Macedonia had a long history, in which all kinds of local
factors, the future importance of which no contemporary Roman could
foresee, had played and might again play a part. To take sides with one or
more Greek powers against Philip meant inevitably taking sides in
internal Greek affairs. So far Rome had avoided this through the very
limited nature of the actions against Illyria and by avoiding any formal-
ized relationship with the friends across the Adriatic. If the pressure of
the Hannibalic War now made the search for a formal military alliance in
the Balkans virtually inevitable, then in the long term it was unlikely that
Rome would avoid being sucked into the complex political affairs of the
Greek states, which would bring with it an extension of commitments
and interests far beyond the very limited war objectives which Laevinus’
standing orders of 215 laid down.

Moreover Laevinus had little choice as to whom he should approach.
Philip’s predecessor Antigonus Doson had organized a majority of the
Greek states into an alliance which had fought with Antigonus against
Cleomenes of Sparta and under Philip against the Aetolians. This alliance
still existed. Of the western Greek states Epirus, Acarnania and the
Achaean League were members of this alliance and allies of Philip:
whether he could use them for an aggressive war against Rome is
questionable; but Rome could certainly not hope to win them for a war
against Philip, and only a western Greek state could be interested in co-
operating with Rome on and around the coasts of the Adriatic. There
was thus no alternative to approaching Philip’s old enemy of the Social
War, the Aetolian League, once it became necessary to seek an ally. The
Aetolians were the only Greek state of any military importance which
was not friendly with Philip; and contact with the Aetolians was duly
taken up during 212. The date when the negotiations were completed
cannot be certainly established. Livy sets the treaty in 211; information
from Polybius (who, whether at first or at second hand, is Livy’s source)

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ROME AND GREECE TO 20$ B.C.

seems to indicate 212, but since his own account is lost, this cannot be
regarded as wholly conclusive; and an inscription found at Thyrrheum,
the chief town of Acarnania, which originally bore the full published text
of the treaty, is badly damaged and does not help to decide the problem of
the date. 21 The precise date is less important, however, than the terms,
which are recorded, albeit in abbreviated form and with some mistakes,
by Livy from his literary source (Polybius or perhaps Coelius Antipater);
and some few sections are preserved in Greek translation by the
Thyrrheum inscription, which allows us to expand some of Livy’s
abbreviations.

The terms, as we can reconstruct them, were as follows: the Aetolians
should immediately wage war on Philip by land; Rome should provide
not less than 25 quinqueremes; as far north as Corcyra, any cities which
were conquered by the Romans should belong to the Aetolians;
moveable property (including persons and animals) should belong to
Rome; any cities which were conquered jointly by the Aetolians and
Romans should, as before, go to the Aetolians. In this case, however, the
moveable property should be shared; cities which came over to the allies
without being conquered might join the Aetolian League under certain
specific conditions, which are unfortunately lost; the Romans should
help Aetolia to capture Acarnania; if peace should be made by either
party, it should be valid only on condition that Philip should not wage
war on the other party or its allies or subjects. A further clause provided
that certain specifically named friends and allies of the parties to the
treaty, Elis, Sparta, Attalus of Pergamum, Pleuratus and Scerdilaidas,
might also co-operate eodem iure amicitiae. It was some two years before
the treaty was ratified by the Senate, probably because the senators
wanted to hear Laevinus’ personal explanation of the (for Rome) unusu-
ally unfavourable terms, which his military activity in the Adriatic and
perhaps an illness prevented from happening until 210. It was then
published on the Capitol in Rome and at Olympia and presumably at
Thermum, the Aetolian federal shrine, by the Aetolians; but this delay
did not prevent the war from continuing as if the treaty had been ratified
at once.

The most striking aspect of these terms is Rome’s lack of interest in
gaining territory in the Balkans. In this respect the treaty represents a
direct continuation of previous Roman policy in this area. The ‘Corcyra’
limitation was certainly not intended to limit this seriously: it probably
meant no more than that Rome did not want to be committed to handing
over to the Aetolians the territories of Rome’s friends which had already
been lost to Philip (the Parthini, Dimallum, Atintania) or which might

21 Thorough recent discussions of the date by Lehmann 1967: (b 14) (212); Badian 1958: (d 6)
(211); sources and literature to the treaty in Schmitt 1969, no. 556: (a 52).

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THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR I O 1

still be captured by him, should they be recovered during the war. On the
other hand the Roman claim to moveable property - a type of division of
booty which is known from all areas and all periods of the ancient world
- meant no more than that Rome wished to try to recover the costs of the
war or even, if the opportunity arose, to make a profit. Acarnania had
long been a thorn in the side of Aetolian expansionist aims; it was an ally
of Philip, however, and thus caused the Romans no difficulty in accept-
ing what can only have been an Aetolian demand. The clause about
peace-making is clear and requires little comment; it meant in practice
that Aetolia was bound to continue fighting until Rome’s interests were
met. The provision about the allies is clear in principle but obscure in
detail. Its aim was to broaden the basis of the formal alliance against
Philip; but what it meant in practice - for instance, what provisions were
envisaged about division of the spoils, should further states become
involved in the war - is unknown, although some agreement about this
will have been necessary. It probably amounted in general to participa-
tion in the division of the ‘moveable property’, which must have stood in
some kind of proportion to the level of participation. No Greek state was
going to go to war with Philip just for the fun of it.

The Aetolian alliance meant that the Romans, who thereby committed
at least half the Adriatic fleet to joint operations, could no longer
maintain their hitherto passive role towards Philip, merely reacting when
his actions seemed dangerous. No ally could be won for such a pro-
gramme. The implication of the Aetolian alliance was that Rome must go
onto the offensive, but that the details of the offensive would in practice
largely be laid down by the Aetolians. And since, according to the treaty,
the Aetolian League was to receive all conquered land and cities, it is not
surprising to find that the military operations resembled those of the
Social War: they took place largely at the cost of Philip’s allies in areas,
above all in central Greece, into which the Aetolian League wished to
extend its influence. Acarnania was expressly mentioned as a war object-
ive in the treaty; but Aetolia also aimed to strengthen its position in
Thessaly and Phocis; and since these actions inevitably involved Philip in
defending his southern Greek allies (or abandoning them and with them
all claims to credibility among the Greeks, which he was not prepared to
do), he was soon fully employed in the south and therefore could not
operate in the west and threaten Italy. Laevinus was satisfied to accept
this traditional Aetolian strategy since operations in central and southern
Greece were far more likely to provide booty, which, according to the
treaty, came proportionately to the Romans, than, for instance, oper-
ations in the north-west against Epirus, which had already recently been
seriously plundered by the Aetolians during the Social War.

The greatest allied successes came in the first two years of co-

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102 ROME AND GREECE TO 205 B.C.

operation. 22 Oeniadae, Nasus and Zacynthos were taken and became
Aetolian. The desperate will of the Acarnanians to resist to the last man
prevented their conquest by Aetolia, which the treaty foresaw; but
Anticyra in Phocis and Aegina in the Saronic Gulf were taken in 2 10 by
Laevinus and his successor, the pro-consul P. Sulpicius Galba (the
Aetolians promptly sold Aegina for 30 talents to King Attalus of
Pergamum, who now sent a fleet to the war). The capture of Aegina,
however, marked the end of major conquests. The Senate seems to have
been so well satisfied with the results of the alliance that Sulpicius was
instructed to send his legionaries home and to retain only the socii navales ,
the Italian allies who manned the fleet, and the sources mark a return to
more sedate activity by the Romans. Philip, who since 214 had no fleet,
tried urgently to exploit this with Carthaginian naval support, but this
did not amount to much in practice. In 209 Bomilcar, the Carthaginian
admiral, reached Corcyra; in 208 he ventured as far as the mouth of the
Corinthian Gulf before deciding not to risk a battle with the Romans. 23
Rome clearly did not need to take this feint very seriously.

The conquest of Greek cities, the sale of their populations and the
general disruption of normal inter-state relationships which the renewed
war in thickly settled central and southern Greece produced affected
others besides the combatants in the war, whether because the balance of
power in the Greek world was being upset, or because commercial
opportunities were being damaged by the war, or because of fears that
the war might spread and involve ever more areas and cities. Outsiders
had indeed tried to bring the Social War to an end. And in 209, the year
after the capture of Aegina and its sale to Attalus of Pergamum, a group
of non-participant states took the initiative to explore with the comba-
tants the possibilities of peace. Their motives were doubtless mixed.
Rhodes and Chios may have been concerned about their trade; this may
also have been a factor with Ptolemy IV, though he may have been more
concerned about Attalus’ intentions, since he cannot have been pleased at
the Pergamene possession of Aegina, only a short distance from his own
Peloponnesian base at Methana. Athens had freed itself from more than a
generation of close Macedonian control only in 229; Philip’s anti-
Aetolian operations in Euboea, Epicnemidian Locris and southern
Thessaly might well have re-awakened fears ofMacedonian actions to re-
establish control of Athens and its important harbour Piraeus. But
neither the Aetolians nor the Romans (who did not participate in the
conference) were interested in peace with Philip in 209. For the
Aetolians, the war was far too profitable strategically, for the Romans far
too convenient for it to be brought to an end merely for the sake of a few

22 For detailed discussion of the military details see Walbank 1940, 68ff.: (d 54).

23 Livy xxvii. 15 . 7 , xxviii. 7 .i 7 -i 8 .

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THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR IO3

Greek non-participants, even if they were Roman amici. u In 208 another
attempt was made. Livy mentions only Rhodes and Ptolemy this time,
but it may be that in abbreviating Polybius he has omitted Chios and
Athens. But this time Philip, who in the meanwhile had achieved some
successes, felt himself strong enough to refuse talks. This will have
pleased Rome well enough, since it was Aetolia and the other allies who
were suffering from Philip’s new strength.

A third attempt in 207 by the non-participants, this time joined by
Mytilene and Amynander of Athamania, came closer to success. The
Aetolians were wearying, since Philip had by now rebuilt his fleet and
recaptured Zacynthos. Then, as he had done during the Social War, he
had penetrated into the Aetolian heartland and plundered the Aetolian
federal sanctuary at Thermum (it may have been on this occasion that his
Acarnanian allies removed to their capital Thyrrheum the stone which
contained the Aetolian treaty with Rome). Sulpicius Galba managed
once more to sabotage the peace talks, but Roman inactivity, which had
already allowed Philip to recover Zacynthos and to penetrate into
Aetolia, was wearing the patience of the Aetolians. Moreover, given that
Philip was again operating in north-west Greece it was increasingly
important that he should be contained, since Hannibal, albeit now
lacking long-term prospects of success, was still in Italy. Without a
stronger Roman commitment the Aetolians were beginning to think of
peace, even though this involved breaking their treaty with Rome. The
successes of the first two years of co-operation had by 206 lost their gloss
through a series of defeats and losses and wearisome indecisive action;
and in 206 the non-participants finally managed to persuade the
Aetolians to make peace with Philip - but, ominously, a separate peace,
against the wishes of Sulpicius Galba, who spoke against it at the
Aetolian assembly. From their peace treaty they gained merely peace: the
precise terms are not recorded, but it is probable that they simply
confirmed the status quo. They had, in order to achieve this, broken a
decisive clause of their treaty with Rome. But strategically they were in
any case no longer able to fulfil Roman expectations, since it seemed that
they were no longer a match for Philip on land. Whether they made peace
or not, the Romans would have had to commit themselves more deeply
in the Balkans, so long as they considered it important to keep Philip in
check. If the Aetolians had fought on, they would probably have been
defeated: a defeated Aetolia was useless to Rome; it might indeed even
have been dangerous to the insecure Roman position in Greece to allow
Aetolia to be defeated.

The Aetolian peace with Philip was probably agreed in autumn 206.

24 Sources for the attempted negoriarions: Livy xxvn.30, cf. Polyb. x.25 (209); Livy xxvm.7.14
(208); Polyb. xi. 4.1; App. Mat. 3.1 (207). See Habicht 1982, 138-9: (d 30).

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104 ROME AND GREECE TO 20} B.C.

The Senate, however, seems to have retained hopes that, despite this,
Aetolia would return to the fray in the next campaign, if Rome showed
a greater commitment. In 205 a new commander, P. Sempronius
Tuditanus, was sent to the Balkans with 10,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry
and 35 warships. The force was inadequate to fight Philip by itself and
cannot have been intended to operate alone. We may compare the 20,000
infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 200 ships which had been sent against Teuta
in 229. Livy indicates that an attempt was made to bring the Aetolians
back into the war; but even winning back the Parthini and an attack on
Dimallum could not persuade them to take up arms again, despite clear
indications that the Romans were angry at their breach of the treaty. In
205 the Senate had no interest in continuing the Balkan war alone; by
then the fighting against Carthage in Spain was over and the successful
Roman commander in Spain, P. Cornelius Scipio, was consul and hoped
to cross to Africa and defeat Carthage there. Under these conditions, if
the Balkan war was to continue, its burden needed more than ever to be
carried chiefly by the allies; if this was impossible, the risk from peace was
less in the circumstances than the risk from an all-Roman commitment,
expensive in both money and manpower. The final reckoning with
Philip for his stab in the back of 21 5 could be postponed. And when it
became clear that the Aetolians, despite the new Roman demonstration
of military commitment, were still not to be moved, Tuditanus accepted
the good services of the officers of the Epirote federation (despite
Epirote friendship with Philip) when they suggested peace negotiations.

The negotiations took place at Phoenice, the main town of the
Chaones, one of the states forming the Epirote confederacy. They seem
to have made no attempt to meet the theoretical risk that Philip might
even now try to join Hannibal in Italy. 25 The terms which Livy records
for the bilateral peace treaty concern solely the possessions of the two
parties in Illyria, since this was still the only area, it seems, which affected
Rome: of Rome’s friends of the Illyrian Wars, three, the Parthini, the
Atintanes and Dimallum had been taken by Philip in 2 1 3 or 2 1 2. 26 The
peace terms foresaw that, of these, Philip should give up the Parthini and
Dimallum, but that if the Senate should agree he might retain the
Atintanes. Two other places, Bargullum and Eugenium, the locality of
which is unknown but which must have been in the same general area -
perhaps they were villages or forts already taken by Tuditanus in 205 -
should also be Roman. Otherwise Philip might keep his conquests.
These and perhaps a general peace formula, whereby neither party
should attack each other or the allies of the other, seem to have concluded

25 Livy xxix. 1 2.1; App. Mac. 3.1.

26 Livy xxix. 12. Literature on the peace in Schmitt 1969,00. 543: (a 32). See Habicht 1982, 138-9:
(d 30) for a critical discussion.

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THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR 105

this hastily patched-up treaty, which was quickly ratified in Rome.

After his account of the terms of the treaty Livy adds two lists of states
which, he says, were foederi adscript i (‘written into the treaty’): Prusias,
king of Bithynia, the Achaeans, the Boeotians, the Thessalians, the
Acarnanians and the Epirotes were ‘written in’ by Philip; the Ilians,
Attalus of Pergamum, Pleuratus, Nabis the ruler of Sparta, the Eleans,
the Messenians and the Athenians by Rome. The precise significance of
this procedure is uncertain, but it is clear that it meant that the named
communities must at least have participated explicitly in the general
terms of the peace as Roman amici , although they cannot have been
affected by the specific territorial terms agreed between Philip and
Rome. There has been a great deal of inconclusive discussion about the
authenticity of these lists - inevitably inconclusive, since neither the full
significance of the procedure is known nor, thanks to the loss of
Polybius’ account, the level of participation of the individual states
concerned. In particular Ilium and Athens have often been suspected of
being added by later Roman writers, since they have been regarded by
modern historians as ‘neutrals’. Moreover, it has been argued, Roman
self-justification may have played a part: Roman legend traced Roman
origins to Troy, the predecessor town of Ilium; and an appeal or appeals
by Athens to Rome played some part in the renewed outbreak of war
against Philip in 200. Ilium, however, was certainly not neutral, since at
this time it was controlled by Attalus of Pergamum and may even have
provided some ships or troops for Attalus; and Athens had already
shown her fear of aggression by Philip when she was aligned with the
states that had from 209 onwards tried to persuade the combatants to
negotiate a peace. Of these, Athens was the only mainland Greek state
and might well have sought some modest protection against Philip by
associating itself explicitly with the peace treaty on the Roman side. It
thus seems not altogether unreasonable to accept the Livian list of
adscripti as authentic, even though we cannot appreciate the precise
significance of the procedure.

One thing it must mean, however, and that is the recognition of these
states as Roman amici. The course of the First Macedonian War had
broadened Roman knowledge of and extended Roman contact (both
friendly and hostile) with Greek states of central and southern Greece
and of Asia Minor, and had thus opened up an area of potential interest
and possible involvement far wider than the narrow limits set by the
operations in Illyria in 229 and 219 and by the initial aims of the war
against Philip. The list of adscripti documents some of these implications;
and we should probably envisage that informal assurances will have been
given to the amici. Nevertheless the formal terms of the Peace of
Phoenice reflect merely the urgency of bringing military operations in

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106 ROME AND GREECE TO 20J B.C.

the Balkans to an end, and remain firmly within the framework of Rome’s
traditionally limited interest in Illyria. This time Rome even sacrificed
one inland Illyrian community, the Atintanes, as the price of peace. Thus
apart from the coast the Roman position appeared formally even less
substantial than in 219. The critical harbour towns, Corcyra, Oricum,
Apollonia, Epidamnus, nevertheless remained Roman friends; and
Scerdilaidas’ son and successor Pleuratus would doubtless keep watch
from Scodra on Philip’s activities. Even without the Atintanes the
checks and balances which had characterized Roman policy towards
Illyria since 228 were still functional. The peace treaty and the
watchfulness of the amici should manage to guarantee the peace at least
until Hannibal had been driven out of Italy. Should it then seem desirable
to adjust Rome’s relation with Philip, the Senate would be able to choose
its own moment.

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CHAPTER 5

ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

W . V . HARRIS

I. INTRODUCTION

Between the end of the second war against Carthage and the fall of
Numantia in 1 3 3 Roman power engulfed northern Italy and vast territor-
ies in Spain, as well as defeating Carthage once more, destroying the city
and establishing a province in northern Africa. These developments can
conveniently be considered in a single chapter. This does not mean any
detraction from the important differences which distinguished these
three areas and Roman behaviour in them. In addition, due attention will
be paid both to the internal workings of the state and society of the
conquerors and to the expansion carried out in the east in the same
period. Only when studied as a whole can the vastly complex process we
call Roman imperialism be understood.

The Roman Senate had already made its crucial decisions about the
Gallic area of northern Italy and about Spain before 202. In the case of the
Gauls, the decision to exact obedience dated from before the Hannibalic
War, and in 206 the two pre-war colonies in the plain of the Po, Placentia
and Cremona, had been resettled. At about the same date the Senate had
decided to begin sending a regular series of governors, two at a time, to
Spain. In the year after Zama, with the Carthaginians now committed to
a treaty which effectively prevented them from re-establishing their
power in Spain, Rome could in theory have withdrawn from its Spanish
possessions - though such an action would have had no appeal at Rome.
Northern Italy, however, required attention more urgently.

II. THE SUBJUGATION OF CISALPINE GAUL 1

In 201 there was not even a geographical expression to apply to the area
which the Romans later came to call Gallia Cisalpina (among other
labels). It was not a single political or even ethnic unit, and its popula-

1 The main literary source for this section is Livy; Polybius and also Diodorus Siculus, Strabo and
Zonaras contribute. The important epigraphical and archaeological evidence is mentioned in later
notes.

107

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THE SUBJUGATION OF CISALPINE GAUL IO9

tions lived in several different ways, as well as having different relation-
ships with Rome. The Ligurians, though they had some level territory on
both sides of the Appennines, were largely hill people with a more
pastoral, less agricultural, economy than could be found in most other
parts of Italy, with hunting, too, relatively important . 2 There must have
been rudimentary political institutions at the tribal level, since quite large
armies sometimes took the field, but no organization bound all Ligurians
together. There are no Ligurian inscriptions in this period, there is no
coinage. The quantity and quality of their metal work is scarcely known
(no territory was more thoroughly plundered by the Romans); they were
probably short of iron . 3 They had very few settlements larger than
villages, and had lost two important places, Pisae and Genua, to Rome
before our period begins. Population, however, was probably quite
dense by the standards of the ancient countryside, for otherwise such
long resistance to Roman legions would be hard to understand.

The main Gallic tribes, the Boii, Insubres and Cenomani, were more
advanced in some respects. Polybius libels them in saying that they had
no techne whatsoever, as we know from preserved metal ornaments,
equipment and weapons . 4 Iron weapons were commonplace. Similarly
Polybius is wrong to represent them as essentially nomadic , 5 though it is
no doubt true that there was a significant pastoral element in their
economy too. The Gauls tilled the soil extensively, it almost goes
without saying . 6 Once again, Polybius’ assertion that the Gauls lived in
unfortified villages is partly unjust. Acerrae, Mediolanum, Felsina
(Bononia) and Brixia, at least, must have had fortifications . 7 The silver
coinages produced by the Gauls of Northern Italy are imitative but they
prove the existence of a certain degree of civic organization . 8 Though
none of the handful of extant Gallic inscriptions is likely to date from
before the arrival of the Romans, some Gauls were literate, since they
addressed letters to the Roman Senate. And while very little is known of

2 The importance of stock-raising: Diod. Sic. v.39.4 (from Poscidonius?) (also mentions hunt-
ing). Flocks: Strabo iv. 202; cf. v.218. These and other texts bearing directly on ancient Liguria arc
collected in Forni and others 1976: (b 211).

3 They used bronze shields: Strabo iv.202.

4 Polyb. 11. 1 7. 10. In fact he knew about their horns and trumpets (29.6), necklaces and bracelets
(29.8, 51.5), but in 33.3 he gives an unduly belittling account of the Gallic sword. The best guide to
the archaeology of the North Italian Gauls in this period is Peyrc 1979: (h 164).

5 11.17.11. For later wool production among the Insubres sec Strabo v.218.

6 Polyb. 11. 1 5 may have little relevance to the pre-Roman period, but sec 11.34. 10, hi. 44. 8; cf.
Toynbee 1965, 11.256: (a 37).

7 Polvb. 11. 1 7.9. On Acerrae and Mediolanum: 11.34. On Bononia: cf. Livy xxxm.37.3-4. It is
impossible to suppose that Brixia, being the capital of the Cenomani (Livy xxxn.30.6), lacked walls.

8 On these coins see Pautasso 1966, 1975: (b 123 and 124); Peyrc 1979, 99-101: (h 164). All or
virtually all of these silver coins were minted north of the Po. Considerable quantities of bronze and
silver coins appear in Livy’s accounts of the booty collected from the Gauls (cf. fc.SVIR 1.128 -32).

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I IO

ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

the political organization even of the larger tribes, these plainly main-
tained stable control over fixed and quite sizeable territories. 9

The Boii and the Insubres had regained their freedom from Rome
when Hannibal arrived, though the Cremona and Placentia colonies
remained. The Cenomani for their part appear to have taken open action
against Rome only in 200 - which, if true, shows how badly informed
they were about the outside world. During the Hannibalic War they may
have been influenced by their neighbours to the east, the Veneti, who
continuously preserved the alliance which they had made with Rome
before 225. (Since the latter offered no armed resistance to Rome in the
second century, while becoming more and more subject to Rome, not
much will be said about them in this section.) After the withdrawal of
Mago’s forces in 203 the reimposition of Roman power in northern Italy
had a high priority, and each year from 201 to 190 the Senate assigned one
or both consuls to that region, until the Gauls had been subdued. 10 In the
majority of years more legions served there than in Spain, and even after
190 the North Italian legions were usually as numerous as those in Spain,
down to 172. 11

One reason behind this policy was that in Roman eyes it was necessary
to punish the Insubres and Boii for their defection. According to a
common interpretation, however, the main aim was simply the defence
of existing Roman territory. 12 And the Gallic wars, perhaps even the
Ligurian wars, did have something of this character. Gallic troops had
been all too visible in Roman Italy on various occasions since 225 , and it
may have been felt, whether this was realistic or not, that they were still
dangerous. But there were other motives, still more important than
these. Roman society in this period was directed towards very regular,
virtually annual, warfare, towards the expansion of Roman national
power, and towards the material benefits which were part of successful
warfare. 13 So deeply ingrained were these traits that even the fearful trial
of the Hannibalic War did not alter them. The plain of the Po had been a
potential area for Roman conq uest since the 260s, for though it was both
poorly drained and heavily wooded by the standards of later centuries, it
was a very attractive territory, as indeed the massive Roman and Italian
immigration of the second century demonstrates. The relative back-
wardness of the Gallic and Ligurian populations had some obvious
advantages from the Roman point of view — their fortifications and

9 Livv xxxn. 30.6 {in vicos), however, suggests some fragmentation among the Cenomani.

10 The best detailed accounts of these events are still those of De Sanctis 1907-64, ^^.407-17:
(a 14) and (in spite of many faults) Toynbee 1965, 11.252-85: (a 37); sec also Hoyos 1976: (h 16 i).

11 On the disposition of legions see Toynbee 1965 11.652: (a 37).

12 H.g. De Sanctis 1907-64, iv.i.407: (a 14); Scullard 1973, 89-90: (h 54).

13 For this view see Harris 1979, 9-130, 210-11: (a 21).

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THE SUBJUGATION OF CISALPINE GAUL 111

military organization were weak. Thus it was entirely to be expected that
Rome would quickly return to attacking these peoples.

The precise political situation among the Gauls in 202/1 has some
obscurities to it. A Carthaginian leader named Hamilcar still seems to
have been present, 14 but his influence and significance may have been
very limited. When the consul of 201 P. Aelius Paetus, assigned to the
provincia Italy, arrived in the north, he supposedly received reports of
attacks on allied lands before he invaded the territory of the Boii; 15 in any
case his expedition resulted in heavy Roman casualties in a battle at
Castrum Mutilum (probably Modigliana, in the Appennines above
Faenza). Another puzzle, already mentioned, concerns the Cenomani,
who, if we are to trust the sources, were now on the verge of rebelling
against Rome for the first time, at a very inopportune moment. 16

In the latter part of 201 Rome was moving quickly towards war
against the king of Macedon, and for 200 Gaul was initially no more than
a praetorian provincia lacking legionary troops. This, however, was the
year when not only the Boii but also the Insubres, Cenomani and
Ligurians made their most vigorous effort to expel the Romans from
Gallic territory. So at least said the Roman annalistic tradition, and it is
probably true that contingents of all these peoples combined; however,
the Cenomani were not unanimous, and not all the Ligurian tribes were
involved - the Ingauni, for example, having freely made a treaty with
Rome the year before, 17 are likely to have kept it. In any case this force
sacked the Latin colony Placentia and attempted to do the same to its
twin Cremona, only to be heavily defeated there by the army of L. Furius
Purpurio. The victory was considered important enough to earn him a
triumph, even though he thus became the first praetor to celebrate one
for more than forty years.

Henceforth the pressure all seems to have come from the Roman side,
though Rome incurred some serious losses along the way. One of the
consuls of 200 led a plundering expedition, and the following year a
praetor initiated an attack on the Insubres - which resulted in heavy
Roman casualties. 18 In 199 and 198 the consuls who were assigned to the
northern region did ‘nothing noteworthy’, Livy tells us; the second of
them, Sex. Aelius Paetus, took up most of his year re-establishing
Placentia and Cremona, which must have required some military oper-
ations against the Insubres. 19 But the reason why events were moving
relatively slowly is plain: the war against Philip V was still unsettled. The

14 Livy xxxi. 10.2, 11.5, 21.18, etc. 15 Livy xxxi.2.5.

16 A conflict between generations among the Cenomani may explain their erratic behaviour
(cf. Livy xxxii. 30.6). 17 Livy xxxi.2.11.

18 Livy XXXI1.7.J-7 (more than 6,700 killed); Zon. ix.15; cf. Harris 1979, 238: (a 21).

19 Cf. Zon. ix. 16; Livy xxxm.21.6-9.

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I I 2

ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

fact that Paetus had retained in the north two legions which were
supposed to have been disbanded 20 may suggest that he was impatient for
activity. In 197, with Flamininus still in possession of the Macedonian
command, both consuls campaigned in this region. They inflicted severe
defeats on both Gauls and Ligurians, though the Cenomani submitted
without much fighting and never again took up arms against Rome (a
praetor who tried to provoke a war with them in 187 was restrained by
the Senate); C. Cornelius Cethegus celebrated a triumph over the
Insubres and Cenomani, Q. Minucius Rufus only an unofficial triumph
‘on the Alban Mount’ over the Boii and Ligurians. Cethegus’ army
fought its main battle on the River Mincio, among the Cenomani, and
though Insubrian casualties were heavy 21 he may not have advanced into
Insubrian territory. Minucius, after reaching Genua and campaigning in
Liguria (see below), crossed the Appennines and plundered the land of
the Boii, who were unable to persuade the Insubrians to help them by
sending an army southwards and were so unnerved by the Roman attack
that they could not put up a concerted defence. This chain of events
makes Polybius’ allusion 22 to the ‘fear’ that was felt at Rome with regard
to the Gauls in early 197 impossible to take at face-value; if the consuls
had feared a Gallic attack, Minucius in particular would have had to
follow an entirely different strategy.

The Insubres had clearly been much weakened even before the consul
of 196 M. Claudius Marcellus (son of the man who had won the spolia
opima against the Gauls in 222) attacked them, since he was able to
penetrate as far as Comum, on the northern side of Insubrian territory,
where he captured the town as well as inflicting a severe defeat on the
Insubrian army. The Boii too, though they defeated Marcellus in one
battle, had to surrender Felsina and the surrounding castella-2.1 least fora
time — to the combined forces of Marcellus and L. Furius Purpurio (now
commanding in Gaul again as consul).

With Spain claiming increased Roman attention in 195, only one
consul, L. Valerius Flaccus, went north (against the Boii), but early the
next year he commanded in the final defeat of the Insubres near Milan.
Both consuls were sent north each year from 194 to 192, the Boii still
showing considerable resilience. 23 In 192, however, their state began to
disintegrate as the elite, including what Livy calls the ‘senate’, deserted to
the Roman side; some 1,500 persons were involved. 24 In the following

20 Livy xxxn. 9. 5, 26.2. 21 Livy xxxii. 30. 1 1-1 2.

22 Polyb. xviii. 1 1.2, echoed by Zon. ix.i6. Livy explains the attacks simply by saying that the
Gauls had defected (i.e. in 200) (xxxn.28.9).

23 But it is quite uncertain how much value should be attributed to the Roman casualty figures:

5,000 killed in the main battle of 194 (Livy xxxiv.47.8), more than 5,000 (including allies) in the main
battle of 193 (Livy xxxv.5.14). 24 Livy xxxv.22.4, with a ‘doublet’ in 40.3.

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THE SUBJUGATION OF CISALPINE GAUL I I 3

year the subjugation of the Boii was completed by the consul P. Scipio
Nasica.

It was a foregone conclusion that Rome would force the Insubres and
Boii to capitulate within a few years. Only a prolonged demand for many
legions in the east could even have delayed the event. The defeat of
Hannibal, as well as the ruthlessness and persistence of Rome, must have
dispirited the Gauls, and the betrayal of the Boii by their own rulers in
193 shows how far demoralization had progressed.

The devastation Rome caused in the conquered areas was certainly
intense, even though in the case of the Insubres it is hard to gauge.
Polybius was exaggerating when he wrote that he had himself seen that
the Gauls (he is concerned mainly with the Boii and Insubres) had been
driven out of the plain of the Po ‘except for a few places near the Alps’,
for there is plentiful evidence that many Insubres continued to inhabit
their ancestral territory. 25 No new colonies were settled on Insubrian
land. Many other Insubres, however, had been captured and sent into
slavery; and it is very possible that the Insubrian treaty with Rome, about
which very little is known, 26 designated some of their territory as Roman
ager publicus. At all events the treaty must have imposed burdens on the
Insubres, as must also have happened even in the case of the less stubborn
Cenomani.

Some Insubres survived, with the advantages as well as the disadvan-
tages of a Roman treaty. The Boii on the other hand were dealt with
brutally, since they had put up a somewhat longer resistance, and perhaps
also because their territory was more accessible from the south and hence
more desirable for settlement. The survivors had about half of their land
confiscated by Scipio Nasica; 27 presumably this was the more valuable
half of their territory and much of the rest of it was too poorly drained or
too heavily wooded to sustain a dense population. Polybius implies, and
Strabo plainly believed, that the expulsion of the Boii was total. 28 This
was the effect as it seemed a generation after the remnant had been
reduced to living on unsatisfactory land outside the Roman settlements.
The archaeological and onomastic evidence shows a very marked con-
trast between Cenomanic and Insubrian territory on the one hand and
Boian territory on the other; the latter area lacks significant Gallic
survivals of the second century or later. 29

25 Polvb. 11. 3 5.4. Strabo v.213 merely says that they ‘still exist’. For the archaeological and
onomastic evidence see the relevant items in Chilver 1941, 7 1 —8 5 : (h 1 59); Mansuelli 1965: (h 163);
Pcyre 1979, 63-4, 72-81: (h 164). Without doubt they continued to mint coins after the conquest.

26 Cic. Ba/b.^z is the only source. 27 Livy xxxvi.39.3.

28 Polyb.n.3 3.4; Strabo v.213, 21 ^» cf- Phn. HA : 111.116.

29 On the archaeological evidence, or rather lack of it, sec Arslan 1971-4, 47, and 1976-8,443-6:
(h 1 3 7 - 8). The ‘Celto-Italian’ dialect of Emilia, Toynbee 1965, 11.664 n. 1 : (a 37), is a myth, and the
religious survivals mentioned by Peyrc, 52: (h 164), who realizes that the surviving Boians were few
and impoverished, are minor and very dubious.

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114 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

The most useful part of the land of the Boii passed into the hands of
Roman, Latin and probably Italian-ally immigrants. At the same time as
Cremona and Placentia were gaining no fewer than 6,000 new families of
colonists between them (190), it was decided to found two new colonies
on Boian land. 30 In the event only one, Bononia, was established quickly
(189); it had 3,000 ‘Latin’ colonists, each of them with a relatively large
land-grant of 3 1 acres (43 fora cavalryman). Next in order probably came
the small settlements of Forum Livii (188) and Regium Lepidum, the
latter founded when M. Aemilius Lepidus, the consul of 1 87, constructed
the trunk road from Ariminum to Placentia. Parma and Mutina followed
in 183, with 2,000 male citizen colonists each. 31 183 was also the year
when, faced with some possible opposition in the extreme north-east of
the north Italian plain, Rome decided to establish the Latin colony of
Aquileia. The long-term effects of all this settlement will receive atten-
tion in a later section (ch. 7, pp. 1 97-243). Here only the overall political
and economic effects can be noted. They are obvious enough: the
colonies and other settlements, together with the Insubrian and
Cenomanian treaties, finally secured Roman control over the Gallic
section of the Po plain; they also represented a massive transfer of
resources from Gauls to the Romans and their Italian allies.

The Ligurian wars progressed more slowly. Even in the 1 70s fighting
still occurred in the Appennines as far east as the hills south of Mutina,
and Mutina itself was captured by Ligurians in 177. It was not until 1 5 5
that the whole of what can be regarded as ‘Cisalpine’ Liguria was
indisputably in Roman hands.

On the coast Genua had been rebuilt in 203, and two years later it was
partially secured by means of a treaty with the Ligurian people immedi-
ately to the west, the Ingauni. This site provided an important harbour
and access of a kind to the Po valley through the Passo dei Giovi. It was
now the Ligurians to the east and south-east of this line (which must have
been in common use long before the Via Postumia was built in 148) who
were the objects of Roman attention: in the main, the llvates, Apuani and
Friniates. The territory in question, it is worth recalling, was quite
extensive, running southwards as far as Pisa and eastwards almost as far
as the line of the Via Flaminia (which was built in 187 to connect
Arretium and Bononia).

In 197 the consul Q. Minucius Rufus conducted a vigorous campaign,
subjugating the Celeiates and Cerdiciates (who probably lived on the
path northwards from Genua), and the llvates immediately to the east. 32

30 Livv xxxvii. 47. 2.

31 Mutina must have been mainly Boian in the years before 191, in spite of Polyb.m.40.8 (be
anachronisticallv calls it a Roman colony) and Livy xxxv.4.3-4.

32 An advantageous consequence for Minucius which can be inferred from ILLRP 5 17 is that he
became patronus of Genua.

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THE SUBJUGATION OF CISALPINE GAUL I 1 5

His triumph was the last one over Ligurians for sixteen years. This was
not because the Senate failed to pay attention to Liguria. Throughout
this period and down to the start of the Third Macedonian War in 171,
one consul usually campaigned in Liguria each year, often both; each of
them commanded two legions and a comparable number of allies. The
first to make much impact after 197 was Q. Minucius Thermus (not a
close relative of Minucius Rufus), who as consul in 193 allegedly had to
defend Pisa against a massive attack, before taking the offensive in the
following year. 33 The place name ‘Minucciano’, some eighteen miles east
of La Spezia, probably derives from him - a detail which underlines the
absurdity of his claim to have forced all Liguria to surrender. 34 Since he
was refused a triumph on his return in 190, the Senate evidently did not
believe any such claim.

With Antiochus III and the Aetolians defeated, consular wars in the
north became more acceptable again in 188 and 1 87. The consuls of 1 87,
C. Flaminius and M. Aemilius Lepidus, are said by Livy to have defeated
and disarmed Ligurian Friniates - all of them, supposedly — and
Flaminius also defeated the Apuani, ‘who by their attacks were making it
impossible to cultivate land at Pisa or Bononia’. 35 Mention of fighting at
the mountains Ballista and Suismontium (Valestra, Pietra Bismantova)
shows that Lepidus had penetrated deep into the Appennines above his
Ariminum-Placentia road and his settlement at Regium Lepidum, and
though the vowing of two temples while he was on campaign suggests
some difficulties, this is the last we hear of resistance by the Friniates for
several years. The Apuani, however, defeated a Roman army in 1 86 and
continued to resist thereafter. It seems to have been the achievement of
M. Sempronius Tuditanus (cos. 1 85) to make the land-route to Luna (near
the River Magra, at the north end of the coastal plain) truly secure against
them. The other consul of 1 8 5 extended the war to the Ingauni in western
Liguria. 36

The year 182 apparently marked an increase in Roman effort in
Liguria, since a proconsul as well as both consuls spent the year there,
each with two legions. One of the consuls, L. Aemilius Paullus (who was
later to command at Pydna), attacked the Ligurian Ingauni, the reason or
pretext being piracy, 37 and defeated them severely. The Ingauni
capitulated, and Paullus returned to Rome and a triumph in which the

33 Livy xxxiv. 56.2, xxxv. 3. 1, 21. io-i 1; at about the same time other Ligurians were plundering
the territory of Placentia (xxxiv.36. to).

34 Livy xxxvii. 2. 5. He was attacked by Cato in a speech ‘On Fictitious Battles’ (OR/ 74 fr. 58,
pp. 26-7).

35 Livy xxxix.2.5; but the Apuani cannot have got as far as Bononian territory.

36 Livy xxx1x.32.z-4. What happened in the Ligurian wars in 184/3 ' s quite obscure; cf. Harris
! 979» 2 59 : ( A *«)•

37 Plut. Aem. 6, probably derived from Polybius; cf. Livy XL.18.4, 28.7.

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I 1 6 ROHAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

prisoners were naturally more conspicuous than the gold and silver. 38
Other Ligurians wanted to surrender, but were put off by the Senate. 39

The consuls of 181, still in Liguria in i 80 with instructions to make
war on the Apuani, introduced a radically new policy of deportation.
They transported some 40,000 adult males, and presumably a great
number of women and children, from Liguria to Samnium. The two
cousins named Q. Ful vius Flaccus continued this policy as consuls in 1 80
and 179, the one sending about 7,000 more Apuani to Samnium, the
other settling 3,200 mountain Ligurians in the plains to the north. On the
territory of the Apuani Rome now founded the Latin colony of Luca
( 1 80), 40 and three years later Luna, a citizen colony of the large new type
with 2,000 male colonists. 41

The conquest of all of Liguria east of Genua being nearly complete,
the more active of the consuls of 1 78, A. Manlius Vulso, was sent instead
to fight in Istria, where a war had been in the making since 1 8 3 and where
a praetor had fought in 181. 42 Two years of consular campaigning
imposed Roman power. The most interesting details concern the plun-
der seized by the consul C. Claudius Pulcher in 177: 5,632 prisoners (a
useful figure since we have few prisoner totals for ‘normal’ wars in the
second century) and the equivalent of about 3 50-370,000 denarii, some of
this perhaps from Liguria. 43

The Ligurian Friniates continued to resist, even capturing Mutina for
a time in 1 77/6 by means of a surprise attack. But shortly afterwards they
lost their main stronghold at Valestra-Monte Fosola. 44 The last phase of
the war is obscured by a lacuna in Livy’s text covering the activities of the
consuls of 175, both of whom triumphed over the Ligurians.

When we next hear what Roman commanders were doing in Liguria,
the focus has changed to the Statellates in southern Piedmont but the
policy of deportation continues. Those of the Statellates who survived
the attack of M. Popillius Laenas {cos. 173), fewer than ten thousand,
surrendered to him. Fie promptly sold them into slavery, though this was
not the customary treatment of peoples who made a formal deditio - hence
an opening for Popillius’ political enemies. The most important facts
about this case are that though the Senate tried to make Popillius free the

38 Livy xl. 54.8. 39 Livy XL.34.9-1 2.

40 Livy XL.43. 1 implies that the land was provided by Pisa, but the territory of Luca went further
than that of Pisa can ever have done.

41 Livy (xLi.13.5) says that each colonist received 5 ij iugera (32 acres); scholars have generally
followed De Sanctis 1907-64, rv.i. 568 n. 204: (a 14) and Castagnoli 1946-8, 5 5: (h 84) in scaling this
down to 6£ iugera , but this figure can hardly be reconciled with centuriation as far south as
Pietrasanta. 42 For the pretexts invoked cf. Livy xl. 18.4, 26.2.

43 Livy xli.i 1.8, 13.7 (it seems unlikely that much of this silver coinage was collected in Liguria,
which had produced little before - whereas Istria, after a long period of peace, was now over-
whelmed); on the value of the victoriates included see Crawford 1974, 628-9: (b 88).

44 Livy xli.i8.i— 3, 9-13.

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THE SUBJUGATION OF CISALPINE GAUL 1 1 7

prisoners and give them back their land, 45 he not only made war on some
more Statellates in 171, but in the end obtained a compromise under
which many of them remained slaves and most of the rest were deported
northwards across the Po. 46 Somewhere in that region they were ‘as-
signed’ land, while between them and their homeland Rome set up the
new communities of Hasta and Valentia. 47 Besides the activities of M.
Popillius and his brother Caius (cos. 1 72), a ten-man commission of 1 73
in which the senior man was M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 187, 175), already
powerful in Northern Italy - engaged in what was in effect a rival
programme of individual land distributions, both in Cisalpine Gaul and
in Liguria, for the benefit of Romans and Latins. 48 There for the
moment, with a new war due to begin against Macedon in 171, Roman
expansion in Liguria rested. After Pydna there were still more cam-
paigns, but without Livy we know scarcely anything about them. There
were at least three more triumphs: two over the Eleiates Ligurians, in 166
and 158, one over the Apuani in 155. 49

These Ligurian wars are problematical and interesting, though they
are not commonly so regarded by historians. What is most puzzling is
why it took Rome so long - till 180 if not 175 - to produce decisive
effects. It was not shortage of manpower, since four legions, with
auxiliaries, were often used, and the Ligurians probably could not field
much larger armies. The usual belief is that the land itself, and particu-
larly the steep-sided valleys within the Appennine range, formed the
chief obstacle. 50 The terrain was without doubt more confusing and
more arduous for an attacking force than was the plain of the Po. On the
other hand Rome possessed, from the late 190s, the great strategic
advantage of being able to attack eastern Liguria from both sides of the
Appennines at once. In fact the mode of life of the Ligurians was a serious
additional obstacle (as it later was with the Celtiberians): a stock-raising
semi-pastoral economy gave the Ligurians enough mobility to make
them awkward enemies. But once a wholehearted Roman effort began,
only real guerrilla warfare in the modern sense could have prevented the
Roman conquest. Hence we must ask why the thorough-going Roman
drive began only in 181. The reason cannot be that the Ligurians

45 Livy xlii.8.8, 9.6, 21.1

46 This result is described in Livy XLi1.22.5-6; those who qualified as not having been enemies of
Rome since 1 79 (this clearly excluded many Statellates) were freed and transported to land north of
the river (there were ‘many thousands’ according to Livv). The name of Aquae StatieUac shows that
some remained.

47 Toynbee 1965, 11, 668: (a 37). Forum Fulvii in the same area probably followed in 159.

48 Livy XLii.4.3-4.

49 See the Acta Triumphalia for these years. Another in 1 66 seems to have been over the ‘Ligurian’

Taurini in the area of Turin, who were not properly called Ligurians: Walbank 1957 79, *.177:
(b 38). 50 See already Floras 1.19.4.

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I I 8 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

suddenly seemed to offer a greater threat then, since their comportment
was unchanged and there had been no trouble in Pisan territory since
187. All through the 180s they had been a threat to the Roman immi-
grants in the plain of the Po, as they had long been a threat to Pisa and to
Roman traffic to and from Spain; but there was clearly an additional
factor at work in 18 1.

What appears to have happened is that soon after the Roman occupa-
tion of Boian territory was completed by the colonies of 183, and
colonies had been planned for some other desirable and (in Roman eyes)
available sites (Saturnia in 183, Aquileia and Graviscae in 1 81), the most
desirable section of Ligurian territory became the target of Roman greed
for land. Luca, Luna and land of the Statellates were the latest, and as it
turned out almost the last, places in Italy which Romans and Latins
settled before the Social War.

It would be absurdly anachronistic to suppose that when the Romans
conquered northern Italy they had anything like the ‘unification of Italy’
in mind, 51 since Italy as a political concept, in so far as it existed, did not
include Ligurians or Gauls. As for the ‘natural frontier’ at the Alps, it
seems likely that the notion was devised only after the conquest - perhaps
by Cato. 52 Even as a geographical concept Italy probably did not extend
into the northern regions until the second century. 53 In the event,
however, the wars against the Gauls and Ligurians were the first
important step in the Romanizadon and Italianization of a large section
of the peninsula. 54

III. SPAIN 55

Simultaneous with the decisive conquest of northern Italy was the
conquest of a large area of Spain, a sequence of events which shows, more
plainly perhaps than any other, the Romans’ drive to expand and their
determination in the face of obstacles to expansion. 56

51 The treaty clauses which forbade the bestowing of Roman citizenship on any Cenomanian or
insubrian (Cic. Ba/b. 32) are significant.

52 Orig. fr. 8j;cf. Polvb. 111.54.2. Livy xxxix.22.7, 54.10-12 may show that Venetia was claimed as
‘Italy’ in the 180s. Cisalpine Gaul was of course commonly called Gaul down to 42 b.c. and even
later.

53 Geographically, Cisalpine Gaul was part of Italy to Polybius (1.1 3.4, n. 14.3-1 2, in. 54.2, etc.),

though it had not been so to outsiders in 215 (vn.9.6). 54 See below, ch. 7, pp. 197-243.

55 The main literary sources for this section are Livy and Appian, btisp. (all references to Appian
are to this work); Polybius, the fragments of Cato’s Or/^w and speeches, Lucilius, Cicero, Diodorus
Siculus, Strabo, Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, the elder Pliny, Plutarch, Florus, Ptolemy
the geographer, Festus, Cassius Dio and Cassiodorus also contribute. The important archaeological,
epigraphical and numismatic evidence is mentioned in later notes.

56 The best detailed narratives remain those of De Sanctis 1907-64, iv.i. 428-71, and iv.iii. 222-79:
(a 14), and (for the wars of 1 54-133) Simon 1962: (g 29). Still very useful is Schulten’s commentary
on the sources: Schultcn 1935 and 1937: (b 33). Spanish publications have proliferated since about
i960; Blazcjucz and others 1978-80, n.5 1-98: (g i i) provides a serviceable narrative of this period.

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The Spain which Rome subdued between 218 and 13} was far from
being capable of repelling the onslaught of a Roman army of even
moderate size. Not that the territory was entirely primitive or without
exploited resources; rather, it resembled Oscan Italy in the period of the
Samnite wars. On the coast lay several cities of mainly Punic or Greek
character. Inland, while the Celtiberians and Lusitanians inhabited
regions comparable in size with Etruria or Samnium, there were at least
twenty other independent peoples that possessed considerable territor-
ies. From the archaeological evidence scholars have concluded that
scarcely any substantial cities existed away from the coast; Numantia is
the most impressive. 57 Yet the literary sources often speak of cities and
towns, and though they certainly exaggerated - Cato cannot have
captured 400 towns - we should also allow for the inadequacies of the
archaeological record, which tells us little or nothing about, for example,
the existence of wooden buildings or the pre-Roman remains of such still
inhabited sites as Toledo or Sigtienza. However, small hill-top poblados,
not large towns, were characteristic of inland Spain about 200. We have
very little evidence for complex political institutions, though the sources
sometimes refer to local kings and senates, but we ought not to assume
that the tribal institutions were crude or primitive by Italian standards. 58
While it was mainly the Greek and Punic cities that devised their own
coin-types before the Roman conquest, some Iberians in adjacent regions
were minting imitative coins. 59 As to literacy, it was obviously very
sparse among the pre-Roman Iberians, but to judge from the inscriptions
- which are admittedly difficult to date - Iberian was being written to a
significant extent in certain areas, for example at Ullastret (near
Emporion) and among the Edetani. 60 The existence of the Iberian group
of alphabets is itself significant.

With regard to metal resources, the pre-Roman Iberians not surpris-
ingly had a fair knowledge of how to exploit them. Even the silver
objects which Carthage and Rome neglected to take away show that
Iberian craftsmen had real skill. 61 Iron weapons and equipment appear in
numerous Spanish burials, and it was notoriously from the Iberians that
the Roman army learned a major improvement in efficient sword de-

57 The area within Numantia’s sccond-ccntury fortifications was 93 hectares ( = 229 acres):
Schulten 1914-31, 11.96-103: (b 198); but only about 1 1 ha were really built up (with some 2,000
houses, according to Schulten, 11.178). On Spanish towns of tbis period in general see Blazqucz 1964,
1 8 1 n. 40: (g 8): Garcia y Bcllido 1968, 7-30: (g 17); Martinez Gazquez 1974, 156-7: (g 22).

58 On the political culture of pre-Roman Spain sec Maluquerde Motes in Mcncndez Pidal 1954,
143-51, 251-2, 318-24: (g 23); Blazqucz and others 1978-80, 1.183-203: (c n).

59 The chronology of these coins in the standard handbook, Dc Guadan 1969, 1 22-8: (b 89) is too
low because in practice he ignored the discovery that the Roman denarius dates from 21 1 b.c. Hoard
evidence, e.g. from Les Ansias: De Guadan, op. cit. 95; Crawford 1969, no. 104: (b 87), shows that
Emporion coins were being imitated by c. 210.

60 See Maluquer de Motes 1968: (g. 21). 61 Cf. Raddatz 1969: (b 189).

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ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

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I 2 1

sign. 62 This chapter is not the context for a full survey of the cultures of
the Spanish peninsula at the moment of the Romans’ first arrival, but we
ought to avoid the stereotyped view of a barbarian Spain being con-
quered by civilized Romans. 63 Reality was more complex than that, and
we must attend both to the more ‘primitive’ aspects of Roman behaviour
and to the variegated local conditions, political and material, which
affected the lengthy process of Roman conquest.

A war in Spain had been part of the Senate’s original design for the
conflict with Carthage in 218. After the Romans had shown remarkable
tenacity in maintaining forces there, the reward came in 206 with the
victory of Scipio Africanus’ army at Ilipa. The Senate soon let it be
known, next year at the latest, that it intended to send a regular series of
annual magistrates to govern the new territory. 64 This, not 197, was the
date of the first Roman annexation as that term is usually understood. 65
From the beginning there were two provinces, Hispania Citerior
(Nearer) and Ulterior (Further), though a precise dividing line between
the two may not have been drawn until 197. 66 Scipio’s main effort had
been in the valley of the Guadalquivir (Baetis), where the right bank of
the river as well as the left was evidently under firm control after Ilipa; the
lower reaches of the river were guarded by the town ofltalica, founded in
206. Further to the east, a continuous but not very wide strip of coastland
stretched northwards to the Ebro. 67 In the north-east, some thirty
peoples had given hostages in 205 , and the appearance of the llergetes as
Roman allies shows that strong influence, if not control, extended as far
to the north-west as Osca (Huesca). 68

As to what Roman control meant, here too we know little about the
earliest phase. Gades had a treaty with Rome which probably contained a
provision that Roman praefecti should be sent there, a provision which
the Senate cancelled in 199. 69 But neither Senate nor people ever voted on
this treaty, and Gades was probably alone or almost alone in having one.
Other Spaniards were not favoured with such guarantees of their rights.

62 Basic information about indigenous Spanish metallurgy: Maluqucr dc Motes in Mcnendcz
Pidal 1954, 109-22, 257-69, 35 5-60: (g 23); Blazquez 1968, 210-1 1, 2 18-20, 228, 236, 245-9: (c 9).
The Spanish sword: Walbank 1957-79, 1.704: (b 38).

63 Found in some standard accounts, e.g. De Sanctis 1907-64, iv.i.408: (a 14).

64 App. 38.1 5 2.

65 Harris 1979, 1 36: (a 21). For the contrary view: Bernhardt 1975, 420: (g 5); Knapp 1977, 62:

(G 20 ).

66 Cf. Livy xxxn. 28. 1 1. Sumner’s theory that Nearer and Further Spain did not become distinct
provinces until long after 197 is to be rejected: Sumner 1970 and 1977: (g 30 and 31); Dcvclin 1980,
364-7: (g 12). On the coast the two provinces were divided just west of New Carthage (Livy
XL.41.10).

67 The narrowness of this territory is suggested by Scipio’s campaign against ‘llurcia’ after Ilipa;

it was probably at Lorqui, north-west of Murcia and only 30 miles from the coast: Walbank 1957-79,
ir. 305: (b 38). 60 Livy xxix. 3. 5. The llergetes: Livy xxxiv.12.1, Frontin. iv.7.31.

69 Livy xxxii. 2. 5, with the interpretation of Badian 1954: (g 3); Knapp 1977, 209-10: (g 20).

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I 22

ROMAN EXPANSION TN THE WEST

With regard to revenue-gathering in the newly acquired territories, it is
best to assume that the fixed vectigal stipendiarium, known later, was
imposed from the start and that each community was responsible for
delivering a fixed sum or its equivalent in goods to Roman officials each
year. As for garrisons, the two legions in Spain were probably amalga-
mated in 201, 70 and in 197 even these troops were to be withdrawn,
leaving only Latin, Italian and Spanish allies. This decision was, as we
shall see, a serious mistake.

The years 19810 196 are, because of Livy’s negligence, obscure ones in
the history of Roman possessions in Spain. The background is plain
enough. After Scipio’s departure several of the peoples whom the
Romans already aspired to control rebelled, including the Ilergetes and
Ausetani north of the Ebro, and the Sedetani further south. By 199,
however, serious fighting had ended, and in the following year, now that
the Senate presumably felt that Spain was secure, a desirable constitu-
tional change was made: two new praetorships were created, an increase
from four to six, so that a praetor could rule each of the two Spanish
provinces each year. 71 In further recognition of the imagined calm in the
Spanish provinces, the Senate decided that the legionary part of the army
in Spain should be shipped home. On the most probable reconstruction
it was the beginning of this repatriation of the legions which provoked
the rebellion; the cause can hardly have been, as is often said, the
realization by the Spaniards that they had now been annexed. In any case
by the summer the rebellion was on, and it required the efforts both of the
new praetors and of their predecessors, Cn. Cornelius Blasio and L.
Stertinius. The latter pair’s stay in Spain was prolonged into the winter of
197/6, and it was probably during 197 that they won the victories which
they celebrated on their return home; 72 all or most of their legionaries are
likely to have returned with them. Livy’s account of the Spanish events
of 1 97 is too scrappy to show us the scale or the geographical range of the
rebellion, 73 but the delayed return of the proconsuls of 199-197 seems to
guarantee that the rebellion was widespread in its first year. 74 One of the
governors of 197/6, C. Sempronius Tuditanus in Further Spain, died of
wounds after his army suffered a defeat. The new praetors sent to Spain
in 196 were each given a legion and additional allied troops, and after his

70 Livy .\xx.41.4-5.

71 However, most or all of the praetors who governed the Spanish provinces were given
proconsular power (Jashcmski 1950,41— 7: (h 12); McDonald 1953, 1 4 3 — 4: (a 24)), at least when their
praetorships expired; cf. Develtn 1980, 352-3: (g 12).

72 Blasio and Stertinius returned to Rome only early in 196, as is evident from Livy xxxm.27. 1-5
and from the A.cta Triumphalia\ contra Briscoe 1973, 299: (b 3).

73 Cf. Briscoe 1973, 290^(8 3).

74 It is striking chat Stertinius (who had been in Further Spain) brought home as plunder a larger
quantity of silver than any other commander in the war of 197-174 (50,0001b: Livy xxxni.27.4).

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SPAIN

1 2 3

return the governor of Nearer Spain, Q. Minucius Thermus (on whom
see above, p. 1 1 5), celebrated a triumph rich in plundered silver. As to the
geography of the rebellion, the first definite details we hear concern
places south of the Guadalquivir, including Punic towns on the coast; ‘all
of Baeturia’ was involved. 75 Who rebelled in Nearer Spain is unknown,
but in 196 the fighting there seems to have been against the Torboletae
(inland from Saguntum). 76

In spite of the success achieved by the forces of Q. Minucius Thermus
(pr. 1 96) in this conflict in Nearer Spain, the Senate took the striking step
in the winter of 196/5 of deciding to send one of the consuls-elect, with
two extra legions, to rule the province. By lot, though presumably not by
accident, this turned out to be a man of exceptional energy, M. Porcius
Cato. It looks as if there was genuine cause for alarm about the Spanish
possessions. And indeed when Cato arrived he met opposition even at
the ports of Rhode and Emporion in the extreme north-east; if Livy is to
be believed, the llergetes of King Bilistages were the only obedient
Spaniards left north of the Ebro. 77 However, we need to guard here
against exaggerations designed to dramatize Cato’s success, exaggera-
tions which without doubt derive from Cato’s own writings. 78 He
claimed among other things to have conquered more towns than he had
spent days in Spain, and the fighting which occurred under his successor
shows that his claims to have pacified his province were also overstated.

It remains true, however, that Cato’s impact on Spain was consider-
able, and his effect on Roman perceptions of Spain may have been still
more important. He defeated or disarmed several peoples north of the
Ebro, business which took several months. 79 Crossing the river in 194,
he then according to many historians took his army some 500-400 miles
south-west to fight against the Turdetani. 80 In spite of the fact that
‘Turta’ is mentioned in two of the few relevant fragments of Cato’s
writings, 81 we should recognize this as an impossibility - especially as
conditions were still turbulent in the north-east and Cato’s next move
was deep into Celtiberian territory. The latter fact hints at the most
probable solution: Cato too fought against the Torboletae. 82 He then

75 Livy xxxiii. 1 1.7-8. But ‘ Baeturiam omnem' looks like an exaggeration, since Roman power
hardly extended to the River Guadiana.

76 Livy xxxiii. 44. 4. Livy never realized that some of those whom he found referred to in his
sources as Turdctani/Turduli were separate from the Turdetani of Further Spain and more
accurately known as Torb-/Turbolctae. 77 Livv xxxiv.ii.6, cf. 13.8.

78 Even if Livy did not rely primarily on Cato’s own writings, and even if some sections (e.g.
xxxiv.17.1-4) do not derive from Cato. On the source question see Astin 1978, 302-7: (h 68);
Briscoe 1981, 63-5: (b 4).

79 On the controversial chronology of his campaigns see Briscoe’s same note.

80 Following Livy xxxiv.i7. 1; so Astin 1978, 41 n. 32: (h 68).

81 ORF 4 frs. 40, 41 (p. 23).

82 See further Sumner 1977, 127: (g 31); Briscoe 1981, 80: (b 4).

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124 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

became the first to lead a Roman army in an invasion of Celtiberia,
presumably reaching that region through the valley of the jiloca. He
failed to capture either Seguntia (Siguenza) or Numantia, however, and
returned — obviously down the valley of the Ebro - to deal with the
apparently still rebellious Lacetani and Bergistani in Catalonia. His
successes in all these areas were important, and on returning to Rome he
celebrated a triumph (which was not, however, richer than some pre-
vious ones earned in Spain). During his stay he was also active in
increasing Roman revenues, and by this means as well as by his publicity
concerning the resources of Spain (see below, p. 1 30), he doubtless made
it much more valuable in Roman eyes.

It was not for several more years, not until 188, that the conquerors’
efforts increased, if we measure them in terms of the manpower used; but
the impetus of Cato’s campaigns was carried forward. In 1 93 several new
peoples appear in the sources, at war with Rome: the Lusitanians (first
mentioned while supposedly plundering the province of Further Spain);
the Oretani, who lived around the upper reaches of the Guadiana (Anas);
and still further north, the Carpetani, Vettones and Vaccaei, all of whom
suffered a defeat that year at Toletum (in Carpetanian territory) at the
hands of M. Fulvius Nobilior, the praetor in Further Spain. There should
be no doubt that the latter pressed aggressively northwards, and on his
return to Rome he won an ovatio , followed at the next election by the
consulship. His successor in Further Spain, L. Aemilius Paullus, also
fought against the Lusitanians ( 1 9 1 /90): 83 the stereotyped details and the
shortage of clear geographical references in Livy’s narrative make it
impossible to say much that is certain about this campaign. 84

By 188, with the North Italian Gauls under control and Antiochus
defeated, the Senate made a somewhat greater commitment of troops to
Spain. The praetors of that year received an extra allotment of allied
troops, though it was not enormous (6,400 men in all) and neither were
the results. Lusitanian raids continued to cause trouble in allied and
subject territory, if we should believe Livy. But in 187 a more serious
reinforcement took place: in fact the number of legions in Spain was
doubled. The praetors sent in 186 (C. Calpurnius Piso, L. Quinctius
Crispinus) achieved an unusual degree of mutual co-operation and were
able to fight successfully on the River Tagus in the land of the Carpetani.
On their return to Rome (184), they were both voted triumphs over the
Lusitanians and Celtiberians, the first full Spanish triumphs since 194.
But neither of these two peoples was near to final defeat, and in 183 the
Celtiberians appear to have penetrated far into Roman-controlled terri-

83 Livy xxxvii. 46. 7-8 (Vif Bastetanis’; cf. Knapp 1977, 66 n. 12: (g 20)), 57.5-6.

84 ILLRP 5 14, an interesting text of a decree of Paullus, provides little to go on, though we can
infer from it that the provincials of Hasta had been rebellious.

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SPAIN

tory. 85 The first praetor who carried out a really successful invasion of
Celtiberia itself was Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who ruled Nearer Spain from
182 to 180. This was clearly in accordance with a policy determined in
Rome, since both Spanish armies had been extensively reinforced in
1 82, 86 and Flaccus had at least two ex-praetors in his army as military
tribunes (a sure sign that an important campaign was expected). 87 After
defeating the Celtiberians to the south of their own territory he advanced
northwards along the valley of the Jiloca, contending mainly with the
Lusones (a subdivision of the Celtiberians), until the majority of the
Celtiberians surrendered. 88 In the following year he attacked the ‘further’
part of Celtiberian territory which had not been surrendered. 89 This
campaign was taken over by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (180-178), who
succeeded in imposing a degree of control in the rest of Celtiberia.
Though the places he captured in ‘the furthest parts’ of Celtiberia (Livy’s
phrase) are unidentifiable, it is certain that he defeated some of the
Aravaci, the most north-westerly and in the long run the most formida-
ble of the Celtiberians. Gracchus also imposed a political settlement, to
be discussed below. The triumph which he celebrated in February 177
included the unusually large amount of 40,000 pounds of silver in its
booty.

Events in Further Spain in these years are more difficult to follow. The
praetors of 186 had triumphed over the Lusitanians, but Livy tells us
nothing about the campaign. 90 There was fighting with the Lusitanians
again in 181, and then in 179 L. Postumius Albinus, co-ordinating his
plans with Gracchus, advanced deep into Lusitanian territory in order to
attack the Vaccaei, who lived far to the north in the region of Valladolid
and were the western neighbours of the Aravaci. He defeated both
Lusitanians and Vaccaei, 91 and in 1 78 his triumph, which took place the
day after Gracchus’, was ‘over Lusitania and Spain’.

Gracchus’ successor in Nearer Spain, M. Titinius Curvus (178-175),
also celebrated a triumph, but gaps in Livy prevent us from knowing
where he fought. It was not against the Celtiberians, since they remained
quiet under the Gracchan settlement until a short-lived rebellion in
175/4. Yet somewhere or other - perhaps within the area already well
controlled by Rome (in view of the charges brought against him in 1 7 1 ) —
he established his claim to a triumph. It was the last full triumph of the
war.

Since Scipio’s departure, Spain had been without warfare only in 204-
zoo, 191 and possibly 188/7, periods which coincide to a significant

85 Livy xxxix. 56. i. 86 Livy XL. 1.7. 87 MRR 1.385. 88 Livy XL.33.9 (1 8 i).

99 Livy XL. 39. 1.

90 Though it is possible that the events he describes in xx;;ix.3o-3 1 as taking place in Carpctania
and near Toletum concerned the Lusitanians. 91 Livy XL.50.6; Per. xli.

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126 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

degree with important Roman fighting in other theatres. This supports
the view - which it would be difficult to contest in any case - that the
main military pressure came from the Roman not the Spanish side during
all or almost all of the period from 202 to 174. This is the impression
which the Romans create by their progressive involvement with new
peoples - the Celtiberians and others during Cato’s command, the
Lusitanians from 193, the Vettones and Vaccaei from the same year. The
Carthaginians had shown that a Spanish empire could be held, in
consequence of the political disunity of the Spanish peoples, without
constant advances to the north and west. 92 It is true and important that
Spaniards did sometimes invade territory which the Romans regarded as
subject to themselves. Roman sources were naturally prone to invent or
exaggerate such stories, and the precise circumstances in which the
Lusitanians intruded into Roman territory (if they did) in 193 and 190
cannot be recovered. In 186 both Celtiberians and Lusitanians sup-
posedly attacked the territory of unspecified Roman allies, but this was
probably no more than a convenient pretext. Celtiberian raids into the
territory of the Ausetani (183) and Carpetani (1 81) are also to be regarded
with suspicion. And if all these stories were true, they would not by
themselves explain Rome’s regular Spanish wars and relentless advance.

The Roman conquest up to this point had proceeded at a moderate
pace by comparison with what happened in some places. This should no
doubt be traced in part to the determination of the indigenous popula-
tion to resist. In addition the Celtiberians, like the Ligurians, had a
largely pastoral economy 93 which made them difficult to pin down and
destroy. But though reliable figures are lacking, our Roman sources do
not give the impression that any Spanish people could mobilize a force of
overwhelming size. 94 Nor does guerrilla warfare, in any precise sense of
the phrase, have much to do with it, though modern scholars often say
that the Spaniards fought in this fashion. Some Spanish peoples must
have been elusive opponents, but more relevant is the fact that the
Romans did not commit forces that were enormous in relation to the
extent of the land itself; it was only from about 1 87 to about 1 72 that four
legions were regularly in Spain 95 - previously there had only been two,
that is to say a nominal complement of 10,800 citizen troops for the whole
peninsula. Italian allies too were an essential component in each of the
two armies. Though the figures we have in Livy are incomplete it has
been calculated from them that in the period 197—187 each legion was
supplemented by an average of 7,900 allied troops (including 400 cav-

1)2 Schulten 1950, 507: (g 28). 93 Schultcn 1914-31, 1.191—2: (b 198).

94 On Cekibcria cf. ibid . 245-6.

95 The increase: Afeelius 1944, 40-1: (h 80) (it may have happened in 185). The number was
probably reduced about 172; cf. Brunt 1971, 661-3: (h 82), who puts the change slightly earlier.

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127

airy), while in the period of four legions the allies amounted to 6,300
(including 300 cavalry) for each legion. 96 To be added to these figures are
the contingents of Spanish allies who often served in thousands on the
Roman side. 97 All the same, the total force was remarkably small until
about 187 in relation to the size of the peninsula. The Senate rated rapid
expansion in Spain less important than expansion in northern Italy
(which was also the reason why a consul was only once sent to Spain in
this period). But what is really remarkable is that so many Romans served
in Spain, given the size of the citizen body and more particularly the
number of assidui qualified for military service. It is probable that in the
period of four legions as many as 20% of the eligible iuniores were in Spain
and suffering casualties at any given time, 98 as sure a sign as any of
Rome’s profound commitment to imperial power.

Here in the 1 70s expansion came to a halt for twenty years. One reason
must have been a military preoccupation with Macedonia in and after
173. It seems likely, too, that the Senate felt that a satisfactory limit had
been reached by the activities of the most recent governors, so that little
individual or collective gain would result from further campaigns.
Gracchus evidently saw his role as the glorious one of bringing an
important enemy, the Celtiberians, to submission, and though this was
somewhat premature - in spite of the scholars who carelessly state that
Gracchus completed the war in Celtiberia or in Spain as a whole - it was
an understandable claim. He had after all compelled not only the Belli
and Titthi but also the Aravaci, or at least those in the main Aravacan
town, Numantia, to accept treaty terms (unknown to us in detail) which
were acceptable to the Roman Senate. 99

The extent of the power the Romans had achieved in Spain by 1 74, as
far as it can be known, was as follows. North of the Ebro, it extended, as
before 197, to the Ilergetes, while in the river valley itself the limit was
further west, at Calagurris (Calahorra) or a little higher. 100 To the south
of the river, all or most of the Celtiberians, and all who lived between the
latter and the south-east coast, were subject to Rome. So were the
Carpetani and Vettones, whose territories lay astride the River Tagus
further west; and so probably were their northern neighbours, the
Vaccaei. Yet none of these three peoples was completely subdued, and

96 Afzelius 1944, 66-75: (h 80).

97 Cf. Afzelius 1944, 90-1: (h 80); Balil 1956, 120-4: (g 4); Brunt 1971, 665-4: (h 82).

98 Cf. Harris 1979, 44: (a 21).

99 It was misleading of Simon 1962, 1 2: (g 29), to say that the Aravaci were free under Gracchus’
settlement, since though Appian is somewhat unclear on the subject (45.179, 44.185), Gracchus
definitely made a treaty with them (Polyb. xxxv.z.if, etc.).

100 Presumably Calagurris took its additional name Nasica from P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica {cos.
191) after he served as one of the. pa from of the provincials of Nearer Spain in i7i;Gabba 1954, 298-
500: (h ijo) = 1976, 106: (h 42).

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128 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

evidence is lacking that anything like provincial government had been
imposed on them. 101 The Lusitanians remained independent, it seems;
there are few Lusitanian placenames in the sources for the period down
to 174, and in fact Roman control beyond the River Guadiana was
probably limited to the Cunei in the extreme south of Portugal. That the
Cunei were Roman subjects before 153, and hence before 1 74, we know
from Appian. 102 The limit of Roman power probably lay along the
Guadiana for a long distance. As to where the northern boundaries of the
provinces were, it is entirely possible that they remained without
definition.

In Spain, as elsewhere and always, Roman armies plundered the
inhabitants with great thoroughness. Metals, and above all silver, made
the gathering of booty in Spain especially profitable. The amounts of
silver and gold which Livy reports as having been carried in triumphs
between 200 and 1 74 represent only a fraction of what was seized, but all
the same the total of uncoined silver easily exceeded 100 tons, a very large
quantity by the standards of the time. 103 Among moveable assets of other
kinds, the plunder will have included very numerous slaves, though
enslavement was usually such a routine matter that the sources do not
trouble to mention it; casual references confirm the obvious fact that
some of these slaves were exported. 104 But the strongest attraction of all,
for those with any vision, were the workable deposits of silver, especially
near New Carthage and in the Sierra Morena. As Gibbon wrote, ‘Spain,
by a very singular fatality, was the Peru and Mexico of the old world.’

The sources about Spain in this period seldom reveal any interesting
details about the forms of Roman domination, but there are questions
worth discussing about immigration and about taxation. Three new
cities appear after Italica — Gracchuris, Uiturgi and Carteia — but none of
them is likely to have been inhabited mainly by immigrants. Carteia, on
the bay of Algeciras, was founded as a Latin colony in 171 - the first
outside Italy and hence an important innovation. Its primary members
were the children of Roman soldiers and Spanish women, though their
freedmen and the local inhabitants of the district were also, Livy says,
able to enroll. 105 Who inhabited Gracchuris, which was founded on the
upper Ebro by Ti. Gracchus in 178 (he thus became the first Roman to
name a city after himself), the sources do not tell us; scholars usually

101 Thus in the 150s Appian still seems to contrast the Vettones with those who are Roman
subjects (56.235, 58.243-244). 102 App. 57 - 239 -

103 BSAR 1. 1 27-37 catalogues the evidence (though with some inferior textual variants). On the
importance contemporaries attached to booty cf. Harris 1979, 209 n. 6: (a 21).

,(M Acts of enslavement: Blazquez 1962-3, 19-20: (c 6). Export: Liv. Per. xux; App. 77.331.
105 Livy XLin.3.4. Why exactly the Senate said it was to be called a colony of freedmen is unclear;
cf. Galsterer 1971, 8-9: (g 15); Humbert 1976, 225—34: (h 138).

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SPAIN

I2 9

suppose that it must have been indigenous Spaniards, 106 but a mixed
population, with some Italian blood in it, is more likely, for otherwise
Gracchus would have been creating a potential danger to the security of
the province. The third site, Iliturgi (Mengibar, on the south side of the
upper Guadalquivir), is more problematical still: its status as a Gracchan
foundation depends on a solitary inscription which may not be trustwor-
thy. 107 If Ti. Gracchus really did establish such a town (presumably it was
not a formal colony), its population too was probably made up of both
Spaniards and Italians. Other immigration in the period before 174
cannot be measured, but quite a lot of Italians were probably attracted to
the mining areas. The immigration is likely to have centred at New
Carthage, because of the silver mines nearby, 108 while other immigrants
probably concentrated at the main ports, Emporion, Tarraco and per-
haps Gades.

How the exploitation of the silver mines was organized has been
debated. It is evident that Rome must in some way have relied on con-
tractors {publicani ), and the considerable investment which must have
been required 109 suggests that large companies were involved. These are
likely to have been Rome-based and to have made their contracts over
five years with the censors. In the developed Roman system, and
probably from the beginning of the Roman occupation, slaves naturally
provided the manual labour. 110 What the surviving sources do not make
clear is whether there was a system of subcontracting by the companies of
publicani, as Polybius may imply when he says that in his time the mine-
workers near New Carthage contributed 2 5 ,000 drachmas to the Roman
people each daj. ni An alternative possibility is that the Roman governors
rented mining rights to contractors who had migrated to the locality. In
any case, as Polybius’ account makes clear, the revenues to the state from
the area of New Carthage alone were enormous, the equivalent of 36.5
million sesterces a year. 112 Private profits must also have been on a
generous scale.

The other public revenues drawn from the Spanish peoples were a
fixed tax in cash, the stipendium , and a 5 % levy on grain. Attempts to deny
that any Spaniards paid stipendium in this sense in the early second century

106 E.g. Brunt 1971, 2 1 5 n. 8: (h 82); Knapp 1977, 108-9: (g 20). In the case of ‘Complcga’ (in or
near the territory of the Celtibcrian Lusoncs), Gracchus seems to have given some rights and land to
the landless after defeating an attack (App. 43.179).

107 The text is ‘ 77 . Scmpronio Gracchojdeductorij populus lliturgit anus' For the view that the inscrip-
tion is ancient (though not of 178 b.c.) and correct sec Degrassi 1967, 34-8: (b 48); Galstcrcr 1971, 13
n. 5 3: (g 1 5); Knapp 1977, 1 10: (g 20); ancient and incorrect: Wiegels 1982: (c 36); not ancient at all:
Garcia y Bcllido 1959, 449 n. 6: (o 16). 1(JB Cf. Strabo in. 147.

109 Cf. Badian 1972, 33-4: (h 32). 110 Diod. Sic. v.36.

1.1 xxxiv. 9. 9 = Strabo 111.148: cf. Richardson 1976, 142: (g 24); Harris 1979, 69: (a 21).

1.2 A perfectly credible figure; cf. the 3001b of silver a day which Hannibal received from a
‘Baebelo’ mine (Plin. HN xxxm.97).

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I JO ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

are ill-founded: the sources are no more silent than we would expect
about such a mundane matter, and the natural presumption is that Rome
started to gather taxes in the period after the battle of Ilipa, gradually
(perhaps slowly) extending the obligation to more and more Spanish
peoples, rather than waiting until the 170s. 113 The minting of Iberian
‘ denari F began at the latest about 197, 1,4 and it seems plain that such coins,
minted on the Roman standard, must in the first place have been
designed principally as a means of paying tribute to Rome. The uniform-
ity not only of the weight-standard but also of the types between widely
scattered mints, together with the chronology, establishes this. 115 To use
the names that appear on the coins themselves, Bolscan (Huesca), Iltirta
(Lerida?), Cese (Tarragona), Ausescen (north of Tarragona) and
Icalguscen/Icaloscen (somewhere in the south) are the main places. 116
The only reason to doubt that Rome imposed money taxation on the
peoples of Spain from the earliest period is that there was simply not
enough money in the economy; but the Romans realized that this
problem could be overcome at least in many areas by means of these local
‘denarii’. It may possibly have been in other areas that the 5 % levy on
grain production was exacted. Unfortunately the only text which men-
tions this levy - in the setting of the 170s - gives us very little clear
information about it. 117 But there is no good reason to doubt that grain
was already being exacted in the first years. 118

It is a waste of time to try to ‘calculate’ the profits Rome made from the
Spanish provinces in the second century, the evidence being entirely
inadequate; it is almost equally far-fetched to claim that they were not
profitable at all. 119 Silver must have tipped the balance. Not that other
natural resources were lacking: the astute Cato, as we know even from
our very fragmentary evidence, was greatly impressed not only by the
silver, but by the sources of iron and salt and even by the fishiness of the
Ebro. 120 It might be comforting to imagine that the greed which was

113 Otherwise Bernhardt 1975, 422: (G 5); Richardson 1976, 148-9: (G 24). Already in XXVlll.25.9
Livy refers to stipendiariae civitates , and Florus (1.3 3. 7), for what he is worth, says that Scipio
Africanus made Spain a stipendiaria provincia (the natural reference in these texts is to taxation).

1.4 Knapp 1977, esp. 8 — 1 1: (b 106).

1.5 For this interpretation cf. Albertini 1923, 21 : {g i); Schulten 1935, 153; (b 33); Knapp 1977,
1 7-1 8: (b 106); Dominguez Arranz 1979, 2941(0 13). Knapp is tempted by the alternative theory that
the Iberian denarii were minted to pay Spanish auxiliary troops, but this would hardly account for the
uniformities mentioned in the text. 116 Knapp 1977, 2-3: (b 106).

1,7 Livy xLin.2.12; it seems that the task of collecting it was farmed to the local communities.
Plut. C. Graccb. 6 refers to a case in which, presumably, more than 5 % had been exacted by a Roman
governor.

118 Richardson 1976, 1 50: (g 24) notwithstanding; it is hardly surprising that with his province in
chaos, as it was on his arrival, Cato had to rely for grain on purchase (a course he naturally rejected)
or violent seizure (Livy xxxiv.9.1 2-13).

1,9 As said by Van Nostrand, ESAR m. 123 and Badian 1968, 8: (a 5); see further Harris *979, 69:
(a 21). 120 Cato, Orig. frs. 93, 1 10 (‘pisculentus’).

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SPAIN I 3 I

obviously an important reason why Rome maintained and expanded its
Spanish empire in the second century was somehow disappointed, but in
reality it is likely that Rome profited both in the public and private
sectors.

The following years, from 173 until about 155, were relatively though
not entirely peaceful in Spain. During the Third Macedonian War
Roman governors in Spain restrained themselves or were restrained by
the Senate; but in 170 some part of Nearer Spain evidently saw a quite
serious rebellion, most of the details of which are lost in a gap in the
manuscript of Livy. 121 After the manuscript finally breaks off, we know
that Rome fought against the Lusitanians in the period 1 66-1 60. 122 But
the most interesting known events in this period concern the conduct of
provincial governors and the repercussions of this conduct at Rome. In
171 delegates from several peoples in both Spanish provinces petitioned
the Senate about the ‘greed and cruelty’ of three recent governors. The
Senate had a committee of five assessors ( recuperatores ) appointed for each
of the accused, with senatorial patroni , including Cato, to represent the
provincials. 123 The triurnphator M. Titinius Curvus was acquitted, the
two others evaded judgement by going into ‘exile’ at nearby Praeneste
and Tibur. What is of most interest here is the faint beginning of a wish
on the Senate’s part to restrain provincial governors. The restraint was of
the lightest, and the motives may have been entirely prudential, yet two
ex-praetors had their political careers ended and even Titinius failed to
reach the consulship he could otherwise have expected. When the case
was over, the Senate issued three prohibitions concerning Spain which
presumably correspond to some of the practices complained of: Roman
magistrates were no longer to set their own prices for requisitioned
grain, or to compel Spaniards to sell the contracts for gathering the grain
levy at their own prices, or to impose praefecti in Spanish towns to collect
money. All this suggests that a system of corruption had already grown
up in the Spanish provinces which fell not far short of what was inflicted
on many provincials in the late Republic.

Similar events seem to have occurred in the 1 50s, probably contribu-
ting very substantially to the renewed fighting in Spain. We know at any
rate that in 1 5 3 ‘several praetors’ were condemned for avaritia in the
provinces, that at about the same date a consul was found guilty of a
similar offence, and that it was a Spanish case, that of Ser. Sulpicius Galba
(governor of Further Spain, 151/50), which led directly to the creation of
a senatorial court on provincial misgovernment by the lex Calpurnia of

121 Livy xun.4.1-4; cf. Per. xliii; Flor. 1.35.14.

122 Liv. Per. xlvi.

123 Livy XLiii.2.1-11. MRR 1.419 erred in calling these patroni a ‘special commission’.

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I32 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

149. 124 It is reasonable to suppose that exploitation by officials helped to
provoke a rebellion in Spain.

The new series of wars began, as far as the Romans are concerned, with
an invasion of Roman territory by the still independent Lusitanians
about 154. It appears that they defeated the governors of both Spains in a
single battle. 125 Where this took place we do not know, but according to
Appian’s narrative (our most important source on Spain from this time
onwards) the Lusitanians intruded in the first two years of the war into
several sections of the further province, in southern Portugal and
Andalusia as well as somewhere further east. They also led the Vettones
to rebel. 126 They even crossed to North Africa, in search of plunder and
perhaps of land; but there the praetor L. Mummius, who had failed
against them in Spain, followed and defeated their expeditionary force
(probably in 1 5 3).

The success of the Lusitanians may, as Appian says, have encouraged
the Aravaci to rebel in 1 54. Another account he gives is that the Belli
(Celtiberians like the Aravaci) got into a dispute with Rome about the
degree of fortification allowed to them by the Gracchan treaty, and
subsequently took refuge with the Aravaci. In any case the Senate must
have believed the area to be quite disturbed since it sent one of the
consuls of 153, Q. Fulvius Nobilior, to govern Nearer Spain. 127 This
Celtiberian war was called ‘the fiery war’, Polybius says, because of its
extreme violence. 128 Awareness of what it was like contributed to the
unprecedented recruiting difficulties which arose at Rome in 1 5 1. In
spite of dissension among the Celtiberians themselves and the unusual
size of his army, 129 Fulvius’ year in Spain was a failure. It was only his
successor, M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. 152), who, after a period of
armistice in which the Celtiberian peoples sent ambassadors to Rome,
brought the rebellion to an end in 1 5 1, when the Aravaci and the anti-
Roman dissidents among the Belli and Titthi surrendered to him. 130
Though he exacted an indemnity of 600 talents, his hope of gaining credit
for completing the war seems to have led him to give the rebels relatively

124 Liv. Per. xlvii. The consul (L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, 156): Val. Max. vi.9. 10; Festus
360L. It is not known where he served; Liguria is more probable than Spain. On Galba and the lex
Calpurnia see A4RR 1.45 6 — 7, 459. 125 App. 56. 234; Simon 1962, 13 n. 6: (c 29).

126 App. 56.235.

127 However, the conversion to consular governors resulted in part from the fact that with all
Italy, even Liguria, now secure, there was often little for the consuls to do except in Spain. Fulvius
and his colleague were the first consuls to enter office on 1 January instead of 1 5 March, the reason
being that he was needed quickly in Spain (Liv. Per. xlvii, Cassiod. Chron.).

128 Polvb. xxxv. 1.

129 His army: App. 45.184; cf. Polvb. xxxv. 2. The campaign: Simon 1962, 25-30: (g 29).

130 Polyb. xxxv. 2—4 describes the embassies to Rome. Marcellus was elected consul contrary to
law (since he had held the office in 1 5 5), no doubt because of his reputation as a general and perhaps
because he was regarded as an expert on the strength of his command in Spain in 169/8; cf. Astin
1967, 38: (h 67).

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SPAIN

favourable terms in other respects. 131 The next governor, L. Licinius
Lucullus, had to find other opponents and out of his desire for fame and
for money, Appian says, fought against the Vaccaei. He also remarks that
the Senate had not voted in favour of a war against the Vaccaei, who had
not attacked the Romans or done any injury to Lucullus himself. 132
Lucullus also fought against the Cantabri still further north and ‘other
previously unknown peoples’. 133 This kind of aggressive marauding was
tacitly permitted by the Senate, 134 but Lucullus’ attacks were not fol-
lowed up.

Meanwhile in Further Spain the successors of Mummius had also
taken the offensive to some degree, aided in late 152 by Marcellus. The
forces of M. Atilius (praetor in 152) captured a city which Appian says
was the Lusitanians’ largest, ‘Oxthracai’. Ser. Sulpicius Galba, whom he
describes as even more avaricious than L. Lucullus though he was about
the richest man in Rome, was responsible for a notorious massacre of
Lusitanians. 135 And though the Lusitanians still put pressure on Rome’s
subject territories, the silence of the sources about any fighting with
them in 149 and 148, when Carthage was claiming Roman attention,
suggests that the initiative was now mainly in Roman hands.

In fact fighting began again at a somewhat awkward moment for
Rome. The Lusitanians acquired a new and exceptionally effective
leader, Viriathus, with whom they attacked Turdetania in the further
province, this probably in 147. Viriathus proceeded to defeat at least
four more commanders within Roman territory, and it was not until 1 44
that Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus [cos. 145) succeeded in putting
Viriathus’ forces to flight (we should be sceptical about the thorough
defeat which Cicero says C. Laelius, governor of Nearer Spain in 145/4,
inflicted; Appian knew nothing of it). 136 Even at the end of 144,
Viriathus had withdrawn only to Baecula (Bailen), 137 just to the north of
the Guadalquivir, while Fabius Aemilianus spent the winter at Corduba.
There was plenty of fight left in Viriathus’ Lusitanians, and in 143 they
advanced southwards once again. After two years of campaigning by
Fabius Servilianus (cos. 142), brother by adoption of Fabius Aemilianus,
Viriathus finally seemed to be passing his zenith. Nevertheless after

131 App. 50. The indemnity: Strabo 111.162, citing Poseidonius, FGrH 87 f 5 1. On the credit to
be gained from completing a war cf. Harris 1979, 34: (a 21). It is evident that Marcellus’ attitude
aroused the resentment of L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 1 51) and his subordinate Scipio Aemilianus (see
esp. Polyb. xxxv. 3.4-5).

132 App. 51.215. These statements probably derive from Polybius: cf. Walbank 1957-79, in. 640,

648: (b 38). 133 Liv. Per. xlviii.

134 It is very possible that Lucullus celebrated a triumph: Dcgrassi 1947, 559: (b 47).

135 Oxthracai: App. 58.243; cf. Simon 1962, 34-5: (g 29). Galba’s greed and wealth: App. 60.25 5.
The massacre and its aftermath in Rome: Simon, op. cit. 60-7.

136 Cic. Off. 11.40. See Miinzer, PW, ‘Laelius (3)’, 406.

137 Appian in fact calls the place BaiKop (65.278).

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ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

Servilianus’ departure for Rome, Viriathus cornered a Roman com-
mander at an unidentifiable site named Erisane and compelled him to
surrender (141/40). 138 Fabius Aemilianus, who was apparently the officer
in question (he had returned to Spain as his brother’s legate), conceded
very favourable terms to the Lusitanian leader, including the right to rule
all the territory he currently controlled. 139 Even more remarkably, the
Roman people confirmed the agreement. So at least Appian says, and in
fact such an attitude on the part of the assembly fits well with the
recruiting difficulties experienced at Rome in early 140: service in Spain
was now generally unpopular. 140 But in practice the Senate could by this
date declare war independently of the people, and with the encourage-
ment of the new governor of Further Spain, Q. Servilius Caepio (cos.
140), it did so, ruthlessly disowning the treaty. Caepio drove Viriathus,
who possessed only a small force, out of Carpetania and then turned
instead to fighting the Vettones and even the Callaeci. The latter, who
lived in the far north-west, now appear for the first time as enemies of
Rome. In any case during 1 39 Caepio arranged or encouraged the
assassination of Viriathus - a curious incident as well as a brutal one,
since it appears that Viriathus had previously been negotiating with the
new governor of Nearer Spain (M. Popillius Laenas, cos. 139). 141

While Viriathus was still strong, his success had encouraged some of
the Celtiberians to rebel once again; this was in 144 or 143. 142 The war
lasted somewhat more than a decade, during which a long series of
consuls still found the Aravaci difficult opponents. The measure of their
powers of resistance is given by the willingness of Q. Pompeius (cos. 141)
and C. Hostilius Mancinus (cos. 137) to make concessions. Pompeius,
though provided with very substantial forces, 143 made no progress
against Numantia or Termes (some fifty miles to the south-west), 144 the
main centres of resistance, and in 1 39 his position seems to have become
so difficult that he led the Aravaci into a peace settlement by promising
them somewhat favourable terms. 145 Perhaps, like Marcellus twelve

138 App. 69.293-294.

139 The normal opinion is that the officer who surrendered was Servilianus, not Aemilianus
(Schultcn 1937, iv. 1 18-19: (b 33); A'fRR 1.480). This, though many writers seem unaware of the
fact, follows from the decision of J. Schwcighauser (1785) and others to excise several lines from
App. 68.291 or transfer them to the end of65.278 (which entails some other textual changes). In fact
the MS text (followed by Viereck-Roos) is readily intelligible, though Appian did make the
unremarkable mistake of saying (68.291) that Q. Pompeius A.f. (cos. 141) was the successor of
Servilianus, whereas he really took over Nearer Spain (there is also some confusion in 70.296). On
the treaty sec further Simon 1962, 123: (g 29).

140 Ratification: App. 69.294. The year 140: Harris 1979, 49: (a 21).

141 On the assassination: Simon 1962, 1 30-3: (g 29). Caepio may have triumphed on returning to

Rome: Degrassi 1947, 559: (b 47). 142 App. 66.279—280. 143 App. 76.324-325.

144 * Termestinos subegit ’ in Liv. Per. liv. is erroneous, as App. 77.327-8 shows.

145 App. 79. It seems that they nominally surrendered but were not disarmed, and were subjected
to the relatively mild indemnity of thirty talents. See further Simon 1962, 115-16: (c 29).

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S P A I N

155

years earlier, he entertained the vain hope of gaining credit for having
completed the war; perhaps he came to the conclusion that conquering
the Aravaci was not worth the effort. In any case, though the Senate’s
repudiation of the new agreement may have been caused in part by
personal feuds against Pompeius, 146 it took the traditional attitude in
wanting the obstinate resistance of the Aravaci broken. There were
plenty of magistrates willing to try, first M. Popillius Laenas (cos. 1 39)
and next C. Hostilius Mancinus (cos. 1 37). Both failed, Mancinus disas-
trously so. To avoid the probable slaughter of his army he surrendered to
the Numantines with a solemn oath and on equal terms. 147 If the
Numantines had known more about the mentality of Roman senators,
they would have realized that they could obtain no solid result from such
restraint. Mancinus’ treaty too was rejected by the Senate, which to
appease divine anger attempted to hand him over, naked, to the
Numantines. Since it was not yet known for certain whether the Senate
would disavow Mancinus, his successor as governor of Nearer Spain, M.
Aemilius Lepidus Porcina (cos. 137), plundered the territory of the
Vaccaei on the pretext - admitted by Appian to be spurious 148 - that they
had helped their neighbours the Aravaci against Rome. The Senate,
interestingly, tried to make him desist, the reason being that enthusiasm
for wars in this particular region had declined steeply except among
those, such as Porcina, who stood to gain extensively and directly. 149 In
fact the next governor of Nearer Spain did not take action against the
Aravaci either. The decline in enthusiasm for warfare was very selective,
however, as can be seen in the other Spanish province.

The campaigns of D. Iunius Brutus (cos. 1 58), who reaped the benefit
of the earlier wars with the Lusitanians by invading their territory in
depth, show that no fundamental change had yet occurred. Brutus first
advanced by rapid and very violent steps to the Douro (Duero), then to
the Rivers Lima (Oblivio in Latin) and Mino, where he defeated the
Bracari. Beyond the Douro lived the Callaeci, from whom Brutus
eventually took an honorific surname; he did not, however, subdue the
whole north-west. 150 Instead he turned in 136 to helping his relative
Lepidus Porcina make war against the Vaccaei around the upper Douro.

By 134 there remained independent only the peoples who lived in the
mountain range parallel to the north coast, and of course the Aravaci of

146 On these see Grucn 1968, 36-8: (h 1 1). The statement in some texts of Liv, Per. liv. that it was
the Roman people which invalidated the agreement is simply the result of an unwise emendation
(read ‘ob infirmitatem’ , not ‘a populo R. infirmatam’).

147 Equal terms: App. 80.347. 148 App. 80.349.

149 Appian says, in connection with Porcina, that ‘some men took their governorships not to
benefit the state, but for fame or material gain or the honour of a triumph* (80.349). The Senate’s
attitude: 81.331. After his return Porcina was fined: 83.358.

150 In spite of Florus 1.33.12; see other sources in Schultcn 1937, iv. 13 5-40: (b 33).

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ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

Numantia. It seems to have been agreed at Rome that the northern
region should be neglected, and it went untouched in the generation after
the fall of Numantia when it could have been conquered. The Numan-
tines had to be suppressed, but the task required a general of exceptional
elan even by Roman standards. This had to be - at least in the judgement
of many Romans - the conqueror of Carthage, Scipio Aemilianus, even
though it was illegal for him to become consul again; 151 and he will not
have resisted the opportunity to score another spectacular military
success. Elected consul for 1 34, he decided that he needed a larger army
than the two legions, with auxiliaries, which the governors of Nearer
Spain normally commanded. Four thousand additional troops were
raised by means of his personal and political connections and from
among volunteers, and to judge from the 60,000 men his army eventually
contained he also acquired a large number of new allied troops in Spain
itself. 152

After elaborate preparations, including another campaign against the
Vaccaei (1 34), Scipio closely besieged Numantia for many months, until
after frightful suffering the survivors surrendered in the summer of
1 3 3 - 1 53 ‘Having chosen fifty of them for his triumph, Scipio sold the
remainder and razed the city to the ground.’ 154 The Senate sent out the
usual commission of ten legates to organize both the territory conquered
by Brutus and that of the Numantines. 155 The latter had been so reduced
by the end of the siege that at his triumph, celebrated de Numantinis in
1 32, Scipio was able to distribute only seven denarii to each of his
soldiers. 156

Thus a number of quite separate wars took place in Spain between 1 54
and 133. Some of them, most obviously the two wars fought by the
Celtiberians, were rebellions against Roman power. The Lusitanians too,
once they came under the leadership of Viriathus, drew considerable
support from inside what Rome had regarded as pacified territory, some
of it even from south of the Guadalquivir. In 141 Fabius Servilianus
plundered five cities in Baeturia ‘which had collaborated with Viriathus’,
and three of the latter’s most trusted friends (who eventually betrayed
him to the Romans) came from Urso (Osuna); ltucce (Martos) was no
doubt only one of many places that oscillated between one allegiance and

151 Liv. Per. lvi; cf. Astin 1967, 183-4: (h 67).

152 The 4,000: App. 84.366. The 60,000: 92.403, 97.419. Among those present at the siege of
Numantia were Polybius, C. Gracchus, Jugurtha, Marius and the future historian Sempronius
Ascllio.

153 On the campaign (relatively well attested in the sources) see especially Schulten 1914-31:
(b 198).

154 App. 98.424. The physical evidence for the destruction: Schulten 19 14-3 1, 11. 17 1—3: (b 198).

155 App. 99.428. 156 Plin. HN xxxm. 141.

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SPAIN

1 37

the other. 157 On a number of occasions - exactly how many we cannot tell
— Lusitanians invaded lands which the Romans regarded as subject to
themselves. But from time to time the Romans themselves pushed
forwards, both against the Lusitanians and Callaeci, who were added to
the further province, and against the Vaccaei. It is imaginable, though
not attested by the sources, that all the fighting against the Lusitanians
was based on a defensive policy, but that cannot apply to the other two
peoples.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this series of wars was the
ability of the Aravaci and particularly of the Numantines to go on
resisting. This is all the more extraordinary since in the final war (144-
133) they had little support, as far as we can tell, even from other
Celtiberians, and according to Appian they had only 8,000 troops (he
seems to be referring to the Aravaci as a whole) even in 144, before new
casualties began. 158 The reasons for this capacity to resist have already
been discussed in relation to the 1 80s and 1 70s (p. 1 26). Appian empha-
sizes the difficulty of the terrain and simply says that the Aravaci made
excellent cavalry and infantry. 159 Undoubtedly the semi-pastoral nature
of the local economy also made a great difference. In addition it is likely
that the Roman army in Nearer Spain was itself becoming less effective in
these years - there were certainly few reasons for first-rate legionaries to
want to serve there. 100

Like the other wars described in this chapter the Spanish wars of 1 54-
133 obviously caused death and devastation on a large scale, but no
extant writer was interested in assessing the damage. The behaviour of
some Roman commanders became even more ruthless: in 1 5 1 L. Licinius
Lucullus ordered the killing of some 20,000 men at the Vaccaean city of
Cauca, almost the whole adult male population, in spite of their already
having surrendered. 161 The following year Ser. Sulpicius Galba was
responsible for a similar massacre in Lusitania, after having pretended
sympathy for the hard economic circumstances of those whom he
intended to slaughter; but it is true that after he returned to Rome he only
with difficulty repelled an attack in the law courts which was based, in

157 Bacturia: App. 68.288. Urso: Diod. Sic. xxxm.21. Itucce: Diod. Sic. xxxm.7.5-6 (he calls it
‘Tucce’, but the identification is guaranteed by App. 66.282, 67.284). Cf. App. 65.278 (Fabius
Aemilianus in 144 plundering one city and burning another, south of the Guadalquivir).

158 App. 76.324, 97.419. According to the Livian tradition (Per. lv; cf. Flor. 1.34) there were 4,000
Numantine troops at the time of Hostilius Mancinus’ defeat. 159 App. 76.323-324.

160 Comments in the sources on the indiscipline of the legions, though part of the rhetorical
furniture of Roman historiography and hence suspect, arc very frequent in this period: App. 78.334,
83.359; Diofr. 78; and on 1 34 b.c. the many texts collected by Schultcn 1937,63—8 (b 33). Lucil. 398—
400 Marx are lines written by a man who, like Polybius, witnessed the siege of Numantia, and it is
probable that the Roman army Scipio found there in 1 34 was most unimpressive. For a clear instance
of incompetence in command see App. 82 (Lepidus Porcina at the Vaccaean city of Pallantia).

161 App. 52.

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138 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

part at least, on this incident. 162 Nor was such extreme violence entirely
new to the Romans; yet taken with their behaviour towards Carthage and
towards the Achaeans in 1 50 and succeeding years, these actions suggest
that the Roman aristocracy now accepted unscrupulousness and ultra-
violent reactions even more readily. Mass enslavements continued of
course to be normal. 163

Eventually it should be possible to gain a clear impression of some of
the effects of the conquest from the archaeological evidence. At present,
however, the lack of firm chronology on many sites prevents this. Not
that there can be much doubt about the widespread destruction of
indigenous settlements in the second century. That which took place in
the middle and lower valley of the Ebro must mostly date from the early
part of the century; 164 the archaeologically best-known site among those
of any size in this region is Azaila, which was destroyed about the time of
Cato, though it was repopulated again later. 165 In the area fought over in
1 54— 1 33, Numantia, the site of Schulten’s famous excavation, was simply
one of a number of sites that ceased fora while at least to be inhabited. 166

Some of these communities must have declined because of the econ-
omic conditions created by Roman control rather than because of the
wars of conquest themselves. Strabo remarks, somewhat vaguely, that in
Lusitania between the Tagus and the far north-west - that is, in the
territory conquered by Brutus Callaicus in 138 and 137 - the Romans
‘humbled’ the inhabitants and made most of their cities into villages,
though they improved some of the cities by ‘synoecizing’ them. 167 The
change from cities to villages was presumably both an economic and a
political matter; part of the ‘humbling’ may have resulted from the
outflow of taxation to Rome or even from the fact that the Lusitanians
were now no longer able to carry out large plundering raids against
neighbouring populations - which had certainly been a traditional
practice of some economic significance. 168

The Romans and Italians did not, however, seize the agricultural
resources of Spain for direct ownership on a grand scale as they had done
in Cisalpine Gaul and in Liguria. Immigration to Spain still seems to have
been heavy only in the mining areas, and there was little formal coloniza-
tion of immigrants. Cordubaand Valentia are the only real possibilities.

162 The incident: App. 59-60; for precedents: Harris 1979, 5 2 n. 3: (a 21). The sources on the trial:
Schulten 1937, 103-6: (b 33). 163 E.g. App. 68.291, 77.331, 98.424.

164 For a useful account of these sites see Pellicer Catalan 1962: (b 187).

165 See Beltran Lloris 1976: (b 151).

566 The archaeology of Numantia: Schulten 1914— 31: (b 198), and also Wattenberg 1963, 11-29:
(b 205). See further Wattenberg 1959, 181: (G 34), on the Aravacan and Vaccacan regions. The
Lusitanian evidence is more obscure, but it is significant that ‘Oxthracai’ (above, p. 133) cannot be
traced.

167 Strabo hi. 15 4; the statement probably derives from Artemidorus of Ephesus or from
Poscidonius. 16S Strabo in. 134 provides a very instructive account.

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1 39

Of the former, Strabo says that it was originally inhabited by ‘chosen
men’ of both the Romans and the local people. It was founded in some
sense by M. Marcellus (cos. Ill 152), perhaps during his praetorship in
169/8 rather than, as is generally assumed, his less peaceful second tour of
duty in Spain. Its territory was remarkably large. 169 Valentia (138) was
probably settled by Romans and Italians who had fought in the war
against Viriathus, and though there is no clear evidence for other
veterans having stayed permanently in Spain in the second century, it is
likely that some did. 170 The presence of Roman armies must also have led
to the arrival of contractors to deal with supplies, traders to handle
plunder, and assorted parasites. Some no doubt settled permanently in
such places as Corduba and Tarraco. As for the mining districts,
Diodorus recounts in his discussion of the Spanish silver mines how after
the conquest ‘a great number of Italians swarmed to the mines and took
away great wealth because of their avarice. For they buy a great number
of slaves and turn them over to those who are in charge of the mine
workings. . . ,’ 171 This almost certainly comes from Poseidonius, who
visited Spain about 90. But the migration to the mines had obviously
begun quite quickly after the Roman conquest, and their great reputation
at Rome is confirmed by a mention in I Maccabees, a text written in the
1 5 os. 172 The 40,000 slaves mentioned by Polybius as working at the sih'er
mines of New Carthage 173 imply the presence of a considerable number
of free immigrants as well. We should probably think of a total of
immigrants amounting to many tens of thousands by 133. In 122 it was
possible to take 5 ,000 of ‘the Romans from Iberia’ to the Balearic Islands
as colonists. 174

The political forms of Roman domination are known to us only from
very fragmentary evidence. Specific information is meagre about the
degree of intervention in judicial affairs by the governors of the Spanish
provinces, 175 and about the presumable tendency of Rome to favour
aristocratic regimes among the subject peoples. What did Roman gover-
nors of Further Spain think of the agricultural communism of the
Vaccaei, probably still in operation in the 90s (since Diodorus probably

169 Strabo 111.141; he gives no date for Marcellus’ action. The silence of Polyb. xxxv.2.2 (who
mentions that Marcellus wintered there in 15 2/1) slightly favours 169/8, and cf. Galsterer 1971, 9:
(g 15). 170 Brunt 1971, 218-19: (h 82). 171 v. 56.3-4. 172 I Mate. 8.3.

173 Strabo 111.147-148 = Polyb. xxxiv.9.9 (on the number sec Walbank 1 9 5 7—79, m.606: (b 38)).
A scholar who studied the silverware finds of late Republican Spain concluded that a prosperous
class existed in northern Andalusia by about 100, and he associated this with the silver-mining in the
Sierra Morcna (Raddatz 1969, 169: (b 189)).

174 Strabo hi. 168; cf. Gabba 1954. 2 99 : ( H ! 3°) =I 97<>, 106: (h 44). The notion that the
immigrants were primarily Osco-Umbrian (propounded on philological grounds by Menendez
Pidal in Alvar and others i960, ux-lxxxvi: (a i), and in earlier publications) appears quite
unproved; cf. Knapp 1977, 1 5 3-7: (G 20).

175 An inscription of 87 b.c. throws some light on this: Fatas 1980: (g 14).

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ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

took his description of it from Poseidonius )? 176 Perhaps official interfer-
ence in local political matters was quite rare in the period of the
conquest . 177

Several new cities were created in the period 1 5 5—1 33. Strabo says that
Corduba was a colony, but this is usually dismissed, largely because
Velleius wrote that C. Gracchus’ colony at Iunonia was the first colony
outside Italy. 178 However, Carteia and Valentia show that Velleius was
wrong, at least as far as Latin colonies were concerned, and Corduba may
be another instance; in any case it became a conspicuous success as a
centre of Romanization. So too was Valentia (Valencia). About this
foundation the Epitomatorof Livy says that Brutus Callaicus ‘gave lands
and a city’ to ‘those who had served under Viriathus’. 179 This statement is
clear, but it is extremely difficult to believe that such a site would have
been bestowed on recent rebels. 180 We should reluctantly conclude that
‘under Viriathus’ is a mistake and that the beneficiaries of Brutus’ action
were really the men who had fought against Viriathus. This is all the more
likely because the foundation belongs to a date when some veterans were
in desperate need of land, and because Valentia very probably did have
colonial status, which (like the name itself) is more likely to have been
awarded to veterans than to newly surrendered rebels. 181 Brutus also
founded another settlement, which he named Brutobriga. Its exact site is
unknown, but it is to be sought near the coast somewhere just to the west
of the lower Guadalquivir, and it had the evident aim of securing Roman
influence over the local population. 182 Brutus had in fact been preceded
in this policy by Q. Caepio [cos. 140), who, after having arranged the
assassination of Viriathus and defeated his successor Tautalos, awarded
some land and, according to Diodorus, a town to the Lusitanians who
had surrendered. 183 But the total of new towns created by the Romans
was in this period still quite limited.

176 Diod. Sic. v.34.3.

177 On Iberian coinage after the conquest see De Guadan 1969, 128—53: (b 89); Knapp 1977, 4:
(b 106).

178 Veil. Pat. 1. 15.4. Against Corduba as an actual colony: Brunt 1971, 215: (h 82); Griffin 1972,
1 7~ 1 9 : ( G >9)-

179 Liv. Per. lv. The notion that the Valentia in question may have been at one of the Valencias
other than ‘Valentia del Cid’, still to be found in Simon 1962, 138: (g 29), is refuted by Torres 1951,
114—16: (g 32); Galsterer 1971, 12: (c 15); Wiegels 1974: (g 35).

180 Wiegels 1974, 164: (g 35).

181 For these and other relevant arguments cf. Wiegels 1974: (g 3 5); Knapp 1977, 125-31: (c 20).
The status of (Latin) colony depends on an Italian inscription, ILLRP 385.

182 On the site: Steph. Byz. s.v. Bpoirrofipia; Wiegels 1974, 170-2 (g 3 5) (who suggests that this is
where Viriathus’ veterans were settled). On the coin-types: Grant 1946, 381: (b 93); De Guadan
1 969, 128, 2 1 6: (b 89). On the geographical limits of the -briga termination: Untermann 1961, map 3 :
(c 60 ).

183 App. 75.321; Diod. Sic. xxxnt. 1.4. It was probably called Caepiana and in Lusitania: Ptolem.
11. 5.5; Tovar 1974-6, 11.216: (b 223).

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SPAIN

Another form of Roman profit-making, less important for Roman
policy than plunder or silver mines, but still of interest, came from the
increased trade between Italy and Spain in the second century. The main
kind of evidence available consists of sherds of black-glazed pottery, and
quite apart from the difficulties of dating this material precisely and of
showing that any particular item was imported and not merely a local
imitation, the economic significance of the trade is dubious. In any event
such pottery was already being imported to some sites in the extreme
north-east— Emporion, Rhode and Ullastret — in the third century. In the
second century quite a substantial trade, though not of course on an
‘industrial’ scale, grew up with places further south and inland. 184 Italy
also began to export a certain quantity of wine to the more accessible
parts of Spain. 185 On the analogy of other areas in and on the fringes of
the second-century empire a considerable number of Roman and Italian
negotiatores were present (the shortage of literary evidence, apart from
that which concerns mining, is of minor significance).

Can any long-term changes in Roman policy in Spain be discovered by
1 3 3, apart from the obvious one that the conquest stopped short of the far
northern part of the country? It has already been suggested that some
Roman commanders began to show an even higher degree of ruthless-
ness in warfare. Some of them, from the time of the elder Gracchus
onwards, were also ready to help certain elements in the Spanish popula-
tion by including them in new towns. This was hardly an altruistic
policy; and the occasional willingness of the Senate from the 170s
onwards to restrain the avarice of provincial governors was based at least
as much on political considerations as on concern for the well-being of
the provincials. It is a mistake to suppose that Rome made frequent
grants of its citizenship to Spaniards in this period; on the contrary, they
were probably limited to a handful of men. 186 Schulten’s judgement that
the Romans treated the indigenous population ‘little better than cattle’ is
exaggerated, 187 but the time of far-sighted measures was still in the
future.

Much has been written about the Romanization of Spain, 188 but for the
second century the evidence concerning actual changes in the behaviour
and attitudes of the local populations is sparse. In coastal towns such as

184 For Emporion and Rhode: Sanmarti-Grego 1978: (b 195). A modern survey of black-glaze in
the rest of the peninsula is lacking; by way of example see Ramos Folques and Ramos Fernandez
1976, 18: (b i 91), on Illici (Elchc), and Beltran Lloris 1979: (b 152) on Azaila.

185 Consult, with caution, Beltran Lloris 1970, esp. 528, 608: (b 150) and Blazquez 1974, 3 1 n. 35:
(G lo).

186 Frequent grants: Blazquez 1964, 325: (g 8) and others; see instead Knapp 1977, 1 6 1—5: (g 20).

187 Schulten 1930, 324: (g 28).

188 Note especially Sanchez-Albornoz 1949: (g 27); Blazquez 1964: (g 8); Garcia y Bellido 1972:
(G 18).

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Emporion, Tarraco and Gades, in the new towns and in the mining
districts, local populations must soon have come under powerful Roman
influence, and the indigenous culture lacked the prestige and self-
confidence which allowed the Greeks to maintain long-term resistance to
cultural Romanizadon. 189 However, traces of the Romanization of the
local populations are hard to find anywhere in the second century. Even
in the late Republic, Punic language and religion continued in the south-
coast towns; 190 Iberian and ‘Celtic’ inhabitants of sites which were not
subjected to direct Roman influence continued to use the local languages
for inscriptions (to the exclusion of Latin, apparently, for several genera-
tions). Local deities went on being worshipped, and even local political
structures persisted. 191 But the full detail of first-century developments
falls outside the scope of this chapter; for the present many of the local
populations of Roman Spain retained the same cultural character as
before simply because of the Romans’ lack of any interest in direct
exploitation of their territory.

Submissiveness towards Rome was widespread after 133, as indeed it
had long been in the coastal region and in the north-east. In the
succeeding generation some of the Lusitanians, some of the Celtiberians,
particularly Aravaci, and some Vaccaei continued to offer armed resist-
ance. 192 But harsh experience had convinced most of the peoples under
Roman power that freedom had been truly lost.

IV. ROME AND CARTHAGE 193

Under a treaty very advantageous to Rome (above, pp. 64—5), Rome
and Carthage remained formally at peace for fifty-two years (201— 149). 194
Rome’s power over the Carthaginians was now considerable, and if the
latter honoured their obligations — which without a fleet they were very
likely to — Rome had nothing to expect but the annual arrival of 200

189 The importance of Tarraco as a Roman base has been underlined by archaeological investiga-
tion of its early second-century fortifications: Hauschild 1979: (b 170).

190 See Koch 1976: (c 28).

191 Late inscriptions in local languages (other than Punic) and other evidence for the survival of

the languages: Garcia y Bellido 1972, 470-91: (g 18). The survival of cults and other religious
phenomena: Blazquez 1978-80, 11.1 18-26: (g i i); of local political structures: Blazquez 1964, 3 j 7—
40: (g 8). 192 Sources in Schulten 1937, iv. 144-54: (b 33).

193 The main literary sources for this section are Polybius, Livy and Appian, Pun. (all references to
Appian here are to this work); Aristotle, Plautus, the fragments of Ennius and of Cato’s speeches,
Ncpos, Diodorus Siculus, Varro, Fenestella, Strabo, Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, the
elder Pliny, Plutarch, Justin, Diogenes Laertius, Aurelius Victor, Orosius and Zonaras also
contribute. The important archaeological, numismatic, epigraphical and papyrological evidence is
mentioned in later notes.

194 The best detailed discussion of Roman-Carthaginian relations in this period is Gsell 1913-28,
in. 297-407: (c 2 1). Also especially useful are Astin 1967: (h 67) and Sznycer and Nicolet in Nicolet
1977-8, 11.545-626: (a 27).

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>45

talents (payable for fifty years) and diplomatic appeals resulting from the
inevitable conflict between Carthage and its neighbour to the west,
Numidia.

The Roman Senate continued to support its tested ally Massinissa,
king of the Massylii in eastern Numidia and now of some of the
Masaesylian territory in western Numidia which had previously be-
longed to Syphax. There were obvious strategic reasons for this support.
But at the end of the war, and for some years afterwards, moderation was
observed. Part of Syphax’s lands went to his son Vermina. 195 Nor, as we
shall see, was every single territorial dispute between Carthage and
Massinissa decided in favour of the latter. From the point of view of the
Roman Senate, Massinissa too was under a serious obligation to respect
Rome’s wishes, not least because of Scipio Africanus’ and its own
announcements of the king’s royal power. 196

Successive rulers of Carthage tried to conciliate Rome in all circum-
stances, understandably failing to realize that in the end another war was
extremely probable. In 200 the city contributed 400,000 modii (about
2,700 tons) of wheat, half of it for the army in Greece. The indemnity was
paid regularly. Even when an awkward incident did occur, it showed
how essentially submissive the Carthaginian leaders were.

This incident was the election of Hannibal as one of the annual sufetes
(chief magistrates) for 196/5, with the support of the mass of the voters
against the entrenched oligarchs. 197 In office he concentrated his efforts
on internal matters, proposing various democratic reforms, but his
enemies wrote to ‘the leading men’ at Rome, with whom they had formal
relations of hospitality, 198 that he was in secret communication with
Antiochus III. Rome accordingly sent a mission to Carthage in the
summer of 195; after Hannibal, who had now left office, had fled to the
eastern Mediterranean, this mission obtained assurances of obedience
from the Carthaginian senate. 199 The claim that Hannibal had been
negotiating with Antiochus before his flight should be regarded, as it
was by Scipio, with extreme scepticism. 200 In any case it is evident that the
other Carthaginian officials behaved impeccably from the Roman point
of view. Hannibal was only one annual magistrate, 201 and even he did
nothing worth mentioning to subvert the treaty with Rome while he was

195 Livy xxxi. 1 1.8, 19.5-6 196 Livy xxx. 1 5. 1 1-1 2, 44. 12. Cf. xlv.i 3. 1 5.

197 On this episode see Livy xxxm. 45. 6-49.7, and also Nepos, Harm. 7; Val. Max. iv.1.6; Justin
xxxi.i. 7-2.8; Zon. ix.18.1 1-12. 198 Livy xxxm.45.6

199 Livy xxxm. 49. 1 refers to the ‘senate’, the meaning of which is unclear in a Carthaginian
context.

200 Livy xxxm. 47. 4; Val. Max. iv.1.6. However, he may have been disdainful rather than
unbelieving. Though this section of Livy derives from Polybius, it is not clear what the latter
thought of the Carthaginian charges.

201 And perhaps one of four sufetes a year rather than two, as is usually thought: Huss 1977: (c 27).

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ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

at Carthage. He did not take any considerable number of followers with
him to the east, and his complete inability to raise support against Rome
in his home territory is apparent from his activities at Antiochus’ court.
There was still a ‘Barcid faction’ at Carthage in 193, 202 but it was not
strong enough to advocate anti-Roman policies in any effective way,
even if it wanted to. The mere appearance of a Tyrian emissary from
Hannibal sent the government into such a paroxysm of nervousness
about Roman reactions that it despatched a mission to report the matter
to Rome.

This mission also complained about ‘the injustices of Massinissa’. 203
Livy’s account of what had happened is somewhat problematical, since
he can be convicted of importing at least one detail - the story of the

202 At least according to Livy xxxiv .6 i . ii . On the difficult question of Livy’s sources in this
section see VValbank 1957-79, 111.490-1: (b 38). 203 Livy xxxiv .6 i . i 6.

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145

Numidian dissident Aphther- from a sequence of events which we know
from Polybius to have taken place much later. 204 Furthermore he mud-
dles up elementary facts about North African topography, putting Leptis
in the region of the Emporia (‘Markets’), that is the Gulf of Gabes, where
neither Leptis Minor nor Magna was to be found. Yet a real territoirial
dispute between Carthage and Massinissa had probably been going on.
In the treaty of 201 Rome had put Carthage in a most vulnerable position
by prescribing among other things that Massinissa was entitled to any
land or cities that had ever belonged to him or to his ancestors ‘within
boundaries to be assigned in the future’. 205 The boundaries had been
settled by Scipio Africanus, 206 with the precious territory in the Gulf of
Gabes either awarded to Carthage or (less probably) unassigned. In any
case this is a probable enough region for a dispute to have arisen. The
Senate now sent Scipio on a new embassy — which, however, decided to
do nothing; the evident intention was to keep the dispute in suspense
until the conflict with Antiochus was resolved, without in practice
alleviating Carthaginian difficulties. 207 Carthage was of course forbidden
by treaty to make war on Massinissa, even in its own defence. 208 Not that
Carthage was in severe financial difficulty, for two years later the city
offered Rome a quantity of grain and some ships for the Syrian-Aetolian
War and, still more impressively, the immediate payment of the out-
standing indemnity, an amount equivalent to 187.2 million sesterces,
even now a very large sum by Roman standards (and one should recall
that until 187 the Roman treasury was still in debt because of the
Hannibalic War). Massinissa too offered a supply of grain, with some
troops and elephants. 209 The Senate kept itself free of obligations by
paying for the grain (whether the troops were accepted is unclear, except
that six Punic ships served with the Roman fleet in Greece). The
important question, however, was the balance of the indemnity. This
offer was an attempt to buy favour and a degree of independence, and
from the Roman point of view it was better to refuse, thereby keeping
Carthage in the position of debtor. 210

For almost two decades after this, though relations between Carthage
and Massinissa no doubt continued poor, Rome offered the king no great
encouragement to attack. On one occasion, in 1 82, he did so, seizing an

204 In the 1 70s at the earliest: Polyb. xxxi.zi. 205 Polyb. xv.18.5-

206 Livy xxxiv. 62. 9 (Carthaginians speaking). Though the Numidians accused them of ‘lying
about the boundary-making of Scipio’ (sect. 1 1), that phrase seems to imply that he did establish
boundaries somewhere.

207 This is probably the occasion mentioned by App. 67, when the Senate told the legates to
favour Massinissa, who consequently gained territory.

206 Cf. Walbank 1957-79, 11.468-9: (b 38). 209 All this: Livy xxxvi.4.

2,0 The refusal also shows how confident the Senate was about the results of the Syrian-Aetolian
war.

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146 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

area (unidentified) which for a time had supposedly been his father’s. 211
When the Senate came to adjudicate the matter the following year, it
appears from a somewhat unclear sentence of Livy’s that Carthage was
successful. 212

If a Roman embassy went to North Africa in 1 74, as Livy asserts, 213 it is
most unlikely that it was able to find any evidence of clandestine
negotiations between Carthage and King Perseus; that was simply a piece
of later Roman propaganda. But this was in fact a period of renewed
pressure by Massinissa, who perhaps saw an opportunity in the ap-
proaching war between Rome and Macedon (he was certainly informed
about affairs in the Greek world as well as at Rome). 214 According to the
charges made by Carthage to Rome in 172, he had forcibly taken more
than seventy ‘towns and forts’ in their territory in the previous two
years. 215 It is often said that the Senate resolved this dispute in
Massinissa’s favour, 216 but in fact it postponed a decision to give the
Numidians time for consultation, and we are prevented from knowing
what was decided the following year by a long lacuna in the manuscript
of Livy (after XLin.3.7). Meanwhile the Senate tested the spirit of its
North African allies by summoning assistance from them against Per-
seus. Carthage eventually sent one million modii of wheat (about 6,700
tons), half that amount of barley. 217

In the context of 162/1 Polybius reports that ‘not long before’ - a
vague expression - Massinissa had seized the territory in the Emporia
district which belonged to Carthage, though Carthage was able to retain
the towns. Both sides ‘often’ sent missions to Rome about this, the
Senate always deciding in Massinissa’s favour. In the end Carthage lost
the cities too, and also in some undefined way 500 talents of revenue. It
has been judged that this story goes back only a year or two earlier than
162/1 ; more probably the period was longer, and Polybius may have been
referring all the way back to the dispute of 174— 172. 218

There is therefore no definite reason to think that Rome’s decisive
victory at Pydna had the immediate effect of making Rome strongly
favour Massinissa’s interests against those of Carthage. 219 In fact the
Senate’s attitude towards the Numidian king was somewhat ambiguous

2.1 Livy XL. 17. 1-6.

2.2 Livy xl. 34. 14. Interpreted otherwise by Gsell 1 9 1 3-28, 111.3 18: (c 21), and some others. The

Carthaginian hostages now released were probably replaced by new ones: Walbank 1937-79, 11.47 1 :
(b 38). 2,3 Livy XLi.22.1-3. 214 Cf. Walsh 1965, 134-5: (c 62).

2.5 Livy XLii.23.2 (from an annalistic source); nothing in Polyb. xxxi.21 contradicts this (in spite
of Walsh, op. cit. 157).

2.6 E.g. Walbank 1957—79, in. 490: (b 38). The nearest thing to support for this is Livy XLU.24.7.

2.7 Livy xliii. 6.11. Massinissa’s contributions: 6.13.

2.8 ‘Often’: Polyb. xxxi. 2 1.5; compare ‘finally’, sect. 8. Walbank 1957-79, 111.491: (b 38), prefers
the shorter interval (cf. Walsh 1965, 159: (c 62)), but the story seems too complex to fit into such a
period.

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ROME AND CARTHAGE I 47

just after the Third Macedonian War: while it professed itself thoroughly
pleased with his assistance during the war, his expressed wish to visit
Rome in person and the Senate’s declining to invite him 220 both suggest
that he had reason for nervousness. Kings seemed to be at a discount, as
Eumenes of Pergamum discovered a year or so later. In the short run,
however, it was only Carthage that had to fear new developments in
Roman policy. During the 160s it was constantly Carthage which lost
when the Senate gave its verdicts, and presumably this happened again in
the major controversy which broke out in 162/1, a controversy about
which we know nothing except that it began with the 5 00 talents of lost
revenue. 221

As we are now approaching the large historical problems involved in
the Third Punic War, a survey of Carthaginian affairs and particularly of
the Carthaginian economy will be helpful. ‘It was considered the richest
city in the world’, says Polybius, thinking of the final period of its
existence, 222 a judgement which may have become anachronistic only in
the 160s. As a state Carthage had of course lost enormous revenues as a
result of Roman and Numidian aggression. Gold and silver coins seem to
have been issued in smaller quantities in the second century (if that is
significant). 223 Yet there were some positive developments in both
public and private finance. The treasury, which as we have seen was well
off in 191, benefited from greatly reduced military expenditure, and the
absence of mercenaries no doubt explains why its precious-metal coins
were of increased purity. 224 Presumably the state also benefited to some
extent from long-distance trade in Carthaginian hands, and though the
evidence is too haphazard and fragile to justify any notion that this trade
increased in the second century, it certainly did reach out to some
noteworthy places, such as both the Red Sea and the Black Sea. 225 Three
second-century coin hoards from sites in Yugoslavia which are domi-
nated by Carthaginian and Numidian issues 226 suggest Carthaginian
imports from that area (slaves perhaps). They also imply some consider-
able involvement of Carthaginians in trade with Numidia itself, which is
probable in any case, in spite of the political disputes, and somewhat
supported by a difficult text which derives from the early imperial writer

2,9 As argued by Dc Sanctis 1907-64, 1 v.iii> *0 — 1 1 : (a 14).

220 Livy XLV.13.17, 14.4.

221 The importance of this dispute is to be inferred from the elaborate introduction Polybius

provided (xxxi.21). 222 Polyb. xvm.35.9.

223 Jenkins and Lewis 196}, 53: (b ioi). 224 Robinson 1937-8: (b 128).

225 A Carthaginian merchant in the Red Sea: Sammelbucb 111.7169. Another at Istrus: Lambrino
1927-32, 400-6: (b 177); cf. RostovtzcfF 1941, 1462 n. 20: (a 31). It was about 200 that the
Carthaginians reached the Azores: Pfciler 1963, 53: (b 125).

226 Crawford 1969, nos. 142, 14 j, 146: (b 87). Further information about the distribution of
Carthaginian coin finds: Jahn 1977, 414: (b 98).

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148 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

Fenestella. 227 An inscribed Rhodian amphora-handle recently found at
Carthage 228 indicates second-century wine imports. The Romans and
Italians themselves certainly traded with Carthage on a significant
scale. 229 Though there is always the danger of exaggerating the impor-
tance of long-distance trade in an ancient state, some Carthaginians
probably prospered in the second century.

The same may well have been true of landowners, who were probably
responsible for most of Carthage’s exports. A strange passage in a late
source tells us of Hannibal’s efforts to encourage olive production after
20 1, 230 and the grain Carthage periodically provided for the Romans
strongly suggests a regular surplus (a million modii of wheat represents
the net yearly production of as much as 40,000 acres). The Black Sea
merchant just mentioned dealt in grain. And unless Carthaginian agri-
cultural productivity had an excellent reputation at Rome, it would be
impossible to understand why, after 146, the Senate ordered the transla-
tion of Mago’s 28-volume handbook on farming into Latin. 231

As for population trends, they are very hard to make out. Strabo’s
total of 700,000 for the population of the city in 149 is impossibly high,
and since other elements in his description are also much exaggerated 232
it is doubtful whether any value can be extracted from the figure by any
such expedient as supposing that it applied to Carthaginian territory as a
whole. Beloch’s guess of 200-300,000 for the city itself is plausible. 233
More to the point are two other observations: first, the Carthaginian
state as a whole did not dispose of sufficient manpower, even if it could
mobilize its population, to rival Rome and Italy. Secondly — and this
comment is subject to amplification as the results of excavations become
known — construction of a new quarter within the city during the second
century 234 implies that some population growth took place.

What may be Polybius’ most important surviving statement about the
Third Punic War is that the Roman Senate had decided to begin a new
war ‘long before’ it was formally voted in 149. 235 This vague expression
might take us back only a few years beyond 149, say to 153, which is in
effect the date which Appian (unfortunately not reproducing Polybius in

227 Fenestella fr. 9 (Peter, HR Rel. 11, p. 81): there was no trade between Italici and Afri (and the
context shows that by the latter he meant Numidians and Gaetulians) until after 146; this can only
have been because such trade was dominated by Carthaginians.

228 Lanccl 1978, 310: (b i 79). There are others, not so well dated: Gseil 1913-28, iv. 154: (c 21);
Ferron and Pinard 1955, 61—8: (b 165); Lancel and others 1977, 26, 91: (b 178).

229 For the pottery evidence from Carthage see Fulford 1983, 8: (c 16). The main literary evidence
is Polyb. xxxvi. 7. 5 (cf. App. 92.434); Plaut. Poen. 79-82; ORF 4 , Cato, fr. 185 (p. 75). Cf. JLLRP
1177. The Cani Islands coin hoard may also be relevant: Crawford 1969, no. 132: (b 87).

230 Aurelius Victor, De Caes. 37.3. 231 Plin. HN xvm.22; cf. Varro, Rust. 1.10,

232 See Gseil 1913-28, 11.21 n. 3: (c 21). 233 Bcloch 1886, 467: (a 6).

234 See Lancel 1978: (b 179).

235 Polyb. xxxvi. 2. 1. There is no sound reason to doubt this; cf. Harris 1979, 233 nn. 2, 4: (a 21).

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ROME AND CARTHAGE I 4c)

a dependable way) assigns to the decision. 236 It might alternatively take
us back further, perhaps even as far as 162/1, the date of a major new
Carthaginian dispute before the Senate.

However, before coming to the reasons behind this Roman war
decision, we must review what is known about Roman-Carthaginian
diplomacy in the years from 1 5 7 to 1 5 1 . The task is more difficult than it
seems, for Polybius is almost entirely missing, and our other sources,
principally Appian and the Epitome of Livy , are contaminated by more or
less obvious falsehoods, especially the Epitome. The main reason for this
was of course the desire of contemporary and, even more, later Romans
to justify Rome’s conduct.

Five Roman embassies went to Africa in this period, according to the
Epitome. They are to be dated to 157, 153, 153/2, 151 and 1 50. The first
was merely one of the series of missions sent to investigate territorial
disputes between Carthage and Massinissa; 237 its results are unknown but
are likely to have been favourable to the Numidian side. Hostility
between the two African states evidently continued to intensify, since
about 1 5 4 the commander of the Carthaginian auxiliaries, Carthalo, who
was one of the leaders of the faction Appian calls ‘the democratizers’ - the
opponents of appeasement - organized some attacks, which, however,
seem to have stopped short of regular warfare. 238 The Roman mission
which came to help the Numidians in these circumstances must be the
one datable to 1 5 5 of which the Epitome says that it somehow discovered
‘an abundance of ship-building material’ at Carthage. 239 It is in fact not
likely to be true that an abundance of such material had been collected, at
least not for warships, above all because it is plain from what happened
later that in the period before the war Carthage did not build any
warships beyond the ten triremes which the treaty of 201 permitted, even
if it had that many. 240 Livy and his source were already at this point mired
down in Roman propaganda. His next story accentuates this: the general
Arcobarzanes, a probably fictitious Numidian ally of Carthage, is
dragged in, and Cato appears arguing in favour of declaring war against
Carthage on the grounds that it had prepared an army against Rome. 241 It
is quite possible, as we shall see, that Cato was already in favour of
declaring war, but if so this is not likely to have been his reason.

Next comes the Roman embassy which is perhaps the most problem-
atical one of all (153 or 152). This was sent essentially on a spying

236 App. 69.314. In 74.343 (149 b.c.) he says that this was ‘long before’.

237 Liv. Per. xlvh middle.

238 App. 68.306-307; but the whole story is undermined by the lack of any specific Roman
reaction. 239 Liv. Per. xlvii end.

240 Sec Harris 1979. 233 n. i- (a 21)- This was in spite of the fact that Carthage consciously broke
the treaty with Rome in 131, and needed ships more than anything else for defence against Rome.

241 Liv. Per. xlviii.

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I50 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

mission. 242 Our information about what took place is very unsatisfac-
tory, but the overall result is clear - namely that Rome allowed
Massinissa’s depredations to continue, but found no casus belli which the
majority of the Senate held to require an immediate war or justify one.
Almost everything else is obscure: the Epitome says that the mission was
sent to spy out what Carthage was doing, Appian that it was sent in
response to yet another Carthaginian appeal, this one provoked by
Massinissa’s laying claim to ‘the Great Plains and the region of fifty
towns which they call Tysca’, that is to say the fertile plain which opens
out around the upper River Bagradas (in the vicinity of Jendouba). In
fact both accounts of the purpose of the embassy may well convey parts
of the truth. The Epitome omits to mention Cato’s participation, which is
described by Appian and by Plutarch (in an otherwise poorly informed
section). 243 This famous story may be a complete fiction; whether it is
does not matter much — except for the reliability of Appian. There are
further discrepancies between our two main sources. At the end, the
Epitome says, the Roman mission was forced to flee to avoid ‘violation’, a
classic Roman propaganda motif, absent from Appian’s account. The
latter asserts that the returning ambassadors reported to the Senate an
alarming growth in Carthaginian resources.

Now we reach an obscure sequence of events which is jumped over by
Appian, perhaps for the good reason that it did not take place. The
Epitome relates that Massinissa’s son Gulussa visited Rome to give an
alarmist report about Carthage, and that the Senate responded (this will
have been in the winter of 1 52/1) by despatching ten legati to investigate -
which would have been a very unusual use of such a commission. 244 They
eventually reported that they had found an army and a fleet at Carthage
(the latter was certainly not true and is not likely to have been reported),
whereupon the Senate threatened Carthage with war if it did not disband
its forces. All this is probably Roman fiction designed to put blame on
Carthage.

At all events the Carthaginian government’s policy of avoiding out-
right war with Massinissa had been discredited by the complete or partial
loss of the Great Plains. The ‘democratizers’, under the leadership of
Hamilcar surnamed the Samnite, now established their dominance in a
more decisive fashion and banished some forty supporters of the policy
of appeasing Massinissa. When the king besieged a Carthaginian town
called Oroscopa, 245 the new government sent a force of 25,400 troops

242 Ibid, {legato s mitti Carthaginem qui specularentur quid ageretur ); App. 68.309-69.313.

243 Plut. Cat. Mai. 26. 244 Cf. Mommsen 1887—8, 11.692—3: (a 25).

245 Evidently a hill-top site near the eastern end of the Great Plains; near Vaga(Beja), according to
Walsh 1965, 159: (c 62).

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ROME AND CARTHACE I 5 I

under Hasdrubal to oppose him. 246 Lacking substantial military experi-
ence they fought a disastrous campaign from which only very few
returned home. While they were already in severe difficulties another
Roman mission arrived (the date is now spring or summer 150, it
appears) - with the purpose of settling the dispute, according to Ap-
pian. 247 In fact it will have been obvious to these Roman senators that a
new Roman— Carthaginian war was on its way, for here was a large
Carthaginian army in the field contrary to the treaty of 201. The Roman
mission had been told to spur Massinissa on if he was succeeding, and this
no doubt encouraged Gulussa to slaughter the Carthaginian army after it
had surrendered and disarmed.

It was this armed Carthaginian resistance to Massinissa’s forces that
now provided the iusta causa which, according to P. Scipio Nasica and the
majority of Roman senators, had previously been lacking. This was a
very important preliminary in any Roman war with a powerful enemy:
the gods had to be satisfied as did Roman opinion and Rome’s allies in
Italy and elsewhere. 248 How important it was considered on this occasion
can be judged from Polybius’ statement that the Senate almost gave up
the notion of fighting the war because of its disagreements about the
effect on outsiders’ feelings. 249 Even in a period of great Roman aggres-
siveness, the weight of senatorial opinion remained on Nasica’s side until
Massinissa, with Roman encouragement, more or less forced Carthage to
provide technical justification for the war. Even then, Nasica himself was
not satisfied, 250 presumably because he thought that the justification had
been obtained in an excessively deceitful way. But the technical justifica-
tion really was there, as the Carthaginians in effect admitted after their
expedition had failed; this does not, however, reveal to us why the
Romans fought the Third Punic War.

The war might have started in 1 50, since Carthage had without much
doubt fought against Massinissa by late 1 5 1 . It is possible that some
senatorial opinion was still hesitant, more possible still that well into 1 50
the Senate was content to allow Carthage to use up its military resources
against the Numidians, since the latter offered no threat to Rome’s
immediate interests. 251 Normal procedure was to await the assumption of
office by the new consuls, in this case on i January 149. The extremely
evasive replies which the Senate gave to the two Carthaginian embassies
sent to Rome during 1 50 show that it was uninterested in negotiation.
These missions brought news that the failed generals had been con-

246 App. 70.319; later the force is said to have been as large as 38,000(73.337), but neither figure is
very reliable. 241 72.331.

249 Cf. Walbank 19J7-79, in. 654: (b 38); Harris 1979, 168-75: (a 21).

249 polyb. xxxvi. 2. 4. 250 Liv. Per. xlix; Zon. ix.26.

251 It seems more than doubtful that Rome delayed in order to tell the Carthaginians that it would
not make war if they burned their fleet and dismissed their army (Liv. Per. xlviii); they had neither.

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152 ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

demned to death and that Carthage was once more docile. How, they
asked, could Carthage make amends? The first mission was told, accord-
ing to Appian, ‘If you satisfy the Romans’, the second that the
Carthaginians knew well what they must do. 252 In reality Rome was
already beginning the practical preparations for what was to be an
unusually large expedition, and the leaders of the Senate cunningly
intended that Carthage would receive news that war was entirely certain,
and that the Roman fleet was on its way, at almost the same time. 253 Late
in 1 50 Rome had gained a further logistic and psychological advantage
when Utica sent to Rome to make a formal submission ( deditio ). 254
Shortly afterwards, early in 149, the Senate voted to declare war.

Before we look more closely at the underlying reasons for this Roman
policy, it is worth continuing for a moment with the diplomatic ex-
changes, for Roman conduct in the interval before fighting began is
indicative. Before the news of the war declaration reached Carthage, five
emissaries were sent to Rome empowered to offer surrender, and this
they in fact did. The Senate’s reply was deliberately misleading. They
were told in essence that the Carthaginians could recover their freedom if
they surrendered 300 sons of powerful families as hostages and if they
‘obeyed the commands the consuls imposed on them’; 255 furthermore,
the Senate’s reply made no mention of the city of Carthage itself.
Carthage duly turned over the young hostages, but it did no good, for the
Roman expedition continued on its way to Africa. Roman policy was
now war, on the best terms possible, but in any case war. With the
consuls already at Utica, the Carthaginians enquired once again, and
were told to surrender all armour and artillery. In folly and desperation
they handed over 200,000 sets of armour and 2,000 catapults, 256 only to
be summoned to receive the consul’s final demand. They must now give
up their city for destruction and move at least ten miles inland. By this
humiliation, as the Epitomator says with unusual precision, the consuls
on the Senate’s orders drove the Carthaginians to fight. 257

Coming now to consider the fundamental reasons why the Roman
Senate decided to make war — a decision made well before 149, perhaps in
1 5 3 — we must pay attention not merely to the prior diplomacy but to the
mentality of the leading men and its basis in the Roman system.

252 App. 74.344, 346. Polyb. xxxvi. 3. 1 confirms that there had been a Delphic response at Rome.

253 As in fact happened: Polyb. xxxvi. 3. 9; App. 76. 352-353.

254 Liv. Per. xlix cannot be right,against Polybius and Appian, in putting this after the war vote.

255 Polyb. xxx vi. 4. 6.

256 Polyb. xxxvi. 6. 7; Diod. Sic. xxxn.6.2. Strabo(xvn.833)and Appian (80.375) exaggerate. The
demand for disarmament was normal and natural (cf. Walbank on 6. j) in such circumstances.

257 Liv. Per. xlix ( compulerunt ). Some scholars, most notably Astin 1 967, 274: (h 67), have argued
that the Senate did not intend to drive the Carthaginians to resistance. Clearly there could be no
certainty, but probability is heavily against this; after all, Rome could have caused Carthage further
severe political or economic damage by other less provocative means.

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ROME AND CARTHAGE

1 5 3

A theory which deserves to be dismissed quickly holds that Rome’s
essential reason for beginning the war was fear - fear not of Carthage but
of Massinissa, whose growing power the Senate supposedly felt com-
pelled to resist. 258 There never was any support for this theory either in
the sources or in general probability, and successive critiques have made
it untenable. 259 If Rome had wanted to restrain the very aged Massinissa,
there were many much easier methods. What remains instructive none-
theless is the difficulty which drove scholars to accept this theory: the
difficulty of believing that Carthage itself was a source of profound fear
to Rome in the 150s.

For this, in the eyes of most modern historians, has been the only other
possible explanation, namely that Rome gradually became aware in the
years before the war that Carthage was regaining its military strength and
spirit and so once more becoming a significant threat to Roman security.
So the Senate was motivated by fear, ‘fear of a Carthage economically
resurgent and rearming; fear of a people who had shown themselves
restive and impatient . . .’. 26 ° Even after disarmament in 149, scholars
have pointed out, Carthage had the will and resources to hold out for
three years. May the Romans not have feared that the Carthage in which
the ‘democratizers’ had gained some power by 1 5 j might soon become
so powerful that Rome would only be able to disarm it at enormous cost
and real risk?

Yet this theory too has serious weaknesses, and such fears are only a
fraction of the most likely explanation. In the first place, it remains
unproved that Carthage’s economic or military resources had improved
in any dramatic fashion in the immediately preceding years. Even the
arms surrendered in 149 may well have been old, and it must be reiterated
that Carthage had built no new fleet. The interesting ship sheds discov-
ered on the island in the centre of the old military harbour cannot date, as
far as the main structure is concerned, from any date after 201. 261 Until
151- after the decision had been made — scarcely a single Carthaginian
citizen had done serious military service for fifty years. And from some
points of view Carthage had grown still weaker, while Rome had grown
incomparably stronger, since the end of the Hannibalic War. Revenues
had been lost to the Numidians, and as for soldiers, the catastrophe
which overcame the Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal in 1 50 showed
how enfeebling fifty years without military experience had been. In any
case almost all of this army had been destroyed before the Senate finally

2sa Kahrstedt in Meltzer and Kahrstedt 1879-1913, 111.616— 1 7: (c 36); Gscll 191 3-28, in. 3 29-30:
(c 21); Hallward 1930, 476: (c 22).

2V> De Sanctis 1907— 64, iv. 3, 18— 19: (a 14); Walsh 1965: (c 62); for other contributions sec Astin
1967, 273: (h 67). 260 Astin, op. cit. 52; see also 274-6.

261 See Hurst 1979: (b i 74). It seems more likely that the original construction pre-datcd 201, and
that repairs were carried out in 149- 14 7.

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ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

voted for war. As for a navy, if Carthage had tried to build one of any size,
the Romans would probably have tried to burn it, as they burned the
Syrian warships in 163. Most of the territories from which Carthage had
historically recruited mercenaries were now closed off, and the North
African allies, to judge from the hasty desertion of Utica in 149, were
demoralized. What remains very difficult to judge is the temper of the
Carthaginians themselves at the time when the real Roman decision was
made. A group of ‘democratizers’, including Hamilcar ‘the Samnite’ and
Carthalo, no doubt existed, but its efforts were directed against
Massinissa not Rome. More remarkable is the continued existence and
(except for a period in 151/50) dominance of those who favoured the
appeasement of Rome and Massinissa (these were separate groups,
according to Appian). 262 It is undeniable that if Rome had given its
natural allies at Carthage a modicum of support against Massinissa, they
would have been able to maintain the now long-standing foreign policy
of submissiveness to Rome without even the minor interruption of 153.
No doubt most Carthaginians hated Rome, but they had shown very
little inclination to translate this hatred into political action.

Irrational fear of Carthage may conceivably have infected the Roman
Senate. Information may have been poor, especially about Punic re-
sources, though there was probably some contact with leading
Carthaginians in addition to the diplomatic exchanges. 263 Cato attempted
to rekindle hatred of Carthage, in part by recalling atrocity stories, 264 and
he may have been saying such things before 1 5 3 and having some effect.
The extreme violence of Rome’s policy towards Carthage (submission
and disarmament were not enough) might possibly have been based on
fear. There is no doubt that other Romans besides Cato had created a
hostile stereotype of the Carthaginians. Since the latter were obviously
not barbarians like the Celts or Spaniards - their material culture was
quite on a level with that of Rome - this stereotype had among other
functions that of hindering any kind of peaceful settlement. The
Carthaginians were cruel and above all untrustworthy, according to the
cliches which go back at least to Ennius and probably much further. 265
But in the years 201 — 1 50 the Roman attitude towards the Carthaginians
was not simply one of blind detestation, as Plautus’ Poenulus, probably
produced in the 1 90s, demonstrates. 266 In the end it is hard to believe that

262 App. 68.305.

263 Ties of hospitium: Livy xxxm.45.6 (195 B.C.). Scipio Aemilianus would logically have had the
best connections (cf. App. 72.329, 101.473). D. lunius Silanus’ knowledge of Punic (Plin. HN
xvi n. 2 2) may be relevant. 264 ORF 4 frs. 19 1-5 (cf. 187) (pp. 78-9).

265 Ennius, Ann. 221, 274-5 (cd. Vahlen). For later texts sec Burck in Vogt 1943: (c 61); Waibank
' 957 - 79 * M' 2; ( B 38)-

266 The play is not free from hostile cliches (see lines 112— 13, 1125), but on the whole it is
surprisingly sympathetic; Hanno is even allowed to speak Punic, a passage more likely to have come
from Plautus himself than from his Greek model.

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ROME AND CARTHAGE

155

the Senate was carried away by irrational fear, a motive which modern
historians have generally been far too ready to attribute to the Roman
Senate. 267 Fear, both rational and irrational, had some effect; but there
are other still more important factors to consider.

Before we leave this theorv, however, it is worth considering briefly a
complex chapter of Polybius in which he describes Greek reactions to the
Third Punic War. 268 Four points of view are represented, in two pairs,
the first two consisting mainly of opposing arguments about political
justification, the second two of opposing arguments about the legal
justification of the war. The first pair of arguments is what concerns us
here, and it would be particularly interesting to know which, if either, of
the arguments was accepted by the highly knowledgeable and intelligent
Polybius himself. Did he, that is to say, hold that in starting the Third
Punic War the Senate was merely trying to defend Rome, or did he reject
this and privately interpret Rome’s policy as an example of a more
extreme love of power which had infected the Senate since the decisive
battle of Pydna? Both answers have won support; 269 here it can only be
said that the form of the argument (A is capped by B) favours the latter
interpretation, which is perfectly consistent with Polybius’ known opin-
ions - and Polybius can hardly have believed that Carthage was really
capable of challenging Rome’s hegemony.

As with Rome’s other wars, so with this one, any valid explanation
must be based on a thorough analysis of the behaviour and mentality of
Roman aristocrats and also of other citizens. This means that we should
discard the notion of a Roman leadership reluctant to go to war and
recognize that war was generally known or believed to produce some
highly desirable results. Hence the amazing regularity with which Rome
went to war in the middle Republic. In the case of Carthage it was
obvious that any commander who succeeded in inflicting a decisive
defeat on Carthage would gain glory to rival that of Scipio Africanus, not
to mention any contemporary, while the war would provide parallel
opportunities for other officers. Being the richest state on the immediate
fringe of the annexed empire, Carthage was expected to enrich its
conquerors handsomely. The habit of going to war was enormously
strong, and when at some time between 162 and 153 the Carthaginians
came once more to the surface of Roman minds - because of the
intensifying conflict with Massinissa and presumably also because of the
expected ending of the indemnity - it became very likely that Rome
would find some way to pass through a victorious war before coming to a
new settlement. That settlement would reflect a further growth in
Roman power, whether it resulted in an annexed province or not.

267 Harris 1979, 165-254: (a 21). 268 xxxvi.9

269 The former: Walbank 1957-79, 111.663-4: (b 38); the latter: Harris 1979, 271-2: (a 21). Sec also
Musti 1978, 54—7: (b 22).

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ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

No explanation of the Third Punic War which heavily emphasizes
Roman commercial interests has much appeal to historians now. 270
Familiar and in large part convincing arguments tell against such a
theory: no independent group of merchants or financiers exercised
sufficient power at Rome in this period to bring on an important war. In
the short and medium terms the harming of Carthage might actually have
had negative effects on Roman and Italian businessmen, since there was a
substantial trade between Italy and Carthaginian Africa.

A thorough rejection of all economic explanations of the Roman war
decision would also be a mistake. Public and individual profits were an
entirely normal and expected part of successful warfare, and the private
profits would fall to senators as well as others. Appian writes that after
war was voted, ‘every single citizen and ally rushed to join what was a
splendid expedition with a predictable result, and many offered to enlist
even as volunteers’ 271 - all this in marked contrast to what had happened
two years earlier in the case of the Celtiberian war - and most of the
reason lay in the expectation of booty. This is exactly the period in which
certain senior magistrates made themselves remarkable even among
members of the Roman upper class by the avarice they showed while
holding office in Spain. Senatorial hopes for profit were an encourage-
ment to another war against Carthage. Such a war was likely to lead to
long-term benefits as well, an indemnity or perhaps provincial revenue,
and if the city was destroyed, as had been resolved by 149, to the
confiscation of land as Roman ager publicus. In the event this land and its
products, as in the case of Corinth, became in good part another
perquisite of Rome and well-to-do Romans. 272

The destruction of Corinth, an act with even less ‘political’ justifica-
tion, shows at least that 146 was a hard year for commercial cities. An
intriguing fact perhaps takes us further: when the consuls of 149 told the
Carthaginians that they must move their city ten miles inland, they were
apparently alluding to Plato’s advice that if a city was to avoid being full
of trade and the moral consequences of trade, it must be 80 stades (10
miles) from the sea. 273 In any case the Senate aimed either to provoke a
war, the most desirable result, or, the next best thing, to destroy the city’s
trade by sea. This was an effective way of ruining Carthage, but it may
also have had some positive promise for large Italian landowners,
including Roman senators and their non-senatorial friends. Before 149
Carthage probably exported grain and other farm products over a wide
area, and Numidian external trade was still dominated by Carthaginians.

270 Among older historians Mommsen 1921-3, 11.23: (a 26), and De Sanctis 1907-64, iv.3, 21-2:
(a 14), attributed some importance to this factor.

271 75-35 1- For emphasis on booty later in his account see 115-16, 127.609, 133.631.

272 Harris 1979, 95 n. 2: (a 21).

273 Plat. l^eg. 704b-705b, brought into the discussion by Meit7.er 1891: (c 35).

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ROME AND CARTHAGE I 5 7

On the fiscal side, payments to Rome were to cease in 152. After 146, by
contrast, Rome drew provincial taxation from Carthaginian territory and
also revenue from ager publicus, some of which naturally passed before
long into the hands of wealthy Romans. Meanwhile a certain vacuum in
long-distance trade is likely to have been filled by Romans and Italians,
who within a few years were also established in great numbers in
Numidia. In short, many forms of economic advantage came with the
political advantage. That Roman writers have nothing to say about this
aspect of the matter in the context of the 1 50s follows naturally enough
from their source material and their presuppositions.

The expedition which the consuls of 149 took to North Africa was
quite exceptionally large. There is no reason to reject Appian’s statement
that they took 80,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry , 274 figures which imply a
force of eight legions with a normal complement of allied troops. Some
scholars have preferred to suppose that the consuls took the normal force
of two legions each , 275 but they then have to explain that many of
Appian’s ‘infantry’ were really sailors or marines. Yet the number of
warships used was relatively small - since there was no opposing navy to
speak of - namely 50 quinqueremes and too ‘half-ships’ ( hemioliat , with
one-and-a-half banks of oars). Even if Appian did mistakenly include the
crews of these ships in the ‘infantry’, that would hardly account for many
more than 25,000 men (he cannot have included the crews of the
miscellaneous non-military vessels which also participated in the cross-
ing). The 84,000 could have been made up of eight citizen legions of
5,000 men, each with 500 (instead of the usual 500) cavalry, and 40,000
allies. Presumably the size of this force resulted both from awareness that
Carthaginian territory contained a large population and from the Sen-
ate’s willingness to accommodate the legitimate ambitions of an excep-
tionally large number of men.

No hindsight is needed to see that the war had to end in Carthaginian
defeat; the military resources available to Carthage had been too slight
even before the forced disarmament, and internal political tensions were
too strong. It is true that the city itself was effectively fortified, 276 and
that it was a rare event in antiquity for first-rate fortifications to be
overwhelmed by frontal assault. An elaborate effort was going to be
necessary. But even the best fortifications had no chance against a
determined Roman army, and the city’s size brought a further disadvan-
tage- its defence required a large force, which in turn could only be fed if
a large hinterland was also defended.

274 75 1 > -

275 Dc Sanctis 1907—64, iv.5, 34 n. 55: (a 14); Brunt 1971, 684: (h 82).

276 The fortifications are described in App. 95-96. For the archaeological evidence see Duval
1950: (b 164); Reyniers 1966: (c 46).

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ROME AND CARTHAGE

In reaction to Rome’s final demand the Carthaginian senate declared
war, freed the slaves, established a reconciliation with the Hasdrubal
who had recently been among the generals condemned to death (see
above p. 1 5 1), and gave him official command of the forces outside the
city (where he already had 20,000 men). Carthage then set about re-
arming as quickly as possible. The consuls, L. Marcius Censorinus (in
command of the fleet) and Mb Manilius (infantry), went into action in a
dilatory fashion, at least in part because of the supply difficulties of their
monstrous expedition. 277 Though Censorinus’ forces succeeded in
breaching the city wall, the Romans made no decisive headway, and
indeed lost a good part of their fleet to Carthaginian fireboats. In the last
part of the year, Censorinus having returned to Rome for the elections,
Manilius decided to attack HasdrubaPs army at Nepheris, a site about
twenty miles south-east of Tunis. The logic of this must have been that
Manilius wanted to supply his army from Carthaginian territory during
the winter, and could not expect to do so without defeating Hasdrubal.
Appian’s narrative is dominated by hero-worship of Scipio Aemilianus,
who was serving as a military tribune under Manilius, so that it is hard to
judge the result of this manoeuvre, but in any case the Romans suffered
serious casualties and Hasdrubal was not dislodged. A similar attempt in
the winter (149/8) also failed. In fact Polybius’ glorification of Scipio
resulted in a unanimous ancient tradition to the effect that the Romans
achieved nothing of consequence before he arrived as consul in 147. The
truth was that Manilius did important work during 148 in extending
Roman control in the surrounding territory. 278 Though according to
Appian Carthaginian morale improved as time passed without a decisive
Roman victory, 279 tension within the city was so acute that when the city
commander, whose name was also Hasdrubal, was accused in the senate
of treachery he was immediately slaughtered.

The first Roman commander to force his way into Carthage itself was
L. Hostilius Mancinus, a legate under the consul of 148, L. Calpurnius
Piso Caesoninus; this must have been early in 1 47, shortly before Scipio’s
return to Africa. Mancinus established a bridgehead somewhere in the
Megara, that is on the promontory of Sidi-bou-Said in the north part of
the city. 280 It appears, however, that this gain had to be surrendered. In
any case Scipio now succeeded in instituting a really thorough blockade
of the city, with appalling consequences among the defenders. During
147 the latter managed to construct and put into action a fleet of more
than negligible size. 281 Much more important, however, was the Roman

277 Cf. App. 94.446. Of the cities which joined Rome, only Utica was close.

275 Liv. Per. l end; Oros. tv. 22. 8; Zon. ix.27. 279 App. 111.522.

** Zon. i.x. 29; cf. Plin. HN xxxv.23; App. 112-113.

ai Fifty triremes plus small boats: App. 121.575-576. Strabo (xvn.83;) exaggerates again.

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l6o ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

capture of Nepheris at the start of the winter, with large Carthaginian
casualties; this allowed them to bring the rest of the countryside under
control.

The end was near. Hasdrubal, who had previously taken over the city
command from his murdered namesake, now made an unsuccessful
attempt to capitulate. 282 However, it was not until the beginning of the
next spring that the final assault began. Scipio’s soldiers forced their way
into the city from the south and gradually drove the defenders back on
the Byrsa and the temple of Eshmoun. Once Scipio himself had arrived at
the Byrsa, six days were devoted to burning and destroying the city. With
most of it under Roman control, the survivors succeeded in surrender-
ing; Appian gives their number as 50,000. 283 The vast majority of these
prisoners-of-war became slaves in the usual way. In spite of the destruc-
tion, the city was carefully plundered of portable objects, 284 but Scipio,
imitating his father’s behaviour after the battle of Pydna, ostentatiously
refused a share. Shortly afterwards the remains of the city were effec-
tively destroyed, and finally its site was cursed. The latter action was
perhaps not only an exaggerated precaution (some Punic enemies of
Rome survived) but also the result of an unconscious realization of the
awfulness of what had been done. As for the destruction itself, it had
precedents in other captured cities, 285 and was soon followed by that of
Corinth; what makes the Carthaginian case stand out, in addition to the
size and former power of the city, is the fact that this policy, having been
decided in advance, was retained in the period after Carthage had made
its original surrender. This was, and remained, unusual behaviour even
in the history of Roman warfare. 286

Carthaginian territory was now annexed as the province ‘Africa’. 287
The area in question had of course been much reduced by the Numidians,
and Rome seems to have been content with this at first: the sons of
Massinissa retained the Great Plains and the Emporia. 288 The procedure
followed in the annexation was unusual: it appears that the province was
annexed by means of law, under which decemviri (ten commissioners)

282 Polyb. xxxviii. 7-8; cf. Diod. Sic. xxxu.22; Zon. ix.30; Astin 1967, 72 n. 2: (h 67).

283 App. 130.622. Florus (1.3 1. 16) gives 36,000, Orosius (iv. 23. 2-3) 55,000.

284 To judge not only from general probability, but from the survival of the Carthaginian libraries
(Plin. HN xvm. 2 2) and from the restitution of objects plundered from Sicily; see Astin 1967, 76:
(" 6 7 )-

285 To mention only quite recent cases: Haliartus (171), seventy Epirote towns which had ceased
resistance (167).

286 Cf. Livy xxxvii. 3 2. 1 2: Diod. Sic. xxxii.4.5. However, the towns of Epirus were not at war
with Rome, and Piso had destroyed towns in North Africa which had surrendered in 148 (Diod. Sic.
xxxii. 18; cf. App. 1 10.5 19). See further Dahlhcim 1968, 16: (h 86).

287 Cf. App. 135.641; Veil. Pat. n.38.2.

288 On the frontier cf. Romanelli 1959, 43-6: (c 48). The area seems to have been somewhat less
than 25,000 sq. km. (9,000 sq. miles) and was thus slightly smaller than Sicily.

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ROME AND CARTHAGE

1 6 1

were appointed, 289 instead of ten legati appointed by the Senate. The
suspicion must arise that the author of this law was C. Livius Drusus, the
consul of 147 (rather than some otherwise unknown tribune of 146). 290 In
any case what we seem to be witnessing here is part of a struggle over the
economic and other rewards of the conquest, the author of the law
desiring to minimize the role of Scipio and his friends; this is scarcely
surprising, since Scipio had won the consulship illegally and in the face of
bitter opposition. 291

The commission of ten, in conjunction with Scipio, saw to the
destruction of all the towns which had remained loyal to Carthage, and
rewarded those which had supported Rome - above all Utica, which
received the territory ‘from Carthage to Hippo’ (that is, to Bizerta).
Much of Carthage’s own land, however, became Roman ager pub liens.
Finally they imposed a poll-tax on all adults in the province and a tribute
(, stipendiary ) based on land, with exceptions for the cities which had taken
the Roman side. 292 Then Scipio returned to Rome with his army and duly
triumphed over the Carthaginians and Hasdrubal. 293

Rome’s annihilation of Carthage and most of its inhabitants was a
brutal act -and this would still be true if there were something more than
a grain of truth in the apologetics of the ancient and modern writers who
have argued that the policy was, or was imagined to be, necessary to
Rome’s security. But it is important to realize that this brutality differed
only in degree from what was normal in Roman warfare.

The war also had the incidental effect of ruining an entire culture. Not
of course that everything Punic disappeared, any more than everything
Latin would have disappeared if Hannibal had destroyed the city of
Rome. The language and even the religion had long later histories. 294 But
the high culture of the great city had disappeared. About this culture we
admittedly know very little, less perhaps than scholars with an urge to
write the history of Carthage have admitted. The political system,
however, had been an object of interest and respect, together with very
few other barbarian constitutions, to Aristotle, Eratosthenes and

289 Harris 1979, 134 n. 3: (a 21). There were of course only five annexed provinces before this
date.

290 Suggested by Gclzer 1931, 263 n. 9: (c 18); Astin 1967, 74 n. 1 : (h 67). Livius had wanted the
African command himself (App. 112.533).

291 He is also the first known Roman magistrate to have obtained his provincia by a vote of the
people (App. 112.532), an important precedent.

292 For these arrangements: App. 1 3 5 .640-64 1 . There is some uncertainty as to whether the pro-
Roman cities other than Utica received land: cf. Romanelli 1959, 46 n. 2: (c 48). The other main
source of information is the lex agraria of 1 1 1 b.c. ( FIRA 1, no. 8 = Remains of Old lui/in (cd.
Warming ton) iv, pp. 370-437), lines 43-96. See further Haywood in USA R iv.3-5.

293 Only 4,370 lb of silver were carried in the triumph: Plin. HN xxxm. 141 ; cf. Astin 1967,342:
(h 67); but there was plenty of other booty (App. 135.642).

294 See especially Millar 1968: (c 38); Benabou 1976: (c 4). For Punic after 146 see Rollig 1980:
(C 47 ).

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ROMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST

Polybius. 295 Hellenization had had significant effects, increasingly per-
haps in the last century of the city’s existence, with the strange result that
a certain Hasdrubal became a philosopher a la grecque, moved to Athens
about 163/2, studied with Carneades and in 127/6, under the name of
Cleitomachus, became head of the Academy. While still at Carthage, he
had taught philosophy, 296 an activity which no well-bred Roman could
or would have undertaken at this date. Beyond this, there is not a great
deal to recount 297 about the high culture which produced libraries worth
giving to the Numidian princes. It was murdered, with very little regret,
by the Romans.*

295 See Arist. Pot. 11.1272b; Strabo 1.66 (Eratosthenes); Polyb. vi.51.

296 Diog. Laert. iv.67. See Von Arnim, PlP^Kleitomachus (i)\ 656-9. Politically, he went over
to the Romans: Momigliano, 1975, 5: (1 27).

297 For other items see Momigliano, op. cit. 5—6.

* This chapter was substantially completed in 1981.

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CHAPTER 6

ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS,
200-134 B.C. 1

A. E. ASTIN

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING

The constitutional arrangements with which Rome emerged from the
Second Punic War differed scarcely at all in form from those with which
she had embarked upon that great struggle. Their essence remained the
threefold structure of magistrates. Senate, and assemblies of the citizen
body, the structure which the Greek observer Polybius was shortly to
characterize as a ‘mixed’ constitution. 2 Of the magistrates the most senior
and powerful were the two consuls. Invested with imperium , consuls
could be placed in command of armies; they could exercise jurisdiction;
they could issue instructions, particular or general, in the form of edicts,
and could employ coercion and punishment to enforce their will. They
could propose legislation to the assemblies; one of them conducted most
of the meetings at which magistrates, including their own successors,
were elected; and when one or both were in Rome it was normally a
consul who presided over the deliberations of the Senate and gave effect
to its most important decisions. On the other hand they were elected
officials, the term of their office was limited to one year, early re-election
was not permitted, and in various directions their freedom of action was
restricted by the powers and authority of other bodies.

All magistrates were elected by the citizen body - consuls, praetors
and censors in the comitia centuriata (the assembly organized into 193
voting-units known as centuries), the remainder in the comitia tributa or
the almost identical concilium plebis (in which the voting units were the

1 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature of Roman politics in the period and certain
changes which were taking place. It is not a comprehensive survey of those internal events which
could be termed political. The principal source is Livy, whose account of events to 167 survives
almost intact; thereafter epitomes provide a basic framework. Other evidence, frequently anecdotal
and fragmentary, comes from many authors but especially Cicero, Plutarch, Gcllius and Appian;
fragments of speeches, of which Cato’s are the most important, in OR/-' 4 . For the lex V'oconia , which
is not discussed here, see Astin 1978, 1 1 3— 1 8: (h 68).

2 For constitutional matters Polybius’ analysis in the sixth book of his Hittories is fundamental.
Comprehensive modern studies are rare: Mommsen *887-8: (a 25) remains definitive; Dc Martino
1958-67: (a 1 j) is valuable but at times controversial; in English Grccnidgc 1901: (h 10) is still a
useful shorter treatment.

163

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164 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200— I 34 B.C.

thirty-five tribes, in one of which every Roman citizen was registered). 3
Declarations of war and ratification of treaties were matters for the
approval of the comitia centuriatcv, legislation could be enacted only by
vote of the citizen body, the populus , usually in the more convenient
procedure of the tribal assembly; and both forms of assembly - but
usually the tribal — might be used for major judicial hearings, especially
when it was proposed to inflict a penalty on a major public figure.
Although the citizen body was dependent upon the initiative of a
magistrate to convene an assembly and to lay before it proposals for
acceptance or rejection (but not amendment), and although the assembly
as such did not deliberate, it did not vote without hearing argument. A
voting assembly was normally preceded by a meeting ( contio ), summoned
by a magistrate who invited speakers to address it; and it is clear that
convention expected him to bring forward speakers both for and against
whatever was being proposed.

Yet it was by no means the entire citizen body which listened to
argument and cast its votes, nor by any means a representative portion of
it. Organization and order would surely have broken down, the voting
procedures have been made unworkable if the greater part of the adult
male citizens had attended simultaneously to cast their votes in an
assembly. Even at the end of the Hannibalic War they numbered at least
140,000, and probably more than 240,000; by 189/8 the recovery in
population had taken them permanently beyond the quarter-million
mark. 4 Probably lack of interest kept many away, distance and cost many
others, inhibiting the poor and leaving greater opportunity to the more
prosperous. Furthermore, in addition to the skewing of actual composi-
tion which was produced by social factors, the structures of the assem-
blies themselves prevented participation on an equal basis, even though
every Roman citizen was entitled to vote. In the comitia centuriata the
division of citizens into several classes according to the value of their
property, the allocation of a larger proportion of the voting-units to the
wealthier classes, and a procedure which took the votes of the ‘highest’
centuries first and stopped the counting when a majority had been
reached, ensured that the wealthy exercised a disproportionate influence
and that de facto the poorest groups were virtually disfranchised. The
disparities were much less marked in the tribal assemblies, where wealth
was not a formal consideration, but even here the likelihood that many of

3 The total number of regular magistrates remained small, as follows: consuls, 2 ; praetors, 4, soon
to be increased to 6; curule aedilcs, 2; plebeian aedilcs, 2; quaestors, at least 8 (but some believe the
number had already been or was soon to be increased, perhaps to i 2); tribunes of the plcbs, 10. There
were also military tribunes, both elected and nominated, and a few minor magistrates. A pair of
censors was elected every five years and held office for eighteen months. For elections and
assemblies sec esp. Taylor 1960 and 1966: (h 29 and 30); Stavelev 1966: (h 27).

4 Brunt 1971, esp. 13-14 and 61-74: (h 82).

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING

165

the poorer inhabitants of Rome itself were confined to the four ‘urban’
tribes probably meant that in practice a disproportionate number of the
individual votes cast in rural tribes came from wealthier members.

The only formal body suitably structured for debate and deliberation
was the Senate, the three hundred members of which included most of
the men who had held magistracies. It was so structured because in
principle it was largely an advisory body (though not exclusively so since
it controlled expenditure from the state treasury, the aerarium ). 5 The
fundamentally advisory nature of most of its resolutions is reflected in
the language in which its decrees ( senatus consulta ) were cast, carefully
avoiding direct commands. Nevertheless in many fields the Senate was in
practice taking the effective decisions for the state: that is how the
sources present it, and there is little doubt that often it thought of itself as
doing this and that it was so thought of by others. The Senate decided
what armies should be levied and where they should be sent; it autho-
rized provisions, supplies and funds; it instructed magistrates about
action to be taken in a variety of matters; it appointed envoys to foreign
powers; and it received and responded to the embassies which came to
Rome in ever-increasing numbers. Its advice on legislation and on
decisions about war and peace, about treaties, and about other matters
where the formal decision lay with an assembly, was not always the
effective decision to the same extent as in other matters; for the necessary
votes in the assembly had to be obtained, and furthermore it was possible
in principle, though unusual in practice, for a proposal to be placed
before an assembly without prior consultation of the Senate. Neverthe-
less it is clear that, at least in the early decades of the second century, the
Senate was normally consulted and its recommendation accepted. Only
once is a recommendation for war reported to have been rejected. That
was the proposal to declare war on Macedonia in the spring of 200,
immediately after the conclusion of the Hannibalic War; and even then
the initial rejection was soon reversed . 6

Polybius, his attention caught by the distribution of functions be-
tween magistrates, Senate and assemblies, interpreted Rome as an
example of a ‘mixed’ constitution, combining elements of monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy in a constitutional balance of which the
stability was maintained over a long period by the restraints which these
elements exercised over each other. Yet he too saw that in the Roman
governmental system of this period the role of the Senate was central,
that his aristocratic element predominated. In his discussion of how the
constitutional balance would eventually collapse, he predicted that the
people (the demos) ‘will no longer be willing to obey or even to be the
equal of the leading men ’. 7

* Polyb. vi. 13 and 15-17. 6 Livy xxxi. 6.3-8. 1. 7 Polyb. vi.57.8-

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1 66 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200— I 34 B.C.

It would be misleading to suggest that the Senate was ‘the govern-
ment’ of Rome in this period - for Rome had no ‘government’ in the
modern sense, but rather a governmental system. Nor is it to be forgot-
ten that the Senate had no tole in the electoral process, or that many of its
decisions, particularly concerning extra-Italian matters, were effectively
shaped by the actions and the recommendations of Roman commanders
and envoys. Nevertheless in the constitutional structure it was the body
which dominated a large part of the major decision-making of the
governmental process.

Two further groups of officials are relevant to the manner in which
these constitutional arrangements operated. There were first the ten
tribunes of the plebs, elected each year in the concilium plebis. These could
intervene to protect a citizen against a magistrate, indeed they could veto
almost any act of public business in Rome; they could impose penalties,
often leading to judicial hearings before the assembly of the plebs, and
they could introduce legislation to that assembly. The actual exercise of
these independent and potentially far-reaching powers was kept in check
by various forms of social and political pressure, and by the ability to use
one tribune’s veto against another’s proposals. In practice almost all the
known tribunician legislation of the first half of the second century seems
to have had the approval of the Senate, and in some cases the tribunes
were virtually agents for that body; and sometimes tribunes could be
persuaded or pressured into withdrawing a veto with nothing achieved.
Nevertheless, none of their powers was merely notional; all were in use in
the years covered by this chapter, and their existence was an important
element in the constitutional and political scene.

The other officials who must be mentioned here are the censors. These
were peculiar among Roman magistrates in their term of office (eighteen
months instead of the normal twelve) and in their discontinuity - for
pairs of censors were elected only at intervals, which at this time had been
stabilized at five years. Originally established to conduct the census and
register the citizens by their tribes and centuries, they had acquired
important additional responsibilities which included making up the rolls
of the senatorial and equestrian orders (with the power to omit existing
members whom they judged unsuitable), and arranging numerous pub-
lic contracts. In a state with few public servants, the range of such
contracts was great, including recurrent contracts for state services, the
lease of public lands and properties, the collection of rents and some
taxes, and non-recurrent contracts for repairs to public properties and
the construction of new buildings. Furthermore the censors’ exercise of
these various powers was largely unfettered, for, except that the repair
and construction projects required the allocation of funds by the Senate,

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THE NATURE OF ROMAN POLITICS

most of their decisions were subject neither to approval nor to appeal . 8

As was mentioned at the beginning, these constitutional arrangements
were in form essentially those with which Rome had entered the Second
Punic War. Unorthodox arrangements necessitated by the emergencies
of the war years were brought to an end. Particularly striking is the strict
observance of the rule which required an interval of ten years between
tenures of the same magistracy; and no further private individual was
invested with imperium without election to praetorship or consulship.
Yet there may also have been some force at work deeper than the
understandable desire to revert to pre-emergency arrangements. Despite
the continuity of form there were changes in practice, not all of which
were obvious responses to the requirements of expanding empire. With
obvious hesitation the number of praetors was increased, eventually
settling at six each year ; 9 and the recent practice of extending a magis-
trate’s authority for a year, or even two, as a promagistrate was used
frequently in Spain and soon emerged as the normal device for meeting a
need elsewhere for more commanders than were available as magistrates.
But also no more dictators were appointed - perhaps another reflection
of a conscious pursuit of system and order. As will be seen later, the
convention that certain magistracies should be held in a fixed sequence
and with an interval of two years between election to each was soon to be
reinforced by law, and before long other requirements were added.
Symptoms such as these reflect not merely constitutional tidiness but
current political attitudes; they raise questions about the nature of
political activity and its relationship to constitutional forms at this period
in Roman history.

II. THE NATURE OF ROMAN POLITICS

The nature of political life is a topic important for the understanding of
any state; unfortunately, in the case of the Roman Republic it is also a
matter of considerable controversy, not least in respect of the years with
which this chapter is concerned. The sources and the distribution of
power, as exercised both through and alongside the constitutional
organs of the state, the issues over which the participants in political life
divided and disputed, the coherence and continuity, indeed the very
raison d’etre of such groupings as they formed, and the extent to which all
these matters may have been related to the concerns of the poor or to

8 Special studies include Suolahti 1963: (h 28), Pieri 1968: (h 18) and Nicolet 1980: (h 3 1). The
present writer has further studies in preparation.

9 Livy xxxii. 27.6 (6 in 198), XL.44.2 (4 and 6 in alternate years under the lex Baebia of 180);
reversion to 6 every year not recorded but effected by 173, probably by 175.

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I 68 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200— I 54 B.C.

other potential sources of tension in Roman society: all these have been
much debated, not without progress but certainly without achieving a
clear and generally accepted consensus.

In the later nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth it
was widely assumed that the essence of political life in the middle and
later Roman Republic was a contest between advocates of change and
defenders of the status quo, mainly in respect of the location of power and
the dominating authority of the Senate. Political figures, although
recognized to have belonged mostly to established families and not to
have been organized into political parties in the modern sense, neverthe-
less were thought to have been associated loosely in two broad
groupings which were respectively conservative and reformist in their
outlook and inclinations. This kind of interpretation, however, was
inadequately supported by positive evidence (which might have been
expected to be plentiful) and often relied on an uncritical acceptance of
political language at face-value, with insufficient sensitivity to its nu-
ances and shifting shades of meaning or to the overtones of polemic and
propaganda. Eventually a radically different analysis was put forward
and has exerted a strong influence on virtually all subsequent
discussion . 10

Attention was directed to the considerable degree of family continuity
among those who held high office and were prominent in public life.
Examination of the lists of known magistrates, combined with some
remarks by Cicero and others, confirms that in the middle and late
Republic it was unusual to win election to the consulship unless one’s
father had been at least a senator, and that a substantial proportion of
consuls were descendants of former consuls or praetors. Moreover, a few
families held a clearly disproportionate number of consulships, in some
cases sustaining the achievement over many generations. The conclusion
was drawn that there were factors at work which enabled members of a
small number of families to sustain political prominence for long periods
and to exercise exceptional influence.

The source of that influence was identified as lying not in any special
legal privilege but in the elaborate network of social relationships, based
on personal relationships of many kinds, which permeated Roman
society. It was a society in which the lesser constantly looked to the more
powerful for assistance and protection (not least in legal matters), a
society in which there was a strong sense of the obligation created by the
receipt of favour, both between equals (between whom amicitia, ‘friend-
ship’, might mean anything from personal affection to an essentially
political relationship) and between unequals, such as patron and client-

10 Gelzer 1912, trans. Seagcr 1969: (h 8 and 9).

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to say nothing of numerous other relationships, such as those between
landowner and tenant or creditor and debtor. Thus the means existed to
influence, even to determine numerous votes — which for long were cast
openly and orally — to mobilize voters in support of oneself or a friend or
an ally . 11 Furthermore, those who enjoyed most success in the exploit-
ation of such means could often transmit power to their descendants,
since these might inherit both their wealth and de facto the patronage of
their clientelae.

This transmission of social and political power was assisted by the
concept of nobilitas, which, whatever its precise content, is generally
recognized to have had a hereditary aspect. The term, it was argued in the
new analysis, was not a loose reference to high standing but indicated
descent from a former consul. Thus a nobilis enjoyed a defined and
distinctive status (but a social status, with no recognition in law) which
itself conferred prestige and was a considerable electoral asset. Also, it
has been suggested, those who possessed that status had an incentive to
maintain its social and political value by restricting the rise of new men to
the consulship. Restricting, not preventing; for there was always some
upward movement of new men who were the first in their families to
attain the consulship, though probably only a very few of them had been
also the first in their families to become senators.

In such a context politics was primarily the expression of personal
competition in which each sought to surpass others in the acquisition of
honour and power for himself and his family. The means to that honour
and power were the tenure of high public office, the established status
and lasting prestige which resulted from such tenure, and the enhanced
role in the deliberations of the Senate which was open to those who
achieved such status; and the means to attain such office — and for some
families the means to the near-hereditary enjoyment of power — lay, it was
argued, in the development and exploitation of a network of social
relationships through which votes could be controlled.

The idea that a major source of political power was a network of social
connections which tended to be passed from one generation of a power-
ful family to the next prompted a further influential hypothesis . 12 Atten-
tion was drawn to a number of instances in which members of two or

11 The censors of 179 altered the method of tribal registration and those of 169 restricted the
registration of ex-slaves to one tribe (Livy XL. 5 1 .9, xlv. 1 5.1-7). It is often assumed that in both cases
the motives were political, and especially that the change in 169 was an attempt to limit the influence
which former owners could derive from their ability to direct the votes of their freedmen. However,
since the change made in 179 is reported very briefly and imprecisely, with no mention of
controversy, it is possible that it was essentially technical and administrative. The censors of 169 did
disagree about their action, but their difference was resolved by sortition and seems to have
provoked neither tribunician intervention nor public outcry; it is conceivable therefore that they
were more concerned with social esteem than political manipulation.

12 Miinzer 1920: (h 15); Scullard 1973: (h 54).

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170 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1 34 B.C.

more families were clearly associated with each other in public life in
more than one generation; and to the instances which are unmistakable
can be added others which are probable. An explanation was sought in
the importance of kinship as a social connection, combined with the
suggestion that amicitia, in the sense of political ‘friendship’ or alliance
between persons of high status, was also a relationship which was often
transmitted from one generation to the next. The conclusion was drawn
that leading families (i.e. not only individual members of them) formed
groups or ‘factions’ which cohered closely, often for several generations.
Families so associated would support each other and exploit their social
resources to their mutual benefit in competition with other, rival groups.
Efforts have been made to identify such groups of families, to detect
symptoms of their rivalries, and to reconstruct the ebb and flow of their
political fortunes, along with occasional dissolutions and regroupings.
But whatever the details, the supposition that political groupings were
primarily of families rather than of individuals and that they often
endured for generations would make it even more difficult to avoid the
conclusion that, whatever short-term disagreements arose about particu-
lar decisions of state, the underlying source of continuing political
conflict was to be found in the competition for office, honour and
influential status, not in policy or programme, or in ideology or philos-
ophy. For such groupings are unlikely to have correlated closely with
divisions of the latter kind, whereas it is especially in electoral competi-
tion that they could have expected to benefit from the exploitation of
social allegiances to muster support for each other.

Interpretations along these lines have provoked a rash of criticisms,
some of them well founded . 13 Insecure and sometimes grossly inad-
equate criteria have all too often been used in attempts to identify
political alliances. The term ‘ nobilitas' may have been misunderstood in
some modern studies, or its connotation may have changed during the
last century of the Republic . 14 Insufficient allowance has been made for
the range of relationships which could be described as 'amicitia ’ . 15 There
is a suspicious lack of political vocabulary which can be related to the
concept of family-based factionalism. The extent to which the consulship
was dominated by ‘consular’ families has been overstated, for in every
generation there were several consuls who were not the direct descen-
dants of consuls, and more with no consular forebear for several genera-
tions past. Similarly there were only a few families which supplied one or
more consuls for a number of generations in succession, and the notion
that in certain families all male children were virtually ‘born to the

13 Astin 1968: (h 3); Broughton 1972: (h 4); and the studies indicated in the next six notes.

14 Afzelius 1945: (h i); Brunt 1982: (h 6). 15 Brunt 1965: (h 5).

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THE NATURE OF ROMAN POLITICS IJl

consulship’ overstates the advantage they enjoyed . 16 Likewise the pro-
portion of votes in the assemblies which could be controlled by social
pressure and explicit direction has often been exaggerated, giving the
impression that exceptions were insignificant; whereas it is clear that the
effectiveness of control varied, down to the point where many voters had
to be swayed by canvassing, by argument, by emotive rhetoric, by
displays of liberality, or by outright bribery; and that notwithstanding all
these there were some instances in which the decisive factor was the
independent judgement of individual voters regarding the qualities of
the candidates . 17 Furthermore, among those who were active in politics
the nexus of personal and kinship relationships was certainly not so
straightforward that each individual could be located unambiguously in
a self-contained faction, with no ties or obligations to anyone outside it.
On the contrary, in the relatively small social group from which the
Roman senators were drawn relationships must always have been both
complex and shifting, fraught with cross-ties and conflicting
obligations . 18 Finally, on a different level of consideration, to some
historians, even to some who have embraced the concept of family
groupings, it has seemed a priori implausible to identify aristocratic
competitiveness as the overriding determinant of political division, to
suppose that lasting divisions bore no substantial relationship to great
issues of policy implicit in the expansion of empire; or alternatively, to
suppose that they were not shaped in considerable measure by the social
and economic contrasts of Roman society . 19

These criticisms warn against thinking of Roman politics in terms
which are unduly rigid and schematic, or are too preoccupied with the
operation of a single factor. In particular political co-operation - and
rivalry - between families, and even between individuals, was subject to
more variation, to greater fluidity and complexity than many discussions
of factional politics have allowed. Nevertheless the criticisms do not
refute the fundamental contentions that aristocratic ambition and com-
petitiveness were major characteristics of political life, and that the
patronage system and the social nexus based on kinship and mutual
obligation were major sources of political power and important con-
tributors to the restraint (though not the nullification) of the popular
elements in the constitutional structure. Nor do they dispose of some
striking features which seem best explained by this kind of analysis. First,
a state in which legislation could be effected only by popular vote in
popularassemblies, to which popularly elected officials had direct access,
was nevertheless predominantly an oligarchy in which most major

16 Hopkins (with Burton) 1983, ch. 2: (h 49).

17 Astin 1967, csp. 28-9 and 339: (h 67); Millar 1984: (h 14).

18 Astin 1967, csp. 80: (h 67). 19 Finley 1983, passim: (h 7).

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\-]Z ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 2OO-I34 B.C.

decisions were taken, without answerability to an electorate, by a Senate
of some three hundred men, or by officials who for the most part were
responsible to the authority of that Senate. Second, though at times the
continuity and dominance of ‘consular’ families has been overstated, it
remains an astonishing fact that although officials were elected in popu-
lar assemblies, and although any citizen qualified by age and military
service was entitled to seek the offices in progression (at least if he had the
equestrian census qualification), still in the last two centuries of the
Republic about two-fifths of those who reached the consulship were sons
of former consuls, and more than half were sons or grandsons; approxi-
mately one-third of the consuls had one or more sons who were elected to
the consulship; and among the families represented in the consular lists it
is not denied that there were a few who had success manifestly dispropor-
tionate to their number . 20 Third, despite the theoretically powerful
popular institutions of the Republic, in the early second century there is a
singular lack of evidence for the shaping of politics by a conflict of
programmes or by economic and social disparities, or for particular
measures and controversies having roots in such broadly-based divisions
(though the seeming absence of serious economic discontent in these
years was related to other factors which will be examined in a later section
of this chapter). Such features demonstrate that, although in occasional
situations of high enthusiasm the personal judgement of voters could be
decisive, in general voting was strongly influenced - and the political
independence of the assemblies was significantly restrained - by forces
considerably greater than those of the purely constitutional biases and
limitations, forces which were created by taking advantage of an elabo-
rate network of social relationships.

The combination of oligarchic predominance and popular electoral
institutions had a further consequence which tended both to reinforce
the pattern as a whole and to create ample scope for political competition
conceived in personal terms. For this combination tended to divorce
electoral contests, especially for the magistracies in the strict sense but
also for the tribunate of the plebs, from most major decisions of state.
The latter were largely in the hands of the Senate; and since there were
approximately three hundred senators and membership was essentially
for life, not only was their record not subjected to the test of re-election
but the composition of the Senate could not be affected more than
marginally by the outcome of any election. Even a presiding consul was
able to exert only a very limited influence on the topics and outcome of
senatorial deliberation. A candidate offering himself for election could
dwell upon his personal merits and qualifications, could undertake to

20 Hopkins (with Burton) 1983, ch. 2, esp. 55-60: (h 49).

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THE NATURE OF ROMAN POLITICS

173

perform his duties effectively, could point to his record of liberality and
promise to subsidize public entertainments. If he was seeking the
praetorship or consulship he was especially likely to commend himself as
experienced and competent in warfare, and as the candidate most fitted to
command an army and to be entrusted with a campaign. But he had little
incentive to offer policy or programme, for election even to the consul-
ship did not give him the power to deliver upon such promises . 21

It is not surprising, therefore, that political activity was not uniform in
kind and that it took place at more than one level. Aristocratic personal
competition was a major component, manifested in such displays as
triumphs, dedicatory temples and games, and in elaborate funeral rituals;
and it was given its major political expression in contention for
magistracies. In that contention, played out in the electoral context of the
assemblies, much could be achieved through the active support of
friends, kin, family, dependants, and all who could be influenced,
directly and indirectly, through the chain of obligation. Since success
was deemed to bring added distinction to the family as well as to the
individual — exemplified by the ius imaginum , by which families kept and
on occasion displayed in public ‘portraits’ of ancestors who had held
curule office 22 - this reinforced the natural tendency for close kin to aid
each other and for the immediate family to operate as a unit in electoral
situations.

These were not the only assets needed. A scion even of one of the
greatest consular families required a reasonable measure of talent and
early achievement if, in his quest for high office, he was to hope for
sufficient family and social support, for recommendation by distin-
guished senators, and for acceptance by the voters as an adequate
candidate. For the quest was highly competitive, and the competition
was for more than mere triumph over rivals, or for getting ahead in a race
for grandiose titles and symbolic honours. Magistrates exercised con-
siderable power in matters of public importance (without support by
professional civil servants) for a full year. In the case of the senior
magistrates that power was very great indeed. It might have to be applied
in a wide range of fields, and it frequently involved command of a Roman
army in active campaigning — which in the strongly militaristic ethos of
Roman society was a potent source of individual glory and prestige and
hence was itself the object of considerable ambition. The electoral
process did not guarantee the success of the most competent; for, errors
of electoral judgement apart, competence did not suffice, but neither did
social connections and distinguished ancestry. Yet still, when personal

21 Astin, 1968: (h 3).

22 Polyb. vi. 53. 4-8; NX'albank 1957-79, 1.738—9: (b 38); Mommsen 1887-8, 1.442-9: (a 25). The
phrase ius imaginum, though convenient, does not itself have ancient authority.

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174 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1 34 B.C.

qualities and competence are added to the considerable complex of
factors which affected electoral struggles, it serves only to reinforce the
point that most such contests were essentially personal in character.

On the other hand there were also decisions to be taken about the
internal and external affairs of Rome. Sometimes a citizen assembly did
have a real decision-taking role in these, but much more often the
effective decision lay with the Senate, which alone was a deliberative
body. A major characteristic of its decisions, however, was pragmatism;
of competing political theories or long-term social programmes there is
no sign. In particular all internal government was in a broad sense
conservative, seeking to preserve and maintain, to ensure order, to react
to problems as they arose but not to initiate unprompted change in social
or political organization. Consequently, although individuals with simi-
lar temperaments and preconceptions may often have found themselves
aligned for or against a particular proposal, and, although some junior
senators may have seen advantage for themselves in giving regular
support to some powerful leader and patron, there was no incentive to
form semi-permanent groupings committed to political programmes,
nor was there a consistent basis upon which to do so.

It is no cause for surprise that from time to time the politics of personal
competition and aristocratic rivalry intruded into these pragmatic delib-
erations, became blurred with debates unshaped by ‘party’ affiliation,
and sometimes perhaps swayed the Senate’s judgement. The political
participants, after all, were the same and are unlikely to have achieved or
even attempted a total compartmentalization of their motives. Yet
fundamentally senatorial deliberation was a different kind of political
activity from the selection of annual officials; it was a process for
resolving a different kind of conflict and reaching different types of
decision. Given its essentially distinct institutional setting and the ab-
sence of conflicting ideologies there was little reason why divisions
among senators about particular issues should be founded upon perma-
nent groupings or why they should be identified with those divisions
which sprang from rival ambitions and found their essential expression
in electoral contests.

III. OLIGARCHIC STABILITY

(a) The politics of competition

The fearful crises and strategic necessities of the Second Punic War
caused a few talented individuals upon whom Rome placed exceptional
reliance to be appointed to unusual terms of office and to achieve
extraordinary fame. There had been Q. Fabius Maximus and M. Claudius

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OLIGARCHIC STABILITY 175

Marcellus, with their recurring consulships and (in Claudius’ case)
proconsulships; and later there was P. Cornelius Scipio, conqueror of
Carthaginian Spain and victor at Zama. 23 Scipio had gone to Spain in 2 1 o
with a special grant of imperium , even though he held no magistracy. On
his return in 206 he was elected to the consulship of 205, and thereafter as
consul and proconsul he commanded Roman armies until he brought the
war to an end in 201. For almost ten years, virtually without interruption,
he had been invested with imperium. Flamboyant, the centre of adulation,
still only in his mid-thirties, ambition not yet slaked, he re-entered Rome
in a magnificent triumph, parading his achievement even in the very
name he assumed: Africanus. It is small wonder that when he sought the
censorship in 199 he was elected over many distinguished competitors. 24

But those defeated competitors are significant. In an oligarchic system
in which men competed for brief tenure of formal power, in which great
value was placed upon military glory and high status, and in which
personal fame could magnify political power, Scipio had drawn uncom-
fortably far ahead in all of these. It is a reasonable guess that many
senators were resentful and that some were disposed to co-operate to
reduce his influence, though modern attempts to find the reflection of
such a struggle in the identities of those elected to high office depend on
much conjecture. But whether or not it happened in conscious reaction
to Scipio, there are unmistakable signs of a collective senatorial concern
to prevent further instances of early and spectacular advancement, and of
extraordinary and lengthy exercise of magisterial power - a concern to
contain the careers of even the most able and ambitious within a limiting
framework. That the senators of this time feared usurpation and monar-
chy is improbable, but they almost certainly resented and distrusted pre-
eminence so marked that it threatened to restrict opportunities for others
and to distort the conventional pattern of competition for office and
power. Rules suspended during the earlier part of the Punic war had
already been reinstated, namely a prohibition upon election to one curule
office while holding another, and another upon holding any one
magistracy twice within ten years. 25 The latter rule made second consul-
ships rare, long before they were prohibited altogether in or soon after
1 5 2. 20 But it is probable that what actually precipitated the first new rules
was the spectacular rise of yet another brilliant individual.

Titus Quinctius Flamininus had already distinguished himself in
junior appointments, but when he put himself forward for the consulship
of 1 98 he was still only about thirty years of age and had held neither the
curule aedileship nor the praetorship. Two tribunes who threatened to

23 Scullard 1970 and 1973: (ti 77 and 34). 24 Livy xxxn.7.2.

25 Inferred from the lists; cf. MRR. for these years; Astin 1938, 19 n. 6: (h 2).

26 Astin 1967, 39: (h 67).

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176 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 2OO-I34 B.C.

block his candidature because he had held neither of these offices gave
way when the Senate affirmed that the populus , the citizen body, should
be free to elect anyone who was legally eligible. 27 Nevertheless new
restrictions on eligibility for office followed quickly, and in the general
field of appointments some changes in practice can be discerned — all
probably effected without controversy, though by no means all were
related directly to Flamininus’ case. Prior tenure of the praetorship
became a required qualification for those who sought the consulship,
almost certainly with effect from 197, since that year marked the end of a
series of consuls who had not held the praetorship. 28 At the same time the
number of praetors was increased to six. 29 The purpose must have been
to provide elected magistrates to govern the two additional provinces
which had been acquired in Spain; but the converse of this was that it
removed the need to confer promagisterial authority on private individ-
uals, a practice which now ceased. Furthermore the increase had the
effect of enlarging the pool of ex-praetors just at the moment when the
choice of consuls was restricted by law to the members of that pool. From
196 plebeian aediles were brought into line with their curule counter-
parts by no longer being allowed to proceed to the praetorship without
an interval of at least one year. 30 It is noteworthy too, though it cannot
have been the subject of a law, that emergencies and special situations
were never again met by the appointment of a dictator (until Sulla’s
unorthodox exploitation of the office); the dictator of 202 was the last.

A new burst of similar legislation began in 181, when the lex Baebia
attempted to reduce the number of praetors by providing for four and six
in alternate years; but this cumbersome arrangement was soon super-
seded or repealed and the number reverted to six. 31 Meanwhile, in 180, a
tribune named L. Villius carried the lex Villia annalis, which prescribed
minimum ages for the curule aedileship, praetorship and consulship.
Moreover at this time, and almost certainly by this same law, it was made
a requirement that there be an interval of at least two years between
entrance upon successive curule magistracies. 32 Finally, nearly thirty
years later still, there came the restriction which prohibited second
consulships altogether; the circumstances in which this was done will be
described in a later section of this chapter.

These restraints and limitations, so far from being designed to impose
a collective uniformity, were essentially an instinctive attempt - possibly
even a conscious attempt - to safeguard opportunities for the exercise of
ambition in the contest for position, for glory and for power. That

27 Livy xxxii. 7. 8— 1 2. 28 Astin 1958, 19-30, esp. 26 - 7 : (h 2). 29 Livy xxxn.27.6.

30 Mommsen 1887-8, 1.5 3 1-3: (a 25); Astin 1958, 27: (h 2).

31 Livy xl. 44. 2; six every year by 173, probably by 173.

32 Livy xl. 44. 1 ; Astin 1958: (h 2).

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OLIGARCHIC STABILITY

'77

contest found expression in many ways beyond immediate electoral
competition, and took forms often shaped by the circumstances of the
age. Thus almost constant warfare and frequent victories, in the eastern
lands, in Spain, in northern Italy and Cisalpine Gaul, encouraged many
to claim triumphs; and the number of claims which were disputed creates
the suspicion that objectors and claimants alike were as much aware of
political considerations as of formal merits. 33 With the triumphs came
booty, much of it expended in the name of the commander. Cash
donatives to troops increased steadily, creating an expectation which
could not be disappointed without political damage. Thus in 179,
although a campaign against the Ligurians is said to have yielded almost
no money, the troops received three hundred asses each, with the usual
bonuses for centurions and cavalry; and in 167 it was with the greatest
difficulty that troops disgruntled with their donative (in fact it was
probably exceptionally large) were dissuaded from using their votes in an
assembly to prevent L. Aemilius Paullus celebrating his triumph over
Macedonia. 34

Booty paid also for temples vowed to deities in the heat of battle, and
for games similarly vowed and increasingly lavish in scale. It does not
require much cynicism to find a political dimension to the ten days of
games which in 186 L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus suddenly announced,
probably for the first time, that he had vowed four years previously when
he was engaged in the war against Antiochus. 35 Lucius was almost
certainly looking ahead to his candidature for the censorship of 184.
Games were also staged by the aediles, and even before the end of the
Hannibalic War these were having a marked effect on the electoral
prospects of the organizers. 36 To the income from booty could be added
resources derived from empire, often obtained as ‘contributions’ from
provincial and even Italian communities in order to fund ever more
lavish spectacles. In consequence the Senate at least twice saw fit to limit
the amount of public money which might be spent on victory games. On
the second of these occasions, in 1 79, it also decreed that the commander
who was giving the games (Q. Fulvius Flaccus) ‘should not invite,
compel or accept contributions for these, or do anything contrary to that
decree of the Senate which had been made concerning games in the
consulship of Lucius Aemilius and Gnaeus Baebius’ (=182). Livy
commented that ‘the Senate had passed this decree because of the lavish
expenditure on games by the aedile Ti. Sempronius, which had been

33 E.g. Livy xxxi. 20. 1-6 (200), xxxi. 47.4-49. 1 a °d 8-1 1 (200), xxxii. 7. 4 (199), xxxm. 22. 1-23.9
(197), xxxv. 8. 2-9 (193), xxxvi. 39.4-40. 10 (191), xxxviu.43. 1-44.6 (187), xxxvin.44. 9-30.3 (187),
xxxix.4. 1-3.6 (187), XLV.33.3-39.19 (167).

34 USA R 1.127-38 (collected data); Livy XL.39.2 (for 179); Astin 1978, 118-19 (Aemilius

Paullus): (h 68). Livy xxxix.22.8-10. 36 Mommsen 1887-8, 1.332: (a 23).

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178 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1 34 B.C.

burdensome not only to Italy and the Latin allies but also to the provinces
outside Italy’. 37

There were other manifestations of this competitive expenditure.
Funeral ceremonies, always ostentatious in the leading families, might
now last three or four days and include theatrical performances, the
public distribution of meat, elaborate public banquets, and above all
increasingly expensive gladiatorial games. 38 But such expenditure was
not confined to funerals. At the start of the electoral contest for the
censorship of i 89 the favour of the populace inclined very much towards
M.’ Acilius Glabrio, ‘because he had distributed many largesses, by
which he had placed a great part of the people under obligation to
himself’. 39 Before long bribery was a cause for serious concern. In 181
legislation against bribery was carried on the proposal of the consuls,
who acted on the authority of the Senate. In 1 66 the Senate held a special
debate because elections had been marked by much bribery, and there
was further legislation in 159. At least one of the laws made bribery a
capital offence. 40

Another area into which the rivalries of political figures intruded was
that of prosecutions. The bringing of prosecutions and the presentation
of defences against them were important activities among senators in
that period. Many of the leading figures are known to have played some
part in such proceedings, though probably few of them to anything like
the same extent as M. Porcius Cato (r. 235-149; cos. igy,cens. 1 84). In the
course of his long career he was prosecuted (and acquitted) no less than
44 times, not to mention the numerous prosecutions he himself initiated
or supported. 41 It would be unreasonable to assume that such judicial
clashes were primarily or frequently political in their motivation, or that
they were normally expressions of rivalry and personal resentment more
than of genuine concern about the substance of the charges. The frag-
ments of Cato’s speeches, for example, afford several glimpses of issues
and arguments closely akin to undoubtedly genuine concerns which he
displayed elsewhere in his career; and such matters as corruption, the
abuse of magisterial power, and extortion in the provinces, all of which
gave rise to prosecutions, were serious and growing problems of the day.
Yet it is not likely that the participants maintained a rigid separation
between these concerns on the one hand and their rivalries and contests
for power on the other. It is suggestive, for example, that on at least
three, probably on four, occasions, Cato’s judicial opponent was a
Minucius Thermus; 4Z and that in 140 P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus was

37 Livy XL.44.10-1 1. 38 Astin 1967, 339: (h 67). 39 Livy xxxv11.57.10-n.

40 Livy xl. 19. 1 1; Per. xlvii; Obsequ. 12; Polyb. vi.56.4.

41 Plut. Cat. Mai. 15.4, 29.5; Pliny HN vii.ioo; Aur Viet. De Vir. III. 47.7.

42 Astin 1978, csp. 59, 109, 1 1 1 : (h 68). His opponent was not the same on each occasion, since at
least two Minucii were involved.

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OLIGARCHIC STABILITY

J 79

prosecuted by a man whom two years before he as censor had attempted
to downgrade to the lowest citi2en status. 43 Two other examples, how-
ever, are especially striking.

The first of these is the prosecution of M.’ Acilius Glabrio in 189 for
alleged mishandling of booty won from Antiochus. One of the principal
witnesses against him was Cato. At the time Cato and Glabrio were both
among the candidates for the censorship, with Glabrio, as was men-
tioned earlier, much the most favoured to win the plebeian place because
of his extensive largesses. Misappropriation of booty is certainly a matter
likely to have roused genuine indignation in Cato, whom Glabrio
evidently considered to be chiefly responsible for this attack on him; but
that there was a powerful political motive at work, as Livy assumes in his
account of the episode, seems amply confirmed by the fact that the
prosecution was abandoned as soon as Glabrio withdrew his candidature
for the censorship. Furthermore there is reason to believe that an
unsuccessful prosecution of Cato at about the same time, arising out of
his consulship several years previously, also had some connection with
the censorial elections. 44

The other striking example consists of the accusations and prosecu-
tions which in the 180s were directed against the Scipio brothers,
Africanus and L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus. 45 These events constitute a
notoriously difficult and complex episode, accounts of which conflict on
almost every point of substance and betray an underlying history of
confusion, speculation and fabrication. There is no possibility of a
reconstruction which would be beyond dispute. Nevertheless the salient
features can be identified with some plausibility. In 1 87 tribunes demand-
ed that Lucius Scipio submit accounts concerning 500 talents which had
been received from King Antiochus. Lucius apparently insisted that this
was not part of the indemnity required from Antiochus, and that it was
booty and therefore not subject to account. Africanus intervened in the
argument, dramatically tearing up the account books in front of the
senators. Another tribune then imposed a huge fine on Lucius, who was
threatened with imprisonment (probably for non-payment of a surety
pending the actual hearing of the charges to which the fine related). From
this imminent humiliation only one tribune was willing to save him by
interposing the veto. Probably at this stage an impasse had been reached
and for the time being the affair lapsed; for a year or so later Lucius gave
his magnificent victory games, the vowing of which he seems only now
to have seen fit to report! 46 In 184, however, another tribune made a

43 Cic. Ora/. 11.268; Astin 1967, 120 and 175-7: (h 67).

44 Livy xxxvn. 57. 12-58. 1; ORF* 4 , Cato frs. 66 and 21-5 5; Astin 1978, ch. 4. csp. 59-60: (h 68).

45 Principal sources: Polybxxm.14; Livy xxxvm. 50-60; Gcll.iv. 18 and vi.19. Astin 1978, ch. 4,

esp. 60-2 and bibliography there: (h 68). 46 Livy xxxix.22.8-10.

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l8o ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1 34 B.C.

new attack, evidently against Africanus himself and perhaps concerning
his private dealings with Antiochus. It seems that Scipio effectively
dispersed the assembly which was to hear the case by dramatically
withdrawing from it as soon as he had completed a highly emotional
speech in which he reminded his hearers of his great services to Rome.
But he had placed himself in a difficult position, for he had defied a
tribune and refused to answer the charges made against him. He left
Rome and settled at Liternum, where he died a year later.

There are traces of a tradition, insecure in detail but surviving in
several sources, which attributed much of the responsibility for these
attacks on the Scipios to Cato. With this in mind, attempts have been
made to interpret them as part of a long-drawn-out struggle between
major political factions, or as the surface expression of a fundamental
clash of cultural aspirations. There is little evidence to support such far-
reaching hypotheses, which to some extent are derived from misconcep-
tions, especially concerning Cato’s cultural outlook. Furthermore the
accusations made against the Scipios are not necessarily to be dismissed
as mere technical excuses for mounting political assaults. It is not
impossible that there was substance in the charges, and in the motivation
which prompted them there may have been a substantial measure of
genuine concern about impropriety in the handling of public funds. Yet a
suspicion persists that there were other, more political motives at work,
particularly in the case of an attack launched so long after the event as the
one directed at Africanus in 184. It is possible that this attack (though
scarcely the earlier one as far back as 1 87) was intended to influence the
outcome of the censorial election of 184, 47 in which Africanus’ brother
Lucius and Cato’s close associate L. Valerius Flaccus, were rival candi-
dates for the patrician place.

On the other hand political motivation need not have been wholly or
even in part the pursuit of specific political objectives. Africanus had
friends and supporters, but it is plausible to conjecture - possibly
implausible to suppose otherwise — that much resentment was engen-
dered by his successes and eminence, by his flamboyance and arrogance,
not to mention the reflection of all this in the ostentatious extravagance
which characterized the public appearances of his wife. 48 The ‘trials of
the Scipios’ were perhaps another manifestation of that spirit which
generated in the oligarchy of this period a strong sense that in the
competition for advancement, power and glory there were limits to the
degree of success which could be tolerated in any individual.

47 The timing is possible, since theattack on Africanus could have been initiated in the tribunician
year which began on io December, whereas at this time the consular year still began on 1 5 March.
4a Polyb. xxx. 26. 1-5.

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OLIGARCHIC STABILITY I 8 1

(b) Mores

In the year 1 84 the election of M. Porcius Cato and L. Valerius Flaccus to
the censorship brought into sharp relief another characteristic of the
political climate of the early second century. For much of their activity as
censors gave expression to a considerable concern with mores , that is with
standards of conduct, which in practice meant largely the conduct of
individuals in the upper strata of Roman society. This was no inno-
vation. Censors had long since acquired a recognized responsibility to
concern themselves with mores', but Cato and Valerius evidently placed a
distinctive emphasis upon this aspect of their duties. In doing so they
were acting from a concern which was not theirs alone but which has left
many other traces in the history of these years. 49

This special concern with mores reflected the tensions generated by
changing circumstances. On the one hand the two great struggles against
Carthage, especially the second of them, had placed a high premium on
long-established military virtues, on social discipline, on the authority of
the res publica, and upon the fostering of a strong sense of corporate
responsibility. On the other hand those same struggles had enlarged the
dimensions of Roman experience and initiated a process which repeat-
edly brought new opportunities for the exercise of power, for the
acquisition of wealth, and for personal indulgence in the fruits of
affluence. Roman commanders and provincial governors found them-
selves exercising virtually untrammelled authority; victories brought
booty and indemnities, sometimes on a spectacular scale; the annexation
of provinces created a regular flow of taxation and opened up new
possibilities for private investment. Not a little of the new wealth passed
directly into private hands, and much of the large portion which went to
the state quickly found its way into general circulation. Simultaneously
the same processes made wealthier Romans more aware of the possibili-
ties of different, more comfortable life-styles, and gave them access to
more varied, more exotic and more luxurious products. In such circum-
stances it was inevitable that changes in mores and social values, and
reactions to those changes, should have consequences which are visible
in several areas of public life.

One such area was the prosecution of public figures and the nature of
alleged offences. Acilius Glabrio and the Scipios, as has been seen, were
attacked on the score of improper handling of public resources. In 190
Cato accused Q. Minucius Thermus not only of claiming an unmerited
triumph but of beating allied officials, allegedly for having made inad-
equate arrangements to supply him. At about the same time Cato also

4n Astin 1978, ch. s passim: (h 68).

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l82 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1J4 B.C.

accused Thermus of having executed ten men without trial or oppor-
tunity to plead in their own defence. 50 In 171 three former governors of
the Spanish provinces were prosecuted for maladministration and extor-
tion. 51 The next year an ex-praetor, C. Lucretius Gallus, was convicted
and subjected to an enormous fine for having grossly maltreated Greek
allies during the war against King Perseus of Macedonia. 52 In 1 54 or 153
Cato accused another Minucius Thermus, alleging outrageous and de-
ceitful conduct inspired by greed; and in 149 he spoke vehemently in
support of an attempt to prosecute Ser. Sulpicius Galba, who was said to
have massacred a large number of Lusitanian captives and sold many
others into slavery. 53 Furthermore some of these cases highlighted the
inadequacy of the existing judicial machinery to cope with some of the
situations now arising. In 171 it had been necessary to create a special
temporary court, and in 149 the dispute surrounding Galba was centred
upon a proposal to set up another. Since Galba managed to prevent this it
is probably not a coincidence that 149 was also the year in which a
tribunician law, the Lex Calpurnia, established a standing court for the
trial of extortion cases. 54

The actions of censors are another area in which the concern about
mores can be seen at work. For the most part censors discharged their
responsibility in the field of mores by retrospective action against individ-
uals whose conduct they judged to have been gravely at fault in some
respect. In practice they concerned themselves mainly with senators and
equites. The normal and almost the only sanction was to remove an
individual from his order and usually also in effect to deprive him of his
vote in the comitia by enrolling him in the lowest possible category of
citizens. 55 Probably most pairs of censors took such action against
several senators and equites , and in the early decades of the second century
almost all are known to have done so. The initiative in these cases, the
grounds for action and the determination of the facts were all entirely in
the hands of the censors themselves and at their discretion. When
grounds are recorded they usually refer to particular actions rather than
categories of conduct, but known cases include instances of dereliction
of military duty, abuse of magisterial power, neglect of family cults,
perjury, and indulgence in extravagance and luxury. 56

An atmosphere of euphoria following the Hannibalic War probably
explains why the censors of 199, quite exceptionally, expelled nobody

50 Livv xxxvii. 46. 1-2; ORF 4 , Cato frs. 58-65 and 182-4; Astin 1978, 59 (esp. n. 27) and 63:
(h 68). 51 Livy xuii.2.1-12. 52 Livy xliu.8.i-io.

53 ORF 4 , Cato frs. 177—81 and 196-9; Astin 1978, 1 1 1-1 3, with further references there: (h 68).
34 Cic. brut. 106; other refs, in AfRR 1.459.

55 E.g. Ps. Ascon. 189 St.; Cic. Rep. iv.6 (‘imposes almost nothing except a blush 1 ).

56 Mommsen 1887—8, 11. 377-82: (a 25); Nowak 1909: (h 17); Schmahling 1938: (h 23).

57 Livy xxxii. 7. 3.

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OLIGARCHIC STABILITY I 8 3

from the orders. 57 Those of 194 and 1 89 effected a few expulsions but are
reported to have acted with moderation. 58 In 184, however, Cato and
Valerius sought the censorship with a declared intention of exercising
severity, ‘cutting and searing the hydra-like luxury and softness’ which
they alleged were afflicting Roman society. 59 The number of expulsions
from the Senate, though not large in an absolute sense, increased sharply,
and the same can safely be assumed to have happened to the equestrian
order. In several instances expulsion was accompanied by scorching
public denunciation. Most striking was the expulsion of a former consul,
L. Quinctius Flamininus, for an outrageous misuse of his authority while
he was in Cisalpine Gaul. His expulsion will have had all the more impact
because Flamininus was the first former curule magistrate for at least
twenty-five years, and probably for nearly a century, to suffer this
ignominy. Criticisms of an eques , L. Veturius, included neglect of a cult
and gluttony to a degree which had rendered him unfit for cavalry
service. A more direct attack on luxury and extravagance - prominent
targets of Cato in many fragments of his speeches and in anecdotes about
him - was the imposition of heavy financial penalties upon those who
possessed certain very expensive items of property: ornaments, women’s
clothing and vehicles valued at more than 1 5 ,000 asses, and slaves under
the age of twenty who had been purchased since the previous census for
10,000 asses or more. This financial penalty, linked to an adjusted census
assessment, was probably a device peculiar to these particular censors,
but in general terms their more stringent attitude seems to have prevailed
for several censorships thereafter. In 1 69/8, for example, when the censor
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus went through the streets at night on his way
home, citizens are said (no doubt with picturesque exaggeration) to have
extinguished their lights for fear that they would be thought to be
indulging themselves immoderately. 60 A generation later, P. Cornelius
Scipio Aemilianus, as censor in 1 42, looked for similar severity, though
he was thwarted by an unco-operative colleague. 61

The concern with mores , and with luxury and extravagance in particu-
lar, was by no means an idiosyncracy of Cato and Valerius and a few other
individuals. The promise to ‘cut and sear hydra-like luxury and softness’
did not impede the election of Cato and Valerius and seems rather to have
brought them large numbers of votes. And at various times in this period
both Senate and assembly actively supported sumptuary legislation. 62

w Livy xxxiv. 44. 2, xxxviii. 28. 2; Plut. \ : lam. 18.2.

59 Plut. Cat. Mai. 16.6-7. For this censorship see csp. Livy xxxix.42. 5-44.9 and 5 z. 1-2; Plut. Cat.
Mai. 17—19; OR/-' 4 , Cato fr. 69-! 27; Astin 1978, ch. 5, passim , for further references and discussion,
and appendix 6 for some alternative views: (h 68).

60 Plut. 77 . Gracch. 14.4. 61 Astin 1967, 116-21: (h 67).

62 For the sumptuary laws and for the wider issues discussed in the remainder of this section sec
esp. Astin 1978, 93—103: (h 68); Clemente 1981: (h 85). Principal sources for the laws: Macrob. Sal.
m. 17.2-6; Cell. 11.24. 1-7.

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184 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1 } 4 B.C.

As far back as 215 a lex Oppia had imposed restrictions upon the
ownership of gold by women, upon the wearing of multi-coloured
garments by them, and upon their use of animal-drawn vehicles. That
had been primarily an economic measure in response to a serious
financial situation, but such restrictions pointed the way towards the
later sumptuary legislation which was introduced to control expenditure
on ‘luxuries’ for social rather than for economic reasons. Indeed the latter
concept came to the fore when the lex Oppia itself, seen by many as an
outdated wartime measure, was repealed in 195; for there was vigorous
though unsuccessful opposition to the repeal, led by two tribunes and by
Cato, who was consul in that year. 63 The first true sumptuary law,
however, the lex Orchia, which placed restrictions on expenditure for
banquets, was enacted in 182, and it was introduced on the recommenda-
tion of the Senate. The lex Fatinia of 161, which strengthened and
elaborated the provisions of the lex Orchia, was put forward by a consul
‘with the consent of all orders’, which means that this too was recom-
mended by the Senate; indeed earlier in that same year a decree of the
Senate had required leading citizens who were to entertain each other
during the Megalesian games to take an oath before the consuls that they
would not exceed specified expenditure limits. A third law, the lex Didia
of 143, which extended sumptuary restrictions to the whole of Italy,
presumably also had substantial support at all levels.

The reasons for this concern about luxury and extravagance were no
doubt mixed. They are likely to have been more numerous and subtle
than the modern historian can hope to comprehend. There are three
reasons, however, which can be conjectured with some plausibility.
Probably there was a widespread assumption that indulgence in luxury
was liable to undermine traditional military virtues, above all physical
and mental hardiness. Then a love of luxury was almost certainly
considered to be a powerful stimulus to avarice, hence as a major
contributor to the growth of corruption and extortion. And there was
probably a deep-seated inclination to associate lavish and self-indulgent
expenditure with the wasteful dispersal of personal and family fortunes,
disapproval of which had been given expression in legal provision to
restrain prodigi since very early times. 64

All these activities concerned with mores - prosecutions, rhetorical
exhortation and denunciation, censorial actions, sumptuary legislation -
were more than tolerated by the Roman elite. They sprang almost
entirely from that elite, the very group to which they were primarily
applicable. They were essentially measures of self-regulation — measures

63 Livv xxxiv. 1-8; Zon. ix. 1 7; Val. Max. ix. 1.3; Astin 1978, 25-6: (h 68); Clemente 1981, 5—6: (h
8,) -

64 Dig. xxvil. 10. 1 pr. (Ulpian); Spit. U/p. 12.2—3; Pauli Sent. 3.43.7; Watson 1975, 78-80: (h 119).

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OLIGARCHIC STABILITY I 8 J

not merely embodying idiosyncratic attitudes of Cato and a few others,
but favoured, or at the least accepted by a considerable portion of the elite
itself.

There were contradictions and illogicalities inherent in this state of
affairs. Throughout this elite which was seeking to restrain certain types
of expenditure, the level of wealth was rising significantly; almost all its
members - Cato included - were increasing ‘non-productive’ expendi-
ture on the comforts and adornments of life; acceptable social values and
standards were changing as the context and scale of the Roman world
changed. Already the Romans of the early second century must have
looked back with a mixture of astonishment and moral uplift, as later
generations certainly did, to the story of an eminent ex-consul, P.
Cornelius Rufinus, who is alleged to have been expelled from the Senate
in 275 because he possessed ten pounds’ weight of silver table-ware; 65
whereas the Senate’s decree of 161 attempted to limit the amount to be
used at any one banquet to one hundred pounds’ weight. 66 Nevertheless
it was because changes were taking place that the self-regulatory process,
long familiar, acquired fresh impetus in the early decades of the second
century and was a significant element in the outlook of the elite in that
period. Fundamentally it was a reaction - perhaps in considerable
measure an instinctive reaction - in defence of accepted social values and
standards of conduct when new circumstances seemed to threaten their
rapid modification or even their destruction. Furthermore, whether or
not the issues were generally thought through with care and logic, these
were values and standards which had helped to mark off and distinguish
the elite in society, to sustain its sense of corporate identity and obliga-
tion, to facilitate the transmission of wealth and influence, and to
preserve stability and continuity. It is no wonder that the prospect of
swift and far-reaching change provoked response.

In the early decades of the second century the character of Roman
political life does not appear to have been determined to any substantial
degree by conflict (or the potential for conflict) arising from the great
economic and social disparities which existed in Roman society. There
are a few particular measures which might be construed as showing that
from time to time those in power were conscious of the need to remove
some immediate sources of discontent as they arose. Thus in 193 a serious
problem of debt arose in consequence of very high rates of interest made

65 Numerous refs, collected in MR R 1.196.

66 Gell 11.24. 2. On senatorial wealth and expenditure see Shatzman 1975, esp. chs. 2, 4 and 5:

(H is)-

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I 8 6 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLTTrCS, 200-134 B.C.

possible by evasion of the laws governing usury. The Senate and
magistrates responded with new regulations, followed by new legisla-
tion, and in 192 by the imposition of heavy fines on some usurers. 67 In
188 fines were inflicted on dealers in grain who had been holding back
supplies, presumably in an attempt to force up the retail price. 68 Whether
the heavy fines similarly imposed on ‘herdsmen’ in 196 and 193 had much
bearing on the interests of the poorer sections of the population is
doubtful; these were rich men, operating on a large scale, whose princi-
pal offence may have been to defraud the state. 69

The one episode which does have something of an appearance of social
conflict is the so-called ‘Bacchanalian conspiracy’. In 186 the Senate,
through the consuls, rigorously suppressed, with many executions, an
apparently widespread and organized Bacchic cult. This cult, which had
flourished for a number of years, practised secret nocturnal rites which
were alleged to have degenerated into sexual depravity and ritual mur-
der, and to have become the setting for a variety of other crimes. In
pursuit of its complete suppression the Roman authorities took further
action in 184 and 1 8 r . Probably the participation of many thousands of
men and women in this cult did in some way reflect social frustrations -
though the participants were by no means drawn exclusively from the
poor. Also the cult was indeed an organization which operated indepen-
dently of the normal framework of social and legal constraints. Never-
theless there is no indication that it had political objectives, pursued
social or economic change, or set itself to supplant the established
authorities. 70

It is not difficult to identify reasons why social and economic dispari-
ties were not major political factors in these years. To start with,
although the investment of new wealth in Italian agriculture had already
begun, the processes which it set in train, and which were ultimately to
make land reform the centre of a political explosion, were not yet having
a severe effect upon large numbers of the peasants who farmed on a small
scale. They were not yet causing the disruption and dispossession which
were to have far-reaching consequences in the last third of the century.
On the contrary, though the wealthy were enlarging their holdings and
in many cases working them primarily with slave labour, at this stage
they were not so much supplanting their poorer neighbours as filling a

67 Livy xxxv. 7. 2—5, 41. 9-10. On the nature of the problem and the possible relevance of a
proposed lex lunia see Astin 1978, 54-5 and 319—23: (h 68).

68 Livy xxxviii. 3 5.5-6. 69 Livy xxxm.4— 2. 10, xxxv. 10. 1 1-1 2.

70 It is sometimes assumed a priori that an episode of this kind must have been fundamentally
economic or political, and therefore such an explanation is superimposed, though the evidence itself
does not demand it. Principal sources: Livy xxxix. 18-19; ILLRP 511= ILS 18. See Scullard 1973,
147: (h 54); Tarditi 1954: (h 58); Toynbee 1965, 387—400 (a 37); Cova 1974: (h 37). See also p. 227 of
this volume.

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OLIGARCHIC STABILITY I 8 7

vacuum. The enormous population losses and the general disruption of
the Second Punic War left them considerable opportunities to expand
their activities without creating immediate widespread pressure on the
peasants. Further opportunities for rich and poor alike had been brought
about by the great increase in Roman public land, ager publicus, following
confiscations from rebellious Italian allies in the south and newly con-
quered peoples in the north. Any Roman citizen was permitted to farm or
pasture animals on public land, up to prescribed limits and subject to a
small rental, though presumably those with substantial resources were
best placed to take advantage of this. Also, considerable tracts of public
land were distributed to the citizens of the new colonies and other
settlements which Rome established in these years. These settlements
could themselves be the means of relief to any who were distressed or
dispossessed, but it is unlikely that the provision of relief was a major
motive for their creation or that the need for such relief was especially
marked at this time. In fact it seems to have been difficult to find
sufficient settlers for the colonial ventures of the first quarter of the
century. 71

A second major factor which was masking the potential social tension
was the great inflow of new wealth, which, though primarily concen-
trated in relatively few hands, was filtering through society and creating
new opportunities for the poorer sections. 72 It was not all invested in the
acquisition and development of agricultural enterprises. Much was spent
on goods and services and on buildings, in the towns and in Rome itself.
It was expended - and thus put into circulation - by private individuals
enlarging their dwellings and enhancing their mode of life, by successful
generals distributing donatives and celebrating their victories with
games and dedicatory temples, and by the state itself as it maintained and
equipped its armies, purchased a multitude of services from contractors,
and undertook extensive public works. The censors of 184 - Cato and
Valerius — incurred enormous expense, probably 6,000,000 denarii, on the
renovation of the sewer system, and in addition they are known to have
constructed a new road, a mole or causeway, two business buildings and
a basilica. 73 Their activity seems to have initiated a period in which
censors continued to contract for public works on a very large scale: the
censors of 179 had at their disposal for this purpose funds equal to the
entire vectigalia received by the state in one year, and those of 169 had half
the vectigalia of a year despite the cost of the Macedonian war then being

71 Astin 1978, 240-2, and refs, and bibliography there: (h 68).

72 ESAR i, chs. 3 and 4, for a useful collection of data. For an assessment of the archaeological
evidence see Ch. 1 3 of this volume.

73 Livy xxxtx.44.5-7; Dion. Hal. in. 67. 5 (= Acilius fr. 6); Plut. Cat. Mai. 19.3, Cat. Min. 5.1; Aur.
Viet. De Vir. III. 47.5; Ps. Ascon. 201 St.

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I 8 8 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200— 1 }4 B.C.

fought. 74 The consequences of expenditure on this scale cannot have
failed to be far-reaching: in the direct demand for labour and supplies and
the indirect requirements of a whole range of support provision - food
(itself requiring transportation, harbour and warehouse facilities, and
marketing), shelter, clothing, shoes, tools. Not surprisingly, there are
signs that the population of Rome in particular was expanding. It is
significant both that Latins and Italians moved to Rome in substantial
numbers and that this extra population could be accepted without major
difficulty - for when the authorities were induced to require them to
leave the initiative and urging came not from within Rome itself but
from the parent communities whose populations were declining. 75

Nevertheless the vastness of economic and social disparity was poten-
tially a powerful political factor which could emerge to interlock with
others and become one of the important elements in the shaping of
political struggles - as did happen before the second century was out.
The factors which concealed this growing potential in the earlier part of
the second century were palliatives, not preventatives. The expenditure
on goods, services and construction could not always be increasing. By
its very nature it was liable to fluctuations, both short- and long-term,
and it had encou raged a considerable and not easily reversible concentra-
tion of poorer citizens in the urban setting of Rome itself. Investment in
agriculture - the most secure and most socially regarded form of
investment 76 - with expansion of holdings, an increasing use of slave
labour and direct management, and the enclosure, often illegal, of much
public land, could not long continue without engendering serious
problems for many of the free peasantry who farmed on a modest scale.
The problems were exacerbated by the recurring levies for the consider-
able and predominantly conscript armies which the state now normally
had in being and which often took men away from family farms for long
periods. Furthermore the opportunity to move to new settlements
disappeared when colonial foundations ceased in the 1 70s. That probably
happened because the colonies had been conceived primarily in terms of
military needs which by then seemed to have been met, while the
demands for agrarian resettlement had not yet developed very markedly.
By the time such demands became acute most public land which was
suitable for settlement had been taken into use in other ways.

IV. FORCES FOR CHANGE

It has been seen that in the years following the Second Punic War the
Roman political scene was characterized by an apparent stability. The

74 Livy XL.46. 16; xliv. 16.9. 75 Livy xxxix.3.4-6, xu. 8.6-1 2, 9,9-10.

76 Astin 1978, ch. 1 1 , esp. 250-61: (h 68).

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predominantly oligarchic pattern of government, though not so exclu-
sive as to prevent the rise of new political figures, did not seem threat-
ened by the theoretically powerful popular elements in the constitutional
structure. To some extent, especially in elections, it was necessary to
court the favour of those citizens who played a part in the popular
institutions; but their independence was considerably restricted, and the
oligarchic structure was correspondingly sustained, by a variety of
constitutional and social devices. From time to time there were domestic
problems which required administrative action or new legislation, but
these seem to have been perceived as isolated episodes and not to have
persisted or coalesced into a long-term issue. At this stage the inflow of
wealth, though it bore within it the seeds of disruption, helped to
obscure the potential importance of economic and social tensions as
political factors. The political attention of senators was engaged princi-
pally with foreign and military affairs, and with their own ambitious and
mutual competition for honour and office, for distinction and esteem,
conducted within a framework of conventions and rules which was
actually reinforced by the legislation of the early second century.

This seeming stability, however, was closely associated with factors
which were not constants - with factors which, if not exactly ephemeral,
were by their nature liable to change. That is the case, for instance, with
the complex diplomatic and strategic questions which were prominent in
the earlier decades of the second century. The phase in which these were a
major preoccupation of political life did not last beyond, at the latest, the
subjugation of Achaea and the destruction of Carthage in 146, perhaps
not really beyond the end of the Third Macedonian War in 1 68. Of course
military problems and occasional crises continued to occur — as in Spain
between 153 and 133, and later in the Jugurthine, Cimbrian and
Mithridatic Wars. The age of conquest was not yet ended and there were
still decisions for the Senate to take in this field. But fundamentally all
this took place in a world which Rome now dominated, in which she was
no longer treating with Hellenistic powers or engaging in the complex-
ities of diplomacy and of strategic interest. The very magnitude of
Roman success had diminished the role of such matters among the
preoccupations of political life.

There were changes also in the manner in which men pursued the
competition for advancement and distinction. Two trends can be dis-
cerned. One was a growing tendency to take greater advantage of the
popular elements in the constitution by means of self-projection and
direct appeal to the electorate at large. The other was an increasing
readiness to find technical means of circumventing conventional or legal
obstacles, or actually to override them. No doubt this was always done
,on the ground of expediency in the immediate public interest, though it

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I9O ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1 34 B.C.

can usually be seen to coincide with the ambitions of some eminent
senator.

In practice these two tendencies often went together, and neither was
wholly novel. Scipio Africanus, when he was sent to Spain in 210, and
Titus Flamininus, when he was elected consul for 198, both overrode
convention, the former certainly, and the latter probably, less by means
of social manipulation than by personal appeal to the electorate. In 184
Q. Fulvius Flaccus stirred up great controversy by seeking election to a
vacant praetorship while he was in office as curule aedile; and the Senate
judged his prospects of success so good that it decided to leave the
praetorship unfilled rather than risk such a questionable appointment. 77
Finally, the legislation of the 190s and 180s which sought to control by
law the sequence of offices and speed of careers itself reflects an aware-
ness that contrary tendencies, illustrated by the cases of Scipio,
Flamininus and Fulvius, were at work in the contemporary political
scene.

Attempts to circumvent or set aside constitutional impediments are a
consequence only to be expected from the increasing elaboration of
artificial restrictions upon career patterns. In a social environment which
placed a high premium on the competitive pursuit of public office, and in
which this was the route not only to a sense of achievement and success
but to power, status, and the military glory which Roman society
esteemed so highly, it is no surprise that from time to time men of
ambition sought to override seemingly unnecessary formal impediments
which slowed their advance or denied them attractive opportunities. Nor
is it surprising that there was sometimes impatience with restrictions
which prevented the election of an apparently excellent candidate be-
cause he did not meet some formal condition. It was understandable that
in the face of a serious military situation the voters might wish to elect to
the consulship someone with an outstanding military reputation despite
the fact that he was below the minimum age, or had not been praetor, or
alternatively had held a previous consulship within the last ten years —
not to mention the total exclusion, from c. 15 1, of anyone who had had
previous experience in the consulship. It is perhaps more remarkable that
such rules were sustained for decades than that ultimately they were set
aside in a number of instances; but when they did begin to be overridden,
precedents were set and the inhibitions which reinforced rules and
conventions were gradually eroded.

Two early instances of this development were the second consulships
of C. Marcius Figulus and P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum. These
men entered on the consulship of 1 62 but were obliged to resign when it

77 Livy xxxix. 3 9 . 1 - 1 5 .

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FORCES FOR CHANGE

191

was announced that there had been a fault in religious procedure at the
election. Magistrates who resigned because they had been declared vitio
creati were nevertheless deemed to have held the office in question, so
these men do appear in the consular lists under this year, and when they
appear again later they are each designated ‘consul for the second time’.
They should therefore have been subject to the rule which prohibited
tenure of a second consulship less than ten years after the first. Yet
Marcius was re-elected consul for 156, Nasica for 155. Plainly Marcius
had successfully advanced technical arguments to the effect that his
aborted consulship in 162 did not count, and thereby he became the first
exception to the ten-year rule in more than half a century, to be followed
immediately by Nasica. 78

Three years later there was another instance. In response to news of a
serious military situation in Spain, M. Claudius Marcellus, who had held
his second consulship as Nasica’s colleague as recently as 1 5 5 , was elected
consul for 1 52. Since Marcellus was one of the foremost generals of this
period and was now sent to take command in Spain, it is evident that he
won his third consulship so soon after his second because the intention of
the law was subordinated to expediency. 79

Five more years brought an even more striking instance. P. Cornelius
Scipio Aemilianus was a son of L. Aemilius Paullus, who had conquered
Macedonia in 168, and by adoption was a grandson of Scipio Africanus.
Ambitious to prove himself worthy of such a distinguished inheritance,
he had already won for himself a considerable reputation of military skill
and daring, first in Spain, then in Africa, where the Third Punic War had
begun in 149. But the Punic War had not brought the quick and easy
victory which had been expected. At the end of 148 there was still little
visible progress, and there were even some reports of Roman reverses. In
reaction the comitia centuriata elected Scipio to be one of the consuls for
147; subsequently a tribune intervened to ensure that he received the
command in Africa. But Scipio had not been praetor (in fact he had
returned to Rome at that time to stand for the aedileship) and he was
several years below the minimum age for the consulship. Moreover his
election was strongly opposed both by the presiding consul and by the
Senate; not until there was a threat by a tribune to use his veto to block
the consular elections altogether if Scipio’s name was not accepted did
the Senate assent to the temporary repeal of the legal obstacle. 80 Nor was

7 * AfRR i.442; Astin 1967, 56, n. 2, 58-9: (h 67).

79 Astin 1967, 57-40: (h 67). It is generally agreed that the total prohibition of second and
subsequent consulships was a reaction to this episode. A proposal to this effect was supported by
Cato, who died in 149: ORF 4 , Cato frs. 185 and 186.

80 Most detailed of the many sources: App. L/b. 1 iz. The election: Astin 1967, ch. 6: (h 67). The
military events: Ch. 5 of this volume.

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I92 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1 34 B.C.

this all. Thirteen years later rules were again set aside for Scipio, who in
the meantime had destroyed Carthage, assumed his adoptive grand-
father’s cognomen, Africanus, and in 142 been censor. In 134 he again
entered upon a consulship for which he was not eligible — this time
because since the election of Marcellus for 1 5 2 all second consulships had
been prohibited by law. Again he was elected by supposedly popular
choice to take charge of a war protracted beyond expectations, in this
case the seemingly endless struggle against Numantia in Spain (which he
captured in 1 3 3); and again he was probably elected against the wishes of
a majority of his fellow-senators, whose attitude may be inferred from
the fact that they denied him cash and conscript reinforcements for his
campaign. 81

Thus in achieving his consulships Scipio not only overrode legal
obstacles but defied the Senate, certainly on the first occasion and
probably on both. Moreover in 1 34 when that body denied him money
and permission to levy reinforcements he responded by recruiting clients
and volunteers, by drawing upon the private fortunes of himself and his
friends, and by obtaining assistance from Hellenistic monarchs. Nor was
he the only eminent senator successfully to defy the Senate and thereby
impair its authority. In 143 Appius Claudius Pulcher celebrated a tri-
umph which the Senate had refused him. When there was a threat of
physical intervention to enforce a tribunician veto against the proceed-
ings, he thwarted it by having with him in his triumphal chariot a
daughter who was a Vestal Virgin, so contriving that the tribune could
not touch him without doing violence to her sacred person . 82

Equally significant is Scipio’s evident ability to ride to success on a
wave of popularenthusiasm- which no doubt he did much to encourage.
In theory this tactic was always open to candidates, for in principle every
citizen had the right to vote as he thought fit; and probably an effort to
appeal directly to the judgement and emotions of voters at large was
made in most contests. In practice, however, its significance was usually
restricted by a combination of structural, procedural and social factors.
Presumably the degree to which it was restricted varied from election to
election, but only occasionally did such direct appeal become the over-
whelmingly decisive feature. More than most, Scipio Aemilianus seems
to have had considerable success in exploiting this possibility afforded by
the constitutional structure. When he was canvassing for the censorship
of 142 he was criticized by his principal rival, Appius Claudius, because
he was being escorted by ‘men who frequented the Forum and were able
to gather a crowd and to force all issues by shouting and inciting
passions ’. 83

81 Livy, Per. lvt; App. I her. 84; Astin 1967, 135 n. 5 and 182-4: (h 67).

82 Cic. Cael. 34; VaL Max. v.4.6; Suet. Tib. 2.4 ; cf. Oros. v.4.7; Dio fr. 74.2.

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FORCES FOR CHANGE I93

There are other indications in this same period of a growing sense that
those in the assemblies could be won over and that social pressures could
be outweighed by personal appeal and emotive incitement; and that this
could be a potent means to political achievement. The process could be
assisted by shielding the act of voting from social supervision. In 139 a
lex Cabinia introduced the written ballot in place of open voting in
elections; 84 two years later a lex Cassia , powerfully supported and per-
haps instigated by Scipio Aemilianus, made the same provision for all
popular trials except where the charge was treason ( perduellio ). 85 Earlier,
in 145, a tribune named C. Licinius Crassus had failed to carry a proposal
that vacancies in the priestly colleges should be filled by popular election
instead of co-option. Yet the principal speaker for the opposition, C.
Laelius, is himself known to have used arguments calculated to appeal to
the independent judgement and the religious emotions of the voters,
while Crassus symbolized the ‘popular’ nature of his proposal by turning
around on the rostra to address the mass of the people, instead of
conventionally facing the more restricted space of the comitium . 86

Alongside and increasingly interacting with the changing practice and
attitudes of competitive politics were social and economic problems. By
the middle years of the second century these were developing to a degree
which made them potentially influential factors in the shaping of political
contests. In the city itself, for example, a special arrangement in 144 to
repair the existing aqueducts and construct a new one undoubtedly put
vast additional funds into circulation, but it was also a reflection of the
growing problems of the large urban population. 87 A harbinger of
trouble to come was the serious difficulty with the grain supply in 138.
This gave rise to agitation by a tribune, C. Curiatius, and to a popular
outcry against the consul Scipio Nasica (son of the consul of 1 62 and 155)
when he rejected a plan under which the state would have purchased
grain through special legati . 88

Probably most tribunes, whatever their real motives may have been,
had always claimed to be carrying out their historic function, ‘to perform
the will of the plebs and especially to seek after their wishes’; but it is
symptomatic of growing problems that from the 150s onwards more
incidents are recorded in which this took on substance. 89 Attention has
been drawn already to the actions of C. Licinius Crassus in 145, to the
ballot laws, and to the dispute about grain in 1 38. The latter year saw also

83 Plut. Atm. 38.2-6, Prate. Reip. Ger. 14.

84 Cic. Leg. 111.35, Amic. 41; Livy, Ox. Spit. liv.

85 Esp. Cic. Brut. 97, 106, Sest. 103. Astin 1967, 130-1: (h 67).

86 Cic. Amic . 96; ORF 4 , Laelius frs. 12—16; cf. Varro, De Re Rust. 1.2.9. Plut. C- Gracch. 3.4-5
attributes the innovation to Gaius Gracchus. Astin 1967, 101-2, esp. 101 n. 2: (h 67).

87 Frontin. De Aquis 1.7 ; Astin 1967, 108-10: (h 67).

88 Val. Max. hi. 7. 3. 89 Polyb. vi.16.5. Taylor 1962: (h 59).

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194 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 2 OO-I 34 B.C.

a massive demonstration at the funeral of a popular tribune, conceivably
Curiatius himself; 90 and tribunes, including Curiatius, were prominent in
the disputes now arising in connection with the military levy.

Rome’s recruiting problems in the middle decades of the second
century sprang from a mixture of causes which even at the time were
probably not easy to analyse and evaluate. 91 They included the fluctuat-
ing but often considerable number of men required, the arduous and
relatively unprofitable nature of some of the campaigns, and the long
periods of service demanded of many soldiers, which added to the
dislocations increasingly being caused by the accelerating investment of
wealth in agriculture. While some Romans perceived the problem as a
shortage of manpower, it is likely that this was not the case in an absolute
sense. More probably the difficulties sprang rather from the inadequacies
and obsolescence both of the recruiting system and of the terms of
service in relation to the conditions which now prevailed. The net effect,
however, was that, except when the prospect of an easy campaign with
much booty attracted volunteers, the pressures increased upon those
who were subject to the compulsory levy. As a result, manifestations of
resistance from time to time developed into overt political clashes.

Occasional minor episodes earlier in the century probably reflect little
more than the ordinary problems and resentments incidental to any
system of enforced recruiting, though in 169 difficulties related to the
heavy demands of the Third Macedonian War gave rise to mutual
recriminations among the magistrates and to exceptional action by the
censors of that year. 92 From 15 1 onward, however, there are symptoms
of a more acute malaise. Fragmentary evidence for that year records an
initial reluctance to serve which amounted almost to a boycott of the
levy; there was tribunician intervention, which the consuls must have
defied since the tribunes went so far as to imprison them; and for the first
time the drawing of lots was introduced into the procedure of the levy. 93
Six years after this sensational episode the Senate forbade Scipio
Aemilianus’ brother, Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, to recruit for his
army in Spain anyone who had served in the recent wars in Africa,
Macedonia and Greece. 94 In 140 the Senate, at the prompting of Appius
Claudius Pulcher, decreed that there should not be more than one levy in
the year. 95 In 138 deserters from Spain were publicly scourged on the
orders of the consuls, perhaps in connection with fresh disputes about
recruiting. Curiatius and another tribune, S. Licinius, demanded that

90 Livy, Ox. Bpit. lv.

91 Astin 1967, 162-4 and 167-72: (h 67); Brunt 1971, chs, 22-5: (h 82). Rich 1983: (h 53) denies
both that there was a real problem and that contemporary Romans believed that there was one.

92 Livy xLin.14.2— 10.

93 Polyb, xxxv. 4; Livy, Per. xlvih; App. Jber. 49; Oros. iv.21.1; cf. Val. Max. 111.2.6.

94 App. Iber. 65. 95 Livy, Ox. Bpit. liv.

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FORCES FOR CHANGE I95

each tribune should have the right to exempt ten persons from the levy,
and the consequent escalating conflict led once again to the brief impris-
onment of consuls. 96 Finally, in 134 the stated ground for the Senate’s
refusal to allow Scipio Aemilianus to take any but volunteers to Spain
was that otherwise Italy would have been stripped of men. 97

Thus the difficulty experienced in military recruiting was not merely a
technical or an administrative issue but was something which impinged
upon political life. Some perhaps saw in it an excuse for obstructing
political opponents. The growing pressure of an increasingly unpopular
levy produced resentment and attempts to defy consuls and Senate; it led
consuls to try to ignore the veto of tribunes, and to a diminution of the
prestige of their office by the consequent symbolic imprisonment; and it
eroded the authority of Senate and consuls by forcing them, in one major
instance and probably in two, to accept compromise.

Lastly, there were the consequences of the considerable investment in
land and agriculture: on the one hand extension and consolidation of
powerful vested interests, on the other changes in modes of operation
and in the patterns of rural life which brought disruption, dislocation and
distress to substantial numbers of humbler citizens . 98 Herein were a
conflict of interests and a source of social discontent such as could
scarcely fail to become potent political factors - especially in the context
of constitutional arrangements which made elections and legislation
subject to the popular vote, however successfully that may have been
contained and guided in earlier decades. This development, which was to
lie at the heart of a political cataclysm in 133, is amply attested in general
terms but manifested itself in only one particular political event prior to
that year. That event was the unsuccessful attempt by C. Laelius,
probably when he was consul in 140, to effect some kind of land reform,
details of which are not recorded. Even then it is not certain that the full
measure of the problem had yet been grasped, for the one source which
mentions Laelius’ proposal assumes that his motive was a concern about
the decline in manpower available for military service. No hint survives
that his aim was to relieve distress or pre-empt an outburst of discontent,
though the silence may be accidental. 99 A further dimension to the
changing situation was brought forcefully to attention in 136 by a slave
rebellion in Sicily so serious that it took several years to quell, and then
only after consular armies had been deployed against it. Yet the scale and
initial success of the rebellion suggests that there had been little aware-

96 Livy, Per. lv; Ox. Epit. lv; Cic. L eg. in. 20; Frontin. Strat. iv.1.20. 97 App. Iber. 84.

96 See further Ch. 7; also Astin 1967, i6i-5:(h 67 )\id. 1978, 240-2: (h 68);Toynbee 1965, n,csp.
chs. 6-8 (a 57); Brunt 1971, chs. 17 and 20: (h 82).

99 Plut. TV. Graccb. 8.4-5; Astin 1967, 307-10: (h 67). A slightly earlier date is possible but less
likely than 140.

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196 ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 200-1 34 B.C.

ness even of the dangers of the accumulation of numerous resentful and
poorly supervised slaves. 100 The agricultural changes of the second
century were not an event but a process spread over a substantial period
oftime. It is more than likely that an understanding of these changes in all
their aspects came slowly and developed unevenly. Just a few years
before the epoch-making events of 1 33 there may still have been only a
few who realized the full implications and appreciated their political
significance. But whether or not it was widely understood, there was
here an emergent political factor of major proportions and far-reaching
implications.

v. CONCLUSION

Superficially the political scene just before 133 closely resembled that of
the early second century. The constitutional structure was almost un-
changed: in form and standing the senatorial and equestrian classes were
much as they had been; the governmental system had its popular
elements but remained predominantly oligarchic in practice; while ‘new
men’ made their way into the Senate and a few even to the highest offices,
many of the leading men were from families which were prominent early
in the century. Yet this continuity also embraced deep and significant
changes. As a focus of attention the interplay of Mediterranean powers
had faded, to be superseded by the comfortable exploitation and easy
extension of empire. The new opportunities, new pressures, new tempta-
tions, new wealth, to which those who dominated the governance of that
empire were already exposed in the early decades, had proliferated
steadily. Ambition, rivalry and expedience, lubricated by wealth, were
combining to erode some of the inhibitions and conventions which
restrained political conduct, including some of the rules introduced early
in the century precisely to combat such tendencies. Even the authority of
the Senate and the consuls was subjected to challenges which were
damaging to the esteem in which they were held. Underlying all this were
the military commitments of empire, the inflow of wealth, and the
increased investment in land and agriculture. For these induced social
and economic changes of a kind which could not fail in time to exert a
major influence upon the debates and contests of political life, and which
in some respects had already begun to do so by the middle years of the
century.

ioo Principal source: Diod. Sic. xxxiv/xxxv.2 = Poseid. fr. 108 I : GrH. For further refs, and
consideration of the date see Astin 1967, 133-4: (h 67).

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CHAPTER 7

ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND
CENTURY B.C.

E. GABBA

I. THE EXTENSION OF THE AGER PUBLICUS

The end of hostilities in the Hannibalic War was accompanied by a series
of severe punitive measures against the allied communities which had
defected to Hannibal. In 21 i/io b.c. punishment had already been meted
out to Capua: 1 the aristocratic ruling class had been practically
annihilated, the city had lost every trace of autonomy and even its
citizenship, all public and private real property had been confiscated and
the entire ager Campanus, with the sole exception of lands belonging to
those who had remained loyal to Rome, thus became ‘public land of the
Roman people’, ager publicus populi romani. It had also been decided to
deport the entire population; this decision does not seem to have been
carried out, although some measures to limit the right of abode must
have been taken. 2

The turn of Tarentum had come in 208; the city had been sacked at the
time of its capture, but as a whole it was punished only by the
confiscation of part of its territory. The treaty that bound the Tarentines
to Rome may have been made rather more onerous. 3

The confiscation of territory also represented the main punitive
measure against all the other allied communities which had forsaken
Rome. In 203 the dictator Sulpicius Galba with his magister equitum M.
Servilius Pulex spent part of his magistracy conducting investigations in
the various Italian cities that had rebelled. 4 The enquiries were presum-
ably followed by decrees of confiscation and by amendment of the
individual foedera, the treaties with the cities. It is not easy to determine
the extent of the territories that became Roman ager publicus. The ager
Campanus must have been the only territory to become Roman ager
publicus in its entirety, complete with buildings, although it is thought by
some that Telesia also had all of its territory confiscated. Evidence
relating to earlier periods suggests that the amount of land lost by

1 Livy xxvi. 14-16, 33-4; De Sanctis 1907-64, ni.ii. 303-4: (a 14). 2 Livy xxvni.46.6.

3 Livyxxvit.2 1 .8, 25.i-2,xxxv.i6.3,xliv.8.6; Plin. HNin.99; Veil. Pat. 1.1 5.4; Dc Sanctis 1907-
64, iH.ii.437: (a 14); Beloch 1926, 588: (a 7). 4 Livy xxx.24.4.

! 97

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198 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

rebellious allied communities was probably proportionate to their
responsibility for the rebellion and their participation in the war against
Rome (one-quarter, one-third, half, two-thirds). According to the calcu-
lations of Beloch, 5 which are widely accepted, the lands now confiscated
may have amounted to as much as 10,000 km 2 , although other historians
put the figure at about 7,500 km 2 . In any case, the increase in Roman ager
publicus must have been very large throughout southern Italy, even
though it may be difficult to quantify and to locate; 6 some cautious
conclusions in this regard may be drawn from the geographic location of
the extensive post-Hannibalic colonization of the south and also from the
geographic data concerning the assignments which resulted from the
land law of Tiberius Gracchus in 1 3 3 b.c., although it is naturally very
difficult to determine whether the ager publicus recovered and assigned
under the Gracchan law was being worked at that time by Romans or by
allies.

It is not easy to state with certainty what significance the confiscation
of such vast and widely dispersed lands had in concrete terms. At the
political and constitutional level this tremendous increase in territory
had very serious consequences for the Roman state. The need to punish
obliged it to resume the policy of territorial expansion that had been
consciously terminated in the middle of the third century b.c. in order
not to jeopardize the political structure of the city state. It was for this
reason that the Senate had unsuccessfully opposed the assignment of land
in the ager Gallicus and ager Picenus. This was followed by unavoidable
expansion in Cisalpine Gaul.

On the practical level, even the implementation of the decrees of
confiscation was problematic. The Roman state certainly did not have
the resources to verify, measure and mark boundaries in dozens of areas,
so that in many cases accurate surveys were probably never carried out to
determine the area of land confiscated. This situation of confusion and
uncertainty goes a long way towards explaining the serious difficulties in
distinguishing between public and private land later encountered by the
Gracchan agrarian commission set up to recover ager publicus. It is
therefore plausible to suppose that a large proportion of the lands
expropriated as a result of the Hannibalic War were not seriously
examined with a view to planning their use until the Gracchan era,
simply because of the practical and technical inability of the Roman
government to occupy them; this would also explain the vast scale of
uncontrolled private occupation that had developed in the meanwhile.

The likelihood that the expropriated agricultural areas were scarcely

5 Bcloch 1880, 62fT., 73: (h 125); Frederiksen 1981, 267: (h 89).

6 Toynbee 1965, 11. 117-21: (a 37); Brunt 1971, 278—81: (h 82).

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THE EXTENSION OF THE ACER PUBLrCUS 199

or never surveyed makes it probable that in many cases these lands
remained in the hands of their previous owners, although on a different
legal basis, and that the original owners were able to re-occupy them de
facto or even de iure. The further they were from Rome, the looser was the
control. The situation in the rich and easily accessible ager Campanus was
far from clear a few years after its confiscation. Quaestorian sales had
occurred in 210 and again in 205; by the later year it was already necessary
to attempt to define the boundaries of the public part of the land by
offering a large reward to anyone proving that it belonged to the state. 7
Illegal occupation by private individuals (whoever they may have been)
is again recorded in 173, when the consul L. Postumius was given powers
to recover land; in 172 it was decided that the censors would grant leases
on land recovered by the state. 8 In 165 the praetor P. Cornelius Lentulus
prepared a bronze map of the state lands following a further exercise in
land recovery and complex surveying and administrative operations. 9

Elsewhere the situation seems to have remained completely
unresolved, except in areas where there is evidence for the founding of
colonies or for land assignations. The lack of accurate information does
not necessarily indicate negligence on the part of the Roman govern-
ment, even though we happen to learn that in 186 b.c. the colonies of
Sipontum and Buxentum had been abandoned, only a few years after
their foundation: 10 in many cases the government deliberately took no
action. In several instances it may be assumed that after having confis-
cated part of an allied community’s land as a punishment, the Roman
government granted the use of this ager publicus to the community under
the treaty concluded with it and, of course, collected the corresponding
rent. 11 (This arrangement probably lies behind the subsequent violation
of the allies’ ‘rights and treaties’, iura ac foedera , by the Gracchan agrarian
law.) 12 The possession of Roman ager publicus would in general have been
granted mainly to Latins. 13 Further, some communities allied to Rome
would have received allotments of ager publicus in Cisalpine Gaul. 14 It
should also be borne in mind that it was not in Rome’s ultimate interest
for her punitive measures to have too profound an effect on the existing
economic and social order within the allied communities or, above all,
for the upper classes among the allies to lose their dominant political
position. The limited use of Roman ager publicus in Etruria and Umbria
for colonization and land grants (despite its extent) can probably be
explained in terms of Rome’s conscious desire, of which there is also

7 Livy xxvii. 3.1, xxviii. 46.4- 5. Tibilctti 1953,231 n. 1 (h 117); Frcdcriksen 1981, 275-6 (h 89).

8 Livy xlh.i.6, 9.7, XLiu.19.1-2. 9 Gran. Lie. 9-10 Flcmisch; Cic. / *g. Agr. 11.82.

10 Livy xxxix. 23. 3-4; Tibiletti 1955, 249 n. 3: (h 1 1 7)

11 Tibiletti 1955, 259 n. 2: (h 117). 12 Cic. Rep. ill. 41, 1.3 1 .

11 Badian 1971, 397#.: (h 124). 14 Galsterer 1976, 168 and n. 36: (h 132).

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200 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

evidence elsewhere, not to jeopardize the distinctive traditional structure
of land-holding and society in these regions . 15

These observations are clearly general and hence imprecise and should
be verified as far as possible against the many different situations
prevailing in the various regions of Italy. However, if nothing else, they
serve to refute the doubtful and poorly documented theory that vast
tracts of land were distributed to Roman citizens throughout the areas
acquired in Italy after the Hannibalic War, thus leading to discontent
among the allies . 16

It is of course difficult to give a universally valid answer to the
question of which lands were actually confiscated by Rome. In general it
might have been expected that confiscation imposed on the rebel allied
communities would have specifically indicated the lands expropriated,
rather than defined them simply as a proportion of the entire territory of
the community which was being punished; but it was probably the latter
practice which was followed. The question of which land was confis-
cated is a serious one, as the answer to it would throw light on the true
impact of the confiscations on the agricultural systems of Italy in the
second century b.c. and hence on its economic, social and political
structure, though to this question also there can be no universally
applicable answer, as we shall see below.

It is generally thought that Rome confiscated the best arable land and
that this was usually turned into pasture, thus contributing to the
destruction of small and medium-sized farms . 17 There is undoubted
evidence that this change of use did occur in certain specific areas, but it
cannot be considered the norm, as the conditions and methods of
farming in second-century Italy were extremely varied. Such a theory
assumes that transhumant animal husbandry was adopted everywhere —
and indeed it was certainly adopted more widely after the Hannibalic
War. It would, on the theory under discussion, have been introduced in
those fertile lowlands where small farms had previously been common
and would thus have made possible the exploitation of the upland
pastures of Italy. It is certainly true that the argument in favour of arable
farming as opposed to stock-rearing had become a political issue as early
as the Gracchan era, as seems to be illustrated by the tone of the
pronouncements of Tiberius Gracchus against the use of slave labour
and by the proud claim of the author of the Polla inscription, who vaunts
himself on having turned pasture back into arable land . 18 The idea that
this should be done must have had wide support among the rural plebs;
but it is inconceivable that Gracchus allocated or intended to allocate

15 Harris 1971, 147: (h 136). 16 Nagle 1973, 367-78: (h 146).

17 Toynbee 1965, 11.286-95, 570-5: (a 37). 18 Inscr . lta/iae iu.iii.i, no. 272.

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THE EXTENSION OF THE ACER PUBLICUS

201

pasture land or uncultivated land among his assignees; he wished to
distribute cultivated and cultivable land, in other words good land. 19
Thus confiscated land in some areas must have continued to be used for
arable purposes. Furthermore, archaeological evidence from some
northern areas of the Tavoliere near Lucera, characterized in other
periods by the practice of transhumant animal husbandry, reveals occa-
sions during the second century b.c. of changes in land use, with traces of
centuriation and of small farms cultivating olives and vines that seem to
have given way to areas of pasture or extensive cereal cultivation. 20 Such
changes are characteristic of Apulia, but it does not follow that they were
universal in Italy.

If a general pattern is to be suggested for the Roman confiscations
from the rebellious allies, it might well be supposed that for practical
reasons they affected mainly the common lands of the allied states, both
arable and pasture, rather than individual private estates, apart from
those of the men primarily responsible for the rebellions. In the case of
Apulia, the theory that arable land was turned into pasture would be
quite acceptable.

The determining factor in this complex historical development is the
fact that the Roman confiscations came at a time when agriculture in
central and southern Italy had been seriously undermined by the long
state of war. The decline of the Greek cities had already begun some time
earlier. The actual devastation caused by the Hannibalic War was initially
disastrous, although in practice it cannot have been continuous and was,
in fact, limited. 21 Although the repercussions of the war on Italian
agriculture were felt for a considerable time afterwards, this was not
simply because of the devastations but partly also other, admittedly
related, factors. 22 The enforced removal of the inhabitants from the fields
(primarily to the cities), the subsequent difficulty in persuading them to
return home and the fall in agricultural output, owing to a failure to sow
seeds, a lack of seed or the seizure of produce by the belligerents, brought
famine and misery that led to a decline in population in addition to that
caused by the loss of human lives in the war; in other words, they
prevented a growth in population for lack of the means of subsistence.

The depopulation of Italy, a recurrent theme throughout the century,
first becomes evident in Latium itself as early as the end of the third
century b.c. The deportation of the rebel Campanians defeated in 210
b.c., which may not have been carried out, would have meant their
removal to the territories of Veii, Sutrium and Nepete on the right bank
of the Tiber, where they would each have received up to 50 iugera of

19 Tibilctti 1955, 257: (h 117).

20 Toynbee 1965, 11.542-4: (a 37); Gabba and Pasquinucci 1979, 41 n. 64: (h 93).

21 Brunt 1971, 269fl\: (h 82). 22 Brunt 1971, 278ff.: (h 82) (fundamental).

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ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

land. 23 The grant of the trientabula (public land within fifty miles of
Rome) to private creditors of the state in the year 200 seems to indicate
that this land was unoccupied. 24 The decline in the population of the
Latin colonies had been the reason why twelve of them had declared that
they were unable to contribute further to Rome’s military forces in 209;
this state of affairs was implicitly recognized in the punitive measures
that the Roman government took against them in 204. 25 Large areas of
the south, which may have been thinly populated in the first place,
became utterly deserted as a result of the war. In 201-199 plots of land in
Apulia and Samnium could be granted to the veterans of Scipio’s
campaigns in Spain and Africa, who numbered no fewer than 30-
40, 000. 26 It is difficult to believe that this action entailed the complete
removal of the previous inhabitants. In 1 80 47,000 families from Liguria
were moved to the territory of Beneventum, where they will have
received arable land and common grazing rights. 27 The phenomenon of
depopulation, particularly in Oscan areas, continued during the second
century b.c. for various reasons and in various directions. This progres-
sive decline in population in the centre and south is one of the underlying
themes in any interpretation of the crisis of the pre-Gracchan and
Gracchan period. 28 Such a depopulation must certainly have contri-
buted, for better or worse, to the disappearance of many small farms,
which had been abandoned or were on the point of abandonment
because of the rent that in many cases had to be paid to the Roman
government, and thus facilitated the emergence of the upper classes of
Rome and Italy as large landowners. Where a population is sparse, an
extensive form of agriculture naturally predominates and large areas of
land remain uncultivated or easily fall into disuse. Circumstances of this
kind provide a good explanation for the new scale of occupation of
public land, legally or illegally, by rich Roman and Italian possessores,
many of whom will indeed have converted arable land to pasture.

In describing the historical background to the agrarian law of Tiberius
Gracchus, the historian Appian shows that he and his sources were aware
of the profound impact of the vastly increased use of ager publicus on the
social and economic climate of Italy and Rome. 29 (Poseidonius had also
indicated the scale of the change that the dominance of Rome had
brought about in Sicilian agriculture and in the Sicilian economy. 30 ) The
crucial changes and their often dramatic corollaries are presented as

23 Livy xxvi. 34. 10; Tibiletti 1950, 189: (h i 16). 24 Livy xxxi. 13.2-9.

25 Tibiletti 1950, 189-91: (h 116).

26 Livy xxxi. 4. 1-3, 49.5, xxxii. 1.6; Gabba 1976, 39-40: (h 42).

27 Livy xl. 38. 1-7, 41.3(7.; Tibiletti 1950, 205: (h 116).

28 Livy XLi.8.7; (Plut.) Apophth. Sap. 15; App. B. Civ. 1.7.28—30, 8.32, 9.35, 11.43 ar| d 45 -

29 App. B. Civ. 1.7.26-8.34.

30 Poseid. FCrH 87F108; Coarelli 1981, 1.8-14 with the notes: (1 6).

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THE EXTENSION OF THE ACER PUBLICUS 2O3

linked to the Roman conquest of Italy and the gradual but ever increas-
ing appropriation of Italian territory by Rome. The latest step was the
post-Hannibalic confiscation of land from the allied communities that
had defected. Changes in farming and in Italian society are attributed
primarily to the occupation of ager publicus, one of the effects of which had
been the emergence of large estates in the place of the traditional Italian
system of small peasant farms, with many of the previous owners being
forced to emigrate or to become tenant farmers or hired farm-hands.
This process of change had been made possible by a vast influx of capital,
which had permitted the introduction of new crops, combined with the
extension of grazing and the large-scale use of slaves instead of free
labour. In short, a change in the use of ager publicus initiated the crisis for
the small peasant farm.

The picture drawn with such clarity by Appian will obviously not
apply equally to all regions. Nevertheless, it accurately captures the
devastating significance of the exploitation of ager publicus during the
second century b.c. both for ‘industrial’ crops and for grazing. Up to that
time common lands had been an essential component in the prosperity
and continued existence of the small peasant farm, and indeed in some
areas their very structure was determined by the environment.

Against this background it is easy to understand the approval of a law
de modo agrorum in the first third of the second century B.c., to regulate the
occupation of public land by private individuals - involving a limit of
500 iugera; the restriction of grazing rights on public pastures ( ager
scripturarius, in other words land other than the 500 iugera mentioned
above) to one hundred head of cattle and five hundred sheep, goats and
pigs; and the compulsory use of free labour for supervision. The law,
which is mentioned by Cato in 167 and quoted at length by Appian,
forms part of the long history of Roman legislation concerning ager
publicus -? 1 it almost certainly dates from the post-Hannibalic period.
Control of the use of ager publicus was the only means whereby the Roman
state could oppose to some extent the structural changes that were
occurring in the Italian countryside and the breakdown of traditional
social and economic relationships, but the almost complete lack of any
mechanism of control was bound to frustrate the implementation of the
rules and thwart the intentions of the law. As far as the current situation is
concerned, the law demonstrates above all that large areas of public land
were available; its aim must have been to regulate competition for the use
of such land at a time when the upper classes had discovered that the
exploitation of ager publicus represented an excellent investment for the
financial resources acquired as a result of the wars of conquest. The

31 ORF 4 , Cato fr. 167; App. B . Civ . 1.8.35-4; Tibiletti 1948-9, 3-19: (h i i 5), 1950, 246-66:
(h 116); Toynbee 196s, it. 554-61: (a 37); Gabba 1979, 159-63: (h 160).

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ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

graziers on whom the aediles imposed heavy fines in 196 and 193 were
probably owners of large herds grazed illegally on public land. 32 The
theory that it was they who took up the leases when grazing rights were
offered for rent cannot be verified, but there can be no doubt that the
lease of such rights represents a further serious setback for the owners of
small and medium-sized herds grazing ager publicus-, in this light it
becomes easier to understand the limits on grazing imposed by the law de
modo agrorum.

To appreciate the speed with which the simultaneous availability of
vast tracts of land ready for exploitation and of abundant financial
resources could set in motion a process that was to change substantially
the agrarian, social and economic structures of Italy in the second
century b.c., it should be remembered that the prevailing situation
favoured such a development. The moral and civic values, the behaviour
and the ideals which had traditionally been associated with an archaic
agrarian society — with C. Fabricius, M’. Curius and perhaps M. Atilius
Regulus among its last exemplars - were already ceasing to be character-
istic of the Roman upper classes during the second half of the third
century b.c. 33 Although the turning-point had been the First Punic War,
which had brought rich spoils from Sicily, the process had already begun
between the fourth and third centuries, with a decline in ancient forms of
dependent labour based on clientele and nexum (a decline which was partly
due to the process of colonization) and with the decisive establishment of
slavery. The actions of the Roman governing class and, presumably,
those of the Italian upper classes were increasingly motivated by the
desire for self-enrichment; the senatorial oligarchy first acquired wealth
‘in a proper manner’ ( bono modo), by investing the spoils of war in land,
and later, in defiance of prohibitions which were in fact largely inoper-
ative, by engaging in commercial activities. Such attitudes and activities
are illustrated, for example, in the funeral oration of L. Caecilius Metellus
in 221 b.c. 34 and some decades later in the prologue of Cato’s treatise de
agri culture.

If this treatise is considered for a moment in isolation from its context,
it appears at first sight to offer a disconcerting contradiction. The large
plantations it describes, which were the estates of careful but absent
owners, required considerable investment; they were intended for grow-
ing a small number of specialized crops; they produced for the market
but also satisfied the needs of the owner and his workforce; they
promised a high and secure income. The location of such estates in
relation to urban markets was all-important. They were based mainly on

32 Livy xxxiii. 42. 10, xxxv. io. 11.

33 Doubts expressed in Harris 1979, 66, 264—5: (a 21).

34 ORF 4 , p. io; Gabba 1981, 541-58: (h 44).

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THE EXTENSION OF THE AGER PUBLICUS 20 5

the use of slave labour, some of it skilled, but they also needed free
workers. The Catonian farm as thus depicted certainly appears to conflict
with the ideology expressed in the prologue, which harks back to the
model of the small, self-sufficient peasant farrh cultivating several crops
and complemented by the use of common land, and to the figure of the
Roman citizen as a farmer-soldier.

In fact the contradiction is only apparent; it is resolved by the
timocratic nature of Roman and Italian society, which was regarded, not
without reason, as being entirely right and proper, and as consistent with
the political order of Rome and the other Italian states. Minimal social
differentiation was by now a thing of the past, and the governing class
now laid increasing emphasis on its superior economic capacity, which
derived from the rewards of the wars of conquest. In his treatise, Cato is
addressing precisely these men of high social and political status and
suggesting profitable ways of employing the capital at their disposal.
There can be no doubt that Rome saw these wealthy classes and their
predominance as the guarantee of social and political stability in the
Italian states; the entire course of events from the Hannibalic War to the
Social War demonstrates that the Roman government always sought to
protect the social standing and pre-eminence of these classes. On the
other hand, the social structure of the Roman and Italian citizen body
was not upset, or rather should not have been upset, by the presence of
wealthy elements. There was indeed a certain degree of social mobility,
of which Cato himself could be an example, which ensured the social and,
to a lesser extent, political advancement of suitable people. Hence the
traditional small and medium-sized peasant farm, with its subsistence
economy, still represented to a certain extent the foundation of society, a
foundation that had to be defended, in as far as it was possible to do so
with the rudimentary means available for non-violent intervention in
social afFairs. The recurrent eulogy of the sm^ll farm was matched by
Rome’s commitment to the policy of colonization and land assignation as
a means of artificially reproducing the traditional Italian structure of the
small farm supplemented by the use of common land. This is the only
possible explanation for the very small parcels of land that were still
being granted in the citizen colonies founded in southern Italy soon after
the Hannibalic War, parcels which on their own would not have
permitted the colonists to survive. It can be seen, however, that the size
of these assignations meant that they fitted well into the situation that
already existed in the areas colonized. The social and political order
originally established in the Latin colonies was one in which distinctions
were based on the ownership of land. The artificial creation of two or
three distinct social strata, sometimes markedly distinct, each with a
different amount of land, placed the upper classes de facto and de iure in an

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ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

impregnable position of dominance, but at the same time demonstrated
the intention and the possibility of having different forms of land use
coexist without conflict or contradiction - medium-sized properties
linked to a subsistence economy alongside considerably larger estates
producing for the market.

The distinction also led to differences in forms of settlement. The
upper class will have lived in the urban centre of the colony; most of the
less wealthy colonists will have been settled not in the urban area but on
their plots of land (where they will have had greater contact with the
indigenous population), thus in this way too reproducing the traditional
Italian way of life . 35

The most typical case is that of the Latin colony of Aquileia of 1 8 1 b.c.,
in which the 3 ,000 pedites were allocated 5 o iugera , the centuriones 1 00 iugera
and the equites 140 iugera. A few years later the colony was strengthened
by the arrival of 1,500 more families, most probably pedites { Livy XL.54.2,
xliii. 1 7). There is evidence or good reason for supposing that the Latin
colonies of Cremona and Placentia (218), Thurii (193), Vibo (192) and
Bononia (189) had a number of census classes, usually two, distinguished
by differences in the area of land allocated . 36 If the colony of Aquileia was
typical, it may be deduced that the centuriones and equites constituted the
ruling classes and that the magistrates were drawn from among their
number. It is very probable that the three classes voted separately, as in
the comitia centuriata in Rome. Archaeological evidence to support this
theory may be found in the three separate voting areas that have been
uncovered in the forum of Cosa (a Latin colony dating from 273 b.c.),
which seem to correspond to three categories of citizens, that is to say
three distinct census classes. The number of areas rises to five after the
influx of new colonists in 197 b.c., which will have further diversified the
composition of the civic assembly . 37

It seems likely, as we shall see, that the role, size and composition of the
ruling classes were precisely defined in the law setting up a colony. Here
it suffices to observe that, although there will have been some scope for
social mobility within a Latin colony, it will have been very difficult to
rise from the pedites to the class of the centuriones, let alone to that of the
equites, which was thus socially impregnable. Furthermore, the upper
two census classes held farms that did not differ much in size from those
described by Cato. It is therefore difficult to imagine that they worked
them themselves; they must have had to employ native labour, in the case
of Aquileia most probably drawn from among the Carni and Catali. It is
also possible that they lived in the town and that it was from these very

35 Tozzi 1972, 17, 22: (h 166); Frederiksen 1976, 342-7: (h 88).

36 Tibiletti 1950, 2i9ff.: (h 116).

37 Brown 1979, 24—5, 32-3: (h 231); Crawford 1981, 153: (h 129).

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207

classes that there sprang the commercial class of Aquileia. On the other
hand, the pedites, who held much smaller properties which they will have
worked themselves with the help of their families or with some outside
labour, will have been scattered around the territory of the colony. The
question of the presence of native labour in Latin and citizen colonies is
closely linked to the problem of the assimilation of the previous inhabi-
tants within colonies established in inhabited regions and the question of
the direct inclusion of outsiders in the number of settlers.

II. THE ROLE OF THE ITALIAN ALLIES

In 200 b.c. the consul P. Sulpicius Galba used a number of fundamental
arguments to win over the comitia centuriata , which was reluctant to
accept the Senate’s proposal of war against Philip V of Macedonia: he
argued that a conflict was inevitable and that it was therefore preferable
that the war be fought in Macedonia rather than in Italy; moreover,
should Philip land in Italy, it was to be feared that the Italian peoples who
had earlier defected to the side of the Carthaginians would not remain
loyal. 38 There must have been a very real danger of renewed defection
among the Italian allies, who were at that very moment suffering from
the punishment imposed by the Romans. It was not for nothing that the
institution of the tumultus italicus gallicusve - an emergency summons to
arms in the face of a sudden military threat - still applied in the second
century B.C., whatever its origin and date, and that it was normally
embodied in the laws establishing Latin colonies. 39 There is clear evi-
dence that again in 193 b.c. some of the most astute members of the
Roman governing class did not exclude the possibility of an invasion of
Italy such as Hannibal had suggested to King Antiochus of Syria, based
on the assumption that part of Italy would rise to support an enemy of
Rome. 40 Contemporaries must have been fully aware of the uncertain and
insecure nature of Rome’s relations with a large proportion of its Italian
allies, as had been revealed dramatically by the defections during the
Hannibalic War, and must have known that Rome’s victory and the
punitive measures taken had achieved only an apparent stabilization of
the situation. The military function of the eight citizen colonies estab-
lished in southern Italy in 194 b.c. was probably not only to guard the
coast but also to watch over the interior in insecure areas that were
potentially hostile and rebellious. 41 The purpose they served was differ-

38 Livy xxxi. 6-8.

w Gc. Phil. viii. 2-3; Livy xxxi.2.6, xxxii.26. 1 2, xxxiv.56. 1 1, xxxv.2.7, XL.26.7-8; Dari 1974, 18
n. 33: (h 140). Cf. lex col. Genet, lines 30-1: llari 1974, 31 n. 10.

40 Livy xxxiv. 6. 3-6; Passcrini 1933, 10-28: (e 157).

41 Livy xxxn.29.3ff., xxxiv. 4 5. 1 —5 ; Tibiletti 1950, 196-7: (h i 16); Salmon 1970, 96ff: (h 152).

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ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

ent from that of the assignations of land in Apulia and Samnium to
Scipio’s veterans a few years earlier.

Hostility towards Rome, which had induced some Italian communi-
ties to side with Hannibal, derived from much older historic grudges and
complaints. Rome’s military superiority had contained this hostility and
had kept the allies loyal even after the initial defeats inflicted by
Hannibal. Polybius rightly emphasized the remarkable ability of the
Roman state to inspire obedience and respect even in such difficult
times . 42 It took the defeat at Cannae to demonstrate how Roman power
might be overcome and to shatter in large part the practical and theoreti-
cal basis of the network of alliances which Rome had concluded with the
Italian communities. Polybius recognizes that it was not only the main
cities in Magna Graecia that defected: all the other Italian peoples now
turned their eyes towards the Carthaginians. Rome had lost its suprem-
acy over Italy . 43 This was clear proof that the military and political
superiority of Rome had hitherto been the main reason for the cohesion
of Italy. Polybius accepted the legitimacy of the Romans’ desire to
dominate Italy and treat it as their sphere of influence in their confron-
tation with the Gauls and the Carthaginians , 44 on the basis of a geo-
political concept which recognized the substantial unity of the Italian
peninsula. Indeed, it was the common danger presented by the Gauls that
at one point gave the Italian peoples a reason for uniting in the know-
ledge that the defence of Italy against the Gauls was not one of the
habitual wars waged simply to further Roman hegemony, but represen-
ted the salvation of everyone . 45 Of course, this awareness should not be
seen as the emergence of a unified Italian consciousness. Indeed, the
Hannibalic War demonstrated the fragility of this unifying force, which
was based on external factors. However, by her final victory over the
Carthaginians, Rome reasserted her absolute predominance in Italy,
which was confirmed by the punitive measures taken against disloyal
allies and in many cases by a strengthening of the conditions of subordi-
nation set out in the different treaties. The allies who had remained loyal
to Rome certainly shared in the spirit and benefits of victory and derived
from it a new incentive to loyalty and obedience . 46 The system of
alliances, which had been revived de iure, was completely altered de facto
by the new position Rome had acquired in the Mediterranean.

It must have been quite clear at least to the leaders of the Italian
communities, as it obviously was to the governing class in Rome, that the
victory over Carthage would not only reassert Roman domination over
Italy and Sicily, but would also open the way for a policy of imperial
expansion . 47 Hitherto the allied Italian states had been junior partners,

42 in. 90. 1 3-14. 43 in. 118.3-5. 44 1.6.6, 10.5-6,11.14.4-12. Polyb. n. 23. 13-14.

46 Badian 1958, 144—5: (a 3).

47 Polyb. v. 104.3-4: speech delivered by Agelaus at Naupactus in 217 b.c.

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but henceforth they were to be transformed increasingly into constituent
parts of the Roman state that were necessary to its very existence and
taken for granted socially and politically. From the end of the third
century onwards, they became local units in a political system that was
very different from that of the past, as it was now projected on an
imperial scale. It is difficult to say when the treaties concluded by Rome
first contained the clause stipulating the maiestas populi romani , ‘the
majesty of the Roman people’, which the ally undertook to preserve ; 48
nor is it by any means certain, although it is highly likely, that the clause
appeared in treaties with Italian peoples. What is certain is that the
concept of maiestas populi romani developed and crystallized after the
Hannibalic War as a consequence of Roman expansionism.

Provided that the Italian allies accepted and complied with Rome’s
new imperial requirements - and in practice they were obliged to do so -
they could share in some of the rewards. This was the main reason why
the Italian upper classes sought gradual economic and social parity with
the Roman upper classes and pursued a spontaneous policy of cultural
and political assimilation and integration, and finally demanded direct
participation in the exercise of power. In the latter half of the second
century b.c. this demand was to collide with a stiffening of the traditional
elitist attitude of the Roman governing class. On the political plane it
would lead eventually, at least in the opinion of enlightened oligarchs, to
obedience being imposed on the Italian allies by fear rather than being
sought, as before, by conviction and respect; this seems to be the view
which lies behind the reasoning of P. Scipio Nasica in the speech
opposing the destruction of Carthage and of C. Laelius in Cicero’s de
republican

Rome used the traditional instruments at her disposal to organize her
new relationship with her Italian allies; it is pointless to reproach Rome
for failing completely to reorganize her network of alliances to suit her
new political objectives. Certainly, after the Hannibalic War, the juridical
concept of Italy, with its religious implications, was defined with increas-
ing clarity, partly on the basis of geo-political theories of Greek origin . 50
From Rome’s point of view, this concept of Italy is linked with the
complex of political and military relations with her allies, the socii italici.
It is only in relation to the predominant partner, that is to say Rome, that
they are seen as a group and thus bear this title. Naturally this did not
involve any desire on the part of Rome to standardize the position of her
Italian allies on a political, legal or administrative plane; even less did it
foreshadow the conscious creation of a national Romano-Italian state.

48 Cic. Halt. 35-7. On this question: Sherwin- White 1973, 183-9: (h ii 3); De Martino 1972-5,
108-9: (a 13); Iiari 1974, 34—41: (h 140). 49 Diod. Sic. xxxiv.53.5; Cic. Rep. in. 4.

50 Gabba 1978, 11-16: (h 1 5 1 ); Iiari 1974, 23: (h 140).

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210 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

We should not be misled by the unitary view of Polybius, which may
seem to conflict in some ways with what has been said here. For he was
examining the Roman state from the point of view of the centre of power
and was comparing it with the Hellenistic monarchies, which were
regarded as single entities. Polybius was interested in the ways in which
power was actually exercised. Convinced as he was of the solidity of the
Roman state, he saw no need to analyse the bases of the political
organization of Roman Italy or indeed the relations between Rome and
her allies. Proof lies in his description of Roman military organization in
terms of a single citizen militia. In this context, the allied contingents are
depicted as integrated and homogeneous parts of the Roman army . 51

The fact that from the second century b.c. onwards an ideology of
Italy was emerging and developing, an ideology that was to reach its
peak in the age of Augustus, does not mean either that Roman policy was
directed towards forming any kind of Italian unity or that this was ever
actually achieved in ancient times.

Italian history received particular attention, not in contrast to Roman
history, but as part of it, in Cato’s Origines; in books n and hi, he deals
with the foundations of cities and the origins of Italian peoples , 52
although it is not clear whether this constitutes a separate treatise on
geography or forms part of the historical narrative. In any case, the work
provides evidence of a more than passing interest in the history of the
Italian peoples which had been absent from Roman historiography up to
that time and which would be difficult to reconcile with Cato’s suppos-
edly hostile political attitude towards the allies.

As the century progressed, the Roman governing class certainly
became increasingly conscious of the process of economic and social
change through which both Rome and the Italian states were passing, if
only because its more dramatic manifestations in the form of a decline in
population and, in consequence, a military crisis were easily understood
and immediately visible. Nevertheless, all this occurred in the midst of
euphoria, immediate benefits and an obvious spread of prosperity as a
result of the policy of conquest. At the same time, the means available to
an ancient state for modifying any part of the structure of society were
minimal, and it was not until the time of Tiberius Gracchus that an
attempt was made to present a programme for the restoration of
Romano-Italian society along traditional lines.

As we have seen, the Romanization of Italy was sought mainly by the
Italian upper classes and not by Rome, which was interested in maintain-
ing the predominant position of these classes and in defending their
social and political identities, since they were the guarantors of stability

51 Polyb. vi. 2 1. 4— 5, 26.3—10. 52 Nepos, Cato in. 3— 4; Kierdorf 1980: (h 200).

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THE ROLE OF THE ITALIAN ALLIES

2 I I

within their states and of the efficient operation of their institutions and
indeed formed the link between Rome and the states in question. Some
aspects of the new relationship that had developed between Rome and
her Italian allies are difficult to understand and assess. For example, there
is above all the question of whether and to what extent any changes in the
constitutional arrangements of the allied states and the inevitable subor-
dination of the activities of their governments to the aims of Rome
caused tensions to develop throughout society between compliance with
Roman policy and Roman interests on the one hand and local needs and
local ways of thinking on the other hand; such tensions will have
militated against participation in the internal affairs of the Italian com-
munities. And, as we shall see, actual emigration from Italian communi-
ties may be seen as a dramatic form of expression of this decline in
participation.

Roman support for the Italian oligarchies, which was much more
consistent than in pre-Hannibalic days, 53 and their increasing espousal of
Roman policy are two factors inextricably involved in the developments
of the period; they emerge with great clarity from all aspects of the
tradition. The roots are an underlying coincidence and indeed conver-
gence of the political and economic interests of the Roman and Italian
governing classes that would seem to be beyond doubt. Of course, this
does not necessarily mean that the various aspects of Romano-Italian
relations in the second century b.c. should be interpreted solely in terms
of class conflict, even though social tensions are frequently apparent.
Equally, the allies’ support for Rome, which was to lead to a complex
process of Romanization and assimilation, should not be understood as
implying that a unified set of Italian ideals or sentiments existed among
the allied elites. They were motivated by practical reasons of self-interest,
so that it is possible to believe that while acting in this way they had no
thought of renouncing their ancient local traditions and the identity of
their states; indeed, the literature of the first century b.c. bears clear
witness to the vitality of these traditions. This conclusion may be
supported by evidence which is drawn from a later period and which
therefore represents even better the situation pertaining in the second
century b.c. Several decades after the Social War Cicero attempted to
come to grips with the complex problems of the local community by
postulating in de legibus (it. 1-5) the concept of the existence of two
‘ patriae , mam naturae , alteram civitatis, . . . alteram loci , alteram iuris (two
fatherlands, one by nature, the other by citizenship . . . one by place, the
other by law), thus seeking to reconcile the still powerful local realities of
Italian history with that of the politically united state, the true patria,

53 Badian 1958, 147-8: (a 3).

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212 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

which deserved the name of res publica. The Ciceronian theory indicates a
means of overcoming the difficulties arising from provincial thinking
and interests, which were deeply rooted in the mentality and behaviour
of the Romano-Italian upper classes. Furthermore, at the time of the
Social War itself, the oath that M. Livius Drusus extracted from his
Italian followers, to whom he wished to grant Roman citizenship,
obliged them to recognize Rome as their patria and therefore aimed to
create a political and religious ideal that transcended local patriotism . 54
The conflicts within the narrow ruling elite of Arpinum at the close of the
second century b.c. and the subsequent appeal to Rome show clearly the
extent to which a municipal nobility was still wedded to local interests . 55

III. MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

Nevertheless, whatever the intentions and wishes of the Roman and
Italian governing classes, Roman and Italian elements did occasionally
coalesce, with repercussions on a scale that was hard to predict. This
involved primarily Latin and Italian participation in the Roman govern-
ment’s colonization schemes.

In 197 b . c . the Latin colony of Cosa was granted permission to recruit
1,000 new colonists; those who had not been among the enemies of
Rome after 2 1 8 b . c . were also eligible to participate. This is obviously a
reference to Italian elements. Indeed, it is very probable that the new
colonists, who would certainly have been enrolled in the lower census
classes, included Etruscans . 56 This provision also seems to indicate some
difficulty in finding colonists among Roman citizens and Latins. It is
hard to say whether the new colonists who settled in Venusia in 200 and
in Narnia in 199 were assembled in the same way . 57

In 1 94 it was decided to found two Latin colonies in the territory of the
Bruttii and in the ager of Thurii. The colony of Thurii was established in
193 with 3,000 pedites (20 iugera) and 300 equites (40 iugera)-, b8 that of Vibo
Valentia, founded in 192, comprised 3,700 pedites (15 iugera) and 300
equites (30 iugera ) and probably represented the resettlement of a colony
established in 239 b.c. 59 In both cases the previous inhabitants will have
been absorbed into the colony; this was normal practice, and was to be
expected, especially in the case of Vibo. Nonetheless, the land available at
Thurii, for example, would have been sufficient either to settle a larger

54 Diod. Sic. xxxvu. 1 1. 55 Cic. L eg. 111.36.

56 Livy xxxv. 24.8-9; Tibiletti 1950, 193-4: (h 116); Brown 1979, 32-3, 45 : (h 231).

37 Livy xxxi. 49. 6 , xxxii. 2.6; Tibiletti 1950, 192: (h 116).

38 Livy xxxiv. 5 3. 1—2; the colony of Thurii is probably identical with that of Cast rum Frentinum:
Livy xxxv. 9. 7-8.

39 Livy xxxv. 40. 5-6; Veil. Pat. 1.14.8; Tibiletti 1950, 240—4: (h 116); Salmon 1970, 99-100: (h

M 2 ).

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MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

2 1 3

number of colonists or to make more generous grants of land; owing to a
lack of men, the first of these options was probably held open to allow for
a future expansion that seems never to have occurred. At the same time,
Rome will have wished to avoid the disruption to the local economy that
would have resulted from granting larger plots of land.

This phase of the policy of colonization had aims which were mainly
defensive and thus differed from those of the assignations made to
reward Scipio’s veterans in Apulia and Samnium. It must have run up
against the problem caused by the general decline in population as a
result of the war and the lack of interest in colonization of the ravaged
areas in the centre and south. This is confirmed by the admission of non-
Roman colonists even in small citizen colonies comprising no more than
300 families.

In 195 b.c., some of the Hernici living in Ferentinum, who were by
now assimilated to the Latins, enrolled themselves among the colonists
of Puteoli, Salernum and Buxentum and, having been accepted, immedi-
ately passed themselves off as Roman cives without awaiting the first
census in the colonies. It would appear that the Senate denied them the
status of Roman cives in advance, but did not reject the right of Latins to
enrol themselves as colonists; 60 whatever their origin, all colonists
received equal parcels of land. The passage in Livy is far from clear, but it
is hard to imagine that the Latins who enrolled as colonists remained
legally subordinate. 61 What is certain is that within a few years Buxentum
had already been abandoned. 62

Roman citizens, Latins and probably also Italians 63 all received
viritane assignments in 173 b.c. in the ager Ligusiinus et Gallicus, but the
area of land allotted differed, the citizens receiving 1 o iugera and the rest 3
iugera. This substantial difference is open to a number of interpretations.
It is unlikely that the non-Roman assignees would become cives merely by
virtue of the assignation; in any case, the non-Romans, who were
probably in the majority, were certainly integrated in the Roman govern-
ment’s colonization programme but they were deliberately given a
separate status that was inferior for the purpose of the census. Further-
more, larger assignations might have had repercussions on the social and
political order of the communities from which these colonists came.

At all events, these assignations should be considered in the context of
the more general problem of the colonization of Cisalpine Gaul which
progressed in line with the military reconquest of the area and which was

60 Livy xxxiv. 42. 5 -6. The interpretation is that of Smith 1954, 18-20: (h 1 14); for a different view
see Luraschi 1979, 73-4 and n. 140: (h 143).

61 Tibiletti 1950, 197: (h 116). 62 Livy xxxix.23.3 (186 b.c.).

63 Livy XLii.4.3-4 (and also xli. 16.7-9). This interpretation of the expression socii nominis Latini
follows Wegner 1969, 95-104: (h 156), which includes a discussion of the various theories.

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ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

responsible for the official settlement of more than 1 00,000 persons in the
course of the century, to whom must be added spontaneous immigrants,
w'ho were certainly numerous. The historical writings of Cato and
Polybius 64 faithfully echo the strong impression of richness and fertility
that the Romans gained of the Po valley; this richness, fertility and
populousness were admittedly due in large measure to the Roman
colonization of the area, but initially they must have been the result of the
natural state of the land and must have constituted the spur to coloniza-
tion, which progressed all the more rapidly as living conditions in the
region became more secure. It is worth emphasizing the pioneering spirit
that must have inspired the Roman and Italian colonists of the region
during this period, and the great difference between these men and the
later Gracchan assignees who benefited from the ‘organized assistance’
of the state. 65

At the same time, it may be assumed that the Roman ruling class took a
generally favourable view of this largely spontaneous movement of the
peasant masses towards the north (and towards the Iberian provinces) as
it enhanced the availability of areas in the centre and south of the
peninsula for the development of its own economic activities. Further
preconditions were thus created, particularly in the south, for a profound
change in the methods of working the land and hence a transformation of
traditional agrarian society. The process of colonization was on such a
scale that it must have affected Romans, Latins and Italians alike and
must also have involved the local populations, albeit indirectly and as
subordinates during the early stages. The latter were probably restricted
to secondary settlements within the territory of the colonies and
assignations, as some recent sophisticated topographical studies would
seem to indicate. 66 In 1 72 b.c., however, the Ligurian communities of the
Appennine regions, which had not committed any hostile acts since 1 79,
were transferred to Gallia Transpadana and given land there. 67 The
possibility cannot be ruled out that some indigenous social and economic
relationships, such as clientage, as well as typically Celtic forms of
dependence or forms of land tenure inherited from the Etruscan era may
have survived long after the Roman conquest of these areas. 68

In addition to the massive reinforcement of the Latin colonies of

64 Heurgon 1974: (h 194); Tozzi 1976: (h 167).

65 Tibiletti 195 5, 268-9: (h 1 17). For the presence of Samnite elements in Cisalpine Gaul see Pais
1918, 415-57: (h 148); Robson 1954, 599-608: (h 165).

66 Polybius* claim in 11.35.4 that they were expelled cannot and should not be taken as true
everywhere.

67 Livy XLn.22.5-6; Pais 1918, 56ofT.: (a 29); an attempt to locate them in the area of Mantua in
Luraschi 1981, 73-80: (h 144).

68 Polyb. 11. 1 7. 1 2; Heurgon 1967: (1 22). There is an obvious similarity with the situation
indicated by the Sententia Minuciorum to have existed in Genoese territory.

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MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION 21$

Placentia and Cremona in 190, 69 there was the founding of the great Latin
colony of Bononia in 1 89 b.c. 70 The citizen colonies of Mutina and Parma
were established in 183; these were the first colonies of the citizen type to
receive a large number of colonists (3,000) and to differ from the
traditional maritime citizen colonies as far as aims and locations were
concerned. 71 The same number of colonists was settled in the colony of
Luna in 177. 72 The citizen colonies of Potentia and Pisaurum, which date
from 184 b.c., were maritime colonies, however; at least some of the
settlers came from southern Campania. 73 Another colony in Picenum
was that of Auximum. 74 The colonies of Saturnia and Graviscae were
founded in Etruria in 1 83 and 1 8 1 , to be followed a few years later by that
of Heba. 75

The decision to establish a colony at Aquileia with the evident military
purpose of protecting the point of easiest access to Italy was taken in 1 83
b.c., after a debate in the Senate on the question of whether it was to have
citizen or Latin status. 76 The second option was adopted. It was probably
argued successfully that Roman citizens sent so far away would have
difficulty in exercising their civic rights. It should also be borne in mind,
however, that it was easier to incorporate colonists from allied communi-
ties into a Latin colony and in fact it may be the case that Venetic elements
were enrolled. Nonetheless, the clear demarcation of the first two census
classes will have guaranteed that the control of local government rested
with colonists of Roman or Latin origin. 77 The actual foundation took
place in 1 8 1 and, as mentioned above, the colonists were allocated parcels
of land enough to require the indigenous population to remain in the
colony in a subordinate position. Aquileia is sometimes said to have been
the last Latin colony, but it seems probable that one more was estab-
lished, at Luca in 1 77 b.c., in order to stem the continual incursions of the
Ligurians. 78

It is worth recalling at this point that the great difference in size
between the plots granted in Latin colonies and those of citizen colonies
can be explained convincingly in terms of the staunchly upheld principle
of avoiding radical changes in the structure of the Roman citizen body;
large assignations of land in citizen colonies would have had just such an
effect. The small plots of land granted as in outright ownership, which

69 Livy xxxvi 1.46.9—47. 2. 70 Livy xxxvii. 5 7.7-8; Veil. Pat. 1.15.2.

71 Livy xxxix. 5 5 .6. 72 Livy xli. 15.4. 73 Livy xxxix.44.10; Laz/.eroni 1962: (h 28$).

74 Perhaps prior to 174: Livy xLi.27.10-1 3; Harris 1971, 1 50 n. 6: (h i 36). Dated to 157 by Veil.
Pat. 1. 1 5.3; moved to 128 by Salmon 1963, iofF.: (h 150).

75 Livy xxxix. 5 3.9, xl. 29. 1-2; Veil. Pat. 1. 1 5. 1. For Heba: Harris 1971, 1 50: (h 1 36) (between 167
and 157 b.c.).

76 Livy xxxix. 5 5.5, xl. 34. 2; Veil. Pat. 1.15.2; De Sanctis 1907-64, iv.i.428: (a 14).

77 For a different view see Bernardi 1973, 102-3: (h 126).

7 * Galsterer 1976, 63 n. 105: (h 132), contra the view that the references to Luca arise from
confusion with Luna, certainly founded in 177.

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Zt6 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

were smaller than was needed for subsistence, were supplemented by the
use of common land for arable farming and grazing. In Latin colonies, by
contrast, it was necessary to create autonomous communities with their
own social and political hierarchies. 79

As Latin colonies had always served military ends, the main reason for
the halt in the foundation of colonies of this kind is to be sought in the
situation that was developing in Italy in the first three decades of the
second century b.c. 80 If we consider that towards the end large numbers
of Italians were being admitted to the citizen bodies of these colonies, it
seems unlikely that the cause of their demise was the reluctance of Roman
citizens to renounce their citizenship in order to acquire that of the
colony. It is more probable that the halt in the foundation of new Latin
colonies is to be explained in terms of the growing interest of the Roman
and Italian upper classes in the exploitation of ager publicus\ it may,
however, also be seen as another step towards a more rational organiza-
tion of Roman territory, similar to the gradual accession of rives sine
suffi-agio, ‘citizen communities without the right to vote’, to full citizen-
ship that took place during the first half of the second century b.c. In 188
the ins suffragii, ‘the right to vote in Roman assemblies’, was granted to
Arpinum, Formiae and Fundi; other communities must have received it
by 133 b.c. 81 In spite of this, Arpinum was able to preserve a body of
public law different from that of Rome. 82 (It would be interesting to
know whether it was before or after 188 that Arpinum obtained the
territories in Cisalpine Gaul from which it was still receiving revenues at
the time of Caesar. 83 )

In fact, the entire process of colonization promoted by the Roman
government began to slow down after the first three decades of the
second century, not only for political reasons, but also because the urge
that had driven Romans and Italians to seek new lands in the fertile area
of Cisalpine Gaul or in Spain had waned. The policy of colonization
provided a possible solution to the problem posed by the steady decline
in the category of medium and small farmers in the centre and south, in
that the colonists were mainly Romans and Italians from the lower social
classes. It enabled them to regain, albeit in far-flung regions, the econ-
omic and social independence that had been seriously curtailed or even
lost in their original communities. From the end of the second century
b.c. onwards this independence was to be rediscovered in the army or as a
result of army service. And it was therefore both a cause and an effect of

79 Tibiletti 1950, 219-32: (h 116).

80 Galsterer 1976, 64: (h 132)- For a general treatment: Bernardi 1973, 101 ff.: (h 126).

81 Livy xxxviii. 36. 7-9; Brunt 1965, 93: (h 127); Humbert 1978, 346-7: (h 139).

82 Cic. lug. 111.36; Nicolet 1967: (h 75).

83 Cic. Fam. xm.ii.i; Nicolet 1967, 302 n. 4: (h 75).

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MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

217

the acceleration in the transformation of agrarian society in the central
and southern areas of the peninsula, which has been associated with
emigration throughout the history of Italy.

Internal migration was also a powerful factor making for the assimila-
tion of the different peoples of Italy. This mainly took the form of
urbanization, Rome being naturally the main pole of attraction. Urban-
ization originally arose as a result of the hostilities during the Second
Punic War and the wholesale abandonment of the areas most at risk. It
was no easy task for the consuls of 206 b.c. to persuade refugee farmers to
return to their devastated fields. 84 The phenomenon assumed larger
proportions in the decades that followed, however, with the massive
infiltration of Rome by Latins and Italians. In 1 98 b.c. as many as 1 2,000
who had been living in the city since 204 b.c. were sent back to their
communities. 85 The problem continued to simmer, but in 177 it re-
emerged in a more dramatic and complicated guise. The migration of
Latins and allies to Rome led to the gradual abandonment of villages and
lands and jeopardized the provision of soldiers. 86 Italian migrants were
also settling in Latin colonies; for example, 4,000 Samnite and Paelignian
families had moved to Fregellae, prompting complaints from their
original communities, which were nonetheless obliged to supply the
same military contingents. The colony of Fregellae was careful not to
protest. 87 Fregellae will not have been the only such instance. As early as
199 the colony of Narnia had complained about infiltration by outsiders
who behaved like colonists. An inscription in Aesernia dating probably
from the second century b.c. attests the presence of Samnites inquolae
within the Latin colony, who were duly organized in a corporate or
collegiate association; it is not clear whether these were recent immi-
grants or the remnants of the population that had inhabited the region
before the foundation of the colony in 263 b.c. 88

It seems that one of the causes of migration to Rome was the
opportunity offered initially perhaps only to Latin colonists, then to all
Latins and finally also to Italian allies, to become Roman citizens if they
moved to Rome and left male descendants in the town from which they
came. This combination of rights and obligations, which was undoubt-
edly embodied in the laws establishing colonies and in treaties with the
allies, was probably not a recent innovation, as has sometimes been
supposed, 89 but abuse of it by more or less legal means was certainly a

84 Livy xxvm. 1 1.8-9.

85 Livy xxxix. 3. 4-6; Tibiletti 1950, 104ft.: (h 116); Luraschi 1979, 63!?.: (h 143).

86 Livy xLi.8.6-7. 87 Livy xli.8.8; Tibiletti 1950, 204, n. 3: (h 116).

88 La Regina, RIGS, 327; Galsterer 1976, 34: (h i 32); Humbert 1978, 346 n. 34: (h i 39). For the
incolatur. Laffi 1966, 1 9 3 fF. : (h 102).

89 Tibiletti 1950, 2 1 3 n. 4: (h 1 16); Badian 1958, 1 50: (a 3); Luraschi 1979, 91 and n. 209: (h 143);
cf. McDonald 1944, 20-1: (h 145).

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218 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

new development; 90 what must have been intended as an exceptional case
had now become widespread practice. In 177 the Roman government
took a series of measures - consular laws, consular edicts and senatus
consulta which were interlinked, though in what manner is far from clear 91
- which in effect limited the capacity of Latins and allies to acquire
Roman citizenship through migration and the (Roman) census (per
migrationem et censum), obliged them to register in their own town of
origin and hence to return home, instituted enquiries to ascertain the
transgressors and established checks on the subterfuges used to circum-
vent the law. It is highly doubtful how far it was in practice possible to
apply these provisions; it is certain that in 173 a further consular edict
called upon socii to return home and be registered there. 92

That such measures were prejudicial to the rights and interests of socii
who had moved to Rome is obvious and is explicitly stated by Cicero, 93
although he is probably referring to the expulsion of Latins and allies in
the Gracchan and post-Gracchan period, which was motivated by en-
tirely different political reasons. Furthermore, our sources leave no room
for doubt that the measures dating from the first half of the second
century b.c. were taken by the Roman government at the repeated
request of the governing classes of the allied states, which were con-
cerned at the fall in the number of citizens in their communities and the
effect this had on the supply of the military contingents requested of
them by Rome. From a practical point of view, it must have been a matter
of indifference to the Romans whether these allies were registered in
their native communities or as citizens in Rome, but the latter option
threatened the political, social and economic stability of the allied states,
which Rome had to take steps to maintain. In a sense, the demographic
and military decline that the allied states were suffering prefigured the
social and economic transformation which was to affect Rome and Italy
as a whole and which, worsening as time went on, finally led to the
Gracchan attempt at restoration and reform in 1 3 3 b.c. From this point
of view it may be claimed that the measures taken by Rome favoured the
allies; equally, it cannot be ruled out that a certain elitism on the part of
the Romans played a small though not decisive role.

Two points require clarification: who were the immigrants and what
were their aims? In view of the scale of the phenomenon, it is easy to
conclude that in general they were allies belonging to the lower social
classes; it was their departure in large numbers from their native commu-
nities that threatened the latter’s social and military capability, not the
absence of members of the aristocracy engaging in commerce, whether

90 Livy XLI.8.10-11. 91 Livy xu.8.12, 9.9—12; Luraschi 1979, 64-6: (h 143).

92 Livy XLii.10.5. 93 Cic. Sest. 30; Luraschi 1979, 94 n. 222: (h 143).

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MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION 2 I 9

they be few or many. It can be sensed that a profound change was thus
beginning to occur in the relations within the allied cities between the
lower classes and the governing classes, which were always more in-
clined to identify themselves with the Roman governing class, its needs
and its policies; for the more enterprising sections of the lower classes,
emigration, that is to say non-participation in local affairs, increasingly
meant mobility and freedom. The upper classes’ traditional role as
representatives of their societies and their interests gradually diminished
in importance, although they continued to occupy positions of power
owing to the support of Rome. In the Gracchan era the contrast was to
intensify into social conflict. As far as aims are concerned, emigration
was basically the result of economic factors and does not indicate any
desire to obtain Roman citizenship. There were many factors that must
have encouraged a move to Rome by the economically disadvantaged,
who were now also in the process of becoming proletarianized: the
decline of traditional agrarian society and the change in methods of
farming, which Rome had unsuccessfully tried to curb with measures
relating to the use of ager pub/icus; the awareness, brought about by
overseas wars, of the possibility of a higher standard of living and of the
vast spread of prosperity in the cities, particularly Rome; the profound
change in needs, attitudes and behaviour (factors that bear some
responsibility for the decline in the way of life that represented tra-
ditional economic patterns); the new and varied opportunities offered by
the capital city.

It is not difficult to suppose that this drift away from the land will have
affected mainly areas which were not urbanized and where settlements
were tribal in character. It seems that such areas only began to develop
slowly towards forms of urban organization during the second century,
although it is worth stressing that scattered forms of settlement never
actually disappeared. At the same time, some small towns in the interior
experienced a phase of decline during roughly the same period . 94

It was certainly not Roman citizenship as such that attracted these
emigrants; participation in the political life of the city would, by contrast,
be demanded by allied groups belonging to the upper classes at the end of
the century. It was the lure of the great city, which held out the chance of
rehabilitation and social and economic recovery. This also explains the
movement of population towards the Italian sea-ports which were more
directly involved in the development of trade with the provinces. During
the second century Ostia, Puteoli and also Pompeii grew as a result of the
movement of population towards the towns . 95 After the arrival of the
new colonists the city of Cosa also experienced an intensification of

' M Crawford 1981, 1 } 8: (h 129). « Gabba 1976, 3 1 6: (h 91).

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ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

building activity and exploitation of its territory that lasted nearly a
century. 96 Registration in the Roman census, when that occurred, was
simply an incidental consequence of migration which many will have
avoided.

The desire for social and economic improvement also spurred the
allies to volunteer in large numbers as colonists. The significance of this
mobility should not be evaluated solely in socio-economic terms. It also
had considerable cultural and religious consequences, in that it involved
a rejection of narrow horizons and a receptiveness to new ways of life and
thought. After the Hannibalic War, Rome had become the crossroads of
the Mediterranean world. Urbanization had not involved simply an
influx of Italian peasants from areas within the peninsula. People and
ideas came from outside, and the latter found fertile ground in which to
spread, not only among the lower classes. A new desire for alternative
forms of religious experience can be observed in Roman and Italian
society at the time of the Hannibalic War. 97 When this desire coincided
with problems of public order, the Roman government was forced to
intervene and suppress certain practices. The episode of the Bacchanalia
in 1 86 revealed the penetration of Rome by people from southern Italy
and Etruria and the introduction of alien cults. This penetration was
regarded as a danger, threatening subversion of city, society and state,
since it led to instances of coniuratio\ eradication required the involvement
of the whole of Italy. 98 Repression did not fail to arouse adverse reactions
among Italian intellectuals. In 1 8 1 b.c., the destruction of the ‘Books of
Numa’ represented the elimination of politically dangerous texts. 99 A
similar incident occurred in i 39 b.c., when the praetor peregrinus ordered
the astrologers (Chaldeans), against whom Cato had already warned, to
be expelled from Rome and Italy, made Jews not domiciled in Rome
return to their homes in Italian towns, and cleared private altars from
public places. 100 The political danger of alien cults, particularly oriental
and mystical ones, lay mainly in the opportunity they gave their adher-
ents to approach the deity direct without the mediation of the political
authorities, as in the cults of the traditional religion of Rome.

In the second half of the second century b.c., there was a notable move
to develop urban centres in areas of Roman and Italian territory outside
Rome and many shrines were built or rebuilt. 101 Clearly the upper classes
used the vast wealth accumulated as a result of war, imperial exploitation
and trade to embellish and construct large sacred complexes both in their
cities (such as the temple of Fortuna Primigenia in Praeneste and that of

Brown 1979, 33: (n 231). 97 McDonald 1944, 26ft.: (h 145).

98 Cova 1974: (h 37). 99 Livy XL.z9.3ff.

100 Val. Max. 1.3.3; Bickerman 1980, 329-55: (e 90).

101 Cianfarani i96o:(h 2 3 2); also Sannio: (h i 5 3). For a general treatment see Gros 1978: (h 242).

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MILITARY OBLIGATION'S AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 221

Hercules in Tibur) and in rural areas, the tribal sphere where ethnic
shrines had always had an extremely important political and economic
role in addition to their religious function. This blossoming of imposing
buildings (such as the great theatre temple of Pietrabbondante in
Pentrian Samnium, which was completed shortly before the Social War)
certainly indicates the extent to which Greek culture had penetrated into
Italian areas, but above all it proves the common political desire of the
Roman and Italian upper classes, transcending autonomist tendencies
and local pride, to redirect the religious needs of all social classes towards
traditional cults and places of worship and thus stem dangerous experi-
mentation with uncontrollable alien religions. The same aim later lies
behind the Augustan reconstruction of the temples of Rome. In a sense,
this period of intensive temple-building opens in the middle of the
second century b.c. with Polybius’ comment on the Romans’ ability to
control the masses by means of religious practices, and closes in the early
years of the first century b.c. with the enquiries of the pontifex Q. Mucius
Scaevola into the functions of religion for the people. 102

IV. MILITARY OBLIGATIONS AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS

The lamentations of the Italian communities about the decline in popula-
tion, which must undoubtedly have changed the numerical ratio between
citizens and allies during the course of the second century B.c., 103 dwell
on the difficulties it caused in fulfilling their military obligations. The
same problem lies at the heart of the Gracchan arguments at the time of
the proposed agrarian law in 133 b.c., and there can be no doubt that it
was capable of profoundly affecting the attitudes and decisions of the
Roman government. Latin and Italian allies were obliged to meet
Rome’s requests for contingents of troops under the laws establishing
colonies and under individual treaties, which will have laid down the two
parties’ reciprocal obligations to give military assistance and the services
to be rendered by the allies; the treaties wilf also sometimes have given
Rome the right to grant or recognize vacationes. Within the individual
Italian states, with a rigidly timocratic system of government kept up to
date by periodic censuses, military levies will have followed a procedure
similar to that employed in Rome. 104 The common use of the census was
an indirect spur to the political and administrative assimilation of Italian
states. As far as Rome was concerned, the allied communities were
entered in a kind of military register or roll, the so-called formula
togatorum, which formed the basis of Rome’s annual demands for the

102 Polyb. vi. 56.6- 1 1; Aug. Civ. D. iv.27; Schiavone 1976, jff.: (h i i i); cf. Cic. Ltg. 11.19, 25-6;
Goar 1972, 22-8: (h 284). 103 Badian 1958, 150: (a 5). 104 Polyb. vi.21.5.

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222

ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

required allied contingents. 105 There was probably a system of alterna-
tion or rotation so that over a period of time the military burden fell
evenly. Although the laws and treaties will have paid due regard to the
diverse social and economic situations of the different allies, it is imposs-
ible to say whether they laid down the precise size of the contingents to be
provided or indicated the criteria for setting the quotas according to the
needs of the moment. It seems unlikely that no provision was made for
changes in the size of the citizen bodies in the allied states.

The ratio of allied troops to Roman soldiery must have varied accord-
ing to the occasion. The general proportions indicated in the ancient
sources (an equal number of infantry but the allied cavalry three times the
number of the Roman cavalry, according to Polybius; twice as many
allies as Roman citizens at the time of the Hannibalic War according to
Appian and at all times according to Velleius) appear to relate to different
times in history if they are compared with the fairly reliable detailed
figures that have come down to us. 106 There are many indications that the
Roman government tended to place the greater part of the military
burden on the allies immediately after the Hannibalic War and again in
the second half of the second century b.c. 107 If this burden is to be
evaluated correctly it should naturally be viewed in relation to the size of
the populations of the allied communities, which we do not know. If the
burden was heavier for the allies, this fact - along with the phenomenon
of emigration - could explain why complaints about a decline in popula-
tion were voiced primarily by the allies.

It must be assumed in any case that the entire system of allied military
obligations was modified and updated over the years. For example, in
193 b.c. the enrolment of the allied contingents took account of the
number of juniores , perhaps because the allied communities were unable,
temporarily at least, to supply troops according to the formula . 108 Some-
thing that certainly underwent an almost complete transformation was
the political and military significance of allied participation in Rome’s
wars after the Hannibalic War, a transformation which paralleled the
shift in Roman policy from an Italian to a Mediterranean and imperial
orientation. No more wars on a basis of equality or for mutual defence
such as those against the Gauls; participation now meant involvement as
subordinates in a policy of expansion. Undoubtedly the allies had by now
been integrated into the Roman army, 109 but the political advantages of

105 Polyb. vi. 21. 4; Ilari 1974: (h 140); Giuffre 1975: (h 134). Brum 1971, 545 —8 : (h 82), is
fundamental.

106 Polyb. 111. 107. 1 2, vi. 26.7 and 30.2; App. Harm. 8.31; Veil. Pat. 11.13.2; Brunt 1971, 677-86:

(h 82). 107 Gabba 1976, 187 n. 61: (h 42).

106 Livy xxxiv. 56.6; McDonald 1944, 20: (h 145); Galsterer 1976, 160: (h 132); for a different
view see Ilari 1974, 73—5: (h 140).

109 Gohler 1939, 31: (h 135); Frank, CAbl x vm.361. However, they were denied the benefits
granted under the third lex Portia, dating from about 1 50-135: McDonald 1944, 19-20: (h 145).

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MILITARY OBLIGATIONS AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 223

victory and conquest were reserved almost exclusively for Rome; some
of the economic benefits did reach the allies, but certainly not in
proportion to their war-effort. In this respect the disparity between
Rome and the Italian states gradually widened, and the allies became
increasingly aware that they had helped create an empire in which they
enjoyed only part of the fruits and which was beyond their political
control. It was primarily the Italian mercantile class which noticed this
great disparity between what they gave and what they received through
involvement in Roman policy, even though the members of this class had
business links with their Roman equivalents and were certainly not in
conflict with the generally Romanophile governing classes of their own
communities, to which indeed they belonged. This does not necessarily
mean that the allies were forced or coerced into participation in military
operations, particularly in the early decades of the second century, or that
it was for reasons of internal politics that they were sympathetic towards
an expansionist policy which obliged them to send their sons to lands far
from Italy. The attitudes to be found in allied communities were prob-
ably on balance the same as those encountered in Rome. In many cases
both allies and Romans will have seen the overseas wars as providing an
opportunity for enrichment, quite apart from the distribution of booty,
which was usually shared equally among Roman and allied soldiers. 110 It
was the pay and rewards received by allied troops that introduced Roman
currency and an exchange economy to inland areas of the peninsula and
brought with it corresponding forms of behaviour. 111 In this manner
too, military activities may have served as a cement between Rome and
her allies. Viewed in this light the expansionist policy of Rome may
actually have prevented potential internal political conflicts from
surfacing. 112

It is more difficult to guess the position of the upper classes, probably
torn between a generally pro-Roman attitude and the increasingly heavy
responsibility of administering their communities. It was they who
foresaw the consequences of the fall in population resulting from emigra-
tion. The problems will not have been confined to the levy itself; the
financial burden on the allied communities deriving from their
responsibility for the pay of their troops 113 will have fallen increasingly
on the upper classes, because emigration drew away not only potential
soldiers but also potential taxpayers. Although tributum was no longer
levied in Rome after 167 B.C., the allied states undoubtedly continued to
collect taxes from their citizens; this was not the least of their complaints

no polyb. x.i6.4; Livy XL.43.7, XLi.43.7. The discrepancy which occurred in 177, recorded in
Livy xli. iz. 7-8, is certainly an exception. Fora genera! treatment see Brunt 1971, 394: (h 82); Harris
l 979 » 102-4: (a 21). 1,1 Crawford >985, 47-50: (b 88a).

1,2 Momigliano 1974, 3 = 1980, 1.125-6: (b 20). 1,3 Polyb. v1.21.5-

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224

ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

on the eve of the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus. 114 It has to be said,
however, that the Italian upper classes will have found some recompense
for this fiscal burden in their participation in the exploitation of ager
publicus and even more in the advantages that imperial expansion pro-
vided for their commercial activities.

During the second century b.c. the establishment and spread of
Rome’s political predominance in the Mediterranean basin brought with
it growing commercial and economic expansion as well as the benefits
that sprang directly from the military victories. As early as the middle of
the third century b.c. a new set of ethics had begun to develop that was
imbued with utilitarian principles; it cannot have failed to influence the
process of expansion and it certainly helped to overcome the traces of a
narrow ‘peasant’ mentality surviving in a significant section of the
governing class. Economic change therefore had an important effect on
attitudes and behaviour, a process in which the Italian upper classes were
also directly involved. 115 The broad identity between merchants and
landowners must have been even more obvious than at Rome. There is
abundant evidence from as early as the third century b.c. that the
mercantile classes of southern Italy, especially Campania but also else-
where, had interests in the Greek East; during the second century these
became still stronger and gave rise to measures by the Roman govern-
ment to protect Roman and Italian traders. 116 Although there is at the
moment a tendency to emphasize the prevalence of Roman cives, espe-
cially among the negotiatores in Delos, it remains a fact that much trade
was in the hands of Italian socii. The designations ‘Italians’ and
‘Rhomaioi’ for merchants in the Greek world before 90 B.C. usually refer
to Roman citizens and allies indifferently, 117 thus confirming the theory
that the first signs of unity among inhabitants of the peninsula appeared
abroad. The presence of Rhodian amphora stamps datable to the second
century and part of the first in central Samnium (Monte Vairano,
Larinum) seems to provide clear proof of the receptiveness of these
regions to Greek cultural influences and also indirectly of the commer-
cial enterprise of south Italian negotiatores. u% The involvement of Italian
elements in economic activity overseas led eventually to a demand for
participation in the political management of the Roman state.

Collusion between Roman and Italian interest groups had a long
history. The situation that led in 193 b.c. to approval of the lex Sempronia
de pecunia credita , which arose out of the moneylenders’ practice of

1.4 App. B. Civ. 1.7.50, with commentary in Gabba 195 8: (b 8); Gabba 1977, 22-5: (h 45); Nicolet
1978: (h 147).

1.5 Gabba 1976, 7 5 ff.: (h 42); Wilson 1966, 85#.: (h 1 21); Brunt 1971, 209#.: (h 82); Cassola 1971,

505-22: (h 128). 116 Livy xxxviii. 44 . 4 : 187, Ambracia; Harris 1979, 94: (a 21).

1.7 Brunt 1971, 205#.: (h 82); Ilari 1974, 5#.: (h 140).

1.8 Sannio , 542-8: (h 155); Bevilacqua 1980, 21-54: (h 226).

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ROMAN INTERVENTION 22$

employing Latin and Italian agents to circumvent the prohibitions of the
existing law, illustrates the close links between Romans and Italians in
the financial field. 119 It would be reasonable to suggest that Cato’s
associates in his activities in the field of maritime loans were not all
Roman citizens. 120 It seems natural to suppose that economic interests
had a growing, if indirect influence on Rome’s political decisions during
the second century b.c., although that is not to say that they were
determining factors. The sharing of interests between Romans and
Italians suggests that even the latter were in a position to make their
opinions known, in that their interests depended to a large extent on the
credibility of Roman power. 121

V. ROMAN INTERVENTION

So far we have indicated some of the main factors that led more or less
indirectly and spontaneously to the increasing alignment of the Italian
states with Rome during the second century b.c., in the sense that the
main characteristics of autonomy and independence that each Italian state
still possessed in theory were being slowly but inexorably eroded. Of
course, this levelling process received some impetus from Rome’s direct
interventions in the internal affairs of the allied states. In modern
scholarly work, the scale and character of such interventions provide the
most important evidence for an evaluation of Roman policy towards the
Italian socii during the second century and in the period leading up to the
Social War. On this question the most interesting ancient source is
Polybius vi. 1 3. 4-5, which forms part of the historian’s reasoning on the
position and competence of the Senate in the operation of the constitu-
tional mechanisms of the Roman state. 122 ‘Similarly, crimes committed in
Italy, which require a public investigation, such as treason, conspiracy,
poisoning and assassination, are under the jurisdiction of the Senate.
Also if any private person or community in Italy is in need of arbitration
or indeed claims damages or requires succour or protection, the Senate
attends to all such matters.’

Polybius’ text relates to a juridically defined territorial sphere much
larger than the ager Romanus alone. It makes no distinction between
administrative intervention and the criminal jurisdiction of the Roman
state (magistrates acting on behalf of the Senate) in allied states, but it
does separate criminal actions capable of jeopardizing the political,

119 Livy xxxv.7.1-5; Gohler 1939, 53#.: (h 155); McDonald 1944, 20: (h 145).

120 Plot. Cat . Mai . 21,5-6; Gabba 1980, 92-4: (h 92). 121 Harris 1979, 97-9: (a 21).

122 Mommsen 1887-8, 111.1197#.: (a 25); Gohler 1959, 37-69: (h 135); Sherwin-White 1973,
119#.: (h iij); McDonald 1944, 13#: (h 145); Walbank 1957-79, 1.679-80: (b 38); Badian 1958,
145#.: (a 3).

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Zl6 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

military and social standing of the Italian states, and thus automatically
necessitating Roman intervention to restore order, from other cases of
much less importance in which Rome’s intervention might be encour-
aged or requested by an allied city or one of its citizens. It goes without
saying that in both types of case the need for and feasibility of Roman
intervention must have been dealt with and provided for in treaties with
the allies and in the laws establishing colonies. By their very legitimacy
these forms of intervention differed sharply from the abuses of power
that Roman magistrates could commit at the expense of allied states.

Instances of intervention requested by allied communities themselves
are the best documented. They could take the form of arbitration by
Roman magistrates to settle boundary disputes between two autono-
mous communities, such as those recorded in Latin inscriptions in the
area of the Venetia, 123 or settlement of disputes within the same allied
territory between the dominant community and a subordinate one, such
as the celebrated case of the judgement delivered ex senati consulto by the
brothers Q. and M. Minucii Rufi in 1 1 7 B.C. (documents of this kind were
obviously expressed in Latin). 124 Direct intervention was also possible to
subdue more or less violent political and social conflicts within allied
cities - these were probably the cases in which Rome intervened at the
request of individual citizens or groups of citizens, in other words
elements in one of the factions in the struggle, and it is easy to imagine
that the Roman government took the side of the upper classes. One
example from the second century b.c. must suffice: the insurrection of
Patavium in 175, for which the intervention of a consul was requested. 125
A century earlier, in 265 b.c., the Romans had responded to a call made
under the terms of the relevant treaty by intervening in force to put down
a seizure of power by the serfs in Volsinii. 126

Other kinds of intervention prompted by non-Italian allied communi-
ties were designed to establish laws relating to the internal constitution
of the cities, particularly the composition and recruitment of local
senates. Their main aim was to maintain the dominant position of
specifically identified elements within the citizen body of the cities. The
settlements are of the greatest interest, as they will have been modelled
on arrangements already tested in Italian areas, and probably also indi-
cate the way in which in Latin colonies, for example, the pre-eminence of
citizens registered in the highest census class was originally secured,
especially where the citizen body was of varied and heterogeneous

123 Cl L i 2 .6} j = 11 J> 5944a; CIC iL6 34 =//^r 5944; IU 2joi=/LLRP 176 (Patavium and
Ateste), 142 or 1 16 b.c.; CIL i 2 .6$6 = ILLRP Atestc and Vicctia), 135 b.c. Mazzarino 1979,
5917-4: (b 53). 124 CIL 1 2 . 584 — ILS 5946 = ILLRP 5 17= Bruns, Font. 184.

125 Livy xu.17.3-4. 126 Zon. vm.7.8; Flor. 1.16; Harris 1971, 91-2: (h 136).

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ROMAN INTERVENTION

22 7

origin. 127 The examples from Sicily may indicate that similar Roman
intervention occurred in Italian cities and hence that this was a further
way of aligning Italian constitutions with that of Rome, even though it is
probable that except in dangerous situations Rome did not often inter-
vene in order to reform or reorganize the constitutions of allied cities.
Finally, the obscure senatus consultant concerning Tibur in about 1 59 b.c.
may give us an idea of the reprimand of an allied community by Rome. 128

Instances of entirely legitimate intervention on the initiative of the
Roman government itself were much more serious. The best known case
is the senatus consultant of 186 b.c. to repress the Bacchic cult, whose
manifestations were regarded as a form of coniuratio against the state. 129
Even though the ager Teuranus in Bruttium where the bronze tablet with
the senatus consultant was discovered was probably ager R on/anus, there
seems to be no reason to doubt that Roman repression directly or
indirectly involved Roman and Latin territory and that of the Italian
allies and the responsibilities of their respective magistrates. 131 Similar
situations arose in the case of slave revolts and natural disasters requiring
Roman intervention which it would have been difficult to limit strictly to
the territory of the state of Rome. 132 Such interventions were exceptional
and occasional in nature. Indeed, a further question is the Roman
government’s actual ability to control Italy, given the difficulty it had in
knowing the state of affairs within its own territory.

If we accept the passage in Polybius and the other documentation that
confirms and explains it, it seems obvious that we must reject as ill-
founded the theory that Roman legislation was imposed upon the Italian
allies. 133 Certainly many laws in the civil sphere proposed in Rome were
spontaneously adopted by the Latins (and perhaps by allied communi-
ties) as they met the needs and requirements of these communities. 134
This acceptance of Roman legislation became increasingly common in
the second half of the second century, which is probably one of the
reasons why so many fragments of Roman laws of the Gracchan and
post-Gracchan eras are found throughout Italy (the leges de repentundis
published with Roman encouragement in many allied communities are
obviously a case apart). 135 In only one case can it be said that a Roman
law, the sumptuary lex Fannia of 161 b.c., was extended to the whole of
Italy by means of another piece of legislation, the lex Didia of 143 b.c. 136

127 Cic. V err. li.i 20-5. The instances quoted are: Agrigcntum, probably 193; Heraclca, probably
132; Halaesa, 95; Gabba 1959: (1 11).

123 CIL i 2 -5 86 = //— JT 19 = ILLRP 312= Bruns, Pont. 36.

•29 CIL i 2 . 581 = ILS 18 = ILLRP 311 = Bruns, Pont. 36.

130 Gclzer 1962-4, in. 2 59 n. 15: (a 19); cf. Livy xxxix. 18.7.

131 For a different view see Galstcrer 1976, 169: (h 132).

132 Livy xxxn. 26.5-18, xxxix. 29. 8ff, 41.6-7, xlii. 10.7-8.

133 Harris 1972: (h 137) has resolved the problem. 134 Cic. Ba lb. 20-1.

135 Crawford 1981, 155-6: (h 129). 136 Macrob. Satur. m.17.6.

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228 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

The explanation for this piece of Roman interference lies in a desire to
protect the economic viability and hence the social and political standing
of the governing class not only in Rome but also in the allied communi-
ties, where the upper classes were Rome’s only contacts and the bases of
her power . 137 As we shall see below, the Roman government was most
probably authorized to take measures of this kind under the terms of
treaties with the allies and of the laws establishing colonies, which
safeguarded the position of the classes that actually held power.

There is no evidence for true amendment of the constitutions of the
Italian states, but in view of all that has been said hitherto it is certain that
the Italian states and Rome were steadily growing more alike during the
second century b.c. As just remarked, the general cause lay in the shared
interest of the Italian upper classes in the exploitation of the provinces,
the integration of the middle and lower classes through the military
institutions of the alliance, and Rome’s interest in guaranteeing the
position of the allied governing classes, all of which were consequences
of the policy of expansion. One of the most significant aspects of this
trend towards homogeneity concerns political institutions and
magistracies . 138 It is attractive to suggest that the need for close and
dependable co-operation with the Roman state might have provided the
allied states with an incentive to bring the functions and titles of their
magistrates more closely into line with those of Rome, first in the
military sphere and then in civil affairs. This would be tantamount to
saying that the cultural and linguistic assimilation sought by a large part
of the Italian upper classes during the century, no doubt spontaneously
but encouraged by repeated moments of contact with Rome, may have
been mirrored in the institutional field; this may explain the adoption of
new magistracies alongside traditional offices or the replacement of local
titles by Roman ones, which always presupposes some internal constitu-
tional development. The new magistracies were necessary as much for
practical reasons of co-existence with Rome as because of the need for
specialization and the greater complexity of political and administrative
problems, especially as the ancient magistracies, such as the Oscan office
of< weddix, were losing the purpose and meaning they had enjoyed during
the period of autonomy. For example, the prevalence of the censor
( censtur , most probably borrowed from Latin, as it is not a native Italic
form) as an eponymous magistrate in Oscan regions is difficult to
separate from the implications which the census acquired in the second
century b.c. in connection with the allies’ duties and obligations towards

137 Gabba 1981: (h 44). Fora different view see Gohlcr 1939, 38-9: (h 135); Harris 1971, 112:
(h i 3 6); Galsterer 1976, 132-3: (h 132).

138 Camporeale 1956: (h 278); Brunt 1965, 100-2: (h 127); Cristofani 1978: (h 279); Prosdocimi
1978, 29—74: (h 287); Campanile and Letta 1979: (h 277).

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ROMAN INTERVENTION ZZ<)

Rome. In some cases this adjustment to match Roman models is likely to
have favoured a high degree of continuity in the structures of Italian
magistracies before and after the Social War.

The upper classes of the allied communities derived significant indi-
rect protection from another clause contained in some treaties. The
foedera with the Cenomani, Insubres, Helvetii, Iapydes and other Gallic
peoples expressly excluded any of them from being received into Roman
citizenship - nequis eorum a nobis civis recipiaiur.^ 9 These treaties date from
the period between 197 and 104 b.c. Such a specific prohibition demon-
strates the existence of its converse, namely that Rome usually reserved
the right to make such grants of citizenship, as indeed is expressly
attested. In the instances quoted by Cicero, the granting of Roman
citizenship was evidently considered prejudicial to the interests of the
other community. The clause in th e. foedera with the Cenomani etc. does
not relate, as is generally supposed, to the possible granting of citizenship
to members of the upper classes. On the contrary, its aim was to prevent
members of the lower classes of these tribes from obtaining Roman
citizenship and thus acquiring in their home state a position and rights
that would harm the social and political structure peculiar to these
communities; in other words, the granting of Roman citizenship would
have automatically implied recognition of their equality with the ruling
classes in economic and social terms also, as was to be demonstrated in 49
b.c. The possibility in principle that, but for the prohibition in the
treaties, Rome might have made grants of citizenship to members of
these tribes was linked to the duty of the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul to
provide Rome with military contingents under the treaties; that they did
so is well documented for the period up to the Social War. 140 For without
the prohibition acts of valour would surely have been rewarded with
Roman citizenship. A later case when this did happen is that of the
Spanish cavalrymen of the turma Salluitana who were made citizens by the
decree of Cn. Pompeius Strabo in 89 b.c . 141 The punitive significance of
this action for the community, which saw members of its own subordi-
nate classes made Roman citizens or freed from dependence on the city,
can be sensed in the decree of L. Aemilius Paullus, who freed the slaves of
the Hastenses in 190/89 and granted them not only the lands of the
dominant city that they already occupied, which had become ager publicus
of the Roman people with the conquest of the area, but also possession of
the town. 142

The social structure peculiar to Gallic communities and Rome’s

,w Cic. Balb. 32. The best commentary is in Luraschi 1979, 4 iff.: (h 143).

140 Livy xli.i.8; 5.5, on which see Badian 1958, 276 n. 7: (a 3); App. B. Civ. 1.39.177, 42.188-9,
30.219-20; Plot. Serf. 4.1. Regarding Ligurian auxiliaries sec Brunt 1971, 169 n. 3: (h 82).

141 CIL i 2 .7o 9 = /LT 8888 = /LLRP 513. 142 CIL i 2 .6i 4 = /LT ij=/LLRP 314.

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1 JO ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

recognition of it may be compared with similar situations in Etruscan
regions; here too Rome took care to leave the existing social and political
situation undisturbed as far as possible . 143 More generally, the same
objective was served by the provisions of treaties that granted the allies
use of the ager publicus populi Romani within the territory of their
communities.

The treaties between Rome and the different Italian peoples certainly
contained many other clauses dealing with matters of common interest,
which ultimately had the indirect effect of tying the allied states ever
more closely to Rome. For example, provision was certainly made for the
surrender of land for road-building . 144 As we know, extensive road-
building was undertaken in the second century in parallel with territorial
expansion, military conquest and the policy of colonization . 145 This
policy of penetration, which cannot be separated from the economic
aspect of the work that it generated, may have been viewed favourably by
the allies in that it fostered trade and the movement of people and ideas,
although we do not know the extent to which such movement, which
altered the regional status quo, was welcomed or foreseen. Certainly the
new network of Roman roads corresponded to needs and conceptions
that were new even in relation to the most recent past . 146

The political and social importance of the roads, which was recog-
nized by contemporary writers, is confirmed by their role in the emer-
gence of cities and in the participation of non-citizens in the political life
of Rome . 147 Areas not reached by the roads naturally remained in
isolation and benefited little from the circulation of men and ideas. It was
the road network that carried most of the migrants within the peninsula.
Against the background of the Roman policy of colonization, the roads
always encouraged the appearance of settlements and often stimulated
their growth into towns. Renovation of public and private buildings
during the second century was a consequence of the general, if uneven,
spread of prosperity across large areas of Italy. The main beneficiaries
were the sea-ports, which profited from trade.

Against this background, the road-building projects and public works
commissioned by the censors on ager Romanus (and, as far as the roads
were concerned, in allied territory as well) must have acted as a powerful
spur to development from both the political and the socio-economic
points of view, but they were also a means of interference and control by
the Roman government. Nevertheless, it seems that in the second half of
the century the communities even on ager Romanus achieved greater

143 Harris 1971, 114#.: (h 136).

144 Mommsen 1887—8, 11.428 n. 4: (a 25); Wiseman 1970: (h 63).

,4S Toynbee 1965, 11.654-81: (a 37).

146 Regarding Etruria, Harris 1971, (h 136). 147 Wiseman 1971, 28ff.: (h 64).

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ROMAN INTERVENTION 2 3 I

powers to commission public works financed with their own funds on
their own territory. 148

A contemporary phenomenon was the private donation of money for
public building schemes, which may in general be ascribed to increasing
prosperity among the Roman and Italian upper classes. 149 An awareness
that far-reaching economic changes brought with them a serious and
dangerous relaxation of ethical standards is shown by contemporary
moralistic views on the decline in standards of behaviour, which indeed
is simply a way of reacting to a new social and economic situation.

Historical and social factors such as Roman colonization, military
recruitment, the adoption of Roman laws and magistracies, new roads,
emigration and trade were ultimately also to have significant cultural
repercussions; for the attainment of equality with the Roman ruling class
by the Italian elites caused the gradual withering of indigenous cultures
as a result of the adoption of Latin as an essential means of approaching
and then entering the Roman world; paradoxically, the local elites did
not actually intend to renounce their ancient local traditions. The elitist
nature of Italian culture, especially Etruscan culture, seems undeniable;
this may enable us to understand in general terms the decline of local
cultures and their eventual disappearance in the first century b.c . 150 The
longer survival of elements of the culture of Magna Graecia is the result
of the deeper social roots of Greek culture, from which also sprang those
intellectuals from Livius Andronicus to Ennius who settled in Rome and
fostered the assimilation of Greek culture. Outside Magna Graecia
Latinization was already well advanced in the second century, and was to
develop further in the first with the granting of Roman citizenship.
However, as has been said with regard to the disappearance of the Oscan
language, ‘the germ of this phenomenon is to be found rather in the
receptive and passive attitude of Oscan speakers when confronted with a
linguistic tradition that was so much more prestigious on the political
and cultural plane’. 151 Confirmation can be found in the symbolic case of
Cumae, which in 1 80 asked the Roman government for permission to use
Latin for official purposes. 152 Until then this Campanian city, which had
remained loyal during the Hannibalic War, had used Oscan, which it had
probably obtained the right to retain, together with other characteristic
elements of its previous autonomy, at the time of its incorporation into
the Roman state with the granting of civitas sine suffragio.

Voluntary adaptation to Roman realities may also explain the decline
of Etruscan between the second and first centuries b.c., although with

148 Mommsen 1887-8, ii 3 .429: (a 25) regarding Livy XLi.27.10-1 3 (1 74 b.c.); Gabba 1976, 3160. 3
and 323: (h 91). 149 Gabba 1976, 324-3: (h 91). ,so Gabba 1978, 11-27: (h i 3 1).

151 Campanile 1976, no: (h 276). Sec aJso Lejeune 1976: (h 286); Dc Simone 1980: (h 283);
Prosdocimi 1978: (h 288). 152 Livy XL.42.13; Sartori 1977, 156-7: (h 154).

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232 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

important geographic differences - the Romanization of the southern
regions preceded that of the northern regions of Etruria. In this instance
there were special reasons inherent in the structure of Etruscan society,
whose elites were to be among the first to integrate into the Roman state
at the highest level in the first century b.c.

Turning our attention from the upper to the lower classes of Italian
society, we find a similar process of assimilation and integration occur-
ring, this time in the context of military organization. The proletarianiza-
tion of the Romano-Italian military forces in the second half of the
second century b.c. did not create class solidarity among the soldiers; but
recruitment of men without property did represent the most obvious
resolution of the crisis that had afflicted Romano-Italian society as a
whole, as a result of the profound changes that had occurred in its
traditional agrarian structure.

VI. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE

The transformation of society and of the agrarian economy was but the
final unfolding of a situation which had been developing since the third
century. This situation now became more generalized and had a more
serious impact because of the simultaneous emergence of new political
factors - the expansionist policy of Rome - that made new resources
available and favoured the development of new notions concerning the
value and use of wealth.

Although the transformation of Italian social and economic structures
varied from one region to another because of the different reactions it
engendered, a number of common characteristics can be identified.
Between the fourth and third centuries traditional forms of dependent
labour had been declining as a result of the great wave of Roman
colonization; this had brought with it the development of slavery, which
partly replaced previous labour arrangements. Slave labour now became
available in increasing quantity as a result of the wars in Sicily and against
the Gauls. The decline in population and the abandonment of large areas
in the centre and south caused by the Hannibalic War introduced a new
element that grew more acute as the century progressed on account of the
many factors indicated above: movements of population for reasons of
colonization, prolonged military service far from Italy, urbanization and
spontaneous emigration. The favourable and necessary conditions for a
further expansion of slavery to fill the void were thus being created,
particularly as the wars of conquest now provided the wealthy classes
with slave labour on a much larger scale than hitherto.

At least as far as the first half of the second century is concerned, it
cannot be said that the rich had a deliberate wish to drive free

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE 233

smallholders from the land, take over their farms and install a different
form of agriculture based on slavery . 153 This rather simplistic view
ignores the fact that the choice between free and slave labour in the
Romano-Italian economy pre-dates this period and sprang not from a
political decision based on economic considerations but from a concrete
situation that had been developing for quite different reasons. The
difference between the political and social value of the free peasant (a
potential legionary) and that of the slave (exempt from military service)
was expressed in terms of a stark choice by the polemics of the Gracchan
era because they were considering and judging the outcome of a long and
complex process that had undoubtedly included the expulsion of peasant
landowners by the wealthy and their replacement by slaves. Of necessity,
this view dwelt on one aspect of the crisis occasioned by social and
economic change, namely the proletarianization of the rural middle and
lower classes, which soon proved to be an extremely serious phenom-
enon, neither sought nor desired by the wealthy classes of Roman and
Italian society.

The first consequence of the depopulation of the countryside was the
predominance of an extensive form of agriculture, which simultaneously
exploited the decline of the small peasant farm and helped undermine the
typical structure of the economy in many areas of Italy, especially by the
introduction of a new method of working public land that was more
profitable for the rich and for the state. This is the main theme on which
traditional sources dwelt in describing the crisis of society in the second
century b.C. There seem to be two reasons for this preoccupation. First,
ager publicus was traditionally seen as the only instrument available to the
state if it wished to intervene in various ways in the solution of social and
economic problems; the historiographical implications are well known.
Secondly, the problem of the state lands now took on new characteristics
as a result of the large-scale confiscations following the Hannibalic War;
it was well known that the major speculative schemes of the wealthy
revolved around ager publicus.

The transformation of the Italian agrarian economy followed various
paths. It is uncertain whether truly political decisions were involved in
particular phases or at least whether these were motivated by political
requirements, for example in Campania or Sicily. Even in the cases that
seem to be better documented, such as in Campania, it is not possible to
identify precise phases of transition ; 154 our knowledge of the outcome is
better, but not good. There would have been different methods of
working the soil, new forms of agriculture and of the agrarian economy.
The change that was apparently most typical because it had greater

153 Hopkins 1978, 4-5: (h 99).

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234 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

political and military implications was that resulting from the reorgani-
zation of small farms producing for home consumption into larger
plantations cultivated by slaves or part-time labourers or, in some cases,
leased in individual plots to colonists. Some crops, particularly oil and
wine, would therefore be ‘industrialized’, with production for market. In
some areas in Campania and Apulia amalgamation of this kind may have
favoured the expansion of cereal monoculture. In other cases the abun-
dant supply of money and land permitted the rationalization of certain
practices that already existed, such as transhumant stock-rearing, which
must have come into more widespread use as part of the general trend
towards the development of grazing owing to its more immediate
profitability. The increase in pasture at the expense of arable land should
be seen in the context of the depopulation of the mountain and hill
regions of the Appennines, which had been brought under cultivation in
earlier periods of history.

The Campanian and Samnite region may serve as a typical example,
although the same also applies to many areas in the Appennines. The
large walled strongholds that had been built on the hilltops in the
Samnite era as refuges for the population scattered thinly on the floors of
the valleys ceased to have a purpose in the middle of the third century.
The desolation of these previously well-populated areas as a result of the
Samnite Wars was accompanied by a change in the use of the land in the
Roman era. 155

These new forms of agriculture came to co-exist with other, archaic
forms based on half-free labour that survived and would long continue
to survive in some areas, either for local historical and social reasons or
because of environmental conditions. It cannot be imagined that the
system of small peasant farms with their economy based on self-suffic-
iency disappeared, even though the trend was in that direction; indeed,
the policy of colonization and land assignation pursued by the Roman
government in the first thirty years of the second century was designed to
reproduce just such a system, particularly in Cisalpine Gaul. As has
already been said, this does not indicate a contradiction; rather it con-
firms that the Roman ruling class, which would organize the conquests
and take credit for the victories, did not have and could not have a
colonist programme to govern the process of expansion, let alone a
policy with regard to the change in social, economic and political
relations in Italy. However, towards the 160s it became conscious of the
changes that were taking place, a fact that is proved by the consideration
given by the ruling class to the means of exercising power over its

,M Unsatisfactory attempts to determine such phases in Frederiksen 1981, 1.267-87: (h 89);
cf. also Carandini 1981, 11. 250-5: (h 83), and Ghinatti 1977: (h 133).

155 Contra Haller 1978: (h 237).

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE

235

subjects. Not much later, namely in 133 b.c., the presentation of a
systematic programme of reform by Tiberius Gracchus was accom-
panied by a substantial innovation: an attempt actually to analyse the
causes of the crisis and establish links among social, economic, political
and military factors. This socio-economic analysis led to a revival of the
system of small peasant farms, by means of more effective large-scale
state intervention on ager publicus than in the past; but the revived peasant
farms were to exist alongside the new and different methods of working
the land which had developed. Such an analysis and its practical conse-
quences conflicted with economic reasoning, 156 which not only
highlighted the value of the alternative, more modern trends towards
industrialized and rationalized agriculture, but denied any validity to the
socio-economic and ethical model of the farmer-soldier. This may have
been the first time that such a thing had occurred in the political Life of
Rome; underlying the controversy were different models for the devel-
opment of the economy and of society.

New elements had thus been introduced into the social and economic
structure of Italian communities, which it is difficult not to consider as
progressive factors at the time, in that they represented a better adapta-
tion of Romano-Italian society to the demands of a new homogeneous
state. In general, however, much continued as before, especially in the
southern and central regions of the peninsula, so that the innovations
often appear limited in extent; indeed, they were short-lived, mainly
because they depended upon an availability and use of slave labour which
could not last long. The unchanging aspects, by contrast, were deter-
mined by environmental, physical and geographic factors that ancient
societies with the forms of intervention which they devised could not
overcome or change except in a superficial way. Hence even changes in
the method of working the land in the various periods of antiquity
represented nothing more than repeated attempts to adapt a reality that
survived unchanged in its constituent parts, in spite of the disruptions
caused by political events.

The typical instrument of the ‘industrial’ phase of Italian agriculture in
the second century b.c. was the country estate described by Cato in his
treatise. It need hardly be said that this system, which introduced new
agricultural techniques yielding large crops for the market (as well as
sufficient produce for the owner and his labour force), had different
characteristics and functions in the various areas of Italy in which
archaeological evidence shows it to have been widespread. Such diver-
sity was a product of the environment, the suitability of different crops
for the locality and the differing demands of town markets in the vicinity.

156 Dion. Ha!, vm. 68-76; Gabba and Pasquinucci 1979, 64-73: (h 93).

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236 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

The structure of the farms would have been fairly standard, however.
Probably modelled on Greek farms in Magna Graecia and Sicily and on
Carthaginian plantations, it must have been introduced in the Roman
world in the second half of the third century and have spread in the first
half of the second as the most rational system of agricultural exploita-
tion. 157 Cato intended the description of this kind of farm to serve the
particular social and political situation of a young landowner from the
Roman political class investing his substantial wealth in estates of this
kind to generate earnings that would then be used for socio-political
ends. It is clear that in orderto achieve these objectives and also by reason
of the type of crops and the need of the landowner to exercise careful
personal control, a farm of this type in the second century required the
particular conditions to be found in southern Latium, Campania and
perhaps some areas of southern Etruria but almost nowhere else in
central Italy. Nor will it have been easy to transform and lay out vacant
and available lands in accordance with Cato’s suggestions. Elsewhere the
organization of the country estate will have been adapted to suit local
conditions, although the aim of achieving high profits by marketing the
product remained the same. A farm described by two agronomists
named Saserna (father and son; their work is known only at second-
hand), which probably lay in the territory of the Bagienni in Cisalpine
Gaul, may be quoted as an example from the end of the second century. 158
It should be noted that in parts of Cisalpine Gaul, especially the
Transpadane area, that had not been colonized by the Romans, a system
of land tenure and of farming which was closely bound up with the
structure of local Celtic society continued to prevail in the second
century and was still to be found in the first.

The agrarian structure of Etruria also long preserved features charac-
teristic of the region’s particular social organization, which Rome was
careful not to destroy before the Social War. Thus in 196 b.c. the Roman
army intervened to suppress a ‘conspiracy of slaves’ which seems to have
been widespread. 159 The chief factor seems to have been the existence of
large estates, belonging to noblemen, which were worked by ‘serfs’ and
also by slaves. This kind of estate and method of farming was predomi-
nant in the coastal areas of Etruria and also, it seems, at Volaterrae, in the
territory of which there is evidence of the presence of large consolidated
estates throughout ancient times and in the early Middle Ages. Within
such an estate there worked a large class of small, dependent farmers;
archaeological research has succeeded in identifying such individuals,

157 Gabba and Pasquinucci 1979, 30-2: (h 93); Maroti 1976: (h 103) (at the beginning of the
second century). Frederiksen (n. 1 54) prefers to date its spread to the second half of the second
century, at least in Campania. ,S8 Kolendo 1973, 14-16: (h 202).

159 Livy xxxni. 36. 1— 3.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE 237

but not in describing their true social status or their position with regard
to ownership of the land. 160

This problem is central to analysis of the structures of Etruscan
society, especially in inland areas of the centre and north and in particular
in Clusium. Archaeological evidence pointing to widely scattered rural
settlement is often interpreted as a sign of the sub-division of agrarian
property (with individual boundaries, among other things) as a result of
a colonization scheme supposedly carried out by local nobles in the
second century b.c. and the corresponding liberation of their ‘serfs’. 161
This interpretation rests on an imaginative theory put forward by H. Rix
on the basis of the forms of the names occurring in inscriptions from the
area of Clusium and Perusia. 162 The lautni (who in the period before 90
b.c. are usually identified hypothetically with the ‘serfs’, the penestai of
the Latin and Greek sources, although Rix considers them simply as
slaves) are thought to have changed their system of nomenclature
between the third and second centuries b.c. After the change onomastic
formulae in three parts are found, where a praenomen served as the family
name and a family name has the function of cognomen. It is claimed that the
change testifies on the legal plane to a kind of liberation and on the social
level to admission to ‘citizenship’ and ownership of the land. Leaving
aside the doubts about the identification of lautni with ‘serfs’, the change
in nomenclature may be explained more simply as the result of a
reorganization of the Etruscan cities at the prompting of Rome for some
purpose connected with the census. Even ‘serfs’ were obliged to serve in
the military contingents Rome demanded of the Etruscan cities. Even if
the Etruscan ‘serfs’ acquired some special status in relation to the land
they tilled for their lords, the distinction between ‘serf’ and master
remained unchanged until 91 b.c., as is shown by the Etruscan document
known as the prophecy of Vegoia 163 and, perhaps, also by a comparison
with Transpadane Gaul. Hence it is more likely that archaeological
discoveries in the area in question reveal an internal organization of the
large estate that differed from that practised in coastal areas on account of
differences in the nature of the land.

In any case, the Etruscan evidence confirms the view that Cato’s
treatise cannot be considered typical of Italian agriculture in general,
which varied considerably from one region to another. However,
around the end of the second century and the beginning of the first
century b.c., colonial allotments in the area of the Latin colony of Cosa

160 Gabbaand Pasquinucci 1979, 56 and n. 5 1: (h 95). With regard to the territories of Volaterrae
and Clusium: Luchi 1981, 1 .4 1 3 ff.: (h 247).

161 Gabba and Pasquinucci 1979, 57 n. 53: (h 95).

162 Rix 1953, and 1977, 64—73, w * £ b discussion: (h 290 and 291).

163 Gromatici Veteres 1.350 Lachman; Heurgon 1959: (1 21) and 1970: (h 97); Gromatici Veteres
L423-4-

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238 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

were replaced by vast ‘industrialized’ plantations similar to the Catonian
estate; aided by ease of access to the sea, they displayed a strong trend
towards producing for the market. It is noteworthy that similar transfor-
mations are usually found in those Etruscan areas that had previously
been colonized by the Romans. This observation probably has more
general application and may also hold true of other Italian areas where
assignations had previously been made. In areas where there had been no
direct Roman intervention the political, social and economic situation
remained unchanged until the Social War, because, as mentioned above,
Rome would for political reasons not wish to alter conditions that
ensured the local predominance of the upper classes on which she relied.

In other regions Rome’s intervention was massive, but it met its match
in the form of environmental conditions that had always dictated particu-
lar methods of agriculture. This was true of Appennine and
Subappennine areas, where forestry and grazing were the predominant
activities and where there were also forms of collective land owner-
ship . 164 Roman intervention was basically limited to rationalization of
the existing economy by encouraging mercantilistic ‘industrialization’,
particularly by means of extensive exploitation of state pastures. This
does not mean that such intervention did not play a significant part in
undermining the traditional structure in many localities. This applies to
the rearing of large herds and flocks and to transhumance, for which we
have good evidence in Roman sources for the second and first centuries
b.c., particularly in Samnium, Lucania and Apulia, to name only the
regions where it was most prevalent. Stock-rearing was certainly among
the agricultural and pastoral activities of Italian peoples in very early
times, including the movement of stock from mountain pasture to
lowland grazing and vice versa. Although transhumant stock-rearing was
thus a ‘pre-political’ activity and did not require a unitary political power
to enable movements to take place over long distances , 165 it did undergo
fresh expansion in the second century, with the large-scale investment of
Roman and Italian capital and the ever increasing area of state land
available for private occupation. Animal husbandry on a large scale
naturally stimulated profitable related activities, the chief being the wool
trade. Transhumance had now also to take place along lines laid down by
this authority of the state; this fact was to continue to apply in the later
history of the institution and it undoubtedly played a part in altering the
context of stock-rearing and the utilization of large areas of Apulia.
However, in this case too the archaeological and literary evidence is
ambiguous and chronologically uncertain, so that it has been maintained

164 Gabba and Pasquinucci 1979, 26ff.: (h 93); Giardina 1981, i.87ff.: (h 95).

165 Gabba and Pasquinucci 1979, 48ff : (h 93).

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SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS 239

with equal justification on the one hand that Roman domination coin-
cided with a decline in the economic vitality of Apulia and, on the other,
that in the second century Apulian agriculture was flourishing and that
grazing became dominant in the middle of the first century b.c. 166 Both
propositions are extreme, as it is a fact that transhumant grazing has
never entailed the complete or even partial eradication of arable farming.
Indeed, there is direct evidence of both the growing of cereals and the
cultivation of vines and olives in various areas of Apulia, although it is
difficult to ascertain the kind of farm in which these would have been
grown. 167 Nor is it possible to determine the area of land reserved for
stock-rearing. The presence of slaves, even though not a predominant
element, is certainly characteristic of the region as it is linked to the
practice of grazing; evidence of their presence in the second century is
provided by the revolutionary movements among the shepherds men-
tioned above, which the Roman government hastened to suppress.

VII. SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS

After 1 50 b.c., as a result of its political and military repercussions, the
full gravity of this widespread transformation of Italian structures
became apparent in its social consequences (rather than its economic
consequences). Equally apparent was the Italian dimension of the
phenomenon, as emerges clearly from the historiographical tradition
reflected in the first book of Appian’s Civil 1 Vars . 168 Recruitment difficul-
ties, the old argument used by Italian dignitaries in their complaints to
Rome, became ever more common from the middle of the second
century b.c. onwards, especially as a result of the incessant wars in Spain,
and led to a succession of measures during the remainder of the cen-
tury; 169 they eventually created the need for the new kind of levy
introduced by Gaius Marius in 107 b.c.

It is highly likely that the second half of the second century saw a
deterioration in Rome’s relations with the allied communities, at least in
Italy, and especially with the allied upper classes, which were subject to
the ever more burdensome demands of imperial policy. In the face of her
growing problems, Rome’s hand had begun to press more heavily on the
allies. There had been incidents involving the abuse of power previously,
but those quoted by Gaius Gracchus 170 indicate arrogance towards the
allies, who were treated as subjects. Even before 133 b.c. the idea may
have been gaining ground in certain sections of the Italian upper classes
that one way of at least alleviating the problem and raising themselves

166 Discussion of the theories in Gabba and Pasquioucci 1979, 41 n. 64, 45 n. 74: (h 93).

167 Grelle 1981, t . 1 9 2 ff. : (h 240). 168 Gabba 19*6, 34IT.: (b 7).

169 Gabba *972, 777-8: (1 12). 170 OR/*' *48 and 49 (Cell. NA x.3.3 and 5),

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240

ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

from their position of inferiority might be the acquisition of Roman
citizenship. This is all the more likely as the spontaneous process of
integration and assimilation must have been clear for all to see. Further-
more, Romans and Italians were on an equal footing in the provinces and
in exploitation of the empire. On the other hand, these same ideas and
attitudes may have caused a section of the Roman oligarchy to adopt a
more rigidly exclusive stance than in the past.

Once the causes of the crisis and its Italian dimension were identified,
the remedy proposed in 133 b.c. by the agrarian law of Tiberius Grac-
chus was bound also to have an Italian dimension, 171 in other words to
affect the impoverished peasant classes of both Rome and the Italian
states. 172 The historical tradition reflected in Appian clearly assumes that
the distribution of small plots of ager publicus recovered by the state
benefited Roman citizens and the poor among the allies, in keeping with
the entire policy of assignation and colonization pursued by Rome
during the second century b.c. This is the interpretation to be placed on
the presence of Italian allies in Rome at the time of discussion of
Gracchus’ law. 173 It is fairly clear that the social conflict that existed
within the civic body of Rome was now also present in the Italian
communities. Similarly, the recovery of state lands held in excess of the
limits permitted by the law also affected allied possessors, both Latins and
Italians; it was those allies who had been harmed by the laws who
appealed to Scipio Aemilianus in 1 30/29 B.C., even going to the length of
invoking the treaties originally made with Rome. 174 From this dual point
of view the problems resulting from the attempt to use ager publicus to
resolve the social crisis in the Italian communities put in an entirely new
light the relationship of the Italian allies to internal Roman policy before
the Social War.

The connection between the social aspects of the agrarian problem and
the overall question of the allies came into even sharper focus after 1 29
b.c. The strongest opposition to the application of the law now came
from the allied possessores , 175 On the other hand, Italian interference in
Rome was such that in 1 26 b.c. the tribune M. Junius Pennus proposed a
further law for the expulsion of foreigners. 176 It was thought by the pro-
Gracchan consul of 125, M. Fulvius Flaccus, that the hostility of the

171 For subtle differences in the tenor of the accounts of Plutarch and Appian see Sordi 1978,
300-3: (h 57); Gabba 1956, 45-8: (b 7).

,72 An imaginative solution along these lines in Richardson 1980: (h 149).

173 App. B. Civ. 1. 10.41. Whether the allies benefited from Gracchus’ law has been much debated
and the view presented here is not unchallenged. For further discussion see Vol. ix.

174 App. B. Civ. 1.19.78-81. It is difficult to determine whether the state lands affected by the
recovery programme were principally those occupied by the allies or those in the hands of the
Roman oligarchy. The epigraphic evidence which exists for the location of some Gracchan
assignments is insufficient to decide this, especially as Roman state lands were scattered so widely in
the Italian communities and their history between confiscation and 133 b.c. is untraceable.

175 App. B. Civ. 1. a 1.86. 176 Cic. Off. 1 11.47; Fest. p- 388, Glossaria.

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SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS 24I

Italian holders of the land could be overcome or attenuated by granting
them Roman citizenship so that ‘out of gratitude for the greater favour,
they might no longer quarrel about the land ’. 177 Flaccus coaxed the
Italians into wanting Roman citizenship in order to raise themselves
from subject status to being partners in empire . 178 According to Appian,
the allies would gladly have accepted the proposal, but it was defeated
owing to the opposition of the Senate. The question was not as simple as
this - the proposal contained an alternative whereby an ally who was not
interested in Roman citizenship could receive the ‘right of appeal’, ius
provocations , 179 It may be deduced from this that the advantages of
Roman citizen status were not universally evident at that time and that at
least a section of the upper classes of the allied states preferred a guarantee
against the abuse of power by Roman magistrates. Hence the desire to
gain Roman citizenship was not yet generally felt, but it was already
gaining ground.

The alternative proposal of the consul Fulvius Flaccus reappears in a
more developed form in the leges de repetundis of the period as a recom-
pense to non-Romans who had successfully, upheld an accusation under
these laws . 180 The first option - the granting of Roman citizenship - was
applicable as a rule to all non-Romans, in other words Latins and Italians,
and gave them and their descendants civitas with the right to vote
( suffragium ) and exemption from military service, vacatio militiae , which
allowed new citizens to remain in their native city. According to the most
logical interpretation of the fragmentary inscriptions which preserve the
text of the laws, the second option was open to the same category of
persons, in other words Latins and Italians; it gave them and their
descendants provocation vacatio militiae munerisque publici x immunitas and the
choice of going to court either at Rome or in their own city. This means
that those who preferred this alternative were relieved of military duty,
public functions and taxes; in effect they were thus brought close to the
category of those who chose citizenship. The second option was not
open, however, to those who had been magistrates in their own cities
(dictator, praetor, aedile), in other words, in view of the timocratic
structure of these communities, those who belonged to the highest
census class. The reason for this exclusion was not that these groups
already enjoyed such privileges or had Roman citizenship (which are not
very sensible hypotheses) but that the Roman government wanted them
to choose the first option, Roman citizenship, which did not carry with it
vacatio muneris. In other words, the Roman government was concerned

177 App. B. Civ. 1.21.86.

178 App. B. Civ. 1.34.1)2; Gohler 1939, 132-5: (h i3 5);Gabba 1976, 7off.: (h 42); for a different

view sec Galsterer 1976, I77ff.: (h 132). 179 Val. Max. ix.5.1.

180 Lex repet. (Bruns, Font., 20; Girard, 16 — FIRA 7), 76-9 (123-2 b.c.); Frag. Tarent. (Girard,
9), iff.;cf.Cic. Balb. 54. Sherwin-White 1973, 215-16: (h 1 13);/^. 1972,94-6: (h 56); Galsterer 1976,
93ff.: (h 132); Venturini 1979, 3 iff.: (h 61).

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242 ROME AND ITALY IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

not to deprive the allied cities of their traditional ruling class and was thus
at pains to maintain the identity of the latter, particularly in view of its
possible intention to relinquish its position.

Indeed, it seems that another similar measure taken by the Roman
government dates from this period (124 b.c.P), namely the granting of
Roman citizenship to the magistrates of Latin colonies. 181 Although it
was theoretically and legally impossible for a Roman citizen to have dual
citizenship (a problem that is far from clear, however, and has been much
discussed), in this case too it is obvious that Rome had no intention of
decapitating the allied communities closest to home; she merely wished
to meet a desire for Roman citizenship expressed by the Latin elites and
assumed that these new citizens would remain in their cities and part of
the local ruling classes. In fact, as far as we know, there are only rare
instances of Roman senators originating from Latin or Italian cities
before 90 b.c. 182 These Roman measures undoubtedly entail a high
degree of inconsistency, which confirms the difficulty of reconciling
conflicting interests and forces.

The question to be asked is rather how Rome could interfere so deeply
in the internal affairs of allied communities to the extent of according an
allied citizen exemption from military service, burdensome public duties
and taxes within his own community. Such intervention must have been
fully permitted by the tenor of the laws establishing colonies and the
treaties with Italian communities, which, as mentioned above, gave the
Roman government broad powers of interference and supervision as far
as the composition of the allied ruling classes was concerned.

The rebellion of the Latin colony of Fregellae in 125 b.c. is also to be
connected in some way with the rejection of the proposal of Fulvius
Flaccus. 183 The situation in the city may have been particularly difficult
after the immigration of 4,000 Paelignian and Samnite families, 184 which
must have radically changed the composition of the assembly. Perhaps
the Latin upper class aligned itself with Rome. 185 In any case, the
rebellion illustrates a widespread sense of unease which C. Gracchus
tried to assuage in 122 b.c. by means of his rogatio de sociis, which granted
Roman citizenship to Latins and, it would appear, Latin rights to other
allies, with voting rights in a tribe at Rome. 186 An edict of the consul C.
Fannius expelled the socii from Rome in order that they could not take
part in the voting. 187 The proposal was not passed.

The problems raised by the use of ager publicus thus accelerated the
emergence of a situation that had been developing slowly throughout the

181 Ascon. Pis. 3 Clark; Tibilctti 1953, 45—63: (h i 55). Others believe that this privilege was not
introduced until the first century b.c. 182 Wiseman 1971, 17: (h 64).

183 Plut. C. Gracch. 3.1; Aur. Viet. De Vir. III. 65.2.

184 Livy xli.8.8, in 177. 185 Cic. Fin. v.6z, Phil, tn.17 (Q- Numitorius Pullus).

186 App. B. Civ. 1.23.99, with commentary in Gabba 1958: (b 8); for a different view sec Plut.
C. Gracch. 8.3, 9.5; Veil. Pat. 11.6.2. 187 App. B . Civ. r. 23. 100; Plut. C. Gracch. 12.2-4.

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SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS 243

first half of the century. In 133 b.c. the spontaneous process of assimila-
tion and integration that had been pursued in different ways by the upper
and lower classes of the Italian states revealed the allies’ position of
inferiority even more starkly: they were the object of Rome’s internal
policy and its vicissitudes, not subjects with some power over decisions.
The uncertainty of Roman political life, the sharp conflicts within its
ruling class and the different opinions as to the course of imperial policy
at the very moment when the economic and financial interests and
implications that determined it were beginning to have a strong impact -
these all showed the Italian allies the difficulty, not to say impossibility,
of successfully influencing political decisions of historic importance that
involved them directly.

The demand for Roman citizenship was gradually separated from the
agrarian problem and was increasingly embodied in the clear desire to
participate in government and in exploitation of the empire, but no
longer as subjects; it was a desire for consortium imperi civitatisque - 188 The
sacrifices made by the Italians in the creation of that empire had been far
greater than those of the Romans themselves; as Velleius was to say, they
had borne arms in its defence and could no longer be excluded and
despised as foreigners . 189 And the process continued. By the end of the
century German tribes had penetrated deep into Cisalpine Gaul and the
sense of danger must have rekindled the spirit of unity that had emerged
in the third century B.C. as a result of the Gallic wars. The sacrifices in
terms of men that were demanded of the allies must have been enor-
mous . 190 Gaius Marius did not hesitate to grant Roman citizenship to
two cohorts of Camertes, thus ignoring the provisions of the treaty
which probably precluded such a possibility . 191 The colonial law of L.
Appuleius Saturninus, proposed in 100 b.c. for the benefit of Marius’
soldiers, provided for the foundation of citizen colonies (rather than
Latin ones) in which socii were also admitted, as in earlier instances . 192
The fear of a German invasion of Italy engendered at that time was still to
dominate the view of Germany that Caesar expressed fifty years later in
his de hello gallico. The common danger and common successful defence of
Italy gave real substance to the argument of Velleius (cited above), which
was undoubtedly a faithful echo of distant Italian complaints; and the
events of these years must have caused even greater exasperation,
particularly among the leaders, the principes italicorum populorum , who
were thwarted in their demand for Roman citizenship. The failure of the
policy of M. Livius Drusus in 91 b.c. was to be the final factor that would
cause the cup of Italian exasperation to overflow and drive them to war.

188 App. B. Civ. 1.34. 152 and 35.155; Just. BpiL xxxvm.4.13; Gabba 1973, 347-60: (h 90).

189 Veil. Pat. 11.15.2. 190 Brum 1971, 430-1: (h 82).

191 Val. Max. v.2.8; Plut. Mar. 28.3; Cic. Balb. 46.

192 App. B. Civ. 1.29. 1 32 with commentary in Gabba 1958: (b 8); Cic. Ba/b. 48.

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CHAPTER 8

ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

R. M. ERRINGTON

I. THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE

The Peace of Phoenice was intended to give Rome a free hand in Africa
by closing the Balkan front. The peace terms seemed to secure the safety
of the Straits of Otranto, therefore to protect Italy from Philip. Whether
the Senate regarded this as a long-term settlement with Philip we cannot
tell. It is quite possible that in 205 some senators would happily have
returned to the status quo before 215. But events rapidly took another
course, which enhanced the influence of those senators who wished to
continue Roman intervention, and the new watchdog role established by
the Peace lasted a mere five years - which sufficed, however, to defeat
Carthage.

The Peace of Phoenice was in no sense a settlement of Balkan affairs; it
regulated merely the relationship between the two principals. The
traditional friendships and enmities of the Greek states among them-
selves were not fundamentally affected by several of them being adscript i
to the treaty. Thus in the Peloponnese the border war between Philip’s
friend the Achaean League and Rome’s friend Sparta continued sporadi-
cally even after the peace; thus Philip felt free to develop an aggressive
policy in the Aegean (an area which was not mentioned in the treaty), a
policy which affected the balance of power there, which Rome’s friend
Attalus of Pergamum, and also Rhodes and Egypt, wished to maintain.
Nor were these the only new political developments in the Greek world
during the five years. Antiochus III, who in less than twenty years had
restored the Seleucid empire in Iran, Mesopotamia and in central Asia
Minor, had thereby won himself a mighty military reputation, which he
broadcast by taking the traditional Greek title for the Persian King,
‘Great King’ (j 3 ac tAcus ge'yas). In 204 or 203 he set out to recover
western Asia Minor, which had for some years after the death of
Lysimachus (28 1) been largely controlled by the Seleucids. Most affected
by Antiochus’ territorial ambitions were Rhodes and Egypt, both of
which possessed territory in Asia Minor, and Attalus of Pergamum,
whose kingdom had in effect been created at the expense of the Seleucids.

244

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THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE 245

Western Greece and Illyria, which for the whole of Philip’s reign had
played a major part in his expansionist strategy, now ceased to be so
important for Macedon. This did not mean that nothing at all happened
nor that Philip or Rome were totally inactive here. In 203 Livy records
the embassy of C. Terentius Varro {cos. 2 1 6), C. Mamilius ( pr . 207) and M.
Aurelius, who were sent to Philip in response to appeals by allied cities in
Greece. These complained that they had failed to obtain satisfaction from
Philip for his ravaging of their territories; they also reported that Philip
had sent 4,000 soldiers to Africa to help Carthage. 1 The 4,000 Macedo-
nian soldiers can only have been volunteers or mercenaries, since it is
inconceivable that Philip should have chosen this of all times to send his
first official support to Carthage. More interesting are the complaints of
the cities. Livy does not name them, but Rome had very few socii in the
Balkans who in 203 might have been recently attacked by Philip. It is also
possible that a passage of Polybius might bear on the question. 2 In 198
Flamininus demanded that Philip hand over ‘those places in Illyria which
he had occupied since the Peace of Epirus’. Prima facie this shows that
Philip had occupied territory in Illyria between 205 and 198; and it would
therefore not be surprising if the complaints of the Roman socii in 203
referred to this. One of the three Roman envoys, M. Aurelius, remained
in the Balkans and apparently raised some troops to protect these allies.
He was still there in 201, when a Macedonian embassy to Rome, which
requested the return of the Macedonians and their leader, Sopater, who
had been captured at Zama, objected to his presence. 3 But the Roman
reply was a practical one: to send out with a fleet the experienced ex-
consul M. Valerius Laevinus, who had performed a similar function in
and after 2 1 5 , to relieve M. Aurelius and to observe Macedonian affairs. 4

This complex of complaint and reaction has been regarded by many
historians, rather subjectively, as the invention of later Roman annalists,
who wished to paint as black as possible a picture of Philip’s activities.
The men involved, however, are real and the events themselves compre-
hensible enough, and should not be rejected. They indicate that the
Senate not only retained an interest in trans-Adriatic affairs after the
Peace of Phoenice, but was willing to send modest yet effective support
to injured socii; and it seems likely that these socii are to be sought among
the smaller communities of Illyria or north-western Greece- particularly
if the record of an appeal of the Aetolians in 200 for help against Philip is
authentic. 5

However, Illyria was neither for Rome nor for Philip the first priority
after Phoenice: Rome was occupied in Africa; Philip turned to the east

1 Livy xxx.26.j-4. 2 Polyb. xvm.1.14. 3 Livy xxx.42.2. 4 Livy xxxi.j.jff.

5 Livy xxxi. 29.4; cf. App. Mac. 4.2.

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ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE

2 47

Land over 1.000 metres

SCALE

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248 ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

and above all to the Aegean. Events cannot be traced in detail because
most of Polybius’ account of these years is lost; therefore only an outline
can be reconstructed, the chronology of which is often uncertain. Greek
states with Aegean interests had suffered from Philip’s first war with
Rome, as the repeated attempts of Rhodes and Ptolemy Philopator to
urge peace negotiations show. Among the grounds for their concern was
certainly the growth of piracy, practised in particular by Rome’s friends
the Aetolians and Philip’s friends, the cities of Crete. Rhodes, as a major
commercial power, was severely affected; and shortly after the Peace of
Phoenice a regular war seems to have broken out between Rhodes and
some of the Cretan cities, apparently led by Hierapytna. This war, known
as the ‘Cretan War’ ( kptjtlkos n 6 Xefj.os ), 6 offered Philip the chance of a
cheap intervention. Diodorus records that Philip provided an Aetolian,
Dicaearchus, with twenty ships, with which he was to take tribute from
the islands and to aid the Cretans against Rhodes. 7 Polybius mentions
that an intimate associate of Philip’s, Heracleides of Tarentum, at about
this time managed to set fire to some of the Rhodian dockyards and to
destroy the ships that were in them. 8 This probably occurred in 204 or
203, while Philip himself was occupied in restoring Macedonian influ-
ence in Thrace.

Meanwhile Antiochus III was setting out to restore Seleucid control
over western Asia Minor. There were various reasons why he did not
begin until 204, after nineteen years as king. His first years had been spent
in establishing his personal authority within the kingdom: the rebellion
ofMolon in Media and the condition of the eastern satrapies in general,
the rebellion of Achaeus in Asia Minor and the Fourth Syrian War,
which ended with defeat at Raphia in 217, had occupied him fully.
Achaeus, a distant cousin of Antiochus’, while acting as his commander
in Asia Minor had in the first three years of his reign successfully
recovered large areas of southern and central Asia Minor (including
Lydia and at least parts of Phrygia) from Attalus of Pergamum. In 220 he
then assumed the royal title. Although Achaeus seems to have made no
serious attempt to take advantage of Antiochus’ being occupied with the
war with Egypt to attack Syria, suggesting that his territorial aims may
not have stretched beyond Asia Minor, Antiochus could not in the long
term afford to recognize his independence; and as soon as the war with
Egypt was over, Antiochus marched against him. He required four
campaigns (from 216 to 213 b.c) before he succeeded in capturing and
executing Achaeus, who had taken refuge in the acropolis at Sardis.
Seleucid Asia Minor, which still had no access to the Aegean and still
possessed none of the rich Greek coastal cities, was then entrusted to

6 SIG 567 (Hierapytna), 569 (Halasarna). See Holleaux 1938-68, iv, esp. 1 6 3 ff. : (d 35),

7 Diod. Sic. xxviii. 1 ; cf. Polyb. xvm.54.8-12. 8 Polyb. xiu.5.1-3; Polyaenus v. 17.

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THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE 249

Zeuxis, who took up residence in Sardis while Antiochus set out to repair
the damage to Seleucid possessions in the east caused by the relative
neglect of a generation and accentuated by the recent rebellion of
Molon. 9

The ‘Anabasis’ of Antiochus, which occupied him from 212 to 205
b.c., restored Seleucid claims to authority over Armenia and Iran. 10 It
seems probable that Antiochus’ aim was the restoration of the empire of
Seleucus I; but his achievements and the level of control which he was
able to impose fell in practice far short of this. He began in Armenia,
which he successfully reduced to vassal status (2 1 2); 11 in Media he seems
to have re-organized Seleucid administration and collected an army for
an attack on the Parthians. This resulted in a treaty of alliance with the
Parthian ruler Arsaces II, which opened up the land-route to the east. 12
The Parthians nevertheless remained unbeaten and therefore a potential
danger. In Bactria (208—206 b.c.) Antiochus failed to re-establish
Seleucid authority by defeating Euthydemus, the current king. After a
long siege of Bactra, Antiochus was forced to compromise: he saved face
by taking Euthydemus’ elephants and by making a treaty, the terms of
which are not known; but since he also recognized Euthydemus’ title as
king and offered Euthydemus’ son Demetrius one of his daughters in
marriage, the structure of the Bactrian kingdom was clearly not seriously
affected. 13 After crossing the Hindu Kush Antiochus made a treaty of
friendship with a local Indian ruler, Sophagasenus, which the court
historiography, followed by Polybius, depicted as renewing the friend-
ship which Seleucus I had formed with Chandragupta. But apart from a
few more elephants, some provisions and some precious metal, the
Indian connection produced no more than a nostalgic reminiscence of
Alexander and Seleucus. For the rest, Antiochus returned through
Arachosia, Drangiane and Carmania - all Seleucid satrapies, the distance
of which from Syria had in the past given their governors great inde-
pendence - into Persis. Here he seems to have encountered no difficulty,
and we may conclude that the personal presence of the king and his royal
army will have quickly restored an impression of eager loyalty in these
distant provinces. 14

The results of the ‘Anabasis’ were for Antiochus certainly in many
ways disappointing. Neither Arsaces nor Euthydemus was crushed and
the consolidation of Seleucid power in eastern Iran was fairly superficial.
This was not admitted, however. On his return to the west Antiochus

9 The fragmentary sources for the revolt of Achaeus are: Polyb. v.5 7-58.1, 72-78, 107.4,
vii. 1 5-18, viii. 1 5-2 1. Sec also Schmitt 1964, 1 5 8fT. : (e 50); Will 1966-7, n. 1 8ft.: (a 40).

10 As a result of the loss of all but a few fragments of Polybius’ account it is possible without

excessive speculation to trace these events only in outline: in general see Schmitt 1964, 85#.: (e 50);
Will 1966-7, 1 1.42ft.: (a 40). 11 Polyb. vin. 23; Strabo xi.14.15.

12 Polyb. x.27-31; Justin xli. 5. 7. 13 Polyb. x.49, xi. 34.1 -10. 14 Polyb. xi. 34. 1 1-14.

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25O ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

adopted the title Great King and Polybius comments, clearly influenced
by some official or semi-official source, that ‘Antiochus made his king-
dom secure by frightening his subjects by his courage and tireless energy;
as a result of this expedition he appeared worthy of the kingship, not only
to the Asiatics but also to the Europeans.’ 15

Immediately after his return from the east and relying on the reputa-
tion which his exaggeratedly successful deeds in distant lands in the steps
of Alexander and Seleucus had won for him among the Greeks, he set out
to restore Seleucid control over western Asia Minor. The details and
precise chronology of the early stages of this action in 204 and 203 are
uncertain; but Amyzon, an inland Ptolemaic possession in Caria, had
become Antiochus’ by spring 203; and it would be reasonable to date his
recovery of neighbouring Alabanda, since the time of Antiochus II
known as ‘Antioch of the Chrysaoreans’, to the same time; Alinda had a
Seleucid garrison in 202/1; Tralles, if a badly damaged inscription
belongs to this time, will also have become Seleucid now; and a dossier
from Teos shows the presence of Antiochus personally at the Pergamene
harbour town probably in 204. 16 These are isolated details, but one thing
is certain. The same three friends of Rome who were most concerned
about Philip’s Aegean activities were already directly or indirectly
affected by Antiochus’ expansion. Rhodes had mainland possessions in
Caria (‘the Rhodian Peraea’), which must have seemed to be threatened
by Antiochus; Egypt lost at least Amyzon at this time; and Pergamum
had to tolerate Antiochus’ presence with an army at Teos. To rub salt
into the wounds of the losers, both Alabanda and Teos, following up an
initiative of their new protector Antiochus, took steps to have them-
selves widely recognized in the Greek world as ‘holy and inviolate’ (Upa
Kal acruAos); Antiochus also declared the inviolability of the sanctuary of
Artemis at Amyzon and insisted that his troops respect this; neighbour-
ing Labraunda seems to have been treated similarly. 17 Antiochus clearly
wished to represent himself as friend and patron of the Greek cities and
thus win them over.

This activity in Asia Minor was interrupted after 203, however, when
Egyptian weakness resulting from the death of Ptolemy Philopator
seemed to offer Antiochus the chance of deciding in his favour the
century-old dispute between the two dynasties over the control of

15 Polyb. xi. 34. 1 5-16.

16 Amyzon and Alinda: Welles 1934, no. 38: (b 74); Robert 1983, nos. 9, 14-1 5: (b 193). Alabanda:
OGIS 234; Robert 1973, 448-64: (b 68). Tralles: Welles 1934, no. 41: (b 74). Teos: Herrmann 1965,
29!?.: (e 45); Giovannini 1983: (e 44); Allen 1983, 47-8: (e 32).

17 Alabanda: OGIS 234, cf. Hesperia 1978, 49#. Teos: GDI 3165—80 ;SIG 563-6. Amyzon: Welles
1934, no. 39: (b 74); Robert 1983, nos. 10-12: (b 193). Labraunda: Crampa 1972, no. 46: (b 46); cf.
Robert 1983, 139-40: (b 193).

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THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE 2$1

Phoenicia and Coele Syria. The death of Philopator in summer 204, 18 at
the age of about 35, was both sudden and premature, but the succession
of his six-vear-old son Ptolemy V Epiphanes need not in itself have
produced a weak government in Alexandria. The weakness resulted
rather from the conflict between the various groups of courtiers who
aimed to control the child-king and in practice to exercise the real power
in the state. 19 The first attempt was by the upstart family of Agathocles.
Agathocles’ sister Agathocleia had been the favourite concubine of
Philopator and had used her private influence with the king to ma-
noeuvre her brother into a position of such confidentiality with
Philopator that he was immediately able to assume the regency for
Epiphanes. He began reasonably efficiently by concealing Philopator’s
death until Epiphanes’ mother Arsinoe could be assassinated, thus
stifling her claim to the regency; by sending out influential rivals as
ambassadors to Antiochus, to Philip and to Rome; and by recruiting
fresh mercenaries in Aetolia. But he soon had to face increasing oppo-
sition, above all in the Alexandrian garrison and in traditional court
circles. Probably late in 203 a movement led by Tlepolemus, the com-
mander of the garrison at Pelusium, which enjoyed wide support in the
army and the population of Alexandria, resulted in the fall of Agathocles’
clique.

Tlepolemus was, it seems, a popular and competent military com-
mander, but inexperienced in the central government, which he shared
with a regency council of which the younger Sosibius was also a member.
Moreover, serious differences of opinion soon upset the initial harmony
of this council and it became clear that Tlepolemus would not quickly be
in a position to introduce a firm government. It therefore seems possible
that the decisive event which persuaded Antiochus to leave Asia Minor
and to march into Coele Syria in 202 was precisely the collapse of the
regime of Agathocles. His expectations were not disappointed. The
Ptolemaic opposition was clearly very modest: only at Gaza in summer
201 did he meet with serious resistance, but even here a lengthy siege
brought the fortress town into his possession. It was only after the fall of
Gaza that the Egyptian government was able to react to the Seleucid
attack, which in two campaigns had wrested Coele Syria, Phoenicia and
Palestine from Ptolemaic rule. By then, however, it was already too late.

18 This date has been much disputed, since there is a conflict between our documentary evidence,
which dates the beginning of Epiphanes’ second regnal year to October 204, and Polybius, who
places Epiphanes’ proclamation in 203/2. Since the documentary evidence can hardly be wrong,
Polybius seems to have either made a mistake or to have departed from his ‘annalistic* technique;
given the fragmentary state of the text a final decision seems impossible: see in detail (also on the
theory of Philopator’s death having been concealed for more than a year) Schmitt 1964, 189-237:
(e 50); NX'albank 1957-79, 11. 434-7 and 111.784-5: (b 38).

J9 The sources: Polyb. xv. 25-34, xvi.21-2; Justin xxx.z.

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2 J 2 ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

The Aetolian mercenary general Scopas indeed won some initial
successes. He seems to have briefly reconquered parts of Palestine; but in
a battle at Panium, near the source of the Jordan, in spring or summer
200, Antiochus took his revenge for Raphia. The Ptolemaic army was
defeated and forced to retreat. Antiochus spent the next two years re-
organizing his new conquests, and it was 197 before he could again take
up his plans for Asia Minor. 20

After Antiochus’ withdrawal from Asia Minor in 202 Philip showed
that his Aegean ambitions were not exhausted in the profitable support
of an Aetolian freebooter and modest help to his friends in Crete. By then
his fleet was ready; and although in 202 he carefully avoided attacking
towns which were directly under the control of another power and
concentrated on conquering independent communities, his capture of
Lysimacheia, Chalcedon and Cius which were allied to the Aetolians, of
Perinthus which was closely attached to Byzantium, and of Thasos
caused alarm. Moreover, his capture of the important trading cities of
Cius and Thasos was marked by severe brutality which not only offended
Greek opinion but in particular provoked the hostility of Rhodes. The
Rhodians objected in principle to any military activity which threatened
access to the Black Sea, and had tried to intervene diplomatically in
favour of Cius: Polybius, probably reflecting a Rhodian source, writes
that from this time they regarded themselves as being at war with
Philip. 21

Open hostilities were postponed, however, until 201. Early in 200,
Philip possessed garrisons on the Cycladic islands of Andros, Paros and
Cythnos, which prevented them from joining Rhodes. 22 When these
islands became Macedonian, whether all at the same time or whether they
were the only Cycladic islands which Philip took, is unclear; but in view
of recent events it is probable that they were first occupied in 201 (though
202 is possible). In any case, they belonged to the group of independent
states which, being without adequate protection, were the first to attract
Philip’s attention. This was not true for the Ptolemaic island of Samos,
which Philip now took and garrisoned and where he captured more ships
than he could man. 23

During summer 20 1 two sea-battles took place. One developed out of
Philip’s siege of Chios, and was fought against the joint fleet of Rhodes,
Pergamum and Byzantium in the straits between Chios and the Ionian
peninsula. Philip suffered such large losses — larger than in any previous
military operation, according to Polybius - that he refused to rejoin the

20 The sources: Polvb. xvi. 18-19, 22a, 39, xxtx. 12.8; Josephus, Ant.Jud. xn.i29fF.; St Jerome, in
Dan. x 1 . 1 3 fF. On the chronology see Holleaux 1938-68, 11. 3 17-35: (d 35).

21 Polyb. xv. 23. 6. 22 Livy xxxi. 1 5.8.

23 Habicht 1957, 2 5 3fT. no. 64: (b 51); Polyb. xvi.2.9 (the ships).

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THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE 253

battle the next day. 24 The other battle took place, against the Rhodians
alone, off Lade, between Samos and Miletus. Here Philip defeated the
Rhodians and immediately afterwards occupied Miletus, which, like
Samos, until then had had a close relationship with the Ptolemies, though
it was no longer garrisoned by them. Philip and his adviser Heracleides
were voted wreaths by the Milesians, who, anticipating attack, tried to
win favour by simulating enthusiasm. 25 A third event which belongs
chronologically in the general context of the two sea-battles was an
attack by Philip on Pergamum. According to Polybius he acted so
violently that he even destroyed temples outside the walls (which he
could not breach), especially the precinct of Athena Nicephorus, the
‘Victory-Bringer’ — which, if this were after the battle of Chios, would
doubtless seem a particular provocation. He followed up this raid with
an extensive march inland through Pergamene territory to Thyatira, the
plain of Thebe on the Gulf of Adramyttium, and to Hiera Come. 26

The order of these three events has been much disputed, 27 and
although the order Chios, Pergamum, Lade seems marginally the most
likely, it cannot be claimed that there is any conclusive argument in its
favour. One thing, however, is certain. The events of spring and summer
201 showed that Philip was a serious danger to the balance of power in
the Aegean and Asia Minor. Rhodes had already realized this in 202; and
it was Rhodes which in 201 prodded Attalus to take the initiative in
stopping Philip: 28 in 200 and again in 198 Philip claimed that they had
attacked him first and he was not contradicted. 29 Formally this may have
been correct. But his activities in Crete and among the independent states
of the Aegean seaboard, and his capture of Samos from Egypt all pointed
in the same direction. Philip had perhaps not originally planned to attack
Pergamum but was provoked into it by Attalus’ intervention in the siege
of Chios. In favour of this is the fact that he did not follow up the attack,
but subsequently concentrated on Caria where Rhodes had mainland
interests, but where Philip also, around Mylasa and Euromus, had
inherited influence and contacts which had still been active in the first
years of his reign. 30 His activities in Caria in 201 are not wholly clear; but
Iasus and Bargylia, probably Euromus and Pedasa and possibly
Stratoniceia had fallen to him by the autumn; he had also unsuccessfully
attacked Cnidus; but Prinassus, a small Rhodian town, and the Rhodian
island of Nisyros fell to him. 31 An inscription indicates that before 197

24 Polyb. xvi. 2— 9. 25 Polyb. xvi.io. i, 15. 26 Polyb. xvi.i.

27 A sensible discussion of the chronological problems in Walbank 1957-79, n.497ff.: (b 38).

28 Polyb. xvi. 9. 4. 29 Polyb. xvi.34.5, xviii. 6.2. 30 Crampa 1969, no. 7 : (b 45).

31 Iasus, Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia: Polyb. xvi.iz, 24. 1, xvm.44.4. Cnidus and Prinassus: Polyb.
xviii. 1 1; Polyaenus iv.18. Stratoniceia: Livy xxxui. 1 8.22; Polyb. xxx.3 1.6, with Walbank 1957-79,
III. ad loc .: (b 38); SIG 572.

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254 ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

Euromus had been renamed Philippi, and the most likely occasion for
this honorific re-naming is the re-occupation in 201 . 32 How many more
Carian towns were directly affected by Philip’s activities in 201 is
uncertain; but during the following winter, while he was blockaded at
Bargylia, he attacked Alabanda, Magnesia-on-the-Maeander and Mylasa
in desperate attempts to obtain enough food for his men . 33

The short-term threat to Rhodes and Attalus was thus already clear by
autumn 201; long-term implications could be foreseen, if nothing were
done. The battle of Lade had shown that neither partner without the
other could hope to stop Philip; and Egypt, which had earlier played a
stabilizing role in Aegean affairs, could not help since Philip had just
taken Samos; Antiochus had already taken Amyzon and was now
attacking Ptolemaic Phoenicia. Moreover, there were indications that
Philip and Antiochus had some sort of agreement not to interfere with
each others’ activities in Asia Minor. Philip, indeed, seems to have taken
the view that Zeuxis should help him with supplies (though he did not do
so to any significant extent ), 34 which suggests that they may even have
envisaged some kind of co-operation, at least against Pergamum and
Rhodes, the two major obstacles to their aspirations in Asia Minor.
Later writers claimed to know that this agreement aimed to divide up
Egyptian possessions , 35 which seems to have been an interpretation of
the facts that Philip took Samos in 20 1 , in 200 additionally Maronea and
Aenus, while Antiochus was operating against Ptolemaic Syria. But in
201 what troubled the Rhodians and Attalus were Philip’s concrete
activities, not his modest co-operation with Antiochus, and above all his
direct threat to Rhodian and Pergamene possessions. This sent them on
the search for allies.

No potent ally was available among the Greek-speaking powers. The
only hope lay in Rome, which had just successfully ended the war with
Carthage. Attalus had fought alongside Rome in the First Macedonian
War; Rhodes, along with other non-participants who were all basically
friendly towards Rome, had helped to negotiate an end to the war.
Formally a few Roman friends including Attalus were adscript i to the
peace. But it is probable that informal assurances of continued Roman
interest in Greek affairs had been given, the seriousness of which was
evidenced by the recent intervention in favour of Rome’s friends in
western Greece or Illyria. It was thus almost inevitably to Rome that
Rhodes and Attalus turned in the autumn of 201 when it seemed that

32 Prof. Omit Scrdaroglu and Mr R. P. Harper generously gave me advanced knowledge of this
inscription. Text now published by Errington 1986: (b 50a).

33 Polyb. xvi. 24.6-8. 34 Polvb. xvi. 1.8-9.

35 For sources and commentary see Walbank 1957-79, n. 47 iff.: (b 38). For this view Errington
1971, 3j6ff.: (d 24).

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THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE 2JJ

their own efforts could not cope with the crisis created by Rome’s old
enemy. 36

We do not know in detail what the ambassadors of Rhodes and Attalus
said in Rome, whether privately to those senators who were interested in
eastern affairs or publicly in the Senate. They will doubtless have painted
an unfavourable picture of Philip’s activities in the Aegean and Asia
Minor. In private they will above all have cultivated those senators who
had participated in the First Macedonian War and who may well have
been personally known to the envoys — if not, the envoys were badly
chosen. And in this circle of ‘eastern experts’, perhaps headed by the ex-
consul P. Sulpicius Galba, the possibilities of helping will have been
discussed in detail. When the envoys from the east arrived at Rome the
consular elections for 200 were imminent (perhaps December), and it
may be in the light of their mission that Galba stood for election and was
elected, with C. Aurelius, a relative of the M. Aurelius who was currently
in the Balkans, as his colleague. The eastern experts were thus influential
in Rome in late 201. Moreover, the Greeks also received diplomatic
support: three legati, sufficiently highly placed to confront a king (or
more than one, if necessary), were sent to the east, still during the winter
and before the entry into office of Galba and Aurelius as consuls for 200
(the date of their entry into office, the Ides of March, fell perhaps in
January by the Julian calendar in view of the technical dislocation of the
official Roman calendar at this time). They were C. Claudius Nero {cos.
207), P. Sempronius Tuditanus {cos. 204, the peacemaker at Phoenice)
and M. Aemilius Lepidus. Their instructions were to make clear to Philip
in a personal interview the terms on which Rome was prepared to remain
at peace with him. These were laid down in a senatus consultant'. Rome
demanded that Philip make war on none of the Greeks and that he give
compensation, as determined by a fair tribunal, for his offences against
Attalus; if he did this he might live in peace with Rome; should he be
unwilling, the opposite would ensue. 37 The legati were then to go on to
Egypt to announce the defeat of Carthage, to canvass support should war
with Philip be necessary; and, in practice, to try to mediate between
Antiochus and Ptolemy. 38

This mission seems to have been conceived merely as an effort to bring
immediate help to Attalus and Rhodes while avoiding upsetting estab-
lished constitutional practice at Rome: that formal decisions to begin
wars should be taken at the beginning of the consular year. 39 This means
that the senatus consultum was formulated more for its propaganda effect
among the Greeks than because it was expected that its demands might

16 Livy xxxi. 2. 1-2. 37 Polyb. xvi. 27.2-3.

38 Livy xxxi. 2. 3-4; Polyb. xvi.34.2. 39 The view of Rich 1976: (h 20) is accepted here.

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256 ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

achieve more than a short-term effect with Philip. Negotiation was not
intended: a few weeks laterat most, long before any reply to the demands
of the senatus consultum could have reached Rome, the new consuls
entered office, Galba received Macedonia as his province, and was
immediately instructed to present the rogatio to the comitia centuriata that
war should be declared against Philip. It is impossible to believe that this
grave decision was merely a result of the wishes of the envoys from
Attalus and Rhodes, although it is likely enough that their complaints
provided arguments for theeastern specialists, who wished to take up the
war with Philip again. The root cause of their view, which the Senate
clearly immediately accepted, lay fifteen years back, in the treaty which
Philip had made with Hannibal in 215. As long as the Hannibalic War
continued, it had been in practice impossible for the Senate to devote
large forces to the war in theeast, which had been run merely as a holding
operation. This attitude had found its expression in the Aetolian treaty
and in the Peace of Phoenice. But it would be a grave mistake to imagine
(as Philip may have done) that the Peace of Phoenice had cancelled out
the gratuitous provocation of 215. For many senators, particularly
Scipio, who in 205 required all available forces for Africa, it is true that
the First Macedonian War had never been more than a side-issue. But to
those who had participated in it, who had fought that unsatisfactory war
and who now composed the eastern lobby, it was more than that.
Because of Hannibal’s presence in Italy the Senate had not supported its
men in the east as they might have hoped: triumphs were not won there,
though triumphs had been won even in Illyria; and Macedonia certainly
provided the potential for a triumph.

The importance of this aspect - at the precise time when Scipio’s career
re-emphasized with startling actuality the old truth that in Rome the
influence of an individual within the state was directly related to his
military successes — should not be underestimated. The willingness of
many members of the Senate to make war because of the potential glory
that was in it for them personally as commanders is a fact of Roman
political life. Moreover, even after Phoenice, legati and small numbers of
ships and troops had been sent to the Balkans when necessary, to
maintain the peace and to demonstrate Roman interests. M. Valerius
Laevinus was in eastern Adriatic waters with a small fleet at this very
time. Also the smaller Greek states, which before Rome’s intervention
had merely accepted their inability to resist effectively the demands of the
Great Powers, now found hope in Rome; and the wishes of the states
currently damaged by Philip’s activities fitted so well with the practical
possibilities and with the wishes of the eastern lobby in the Senate for
finishing the war with Philip that the Senate voted for war.

Once the Senate had decided a major issue of foreign policy it was not

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THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE

257

used to shows of independence by the comitia centuriata, such as took
place at the beginning of 200. The first war rogatio of the new consul
Sulpicius Galba was voted down in the assembly, after the tribune Q.
Baebius had argued against it on grounds of general war- weariness. But
it did not take long to get this decision reversed, once Galba had
promised not to levy veterans from the African war for Macedonia. It
may be that the final decision of the comitia centuriata to declare war was
helped by the timely arrival of reports from Laevinus and by an embassy
from Athens led by Cephisodorus, which complained of Philip’s activi-
ties against Athens (though Livy places these before the rejected rogatio ,
and he may be right); but when the three legati were sent to Greece even
before the new consuls had entered office, the decision for war had in
principle already been taken in the Senate, which was not likely to be
impressed by a tribune parading his conscience in public, even if this
resulted in a temporary lack of senatorial control of the comitia centuriata
and a certain delay. There is no trace of the Senate’s reconsidering its
opinion or doubting that it was correct. Probably by May at the latest the
comitia centuriata voted for war . 40

Philip seems to have had little idea of the peril which the end of Rome’s
war with Carthage brought for him. When Attalus and Rhodes sent
envoys to Rome in autumn 201 he was still operating in Caria. As winter
drew on, he found his fleet blockaded in the Gulf of Bargylia, and risked
breaking out only when it became clear that the area could not provide
enough food for his men , 41 though he retained Iasus, Euromus, Pedasa
and Bargylia. The date of his escape from Bargylia is uncertain, but it may
have been as late as February. Meanwhile events had not stood still on the
Greek mainland. In the autumn Athens had given Macedon an excuse for
hostility. At the Eleusinian Mysteries in late September 201 two
uninitiated Acarnanians had strayed into the temple of Demeter, and on
discovery had been put to death. Acarnania was an ally of Philip’s and
appealed to him; he sanctioned in due course a raid on Attica, in which
Macedonian troops participated . 42 Precisely when this happened is un-
certain; but it need not necessarily have been after Philip’s return from
Asia: he was by no means incommunicado in Caria, even though he
thought it risky to try to get his whole fleet out of Bargylia. The
Athenians reacted by abolishing the two tribes Antigonis and Demetrias
and by sending envoys to all possible helpers: Cephisodorus apparently
persuaded Attalus, Ptolemy, Rhodes, Aetolia and the Cretans to become
Athenian allies; but when they did not send immediate help he personally
travelled to Rome and probably arrived just before the first rogatio for

40 Livy xxxi. jff. The chronology is much disputed: I follow in general Rich 1976, 78ff.: (h 20).

41 Polyb. xvi. 6; Polyacnus iv.18.2. 42 Livy xxxi. 14.6-10.

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258 ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

war. 43 There may have also been an earlier Athenian embassy to Rome,
possibly shortly after the Acarnanian attack; but whether this could have
arrived in time to influence the Roman discussions about the war is
doubtful, although Livy places its arrival even before the consular
election and Appian, for what it is worth, supports this by making it
contemporary with the Rhodian embassy. 44

In the late winter the three Roman legal i arrived in Greece, but made
no effort to seek out Philip personally and to inform him of the terms of
the senatus consultum. By the time they reached Athens the Romans had
already visited Epirus, Amynander of Athamania and the Aetolian and
Achaean Leagues, all of whom were currently friendly to or allied with
Macedon. At each place they announced the terms of the senatus
consultum . 45 This activity can only be seen as an attempt to frighten
some of Philip’s friends and to win their support or neutrality for the
impending war. At the Piraeus the Romans conferred with Attalus —
Tuditanus, the peacemakerof Phoenice, will have known him personally

— and some Rhodians who had pursued Philip from Bargylia. They will
doubtless have explained what the Senate meant by the senatus consultum
and its practical implications (in terms of Roman expectations of help)
for those who had appealed to Rome; moreover, they seem to have
agreed on a common line of approach to the Athenians. They then all
went up to Athens together and were greeted with great enthusiasm.
Attalus in particular, the king who had been fighting Philip for a year and
who, since his gaining possession of Aegina in 209, was Athens’ most
powerful neighbour, was received with splendid honours, the chief of
which was the creation of a tribe Attalis which implied a cult and a priest

— an honour which, only a few weeks earlier, had been cancelled for
Philip’s ancestors Antigonus and Demetrius. Rhodes had also been
active against Philip, and the recent rescue of four Athenian ships was
repaid with a crown of valour and isopoliteia (honorary citizenship) 46 for
all Rhodians. The communications with the ecclesia were certainly influ-
enced by the conversations with the legati. Both Attalus and the Rhodian
speaker emphasized Roman readiness to make war on Philip and urged
Athens to join them formally: the Athenians replied with a formal vote
declaring war on Philip. Oddly enough, Polybius does not record that
the Roman legati addressed the Athenian assembly, nor does Livy, who
had the complete text of Polybius available. 47 They will have had
sufficient opportunity to make the Roman position clear to the Athenian
council, since they remained in Athens for some time.

43 Paus. 136.5; Livy xxxi.5.6.

44 Livy xxxi. 1. 10; App. Mac. 4.1-2. Habicht (1982), 153-4: (d 30), argues strongly against the
historicity of the earlier embassy. 45 Polyb. xv1.27.2-3.

46 On the nature and function of grants of isopoliteia see Gawantka 1957: (1 13).

47 Polyb. xvt. 2 5 -26; Livy xxxi.14.11-1 5.7.

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THE EAST AFTER THE PEACE OF PHOENICE 259

Meanwhile the preparations for war continued. The Rhodian ships,
returning home, took into alliance all the Cyclades except Andros, Paros
and Cythnos, which were garrisoned by Philip . 48 This success was
doubtless based on their impression of Roman readiness for war and
willingness to protect those Greeks who were prepared to fight. While
the legati were still in Athens, Philip’s general Nicanor, perhaps as
Philip’s first reaction to the news of Athens’ declaration of war, invaded
Attica and penetrated as far as the Academy. The Romans reacted at
once: Nicanor was not Philip, but they could hope to achieve two objects
through an interview with him: they could persuade him to leave Attica
with his army and thus relieve pressure on Athens, and they could expect
him to inform Philip of the contents of the senatus consult um. Their
demarche had the desired effect, and Nicanor withdrew at once from
Attica . 49

It is improbable that Philip did not already know the contents of the
senatus consultum before its formal communication by the legati to
Nicanor. Since their visit to the Epirotes, at the latest since their talks
with the Achaeans at Aegium, news must have reached Pella of their
propaganda activities. Philip neither reacted diplomatically nor did he
allow the senatus consultum to change his plans. Livy records the devasta-
tion of Attica by Philocles with 2,000 infantry and zoo cavalry which,
although the chronology is uncertain, seems to be a reply to Nicanor’s
formal communication of the senatus consultum . 50 Otherwise Philip threw
all his efforts into a campaign in Thrace. This time he showed no interest
in diplomatic considerations. The Ptolemaic possessions Maronea and
Aenus fell to him just as the inland Thracian towns of Cypsela, Doriscus
and Serrheum; in the Chersonese he occupied Elaeus, Alopeconnesus,
Callipolis, Madytus, Sestus and a number of other smaller places. He then
crossed the Hellespont and began to besiege Abydus which, together
with Sestus, controlled the narrowest part of the Hellespont . 51 If he
captured it, he would be in a position to control traffic through the
Hellespont. Of immediate interest and particular importance was the
summer traffic in grain from the grainlands of southern Russia to many
Greek cities, not least to Athens. Whoever controlled the Hellespont at
the time of the great summer grain-cargoes exerted a major influence on
the fates of innumerable Greek cities.

We cannot hope to know finally why Philip chose to ignore the senatus
consultum in such a provocative way. He seems to have been determined
to obtain control of the whole north Aegean coast and the Hellespont, at
whatever cost. Yet he knew that Rome had defeated Carthage and must
have realized that this time the Senate would be able to send as many

48 Livy xxxi. 1 5.8. 49 Polvb. xvi.27. 50 Livy xxxi. 16.2.

51 Polyb. xvi. 29-34; Livy xxxi. 16. 3- 1 8.9.

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ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

troops and ships as necessary against him. The inescapable conclusion is
that Philip did not believe in the genuineness of the demands of the
senatus consultum , that he suspected, or even knew, that the Senate had
already decided on war, regardless of the results of any negotiations he
might begin, and that he was determined to improve his position as far as
possible in his current areas of interest before Roman troops arrived. The
dilatory behaviour of the legati and the fact that the nominal recipient of
their senatus consultum was among the last to receive formal notice of it
must have suggested this. It is indeed impossible to believe that the
Senate would have recommended cancelling the war-vote in the comitia
centuriata (which would have been quite unparalleled) that it had used all
its prestige to force through, even if Philip had reacted favourably to the
demands of the legati. We may be sure that, as indeed happened during
the war, further Roman demands would have followed, which in the end
would have been impossible for Philip to accept and would have made
the war ‘necessary’. If Philip chose to regard the legatio and its senatus
consultum merely as a Roman attempt to win time and influence in Greece,
he was right; its demands were a fraud, and Philip seems to have
recognized them as such.

This becomes even clearer when we consider the last recorded activity
of the legati in the Aegean area. They showed no further inclination to
contact Philip until they arrived at Rhodes, where they learned that he
was besieging Abydus. They had doubtless, in the course of their
leisurely progress, communicated the senatus consultum to such islands as
they visited. But Philip himself was completely neglected. From Rhodes
M. Aemilius Lepidus, the youngest of the legati, travelled without his
colleagues to Abydus and at last formally instructed Philip in person of
the senatus consultum. By now demands had been added that he keep his
hands off Ptolemy’s possessions and pay compensation to the Rhodians
for the damage he had caused them. The threat of war, if Philip did not
comply, remained. The interview ended abruptly when it developed into
a fruitless argument about who had started hostilities . 52 Philip was not
frightened off by Lepidus’ threats and continued the siege; Abydus fell to
him shortly afterwards. Lepidus, it seems, had achieved nothing.

Philip thus paid as little attention to Lepidus’ arrogant protestations at
Abydus as he had to the message of the legati sent via Nicanor from
Athens. Nor did the legati seem to think that he would. Their instructions
had been to confront Philip personally, but when it came to the point
only one of them travelled to Philip, and that the youngest and least
experienced, although Tuditanus, the Roman peace-maker at Phoenice,
was surely the man to confront Philip, if the implicit alleged aim of their

S2 Polyb. xvi. 5 4.

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THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 26l

journey, to bring Philip to a peaceful settlement, were meant seriously.
The only conclusion once again must be that the legati did not regard this
part of their function as being very important, when measured against
the propaganda value of the senatus consultum in the Greek cities as
preparation for war. This being so, we should conclude that the purpose
of Lepidus’ visit to Philip at Abydus lay more in the immediate interests
of the Greeks, above all of the Rhodians, the current hosts of the legati ,
who, as a trading state, always suspected military activity at the
Hellespont. In 220 they had gone to war with Byzantium when it had
tried to impose a transit toll on the Bosphorus; and Philip’s capture of
Cius in 202 was, according to Polybius, the last straw which had driven
them to war. But Athens, as a large grain-importer, was also affected, and
Attalus had sailed from Aegina to Tenedos on receiving news of the
siege. Pressure from Greek allies, therefore, rather than fulfilment of
senatorial instructions, seems likely to have been primarily responsible
for the duty-visit of Lepidus to Philip at Abydus. He cannot have
expected (or wished for) any success; but the Greek allies would again be
given the impression that the Romans were doing all in their power to
defend their interests. Until Galba’s army arrived, it was all that could be
done.

II. THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

Despite the problems which the bargain with the tribune Q. Baebius
caused - the undertaking had been given to levy none of the African
veterans — Galba was ready by late summer 200; 53 and although he would
be unable to undertake major military operations before the winter, he
decided nevertheless to cross to Apollonia. This had the double advan-
tage that the army, once assembled, would not immediately disperse for
the winter in Italy; and it would show the Greeks that it was not lack of
Roman commitment but merely winter conditions which hindered
Roman activity. Presumably war was formally declared, as the fetial
priests had explicitly allowed, at a Macedonian frontier-post. Philip
learned of Galba’s arrival shortly after the capitulation of Abydus, which
seems also to have been the cue for the three legati to continue their
journey to Antiochus and Ptolemy. The consul now represented Roman
interests in the region.

Galba decided at once to seek winter quarters for his two legions in the
friendly area around Apollonia. But since he also had some ships, he sent
twenty triremes under the command of his legatus C. Claudius Centho to

S3 The main sources for the events of this section are: the fragments of Poiyb. xvm; Livy
xxxi. 2 2.4-47. 3, xxxii. 4. 1-6.4, 96-25.12, 32-40, xxxiii. 1-21.5, 24-5, 27-49.

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ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

Athens. Athenians had met him at Apollonia with the news that Athens
was virtually under siege as a result of Macedonian attacks from Chalcis
and Corinth. Energetic action by Centho, supported by three Rhodian
quadriremes and three small Athenian boats, relieved the situation with
an attack on Chalcis, where much war material was destroyed and
plunder taken. The point of this raid was twofold: not just to damage
Philip, but also to raise the morale of the Athenians (who had suffered
Macedonian raids throughout the summer but received no effective
Roman help) and of those who might be influenced by them. The war
was thus from the beginning conceived and fought with two aims. One,
which originated in Philip’s stab in the back in 2 1 5 and which could only
be achieved by military action, was the essentially destructive aim of
making Philip acknowledge that he must act as Rome required; the other
was the constructive aim of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the
Greeks. This latter went back ultimately to the Illyrian wars, was firmly
rooted in the alliances of the First Macedonian War and had gradually
acquired conscious shape through the appeals of the Greeks since the
Peace of Phoenice. In the pursuit of this constructive aim the primary
methods were diplomatic and propagandist, but were supported by
military action which was seen to be in the interests of Rome’s Greek
friends. The three legati had started the diplomatic and propaganda
campaign by broadcasting Rome’s demands that Philip stop attacking
the Greeks. They had even tried to prevent specific Macedonian actions;
but only after the arrival of the army and the fleet were the necessary
concrete demonstrations of military support for the diplomatic aim
possible. In the north-west, Galba made a similar demonstration of the
Roman military presence. A legatus, L. Apustius, whom he sent with a
detachment to attack Macedonian border districts, captured and de-
stroyed Antipatreia and a number of minor towns and forts. The chief
aim was doubtless to impress local states and dynasts, and it had some
success. Immediately afterwards Pleuratus, Amynander of Athamania
and Bato, king of the Dardanians, all arrived at the Roman camp and
offered assistance.

Philip also saw the need to attend to his allies. The Achaean League
had helped him against Rome in the first war, since when his interest in
Peloponnesian affairs — except for his garrison on the Acrocorinth - had
lapsed. In autumn zoo the Achaean assembly met to consult about raising
a levy against their old enemy Nabis of Sparta. Philip came to the meeting
and offered to fight the war for them, if the Achaeans gave him troops for
his garrisons in Chalcis, Oreus and Corinth. They refused, since by his
offer Philip clearly intended to commit the League to the new war with
Rome. Despite the garrison on the Acrocorinth, the Achaeans were not
prepared to follow him into the new war, or at least not immediately. For

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263

this he had only himself to blame. His Aegean commitments since 205
had not only led to his neglecting his old allies, in the meanwhile he had
also offended many Greeks by excessive brutality, above all at Cius,
Thasos and Abydus. Moreover, the Roman legati had visited Aegium in
the spring, and will undoubtedly have assured the Achaeans that if they
did not actively support Philip, Rome would not attack them. Under the
circumstances, Philip now showed consummate tactlessness when he in
effect demanded hostages to guarantee a commitment against Rome.

The pattern of the war was thus established immediately by P.
Sulpicius Galba. After the winter he invaded western Macedonia
unhindered. In Lyncestis he ravaged large areas, defeated part of Philip’s
army and took large quantities of plunder, but he did not press on into
Lower Macedonia. In the autumn he returned to the coast, where he
handed over his command to his successor P. Villius Tappulus, who for
unknown reasons also arrived just in time to go into winter quarters. At
the same time the Roman fleet continued to protect Athens while also
raiding Macedonian possessions in the Aegean and on the coast of
Macedonia. But since Sulpicius’ army in Upper Macedonia could not
support the fleet, no major success was gained; the capture of Andros,
Oreus, Larisa Cremaste and Pteleum were the naval achievements of the
year.

Despite the indecisiveness of the events of the summer, the Aetolian
League was impressed - above all, by the opportunities of plundering
which its non-participation was costing it. Yet the decision not to
participate had been taken formally, contrary to the urgings of Roman
allies, at the Panaetolica, the spring meeting of the League. By late
summer, however, opinion had changed; and after preliminary negotia-
tions with L. Apustius (who, Livy says, ‘promised everything’), the
strategos Damocritus, who at the Panaetolica had opposed participation,
now persuaded the Aetolians to join Rome, and immediately rushed out
with the army, together with Amynander, into Thessaly. It was only
thanks to Amynander that this careless operation did not turn into a full-
scale disaster, when Philip suddenly attacked the Aetolians, who were
conscientious only in collecting booty.

Rome on balance had had the advantage of the indecisive events of
199. P. Villius Tappulus, the new consular commander, made his winter
base on Corcyra. In the spring he learned from a friendly Epirote,
Charops, that Philip had occupied the Aous gorge, a major bottleneck on
the main and most convenient invasion route into Macedonia. His aim
was obviously to prevent a repetition of 199, when Sulpicius had invaded
Upper Macedonia unhindered. Villius’ immediate inclination was to
fight, and he quickly brought his troops to a position only five miles from
Philip’s. But before he could engage, the Roman administrative system

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264 ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

intervened in the form of his successor, the consul of 198, T. Quinctius
Flamininus. Flamininus had taken advantage of the dislocation of the
Roman calendar, which placed his entry into office (nominally 1 5 March)
at the latest in January, to complete his official duties in Rome and to
cross the Adriatic in time to assume his command before the first
engagement of the year.

Roman policy had already been laid down by the Senate in 200. Philip
was the enemy, with those who supported him, 54 not the Greeks, who
were to be protected and (for the purposes of the war) won over for
action. Amynander and the Aetolians, some of the Epirotes, Athens,
Pergamum, Rhodes and the Cycladian islanders had already responded
favourably; the actions against Macedonia itself, and against Euboea and
Philip’s other coastal possessions, spelled out clearly the dangers of
remaining a friend of Philip. This policy Flamininus, whose meteoric
career during the last years of the Hannibalic War had culminated in the
consulship before he was even thirty, had now to represent and develop.
Flamininus, like his two consular predecessors, had had experience in the
Greek world, in Magna Gtaecia, where he had learned Greek adequately
and experienced Greek ways of thought and aspirations. He differed
from them, however, in that he commanded a strong personal support in
the Senate which (he could hope) might in due course, given sufficient
evidence of his energy and progress, secure his prorogation and thus his
chance of personally supervising Roman interests in the Balkans for long
enough to be effective (whether or not he succeeded in defeating Philip
immediately).

From the beginning the Roman aim was to reduce Philip’s power to
the point where he would normally act as Rome required without
argument or quibble. The war had begun without negotiations of any
kind having taken place; and dramatic results such as Flamininus re-
quired could not now be achieved by negotiations, as Philip found to his
cost. He immediately offered the new consul in effect to accept the terms
which Lepidus had stated at Abydus eighteen months before: that he
would evacuate places which he himself had captured and submit allega-
tions of war damage to arbitration. But Flamininus’ lack of interest in
serious negotiation became clear when he demanded the ‘liberation’ of
the Thessalians, who had belonged to Macedon for some 1 50 years, and
the talks ended as abruptly as they had begun. Flamininus’ demand did
not mean any change in the basic Roman attitude to Philip. The demands
of the various Roman representatives were all so formulated that in the
given circumstances they were sure to be rejected by Philip. At the same
time they gave the Romans a propaganda advantage with the Greeks.

M Livy xxxi. 6. i : the war was declared on Philippo regi Maccdonibusquc qui sub regno eius esscnt .

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The difference is one of tactics and technique, and perhaps an indication
that Flamininus might already be seeing the free and freed Greeks as a
pillar of long-term Roman influence in the Balkans, after the immediate
war-aims had been achieved. Thus, the change is not in attitude to Philip
but in relation to the Greeks. For the first time (as far as we know) a
Roman commander had committed himself to freeing specific Greek
communities. Flamininus’ demand that Philip evacuate Thessaly was not
just the deliberate making of a demand that Philip must reject, but was a
considered development of the propaganda programme and an indi-
cation of future policy. The principle was not new, but the application in
detail was important.

Whether a comprehensive post-war policy towards the Greeks was
already being consciously formulated is impossible to say. The Greeks
were important for the war, particularly those, like the Thessalians, with
close attachments to Macedon, and it is certain that winning the war was
the single overriding objective of Roman activities in 198, as it had been
in 199; events show that Thessaly had been chosen deliberately by
Flamininus as one of the main areas of his military activity. After the
break-up of the talks, Philip could not hold his apparently impregnable
position at the Aous gorge, and his retreat to Thessaly cost some 2,000
men. 55 Expecting that Flamininus would follow at once, he followed a
scorched-earth policy, inevitably at the cost of the Thessalians.
Flamininus, however, did not follow immediately. His first priority was
to secure his lines of communication to the west coast, which meant
putting diplomatic pressure on Epirus, whose territory controlled the
critical routes across the Pindus. Only then did he follow Philip into
Thessaly.

The going was not easy. Philip had garrisoned the most important
towns, and although the consul captured several smaller places, the
larger towns caused him serious difficulty, above all Phaloria and Atrax.
Phaloria, despite its 2,000-man-strong garrison, was eventually captured
after a siege and the whole town burnt down; but Atrax held out for so
long that Flamininus abandoned the siege. Time was running short - it
was perhaps already September - and he required more central winter
quarters with direct access for his transport ships than Epirus could
provide. The northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth offered the best
possibilities and here Phocis, with its adequate harbour of Anticyra, was
friendly with Philip, which was a good reason for wintering there, since
winter-quartering of troops always tended to strain relations with allies.
Nor was Phocis likely to offer serious opposition, despite a Macedonian
garrison at Elateia and perhaps some other places. And so it turned out.

55 On the topography see Hammond 1966, 39ff.: (d 31).

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Only Elateia required a siege before it too was occupied. The inhabitants,
though the town was plundered, were declared free, as the Roman slogan
demanded. The fleet also achieved some successes during the year.
Commanded by the consul’s brother L. Quinctius Flamininus, it cap-
tured Eretria and Carystus in Euboea, which left Philip with only his
major fortress of Chalcis on the island.

These successes, above all the proof of Philip’s inability to protect
Euboea and Phocis, had political repercussions. The Achaean League,
which a year before had refused to commit itself to the war with Rome,
now inclined under its new strategos Aristaenus to take the major step of
abandoning the nearly thirty-year-old alliance with Macedon and to join
Rome — perhaps above all because of the operations of the Roman fleet in
the Saronic Gulf and the operations which it was foreseeable that the
Romans would undertake in the Corinthian, once they had established
their base at Anticyra. The decision hung long in the balance at the
meeting of the League held at Sicyon during the siege of Elateia, which
was attended by representatives of Rome, Attalus, Athens and Rhodes.
Finally Aristaenus won the critical vote and the League joined the
alliance against Philip, though the allies proved too weak to expel
Philip’s garrison from the Acrocorinth and to restore Corinth to the
League. A small consolation for Philip was that Argos, supported by
Philocles’ soldiers from Corinth, seceded from the League and remained
loyal to Macedon.

Flamininus had set out with great consequence to ‘free the Greeks’. He
had not entered Macedonia, as Sulpicius Galba had done, but had
concentrated on Macedonian possessions in Greece, removing them city
by city from Macedonian control. In this way, without ever confronting
Philip, he could hope to convince the Greeks that Philip was merely
fighting to maintain his Greek empire, whereas Rome supported their
fight for freedom. Under the circumstances Philip decided to try to gain
precise information about the Roman price for peace. He accordingly
suggested talks which took place around November 198 at Nicaea and
Thronium, near Thermopylae. At this time Flamininus had not yet
received news of his prorogatio, so that he did not know whether or not he
would himself remain in command. For this reason he had no objection
to talking to Philip - indeed, in case his command were not prorogued,
he might even be able to negotiate terms which he could recommend to
the Senate as being the effective achievement of Roman war-aims. If his
command were renewed, as he hoped, it would not be difficult to feed the
Senate suitable demands to guarantee the collapse of the negotiations.
And even in the worst of all foreseeable events, if Flamininus were
replaced and the Senate did not accept his negotiated terms, he would
still not have lost anything by negotiating, since the positive effect on the

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Greeks of accepting, apparently with serious intention, every negotiat-
ing offer which Philip made, was important for the Roman image.

The negotiations at Nicaea were therefore not a total charade, though
demands within the framework of Roman propaganda, which would
guarantee their failure, needed to be kept unmentioned in the back-
ground in case they should be required; these were the evacuation of
Philip’s three fortresses, which he called ‘the Fetters of Greece’ -
Demetrias, Chalcis and the Acrocorinth. All Roman allies were represen-
ted. Flamininus demanded once again that Philip evacuate the whole of
Greece; that he release all deserters and prisoners; that he evacuate the
areas in Illyria which he had occupied since the Peace of Phoenice and
that he restore all places taken from Ptolemy, that is Aenus, Maronea and
Samos (if Ptolemy had not already recovered the latter). 56 The allies also
registered their demands in detail, the Aetolians being particularly
extreme; and the session ended with the presentation of the demands in
writing. Philip replied the next day in closed session with Flamininus,
who told the allies that his reply amounted to the partial satisfaction of
their demands. The allies were not satisfied; but when Philip offered to
send to the Senate to negotiate disputed points, Flamininus readily
agreed, since his powerful backers in Rome would decide what to
recommend to the Senate, depending on whether they succeeded in
having his command prorogued or not. The talks therefore broke up
after agreeing a two-months’ truce; and representatives of all participants
travelled to Rome.

Shortly after their arrival in Rome, but before the formal hearing, the
Senate had decided that both consuls of 197 should remain in Italy, which
implied that no new commander would be sent to Greece. The Greek
allies had clearly been well primed by Flamininus, and now informed the
Senate at length of the central importance of the ‘Fetters’; they argued so
cogently that the Senate refused to listen to the prepared statement of
Philip’s ambassadors, but merely asked if he were prepared to give up
Chalcis, the Acrocorinth and Demetrias. When they confessed that they
had no instructions on this issue the Senate voted to continue the war and
that Flamininus should remain in command. Flamininus’ scheme had
thus succeeded admirably; he had obtained his command and the Sen-
ate’s willingness to listen to the allies had convinced them of Rome’s
essential goodwill, as the propaganda had already indicated. The only
one injured by this cynical business was Philip - but since he was the
enemy, he did not matter.

By spring 197, Flamininus had won over the whole of central and
southern Greece. In the Peloponnese Nabis, Rome’s ally of the first war,

56 This had occurred by 197 (Livy xxxm.20. 1 1-1 2), but we do not know precisely when.

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joined the alliance, despite having just received Argos from Philip as the
price for an alliance with him; in central Greece Boeotia, despite some
internal difficulties, had also been won. Apart from the ‘Fetters’, Philip
thus retained of his earlier sphere of influence in Greece only Phthiotis
and Thessaly. It was therefore in this direction that Flamininus led his
army. Initially his plan seems to have been to continue the laborious
piecemeal town-by-town conquest of 198. He began at Phthiotic Thebes;
but when he heard that Philip had entered Thessaly with a large army, the
prospect of ending the war through a single decisive battle made him
break off the siege and march to meet him. After some manoeuvring,
Flamininus forced Philip to battle at Cynoscephalae. The armies were
numerically about equal: against Philip’s more than 25,000 men,
Flamininus had the two Roman legions, supported in infantry by 6,000
Aetolians, 1,200 Athamanians, 500 Cretans from Gortyn and 500
Apolloniatae as well as 400 Aetolian cavalry. The uneven ground,
however, suited the Romans and theirallies so much better that the battle
was a major success for Flamininus. 57 Philip’s army was destroyed as a
serious fighting force; and immediately after the battle he asked permis-
sion to send envoys to negotiate. The time had come for Flamininus to
lay his cards on the table and say what he wanted. Philip had no
immediate alternative to accepting what the Romans imposed.

From this time, we begin to get an idea of Rome’s long-term concep-
tion for Greek affairs. There is, of course, a sense in which Rome was
committed by the propaganda of the war years; but this had been cleverly
kept in terms of demands on Philip and (as far as we can see) no formal
commitment to any specific post-war general solution had been made.
This did not mean that the allies did not have their own hopes and
aspirations for the post-Macedonian era in Greece, nor their own views
of what should happen to Philip and Macedon.

It became clear at once that Roman war-aims, as far as Macedon was
concerned, had been achieved by decisively defeating Philip; Macedon
was humbled, and what Philip retained was by the grace of Rome. He
would, at least in the immediately foreseeable future, do what Rome
wished. Flamininus, in granting Philip’s request to open negotiations
after the battle, also urged him to be cheerful, as a patron might treat a
client fallen on hard times. This basically friendly attitude troubled the
Aetolians, who hoped to exploit the demolition of Macedon; their
demand that Philip be deposed was brusquely rejected by Flamininus. It
would not have been easy to depose Philip; and in any case Rome had no
interest in letting a power-vacuum in the Balkans come into existence,

57 On questions relating to the battle see Walbank 1957-79, 11.572#.: (b 38); Pritchett 1969,
'33-44: (1 jo).

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particularly in view of events in Asia Minor in 198 and 197, where
Antiochus, after defeating Ptolemy and occupying Coele Syria, was
rapidly re-occupying the coast. Moreover, it rapidly became clear that
Greek hopes of freedom, which had been awakened by the Roman
diplomatic campaign against Philip, could also be used to prevent the
already unpopular Aetolians from capitalizing on the victory and replac-
ing Philip in central Greece. This was just as little in the Roman interest
as that Antiochus should replace Philip. Flamininus’ aim was thus not so
much a balance of power as a balance of weakness in the Balkans; and the
war slogans could readily serve this purpose.

When the Aetolians re-joined Rome L. Apustius ‘promised them
everything’. Despite their separate peace treaty with Philip in 206, they
had apparently received from Apustius the impression that the terms of
the treaty of 2 1 2 would be valid also for this war - that is, that they would
receive such places as were conquered in co-operation with the Romans.
It was an impression which, however, was never confirmed in writing,
for when, at the peace conference at Tempe which followed soon after
the battle, their spokesman Phaeneas demanded the cession to Aetolia of
Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotic Thebes and Echinus, Philip’s
attitude was acquiescent; it was Flamininus who objected that they might
only have Phthiotic Thebes, since it alone had resisted; the other towns,
having surrendered, were under Roman protection. Against Phaeneas’
argument that the treaty gave the towns to Aetolia, Flamininus replied
brutally that the Romans had regarded the treaty as non-existent ever
since the Aetolians had abandoned Rome and made peace with Philip in
206, and that it had in any case never applied to cities which surrendered
voluntarily. 58

The Aetolians’ disappointment was enjoyed by the rest of the allies,
who could now at least be sure that, whatever the final settlement turned
out to be, they would not be delivered up to the overbearingly ambitious
Aetolians. Philip offered the terms which had been demanded at Nicaea
and at Rome, that he evacuate the whole of Greece, including the
‘Fetters’. More was not now required of him, and Flamininus, after
receiving hostages (including Philip’s son Demetrius) and 200 talents,
recommended that the Senate accept these terms. This it duly did,
though the consul for 196, M. Claudius Marcellus, opposed the peace
along with the Aetolians, in the hope of himself being able to continue
the war.

58 This latter assertion of Flamininus’ seems to be possibly contradicted by the inscriptional text
of the treaty which (lines 1 5-21) clearly deals with states who voluntarily come over to Rome or
Aetolia and seems to allow their inclusion in the Aetolian League, perhaps under guarantee of their
self-government. The stone is however broken just at the point where the conditions were detailed, a
fact which makes it virtually impossible to judge whether Flamininus’ assertion is correct: for
discussion and literature see Walbank 1957-79, M99L and in. 789: (b 38).

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The Senate then appointed the usual ten-man commission to settle
outstanding questions. At least four of the members were ex-consuls and
included Flamininus’ predecessors P. Sulpicius Galba and P. Villius
Tappulus. When they arrived (late winter or spring 196) they brought a
senatus consultum, of which Polybius reports what he says are ‘the essen-
tials’: All the Greeks not subject to or garrisoned by Philip, whether in
Asia or in Europe, shall be free and live according to their own laws;
those subject to Philip and the cities garrisoned by him he shall hand
over to the Romans before the Isthmian Games (June/July 196);
Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia and Iasus, also Abydus, Thasos, Myrina and
Perinthus he shall leave free and withdraw his garrisons from them.
Concerning the freedom of Cius, Flamininus shall write to Prusias
according to the senatus consultum. All prisoners and deserters Philip shall
restore to the Romans within the same time. He shall give up all his
decked ships except for five and the ‘sixteener’; he shall pay 1 ,000 talents,
half immediately and half in ten annual instalments. 59

The most important feature of the senatus consultum is the universal
declaration of freedom for all Greeks, including explicitly those Greeks
of Asia Minor who were not subject to and garrisoned by Philip and who
therefore had had nothing directly to do with the war against Philip. This
represents a clear and deliberate extension of Rome’s declared sphere of
interests into Asia Minor, a development which was in no way predes-
tined by the circumstances of the war with Macedon. The reason for it
was quite different, and lay in the activities of Antiochus III in Asia
Minor during the war with Philip. The terms of the peace treaty with
Philip and the settlement of the Greeks were thus not conditioned solely
by Balkan events. Already the wider implications of the Romans’ inter-
vention in the Balkans were becoming apparent: they had defeated Philip
by adopting an attitude of protecting the interests of the smaller Greek
states against Macedon. This had so far been so successful that in its fully
developed form of guaranteeing the freedom of each individual Greek
state (even against other Greek states) it could, it seemed, also be used
offensively — directly and immediately against the Aetolians in the
Balkans, but also less immediately but perhaps more seriously in Asia
Minor, as a warning to Antiochus.

Once more it had been Rome’s allies Rhodes and Pergamum that first
sounded the alarm. In zoo indeed the three Roman legati had gone on to
Egypt and to Antiochus, from whom they doubtless received assurances
that he had no intention of helping Philip. Nor did he. His aims, it turned
out, were more ambitious. Already in 198 Attalus complained in Rome
of an attack on his kingdom and asked the Senate for permission to pull

59 Polyb. xviii. 44 .

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THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR 1J I

his forces out of the Macedonian war in order to deal with it. The Senate
not only complied but sent out envoys who achieved the withdrawal of
the Seleucid army from Pergamum. But they did not prevent the
occupation of regions east of Pergamum, which had until recently been
controlled by Attalus, nor the agreement whereby Prusias of Bithynia
might occupy the part of Phrygia called Epictetus. Despite this, probably
still in 198, Antiochus sent envoys to Rome, who were received honour-
ably and amicably by the Senate.

In 197 Antiochus, starting in Cilicia, set out to recover the coastal
territories of Asia Minor. He met little opposition. The Rhodians,
fearing that he wished to join Philip, met him at Coracesium, but they
gave up plans to oppose him when they heard about Cynoscephalae.
They insisted, however, that Antiochus should not attack Ptolemaic
possessions in their area and successfully preserved Caunus, Myndus,
Halicarnassus and Samos. Otherwise Antiochus’ forces, which took full
advantage of the political weakness of Pergamum resulting from Attalus’
suffering a stroke and from his subsequent death, achieved a steady
stream of successes. By the autumn Antiochus possessed Ephesus and
probably some towns of the Troad, Ilium and perhaps already Abydus.
In autumn or early winter 1 97/6 Lampsacus appealed to Rome for help, 60
having decided to resist, as had Smyrna. But these were Antiochus’ only
problems. In Caria even Philip’s erstwhile possessions had shrunk,
probably by the end of 1 97, to Bargy lia alone. The Rhodians re-occupied
their Peraea, helped by Antiochus at Stratoniceia; Euromus had already
in c. August 197 (Gorpiaios) sent envoys to Zeuxis, clearly immediately
after receiving news of Cynoscephalae, and made a treaty of alliance with
Antiochus; 61 neighbouring Pedasa had doubtless gone the same way, as
had Iasus, to which Antiochus granted freedom and where, shortly
afterwards a cult of Laodice was established. 62 Then in late winter or
spring 196 Antiochus invested Smyrna and Lampsacus and sailed from
Abydus to Europe, where he took control of the Chersonese and began
to rebuild Lysimacheia.

During the three years of the war with Philip the political structure in
the Aegean area had thus changed dramatically. The Romans and their
allies had defeated Philip, but while they were doing it Antiochus had re-
established Seleucid influence in coastal Asia Minor. It is possible that he
regarded Rome as being irrelevant to Asia Minor, that he thought that
Rome would not be concerned. He had treated the Rhodians, finally, as
friends and had allowed them even to protect cities in their area which,
according to them, still claimed loyalty to Ptolemy; even Pergamum, the

60 SIG 591 with Holieaux 1938-68, v.i4iff.: (d 55).

61 Errington 1986, lines 8-u: (bjoa).

62 The inscriptions in Biiimel 1985, nos. 3 and 4: (B44A).

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old Seleucid enemy, he had spared after Roman intervention; he regard-
ed himself, and at the most recent diplomatic contact had been treated as,
an amicus of Rome. But that had been a year ago. Between lay a year of
conquests and the defeat of Philip. By the time the senatus consultum which
gave the ten legati their terms of reference was formulated, the Senate’s
attitude to Antiochus had clearly changed, and the reason is not difficult
to find. Antiochus’ conquests in Asia Minor, but above all his crossing to
Europe, had made him seem a threat to the main strategic Roman
achievement of the Macedonian War: the creation of a zone, in the
Balkans, free from the immediate presence of another Great Power.
Even if this threat were not immediate, Roman experience with the idea
of freedom for Greek states nevertheless made the Senate take the
initiative in Asia Minor. It is not necessary to believe that specific appeals
from Greek states will have made this seem advisable, though Rhodes
and Pergamum, now represented by Attalus’ son and successor Eumenes
II, will doubtless have stressed the danger. But, as with the intervention
in the Balkans in 200, this can have been at most a convenient pretext.
Greek was Greek, whether in Asia Minor or in the Balkans; to recognize
this essential unity and to treat all Greeks of the Aegean area as being
equally dear to Rome was a modest propagandist step, which might
possibly give Antiochus pause for thought. At the same time the Senate
resuscitated its interest in the conflict between Antiochus and Ptolemy
and sent the consular L. Cornelius Lentulus to arbitrate - a further hint
that, if cause were given, Rome might continue to show interest in
Antiochus’ affairs.

The activities of Flamininus and the ten legati in 196 were thus
overshadowed by the actions of Antiochus. Of Philip’s possessions
which the senatus consultum explicitly declared free, four at least —
Euromus, Iasus, Pedasa, Abydus - already counted as part of Antiochus’
sphere of interest, though doubtless all were technically ‘free and using
their own laws’. Here, then, the senatus consultum seems to have been
overtaken by events, though it is possible that the Senate already knew
what had happened, at least to the Carian towns (Euromus was formally
allied to Antiochus as early as August 1 97), when it formulated the senatus
consultum, but maintained the fiction in order to preserve a recognized
locus standi as the conqueror of Philip against Antiochus. On the other
hand, the declaration of freedom explicitly for Asiatic Greeks had a
programmatic character which might specifically help Smyrna and
Lampsacus. But the apparent emphasis on Asia offered ammunition to
the Aetolians, who saw fraud in the senatus consultum and broadcast their
provocative view that the only really free cities would be those of Asia,

63 Polyb. xvni. 45.10.

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and that the Romans would keep for themselves key positions — above
all, the ‘Fetters’, which they had told the Senate were so important - and
thus ensure that the European Greeks merely changed masters.

The ‘Fetters’ indeed caused the /egati difficulties, since some of them
believed strongly that Rome should keep them as a precaution against
Antiochus , 63 and a final decision was postponed; but the town of Corinth
at least was restored to Achaea. The Isthmian Games in june/july was
the date by which Philip should evacuate his garrisons and other Greek
possessions. In order to counteract the Aetolian interpretation of the
setiatus consultum Flamininus determined on a coup de theatre which should
take place at the games. Excitement was already high, since an announce-
ment was expected, when in the crowded stadium a herald made the
following proclamation: ‘The Roman Senate and the proconsul T.
Quinctius Flamininus, having defeated King Philip and the Macedo-
nians, leave the following peoples free, ungarrisoned, tribute-free and to
live according to their own laws: the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians,
Euboeans, Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians and
Perrhaebians .’ 64 The enthusiasm was immediate and enormous; after
such a public pronouncement at one of the great international games -
which, by public demand, the herald repeated - there could be no
doubting the immediate intentions of the Romans. The peoples named
comprised all those who had recognized claims to independent existence
and who had been part of Philip’s Greek empire. The representatives of
the freed communities were then invited to discuss details with the legati.
The only serious dispute was raised by the Aetolians, who wished to
receive Pharsalus and Leucas. The issue was referred to the Senate;
otherwise they were allowed to accept Phocis and Locris into their
League. The /^// inclined to let Eumenes keepOreus and Eretria, which
had been captured by the joint fleet and left to Eumenes to look after, but
Flamininus maintained that this would tear an enormous hole in the
declaration of freedom - would, in effect, play into the Aetolians’ hands —
so these cities were also declared free. Two Illyrian border towns,
Lychnidus and Parthus, were granted to Pleuratus; Amynander was
quietly allowed to retain those border areas of Thessaly, including the
important town of Gomphi, which he had acquired during the war. The
legati then split up and visited the areas where further details needed to be
regulated on the spot. We know that P. Cornelius Lentulus went to
Bargylia, L. Stertinius to Lemnos, Thasos and the Thracian coast, Cn.
Cornelius Lentulus to Philip and Aetolia. P. Villius Tappulus and L.
Terentius Massaliota were sent to Antiochus at Lysimacheia. It would be

64 Omitted from the list in Polyb. (xvm.46.))and Livy (xxxni.32.5, from Polyb.) perhaps simply
by Polybius’ oversight, are the Orestae and Dolopcs (Polyb. xvm.47.6; Livy xxxin.54.6).

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reasonable to assume that the other legati, who are not mentioned
explicitly by the sources in this context, did not sit idly at Corinth but also
travelled, particularly in Thessaly and central Greece, where the greatest
permanent changes were foreseen, meeting people and making
arrangements.

That new organizations could not simply be created in a few weeks is
obvious, and a reference in Livy to Flamininus’ still carrying out re-
organizations in Thessalian cities in 194 demonstrates this. 65 But the
legati worked quickly; the newly organized Thessalian League elected its
first strategos in early autumn 196, 66 and a decision that Magnesia should
be organized as part of this federation also belongs to 196. This means
that fundamental organizational decisions at the federal level — e.g.
which communities were to belong to the league, what its function
should be in relation to the federated communities, what system of
voting should be applied, where the meetings should take place, who
should attend them, how it should be financed - all belong to 196,
between the Isthmia in June/July and the election of the first federal
strategos , perhaps in September; and these decisions must all have been
supervised by Flamininus and the legati. After the emotion of the Isthmia
the legati who stayed in Greece thus spent the rest of their time in tedious
administrative detail — a necessary consequence, if the ‘freedom of the
Greeks’ was to be more than a slogan and take a concrete shape, which
alone could achieve long-term stability in the Balkans.

III. ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT

When the ten legati separated to oversee the details of the settlement of
Greece, two of them travelled to Antiochus. The importance of this
mission was emphasized by the fact that in the end not only P. Villius
Tappulus and L. Terentius Massaliota travelled to Lysimacheia, but that
they were in due course joined by L. Stertinius and P. Cornelius
Lentulus; and that L. Cornelius Lentulus, who had been sent by the
Senate explicitly to talk to Ptolemy and Antiochus, arrived at the same
time and became the Roman spokesman. The initiative which provoked
the Roman demarche had come from Antiochus, who had sent Lysias and
Hegesianax to Flamininus (but not, it seems, to Rome) at about the time
of the Isthmia. Lysias and Hegesianax were interviewed immediately
after the games, and they received a programmatic declaration:
Antiochus was requested to leave autonomous cities of Asia Minor
alone, to make war on none of them (this, above all, a reference to

65 Livy xxxiv. 5 1 .4-6. See also Flamininus’ letter to Chyretiae in Perrhaebia: Sherk, Documents 9,
for an example of the type of decisions required. 66 So Kramolisch 1978, 7ff.: (d 38).

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ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT 275

Smyrna and Lampsacus), and to evacuate the cities which he had just
taken from Ptolemy and from Philip. Additionally he was warned against
crossing to Europe with an army, ‘for none of the Greek cities was
currently at war with or subject to anybody ’. 67

This was the point of departure of the Roman mission to
Lysimacheia . 68 It soon became evident, however, that Antiochus was a
much more polished diplomatic performer than Philip. The atmosphere
of the meeting at the personal level was cordial until the main issues were
discussed. L. Cornelius Lentulus reiterated the demands formulated at
Corinth, that Antiochus should give up the cities which belonged to
Ptolemy and which had belonged to Philip, ‘since it was ludicrous that
Antiochus should take the spoils of the Roman war against Philip’. He
was asked to leave the autonomous cities unmolested, and finally - the
main point of the exercise — he was asked why he was in Europe with
large forces, and it was suggested to him that all thinking men would
regard this an indication of an intention to attack the Romans. Antiochus
was not impressed. He wondered at the Roman interest in Asia Minor,
which had nothing to do with them, just as he did not concern himself
with Italian affairs. He had crossed to Europe to take possession of the
Chersonese and the Thracian cities, since he had the best rights to them:
they had belonged to Lysimachus and had become Seleucid when
Seleucus defeated Lysimachus ; 69 Ptolemy and then Philip had occupied
them at a time of troubles in his kingdom, and he was therefore not now
exploiting Philip’s misfortune, but asserting his own historic rights. In
any case, he was scarcely offending Rome by restoring Lysimacheia,
which had recently been destroyed by Thracians; this was intended as a
residence for his son Seleucus, not as a base from which to attack the
Romans. The autonomous cities of Asia did not enjoy freedom by virtue
of a Roman decree but by his grace and favour. His dispute with Ptolemy
would in any case soon be amicably settled, since he was planning a
marriage alliance with him; in his dispute with Smyrna and Lampsacus -
envoys from the cities were present - he would accept the arbitration not
of Rome, but of Rhodes. The meeting ended inconclusively in a farce
when a false rumour of Ptolemy’s death arrived, which both parties
pretended not to have heard, but which made both eager to investigate
Egyptian affairs as soon as possible with the hope of influencing the
succession.

The Romans were thoroughly discomfited by Antiochus’ consum-
mate performance. He had not only shown himself unimpressed by the
Romans’ assertion of Roman interests but had produced reasons for his

67 Polyb. xviii. 49.}. 68 Polyb. xvm.50-55.

69 At Corupedium in 281; the areas had never been properly occupied by the Sclcucids.

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276 ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

presence in Europe at least as good as the Romans could produce for his
not staying there. He had in effect developed a different world-political
view, whereby he claimed Asia Minor for his sphere, as Italy was Rome’s;
between lay the buffer territory of the Aegean and the Balkans, where
neither had exclusive rights. Since the defeat of Philip and for the present
purpose, however, the Romans inclined to the view that their exclusive
sphere of interests included the Balkans up to the Bosphorus and
Hellespont, and that Asia Minor was a buffer area, where neither might
claim exclusive rights. The conceptions were incompatible; the Roman,
by hellenistic tradition, provocative. But since the Roman concept was
still being developed when the meeting at Lysimacheia took place and
since Antiochus’ activities so far affected only a (for Rome) marginal
area, talks could go on. Antiochus said he would send envoys to
Flamininus, who arrived in spring 195. They tried to convince
Flamininus that Antiochus planned no further conquests and represen-
ted an alliance. Flamininus was non-committal. The legati had by then
returned to Italy; he therefore referred Antiochus’ envoys to the Senate.
But, presumably since they had no instructions about this, they did not
go. 70

That Flamininus and his army were still in Greece in 195 was related to
uncertainty about Antiochus’ ultimate aims, which the talks at
Lysimacheia had exacerbated. If Flamininus knew his Macedonian his-
tory, he must have known that when Lysimachus was defeated by
Seleucus he ruled not only Thrace but also Macedonia; thus Antiochus’
historical argument could also justify a claim to Macedon. Whether or
not this was a factor, Antiochus’ self-righteous attitude and self-assertive
activities were alarming; and although the credibility of the whole policy
of ‘Greek freedom’ was endangered if Roman soldiers stayed in Greece
and above all continued to occupy the ‘Fetters’, the Peloponnese offered
good reason for their staying at least for 195. Nabis, though allied to
Rome, had lost importance since his enemy the Achaean League had also
joined Rome, and the violent behaviour of his regime at Argos - for
thirty years, until 198, a member of the Achaean League — made him
hated by most of the Greek states. A campaign against Nabis could
accordingly be neatly dressed up in terms of the slogan of freedom:
Argos should be freed from the tyrant. A senatus consultum gave
Flamininus the right to act according to his own discretion. 71 He
therefore summoned representatives of the allies to Corinth, and only
when they had voted for war did he bring his troops out of winter
quarters and begin the campaign. Although Nabis was defeated he was
not destroyed, only weakened. The Laconian coastal towns were ‘freed’

70 Livv xxxni. 41. 5, xxxiv. 25. 2. 71 Livy xxxm.45.5.

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and put under the supervision (‘ tutela ’) of the Achaean League, and
Argos was reunited with the League.

Despite Antiochus’ military activities in Thrace in 195 and despite
Hannibal’s successfully seeking refuge with him - which helped Scipio
Africanus to his second consulship, for 194 - the Senate accepted
Flamininus’ policy of evacuation when it decided on the provinces for
the year: the consuls should stay in Italy; the army should be withdrawn
from Greece. It was now urgent, if Flamininus’ policy, loudly pro-
claimed at the Isthmia in 196, were to remain credible and the accusations
of the disappointed Aetolians be proved false, that something should
finally be seen to be done. Only then could Rome hope to enjoy practical
Greek goodwill, which was the ultimate aim of the policy. In spring 1 94,
after he had spent the winter in deciding law suits and in political re-
organization of cities which had been Philip’s, 72 Flamininus summoned
representatives of the Greeks to Corinth. They listened to a recapitula-
tion of what the Romans and Flamininus had done for the Greeks and
then heard that Demetrias and Chalcis would be evacuated within ten
days and that Flamininus personally would give the Acrocorinth back to
the Achaeans, ‘so that all might know, whether it was the practice of the
Romans or of the Aetolians to lie’. 73

While the meeting was still in progress - a theatrical touch, typical of
Flamininus - the first soldiers were seen leaving the Acrocorinth.
Flamininus had great faith in the goodwill of the Greeks. Individual
Greek states had in the past often enough shown themselves grateful to
‘freedom-bringers’ and other benefactors; indeed, a frequent causative
clause of Hellenistic city decrees is precisely, ‘that others might know
that the city knows how to honour its benefactors’. But benefaction on
such a massive scale and a policy so consistently based on it, carried
beyond the stage where garrisons were ‘temporarily’ left and war-
contributions ‘temporarily’ collected, was unique. There was inevitably
risk involved, not so much that the value of the Roman benefaction in
individual states would be unrecognized, as that the complex multi-state
nature of the Greek world, left to itself, would produce political chaos
out of the particularist ‘freedom’. This might then give Antiochus
precisely the excuse he needed (were he looking for one) to intervene.
But the only practical alternative, of using Italian troops rather than
Greek goodwill to maintain Greek friendship with Rome, offered even
less prospect of success. Should it come to hostilities with Antiochus,
then it was clearly better to fight with the support of Greeks, who could
be expected to remember the practical sincerity of Rome’s freedom
policy, than to remain in occupation and inevitably cultivate mistrust and

72 Livy xxxiv. 48. 2. 73 Livy xxxiv.49.5.

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hate. Greeks always appreciated and honoured an extravagant gesture;
this Flamininus had satisfactorily learned and practised.

Until his departure Flamininus continued his work of re-organizing,
deciding disputes, exhorting common sense. Then he was gone. From
the Greeks he took with him a collection of honorary decrees
manifesting Greek goodwill, and the gold crowns that went with them;
then there were some 2,000 Italians, who had been captured during the
Hannibalic War and sold on the international slave markets, freed as a
present from the Greek states to their freedom-bringer (though the
gesture went back to a suggestion of Flamininus’). His three-day tri-
umph over Philip and Nabis was spectacular. The booty from the Greek
cities which had resisted was enormous: not only weapons and gold and
silver coin and bullion, but works of art, bronze and marble statues and
vases were displayed, together with the gold thanksgiving crowns from
the Greek cities, the freed slaves, the captives and the eminent hostages
from the defeated. 74

Antiochus had not been idle since 1 96. In 195 a large army operated in
Europe against the Thracians, and again in 1 94. 75 Then at the end of 1 94
or in spring 1 93 he sent Menippus and Hegesianax to Rome. At the start
of the consular year 193 the Senate intended to deal with the details of the
Greek settlement and in this connection large numbers of Greek states,
including some from Asia Minor, had sent envoys to Rome. Their chief
function seems to have been to provide the Senate with living evidence
of the current depth of Greek goodwill and their presence had doubtless
been engineered by Flamininus. The general atmosphere in which
Antiochus’ envoys found themselves was therefore one of self-satisfied
patronage by the Romans and ostentatious goodwill towards Rome by
the Greeks. It was not a favourable climate for Antiochus’ men, whose
instructions were to seek amicitia and negotiate an alliance (a direct
repetition of Antiochus’ alleged wishes in 195). The Senate, fearing
complicated negotiations, referred Menippus and Hegesianax to a sub-
committee consisting of its current eastern experts, Flamininus and the
ten legati. The opportunity for straight speaking, which this interview
behind closed doors allowed, was fully exploited by Flamininus. Con-
fronted again with the question by what right Rome interested itself in
Asiatic affairs, Flamininus played power politics. If Antiochus wanted
friendship and alliance he must understand two things: first, if he wished
Rome not to concern itself with Asia Minor then he must keep right out
of Europe; secondly, if he did not restrict himself to Asia but crossed to
Europe, then Rome would uphold its right to protect its friends in Asia
and to acquire more.

74 Livy xxx1v.52.4ff. 75 Livy xxxiv.33.12; App. Syr. 6.21-22.

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The next day Antiochus’ envoys were received by the full Senate, and
the other Greek envoys were also invited to be present. Menippus, it
turned out, not only represented Antiochus but also Teos - since c. 203
part of Antiochus’ kingdom - which had asked him to try to obtain
Roman recognition of the asylia which Antiochus promoted as part of his
public relations among the Greeks. We do not know the order of
business, but in neither case can Menippus have been satisfied. The
Senate granted his request for Teos, but added the unique proviso that
th & asylia should be valid only as long as Teos maintained its friendship
with Rome; and since the only way in which little Teos would be likely to
cease being friendly with Rome was if Rome fought a war with
Antiochus, Antiochus was in effect being made responsible for preserv-
ing the asylia. lb On the main issue Flamininus came straight to the point.
He said nothing about the cynical ultimatum which he had stated in the
sub-committee meeting, but urged the Greeks to report home that the
Roman people would free them from Antiochus with the same good
faith which it had shown in freeing them from Philip. If Antiochus left
the Greeks in Asia autonomous and retired from Europe, he might
continue to be a friend of Rome, if he wished. Since Antiochus’ envoys
had no instructions to negotiate on terms which implied a diminution of
Antiochus’ kingdom, they could merely plead for further talks.
Antiochus had been publicly branded as a danger to Greek freedom
before a large Greek audience and they had been unable to prevent it. 77

Flamininus’ cynical stage-managing had made good the diplomatic
defeat of Lysimacheia. But whether it had also made peace more secure
was less certain. The contradictory standpoints had not softened; and the
more public diplomatic defeats were suffered, the more likely it was that
one or other would decide that diplomacy was no longer adequate.
Meanwhile the Senate, certain of its success, showed itself conciliatory
and appointed three of the ten legati (P. Sulpicius Galba, P. Villius
Tappulus and P. Aelius Paetus) to travel again to Antiochus. Their
mission was dogged by misfortune. They first visited Eumenes, and
while at Pergamum heard arguments for going to war with Antiochus,
whose territory now surrounded Eumenes’ kingdom. Moreover, P.
Sulpicius fell ill and had to be left at Pergamum, while the others travelled
on to Ephesus, only to find that Antiochus was in Pisidia; and although
they were able to talk to Hannibal, they had to travel inland to Apamea,
where Antiochus finally came to meet them. Neither side offered conces-
sions, but before the talks ended the news of the death of the king’s son

76 The letter of the praetor M. Valerius Messala announcing this decision was found at Teos:
Sherk, Documents 34. See Errington 1980: (e 42).

77 Livy xxxiv. 57-59; App. Sjr. 6. This interpretation depends on rejecting the self-contradictory
phrase nisi dcccdat Europa in Livy xxxiv. 39. 5, as argued by Badian 1964, 137 n. 70: (a 4).

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ROME AGAINST PHILIP AND ANTIOCHUS

Antiochus stopped the discussions. A later interview at Ephesus with
Antiochus’ adviser Minnio, who seems to have overestimated the
strength of Antiochus’ position, contributed nothing to a settlement.
Nevertheless, on their return to Rome the legati reported calmly that they
saw no immediate reason for war. 78 Even when Eumenes’ brother
Attalus personally travelled to Rome in spring 192 with the information
that Antiochus had again crossed the Hellespont, the Senate made no
change in its dispositions. 79 It seems clear that, if Antiochus restricted
himself to the Chersonese and neighbouring districts of Thrace, the
Senate would in practice, though under protest, accept this as the
necessary price for peace. Only if he interfered further in the sphere
which Rome now regarded as its protectorate would war follow.

Meanwhile the Roman peace was being shaken by the Aetolians.
Probably in spring 193 they decided, in the absence of Roman troops, to
try to upset the Roman settlement. It may be that they felt encouraged by
a visit from Hegesianax and Menippus returning from Rome;
Hegesianax visited Delphi, which was still controlled by the Aetolians,
and received the grant of public honours appropriate to his status
( proxenia ). 80 Antiochus received a formal visit from the Aetolian
Dicaearchus, brother of the strategos Thoas, who must have arrived
before Minnio’s talks with the Roman legati at Ephesus. He hoped to gain
Antiochus’ support for the planned uprising in Greece, but Antiochus
remained cautious. Nor did Philip give the Aetolians any encourage-
ment. Nabis, however, who also received an Aetolian envoy, immedi-
ately set out, contrary to his treaty with Rome, to regain control of the
Laconian coastal cities, which precipitated both military and political
reaction from the Achaeans: they sent reinforcements to Gytheum and an
embassy to Rome. Since the three legati, returning from Ephesus, passed
through Greece, they were able to recommend to the Senate action
against Nabis. Accordingly, the praetor A. Atilius Serranus was sent
with thirty quinqueremes to help the Achaeans. The Senate also reacted
diplomatically to the news, and a new group of four legati , of which
Flamininus and P. Villius Tappulus were members, went to talk to the
Greeks and to remind them of Rome’s continued interest in the
settlement. 81

Towards the end of 193 Thoas, after his year as strategos , had travelled
to Ephesus. When he returned, Menippus came with him and at the
spring meeting of the League (192) promised the Aetolians that
Antiochus would restore the freedom of the Greeks. Flamininus had
difficulty in obtaining permission to speak, and his suggestion to negoti-

78 Livy xxxv. 1 3.4—1 7.2; cf. App. Syr. 45-46; Livy xxxv.22.2.

79 Livy xxxv.23.10-1 1. 80 SIC 585, line 45. 81 Livy xxxv. 1 2-1 3.3, 22.2, 23.

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ate in Rome rather than to involve Antiochus was answered by a decree,
passed after he had withdrawn, inviting Antiochus to free Greece and to
arbitrate between Rome and Aetolia. The Aetolian strategos Democritus
was not satisfied with this. He provocatively refused to tell Flamininus
its terms, but he would do so, he said, when he was camped on the banks
of the Tiber. It was impossible not to conclude that the Aetolians had
declared war, and that Antiochus’ representatives had condoned this
action (neither of which was true). 82

Further events merely seemed to confirm this. The Aetolian delegate
council, the apocleti, decided to try to seize Sparta, Chalcis and Demetrias.
At Sparta they failed, after they had assassinated Nabis, thanks to rapid
Achaean intervention; at Chalcis they also failed, because the Chalcidian
government declared that, since Chalcis was already free, it did not need
freeing, and took appropriately energetic action. At Demetrias, how-
ever, Flamininus had already had difficulty in convincing the people of
the reality of their freedom. They had demanded a guarantee that
Demetrias would not be restored to Philip, as the price for his remaining
loyal to Rome; and Flamininus had hesitated to give this in public, since it
would limit his chance of binding Philip with fraudulent hopes. Accord-
ingly, the Aetolians were successful here. A subsequent visit by P. Villius
confirmed that the Romans had lost credibility at Demetrias. It was a
serious error of judgement. 83

These Aetolian actions meant an open breach with Rome and would
doubtless, even by themselves, have brought about Roman military
intervention. They did not, however, necessarily imply war with
Antiochus (though Eumenes doubtless did his best to persuade
Flamininus that they did, when he met him on the Euripus during the
crisis at Chalcis). Antiochus seems not to have expected that Aetolian
action would follow so swiftly on Menippus’ visit. He was involved with
other projects: in Asia Minor with the still uncompleted conquest of
Smyrna, Lampsacus and Alexandria Troas; and with Hannibal, to whom
-although he had so far kept him at a discreet distance - he now intended
to give a few ships and men, to see if he could cause a diversion in Africa.
But immediately after the capture of Demetrias Thoas travelled again to
Ephesus. According to Livy, he grossly exaggerated the enthusiasm for
Antiochus in Greece, and false expectations seem indeed to be the only
reasonable explanation for Antiochus’ decision to cross to Demetrias in
autumn 192. He could raise a mere 10,000 men, 500 cavalry and six
elephants, all transported on sixty ships which he scraped together and
which necessitated abandoning his support for Hannibal. There can be
no question but that this was an emergency decision taken in order to

82 Livy xxxv.32.2-33.il. 83 Livy xxxv. 31, 34-39.

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consolidate what would otherwise be wasting assets: Demetrias, which
Villius had already publicly threatened to recapture; and Aetolian enthu-
siasm, which could be expected to dissipate if he did nothing.

Antiochus’ crossing to Demetrias, though provoked by events out-
side his control, was a deliberate assertion of his view that the Balkans
were a no-man’s land between Asia Minor and Italy, where he might
legitimately have interests, although Roman representatives had repeat-
edly asserted the opposite view, that the Balkans were Rome’s exclusive
sphere of influence. But this had always been merely oral. Over
Antiochus’ possessions in Thrace and the Asiatic Greek cities, protests
had continued for four years, but no action had followed. Indeed the
Roman army had been withdrawn. It must therefore have been tempting
to believe that the Senate’s threats were without substance and that only a
really major intervention would provoke Roman reaction. Moreover,
Livy, echoing Polybius, suggests that at least one of Antiochus’ advisers,
Minnio, thought that, even if it should come to war, Antiochus would
win; and Minnio was no mere trivial courtier but the minister who had
conducted the final official interview with the last Roman legati. Under
these circumstances Antiochus would doubtless tend to believe Thoas’
assertions that many Greek states were just waiting for a favourable
opportunity to rebel from Rome. A major bridgehead in central Greece,
such as Aetolia could provide, would keep the Roman threat to his
position in Asia Minor even more distant; and an armed conflict, if it
came, would in the first instance occur in Greece, which was expendable,
not in Asia Minor, which was now again an integral part of his kingdom.
Antiochus’ move to Demetrias thus seems to have been based on a fatal
mixture of misleading information, false assessment and wishful
thinking.

For the Senate Antiochus’ crossing to Demetrias was the final confir-
mation of suspicions which it had harboured since at least 1 97, and which
Antiochus’ subsequent activities had done nothing to dissipate.
Eumenes had taken every opportunity to nourish these suspicions and
Antiochus seems to have seen this danger when he tried to prise him from
his Roman friendship with the offer of a marriage alliance, which
Eumenes had nonetheless turned down. In Greece the activities of the
Aetolians, above all their recent contacts with Antiochus, suggested the
possibility of a combination of interests, which diplomacy alone, how-
ever great the underlying Greek goodwill on which it could rely, could
not hope to combat. The sending of the praetor Atilius Serranus to the
Peloponnese in spring 192 with his fleet was the first indication that the
Senate recognized this; moreover, the general underlying situation and
rumours that Antiochus intended to send ships to Sicily had caused the
Senate at the same time to take modest defensive measures for Italy and to

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foresee the necessity of sending legions to Greece again. 84 When the
news of Antiochus’ crossing reached Rome, the praetor M. Baebius
Tamphilus was sent at once to Epirus with two legions, and one of the
consuls, Flamininus’ brother L. Quinctius Flamininus, levied additional
troops so that when war was declared at the usual time at the beginning of
the consular year the new consul could depart without his having to lose
time in levying troops.

M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191) received as his brief the conduct of the
war ‘against Antiochus and those in his empire’ ( cum rege Antiocho quique
sub imperio eius essent). The praetor C. Livius Salinator became fleet
commander; and as soon as weather conditions allowed, they crossed the
Adriatic with all the immediately available forces. 85 When Glabrio
arrived, Antiochus had already suffered severe disappointments. Except
at Demetrias and by the Aetolians, he had been received everywhere
coolly. His claim, based on the Aetolian view that Rome dominated the
Greeks, that he had come to free Greece, fell on deaf ears since most
Greek states since 1 96 had enjoyed greater practical independence than at
any time since the middle of the fourth century, and the only states which
Antiochus had managed to ‘liberate’ - Chalcis and a few Thessalian
towns - he had had to do militarily, against the will of the local
governments. The Achaean League had reacted to a diplomatic approach
by declaring war and Philip, annoyed by Antiochus’ clumsy support for a
pretender to his throne - it was the brother-in-law of Amynander, who
had returned to his Aetolian friendship - sent to Rome offering all help in
the war. Baebius met Philip in Dassaretis during the winter and seems to
have agreed, though probably only orally, that Philip might keep such
places as he captured from the Aetolians and their allies; 86 the result was
immediate activity, and Baebius was enabled to garrison the critically
situated Larisa, just as Antiochus was preparing to storm it. Epirus tried
to keep out of the conflict: Charops brought the message that, if
Antiochus came in force he would be welcome; but if he could not
guarantee protection, Epirus wished not to be involved. Even Boeotia,
where Flamininus had had serious difficulties, hesitated, and a personal
visit by Antiochus produced a decree which indeed indicated friendli-
ness, but committed the Boeotians to no action. Only little Elis, isolated
in the western Peloponnese and traditionally friendly to Aetolia, asked
for a garrison, doubtless fearing the Achaeans. Antiochus finally found a
more congenial occupation than this ungrateful diplomacy in spending

84 Livy xxxv. 2 j.

85 The main narrative sources for the war with Antiochus and the Aetolians are: the fragments of
Polyb. xx and xxi; Livy xxv.41-51, xxxvi.i-45, xxxvn.1-60, xxxvm. 1-34, 37-41.

86 Livy xxxvi.8.6, to. to, xxxix.23.10.

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the rest of the winter at Chalcis enjoying his recent marriage with a local
girl.

In the spring events moved rapidly towards the resounding defeat of
Antiochus at Thermopylae about the end of April. Even before the
consul arrived, operations in Thessaly by Philip and Baebius had recov-
ered most of the towns occupied by Amynander and the Aetolians a year
before. Antiochus himself had apparently been persuaded by the
Aetolians to help them achieve their old aim, of incorporating Acarnania
in the League. He may indeed have hoped in this way to persuade the
Romans to engage in western Greece, where it would be impossible for
the Aetolians not to provide their full army to support him, since a defeat
would mean the devastation of their own territory, but his failure in
Acarnania and the devastatingly swift successes of Philip and Baebius in
Thessaly prevented this. When Glabrio arrived in Thessaly about the
beginning of April little was left to be done, and most of the remaining
towns capitulated as soon as they realized that the consul had arrived.
Antiochus, for unknown reasons, had received no substantial reinforce-
ments since arriving at Demetrias, and was thus outnumbered two to one
by the Romans, who had some 20,000 men and many allies from Illyria
(to say nothing of the Macedonians who, after Glabrio’s arrival and
operating independently, occupied Athamania). He had the choice of
retreating ingloriously to Asia or of choosing a place for battle where the
Roman numerical superiority might not tell. His pride and reputation
forbade the first alternative and he therefore chose to stand at Thermopy-
lae. But his attempt was no more successful and considerably less
glorious than that of the Greeks against the Persians 289 years before.
The Aetolians provided only modest support, and the Romans inflicted
such an overwhelming defeat that Antiochus evacuated Greece at once
and returned to Ephesus. The whole Greek adventure had lasted little
more than six months and ended in farce.

It had nevertheless shown the Senate the strength, but also the
weakness of Flamininus’ settlement of Greece. The conclusion was
typical: not that the settlement was wrong in principle, but that the
general conditions under which it had been implemented were too
uncertain. Rome needed to ensure that no major threat to the peace
existed, not merely in the Balkans, but in the whole Aegean area,
including Asia Minor. Antiochus’ campaign in Greece had demonstrated
that the narrow lines of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont were wholly
inadequate to define Roman strategic interests. It was necessary to re-
define, but this time not just in terms of physical geography but in terms
of geo-politics. The essential unity of the Aegean basin, of the Greek
world of Asia and of Europe as a geo-political system, had been revealed
with dazzling clarity.

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ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT 285

There was never any doubt that the war would go on; the Senate made
this clear when it gave L. Cornelius Scipio, consul for 190, as province
Greece, with permission to cross to Asia if necessary. Scipio received as
legatus his own brother Africanus, who was technically disqualified from
holding a new consulship but whom the Senate expected to take a leading
part in the campaign. Greece was the first priority after Thermopylae,
since the Aetolians continued to resist; and despite major setbacks at the
hands of Glabrio and Philip and despite negotiations both with Glabrio
and in Rome, the siege of Naupactus, which Glabrio had begun in the
autumn, still continued when the Scipios arrived.

Despite the formal priorities established by the Senate’s formulation
of the consul’s province, there was no doubting that the Romans would
cross to Asia. The Roman fleet under C. Livius had been operating with
Eumenes’ fleet in Asiatic waters since Thermopylae; and after a success at
Corycus, in the strait between Chios and the Ionian peninsula, Livius
spent the winter on Pergamene territory near Canae. The first action of
the Scipios was therefore to arrange a six-month truce with the
Aetolians, who were to use the time to negotiate in Rome, while the
Scipios set out for Asia with their army on the land-route through
Greece, Macedonia and Thrace. They doubtless chose this route because
Antiochus’ fleet, despite its setback at Corycus, was still very strong, and
Antiochus had ordered reinforcements from Syria and had given
Hannibal command of them. Until the allied fleet obtained supremacy it
would have been desperately reckless to risk putting the army into ships
and crossing direct to Pergamum. But the land-route, quite apart from its
/ength (some 1,000 km from Naupactus to the Hellespont) was not
without potential difficulties. Philip, whom the Senate had rewarded for
his recent loyalty with the release of his son Demetrius, provided help
with routes and negotiation with the Thracians. But two important
coastal towns, Aenus and Maronea, freed by Rome in 196, were now
garrisoned by Antiochus; and since 196 Lysimacheia had been built up
into a fortress controlling access to the Chersonese, which, together with
Abydus on the Asiatic shore, belonged to Antiochus. Nor was the
attitude of Prusias of Bithynia on the Asiatic side of the Propontis
necessarily friendly to Rome, or even neutral. If Antiochus had played
his cards sensibly the Roman march into Asia could have been made into
a nightmare.

In the event, however, it was merely the distance that created difficul-
ties and cost time. It proved possible to circumvent Maronea and Aenus
because the Thracians, sweetened by Philip, created no difficulties. The
naval campaign in Asiatic waters in 190 had two decisive incidents: the
first, when the Rhodians prevented Hannibal’s reinforcements from
joining Antiochus’ admiral Polyxenidas at Ephesus; the second, a regular

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battle between the Roman fleet, now under L. Aemilius Regillus, and
Antiochus’ fleet off Myonnesus, in which Antiochus’ fleet was so
severely incapacitated that Antiochus panicked and withdrew not only
his garrison but also the settlers in haste from Lysimacheia. However,
since his haste allowed no time to remove the stores, the Romans, who
arrived a few days later, actually chose Lysimacheia as the place where
they could most suitably rest before crossing to Asia. Even the crossing
of the Hellespont was in the end not contested by Antiochus. Abydus he
simply gave up; and the Roman and Rhodian fleets, which after
Myonnesus had sailed to the Hellespont, had no difficulty in ferrying the
army over. Difficulties which the Romans had anticipated from Prusias
were also easily avoided in the event through a diplomatic initiative.

By October 1 90 the Roman army was thus in Asia Minor and the allied
fleet had obtained overwhelming superiority at sea. Antiochus had spent
his time after returning from Europe in assembling army contingents
from all parts of his empire; but despite the size of his army, which by the
autumn had reached some 60,000 men, the Romans’ arrival made him
offer terms. The Romans, who since Antiochus’ crossing to Greece
regarded the Asiatic Greeks as their sphere of interest, were not im-
pressed with his offer to cover half the Roman cost of the war and to
abandon his claims to Smyrna, Lampsacus, Alexandria Troas and other
towns which had joined Rome. The Scipios, reflecting the policy of the
Senate, envisaged a fundamental change in the balance of influence in the
Aegean area, and now that their army had safely landed in Asia they saw
no reason not to use it to achieve their aims, the details of which had
doubtless been constructed in consultation with Eumenes. These formed
the basis of their reply: Antiochus must evacuate all Asia Minor north
and west of the Taurus mountains and pay the whole costs of the war.
These demands seemed so extreme that Antiochus broke off negotia-
tions. Some time later, unusually late in the year for major military action
(about mid-December), the decisive battle took place near Magnesia ad
Sipylum. Antiochus, as at Thermopylae, though this time outnumbering
the Romans and their allies at least by two to one, was routed.

There was not much to negotiate when Antiochus’ representatives,
Zeuxis and Antipater, arrived at Sardis, for many years Zeuxis’ adminis-
trative capital, where the Romans had moved after the battle. The terms
had been stated in the pre-battle talks and now merely acquired some
precision: as before, Antiochus must evacuate all territory north and
west of the Taurus. The war indemnity was made specific: Antiochus
must pay 1 5 ,000 Euboeic talents - 500 immediately, 2,500 as soon as the
terms were ratified in Rome, and the rest in twelve annual instalments;
Eumenes should receive 400 talents and a quantity of grain, which
Antiochus owed him by some treaty which Attalus had once made.
Exiles and enemies of Rome were to be handed over: Hannibal, Thoas,

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ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT 287

Mnasilochus the Acarnanian and the two Chalcidians Philon and
Euboulidas; twenty hostages, including the king’s youngest son
Antiochus, were to be given as a pledge. Antiochus agreed, and embas-
sies were prepared for the journey to Rome. The occasion was a turning-
point in the history of Asia Minor, and not just Antiochus and the Scipios
sent representatives, but almost all states and communities who felt
themselves affected by the war sent envoys; for Eumenes it was so
important that he travelled to Rome in person.

The Greeks did not wish to interfere with the terms of the peace treaty
with Antiochus. This was a Roman matter, and the ratification of the
preliminary terms with Antiochus created no difficulty. Final details and
precise definitions, above all, of the ‘Taurus line’, were referred to a
commission of ten legati who together with the new consul, Cn. Manlius
Vulso (who was already in Asia), were to settle such problems on the spot
and to take Antiochus’ personal oath, but Zeuxis and Antipater were
prepared to exchange oaths on the ratified terms. The Greeks’ aim was to
exert influence on the Senate over what was to happen to the areas which
Antiochus must evacuate. The critical moment had come when it would
emerge whether Rome would treat the Greeks of Asia Minor as it had
treated the Balkan Greeks in 196 - and as its publicized programme for
the war in Asia had announced — or whether the most influential friends,
Eumenes and Rhodes, who under great strain had supported the Roman
cause without wavering and made major contributions to its success,
would now receive reward. There was, however, a pragmatic middle
way, which the conditions of the war suggested and which the Senate
steered. Eumenes and the Rhodian representatives both made long
speeches. Eumenes maintained that the best solution would be for Rome
to retain direct responsibility for the areas evacuated by Antiochus; but,
failing this, he felt that there was no one more suitable for the job than
himself. The Rhodians developed the view that the promised freedom
for the Greek cities should be granted, and that there was plenty of non-
Greek territory being vacated by Antiochus which could satisfy
Eumenes’ just wish for reward. The conflicts of interest were clear, since
it was precisely the Greek cities which Eumenes - like Antiochus before
him - coveted. For a Greek, they were the pearl in the crown of Asia
Minor, with their developed Greek social institutions, their prosperity
and complex economic structure and their interests and contacts
throughout the Mediterranean. The representatives of the cities them-
selves all received the same reply: the ten legati would settle disputes on
the spot. But the principles of the settlement were laid down in the
instructions to the legati , which made it clear that, as in Greece (and as
earlier in Africa), the Senate had no intention of maintaining a physical
Roman presence in Asia Minor. The non-Greek territories vacated by
Antiochus were divided into two categories: the Rhodians should re-

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ceive Lycia and Caria south of the Maeander, with certain specific
exceptions; Eumenes the rest. With the Greek cities the Senate estab-
lished more differentiated principles, based on the attitude of each city to
Rome during the war: those that had joined Rome before the battle of
Magnesia were to be free; the rest were to go to Eumenes or Rhodes,
depending on whether they were north or south of the Maeander.

Meanwhile Manlius (cos. 189), who, before the news of the winter
battle of Magnesia had reached Rome, had been appointed to succeed L.
Scipio and had been voted reinforcements to continue the war, had not
been idle, though the war with Antiochus was over. He soon became
expert on the affairs of Asia Minor by leading a major plundering
expedition into central and southern Anatolia, primarily directed against
the Gauls (Galatians), who had supported Antiochus, though he also
passed through northern Caria, Lycia and Pisidia. His army killed large
numbers of Gauls and seized exceptionally large amounts of booty,
which the delicate political nature of the war with Antiochus had so far
largely prevented. When he returned to Ephesus in late autumn repre-
sentatives of the Asiatic Greek cities greeted him as the victor over the
barbarians, and he received a constant stream of congratulatory visitors
bearing expensive presents. Moreover, even in spring 188 he did not
simply sit at Ephesus and wait for the legati to arrive, but marched to
Pamphylia to receive the first major instalment of Antiochus’ indemnity
(2,500 talents). He interfered at Perge, where Antiochus still maintained
a garrison, and had the garrison removed; and he was still here when he
heard that the legati and Eumenes had arrived at Apamea, where he
joined them.

Since the principles both of the treaty and of the settlement of the
evacuated territories had already been laid down in Rome, it remained
merely to stipulate such details as could best be done locally. For the
treaty the main open question was the precise definition of the ‘Taurus
line’, which had been the core of Roman demands ever since the first
discussions in autumn 190. This was now fixed in two ways (though not
without some ambiguity): by a coastal point (Cape Sarpedon) beyond
which Antiochus might not sail, and a land-line, the River Tanais, which
was probably the upper reaches of the Calycadnus (modern Goksu); the
coastal provision was also strengthened by the restriction of Antiochus’
navy to ten larger open ships, each of not more than thirty oars. In other
respects the final treaty merely formulated (or brought up to date, as in
the case of the indemnity, some of which had already been paid) what had
already been agreed at Rome. The treaty was at once sworn by Manlius
and shortly afterwards by Antiochus. 87

The Senate had decided that the evacuated territories, apart from those

87 For the treaty terms see McDonald 1967: (e 47); McDonald and Walbank 1969: (e 48).

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289

cities which were defined as Rome’s friends, should be divided between
Eumenes and Rhodes. What was now needed to be decided was into
which category the conduct during the war of each individual city placed
it and to settle disputes between cities. This was by no means as
wearisome and time-consuming as the equivalent settlements in main-
land Greece had been in 196/5, since in Asia no new independent states
were created. By attributing to Rhodes and Pergamum all cities that had
opposed Rome or remained too long loyal to Antiochus, the Senate had
spared its legati much trouble. There were, however, certain exceptions
to the general principles, made for reasons we do not know. Eumenes
received Telmessus and its territory, as well as the Ptolemaic royal gift
estate of Ptolemy of Telmessus who had been closely associated with
Antiochus; in the upper Maeander region he also received the area
known as Caria Hydrela and the part of the ager Hydrelitanus which
bordered on Phrygia. The ‘Taurus line’, as defined in the treaty, opened
the possibility of a dispute about Pamphylia, but the Senate settled
inevitably in favour of Eumerres (except for the free cities of Side and
Aspendus). Antiochus’ European possessions also were available for
distribution: Eumenes inevitably received the Chersonese, though
Aenus and Maronea - as recently as 196 freed by Rome from Philip -
were again declared free.

The treaty of Apamea and the settlement of Asia Minor did not reduce
the Seleucids to a minor power, but it did restrict them to being an Asiatic
power, without the possibility of acquiring major influence in western
Asia Minor or in Europe. This still left them an enormous empire
stretching — with varying degrees of dependence - from the Taurus to
eastern Iran. The settlement of the vacated territories seems to confirm
the Roman strategic objectives of the war, of ensuring that the strategi-
cally important coastal areas of the Aegean basin were controlled by
friends of Rome. This was no more than the application to a new area of
the principle which had already been applied to the Balkans in 196 and
195, of insisting that areas in which the Senate recognized important
Roman interests were not only neutralized from outside influence but
were actively a preserve of Roman friends and Roman power. Eumenes,
Rhodes and the free Greek cities of Asia Minor had one thing in
common: they owed the advantages of the status which they received in
188 to Rome alone - and they knew it. Gratitude, according to
Flamininus’ doctrine, which had survived the challenge of Antiochus in
Greece largely intact, was not only a cheap and easy substitute for
legions, but was also in the last resort and in the long term more effective.
Events in Asia Minor so far had given no reason to believe that
Flamininus’ doctrine, suitably adapted to fit local conditions, would not
here also prove the most effective protection of Rome’s position and
interests.

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CHAPTER 9

ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE
SACK OF CORINTH

P. S. DEROW

I. ROME, PHILIP AND THE GREEKS AFTER APAMEA

It is only with the defeat of Antiochus and the Peace of Apamea (i 88) that
the nature of the Roman settlement of Greece can begin to be discerned. 1
Roman troops did not leave Greece for two years after the Isthmian
proclamation of 196, and it was two years after that that Antiochus sailed
into Demetrias. Even in 196 the Aetolians had claimed that the Roman
victory over Philip would bring the Greeks not liberation but only a
change of master. This belief brought them to war. They lost and
surrendered to the victors both their liberty and more money than their
nation could afford. The Greeks had not believed their claim, and the
Aetolians and their eastern ally were insufficient to the task. In a sense
their claim was wrong. The Greeks found in Rome a master such as
Philip had never come near to being, stronger and more deleterious.

1 Far and away the most important sources for the relations between Rome and Greece from 1 88
to 146 are Polybius and Livy. The chronological arrangement of the relevant books of Polybius
(which have mostly to do with Greece and the cast) is as follows: Book xxii (188/7-185/4); xxm
(184/3-183/2); xxiv (182/1-181/80); xxv (180/79-177/6); xxvii (172/1—171/ 70) ; xxvni (170/69);
xxix (169/8); xxx (168/7-165/4); xxxi (164/3-161/60); xxxn (160/59- 157/6); xxxiii (156/5-15 3/2);
xxxv (1 52/1-1 5 1/50); xxxvi (150/49-149/8); xxxviii (147/6); xxxix (146/5-145/4). For the internal
economy of these books sec Walbank 1957—79, 111.56-61: (b 38). The Livian evidence is to be found
in books xxxix-xlv, especially in the following sections: xxxix. 23. 5-29.5 (185), 33-37 (184),
46.6-50.1 1, 53 (183); XL.2.6-16.3 (182), 20.1-24.8 (1 81-180), 54-58 (180-179); XLi.19.4-1 1 (175),
22.2—25.8 (174); XLii.2.1-3, 4. 5-6. 4 (173), 10.11, 1 1. 1— 18.6, 19, 25-27 (172), 29-67 ( 1 7 1 ); xliii.i
(171), 4-6.10, 7-8, 9.4—1 1. 1 2 (170), 18-23 (169); xliv. 1-16.7 (169), 1 8.1 “j, 20-46 (168); xlv. 1 —3
(168), 4.2-10. 1 5, 17.34 (167). The Periochae of books xlvi-lii contain some bits and pieces relevant
to the years 167-146. For the history of the Achaean League from 167 to 146 the independent
account in Pausanias (vn. 1 1-16) assumes an importance of its own, despite obvious difficulties. The
narrative here follows Polybius and Livy (preferring the former) very closely, and running
references will oot normally be given along the way, save in cases of specific details (such as
quotation) or controversy. Reference to Walbank 1957—79, m: (b 38) will for the most part go
without saying; it must be consulted for points of interpretation of Polybius, for notices of other
relevant evidence and for bibliography. A good deal of the important epigraphical evidence is
collected in Sherk, Documents , and the two volumes of Morctti, ISE; virtually all of the most
important texts will be found inSIG. A number of the basic ones arc translated in Bagnalland Derow
1 98 1 : (b 210) and Austin 198 1: (a 2). For the activities of Roman officials (including magistrates and
ambassadors) the evidence is assembled under the year in question in AfRR. For the state of the
Roman calendar from 188 to 168 (always ahead of the seasonal year, but by a decreasing amount in
the later years) and fora table of calendar equivalents see Derow 1973: (h 283). The equivalents there
(and here) may be assumed to be correct to within a day or two: cf. Walbank 1957-79, in.vi: (b 38).

29O

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ROME, PHILIP AND THE GREEKS AFTER APAMEA 29I

Troubles began in Achaea and Boeotia very early on and, in both
cases, have their roots in the 190s. In 192 Sparta had joined the Achaean
League, not by unanimous agreement. Late in 1 89, with others in power,
Sparta sought to secede. The Spartans invoked the Romans but received
from them no clear support, and in spring 188 Philopoemen brought
them back into the League. 2 Some at Sparta, who disapproved of the
Achaean settlement, complained to the Senate. This elicited a letter to the
Achaeans from the consul of 187, M. Aemilius Lepidus, communicating
the Roman judgement that the Spartan affair had not been correctly
handled. No details were added, and the matter was not pressed. What is
important is the fact that the Senate took cognizance of these Spartan
demarches at all. Foreign affairs were properly the province of the League,
not of individual cities. 3 In accepting an embassy from Sparta or some
disgruntled Spartans, the Senate implicitly condoned a breach in the laws
of the Achaean League. At the time of the first Spartan appeal to Rome
the issue had been correctly drawn: Diophanes of Megalopolis desired to
entrust settlement of the dispute entirely to Rome whilst Lycortas,
following the precepts of Philopoemen, maintained that the Achaeans
should be allowed to carry on their own affairs in accordance with their
own laws and that the Romans, authors of their liberty, should support
them in this. 4 The argument, in one form or another, went on for more
than forty years.

In Boeotia occurred an analogous business, with the added ingredient
that the policy of an individual and influential Roman was at issue.
Flamininus had for some time been seeking to bring about the return to
Boeotia of the exiled Zeuxippus (in whose interest he had earlier com-
plied in the murder of Brachylles). 5 The Senate was persuaded to instruct
the Boeotians to restore Zeuxippus. The Boeotians, fearful of effecting a
rupture in their friendly relations with Macedon, declined and sent an
embassy to Rome, where Zeuxippus represented himself. The Senate
wrote to the Aetolians and Achaeans, complaining about the Boeotians
and bidding them to see to the restoration of Zeuxippus. The Achaeans,
eschewing force, tried to persuade the Boeotians to obey. The latter
promised but did not carry through. There the issue was dropped. On
Polybius’ analysis, war would have broken out had the Senate then
chosen to force the issue (xxn.4. 16). Zeuxippus was not restored, but the
Roman intervention was not without other effect. It tipped the balance
(for the time at least) in favour of the wealthy in their conflict with the
poor, and it showed Roman willingness to support their friends in

2 For the background: Livy xxxv.57.1-2 (cf. Plut. Pbilop. 15.2; Paus. vm.50. iof.), 58.50-55.

3 Freeman 1895, 202-5: (1 10); Larsen 1968, 258-9: (041). 4 Livy xxxvm.52.7-9.

5 Brachylles’ murder (197/6) and Flamininus’ role in it: Polyb. xviu.45.5-1 2. Sec Polyb. xx.4-7
on the continuing troubles in Boeotia down to 192/1.

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292 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

Map 12. Macedonia and Greece.

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ROME, PHILIP AND THE GREEKS AFTER APAMEA 293

internal disputes. 6 The lines are visible here. There are Rome’s friends,
there are Macedon’s friends; there are wealthy, there are poor. T wo pairs,
or is it one? Polybius does not say that the Senate aimed to support the
wealthy; but that is the way it turned out.

The Spartans had shown the way, and it soon became clear that the
Senate was interested in the affairs of Greece and was unlikely to turn a
deaf ear to appeals or complaints laid before it. Philip of Macedon had
joined Rome as an ally in the war against Antiochus, partly because it had
been made clear that there was no other course for him to follow, and
partly because he saw therein the possibility of tangible extension of his
influence in the north. 7 During the war he had taken control of towns in
Thrace, Thessaly, Perrhaebia and Athamania. Clearly he felt entitled to
do so. To just what extent he had been encouraged in this belief by the
Roman generals in the field (as the Aetolians evidently had been early in
the war against Philip) is not easy to say, 8 but whatever the case, the
reception of appeals at Rome left no doubt that he was mistaken. These
came from the peoples directly involved and from King Eumenes of
Pergamum.

In the Thracian cities at least there was factional strife, one side
favouring (and being favoured by) Philip, the other Eumenes. The
latter’s supporters had appealed to him, and it was his envoys who laid
their case before the Senate. Philip himself sent ambassadors to Rome to
defend himself against his accusers. The scene was one that would repeat
itself many times over, with these and other characters, and so was the
Senate’s response. After lengthy discussions in 1 8 5 a commission, led by
Q. Caecilius Metellus, was sent to investigate ‘and to provide safe
conduct to those who wished to state their case in person and to accuse
the king’ (Polyb. xxii.6.5). The role played here by the king of Perga-
mum and the invited accusers looks back as well: to the meeting between
the Romans and Antiochus at Lysimacheia in 196. The non-Thracian
cases were heard at Tempe, with Metellus and the Roman envoys sitting
as arbitrators between accusers and accused (Livy xxxix. 25.1). Philip
was ordered to withdraw from all the cities in question: his kingdom was
to be reduced to the ancient boundaries of Macedonia (Livy
xxxix. 26. 14). Metellus went on to Thessalonica where the question of
the Thracian cities, above all Aenus and Maronea, was considered.
Eumenes’ envoys said the cities should either be completely free or, if

6 Polyb. xxii. 3. 3 for the €thr opoi, and the Kax^Krat who outnumbered them; cf. xx.6.2— 3; also
xx. 7. 3 for the alienation of ‘the many’ from Rome attributed to the murder of Brachylles. On the
connection between Roman conduct and class conflict in Greece throughout this period see above
all de Ste Croix 1981, ch. j.iii and Appendix 4 (esp. 523-9) with notes (659-60): (a 35).

1 See above, Ch. 8.

8 That he did receive some such encouragement is beyond doubt: cf. Livy xxxix. 23. 10 and
Walbank 1957-79, 111.104 (on xxi.11.9): (b 38).

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294 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

given to anyone, then to him. Philip’s claim was that they belonged to
him as prizes of an ally in the war. Here the Roman envoys could not
decide: if the ten commissioners settling Asia had assigned them to
Eumenes, then that would hold; if Philip had captured them in war then
he should hold them as the prize of victory; if neither of these was true,
decision should be reserved to the Senate, Philip in the meanwhile
withdrawing his garrisons. Envoys from Philip and Eumenes, as well as
the exiles from Aenus and Maronea, went to Rome and put before the
Senate the same arguments they had put before Caecilius. The Senate
evinced neither doubt nor hesitation. Not only was Philip to withdraw
from the cities in Thessaly, Perrhaebia and Athamania, he was also to
withdraw from Aenus and Maronea and in general to quit all forts,
territories and cities on the coast of Thrace. Such scruples as Metellus and
his colleagues had had were overridden, and Philip’s loss was complete.
A new commission, led by Appius Claudius, 9 was despatched in 184 to
check on Philip’s compliance with Metellus’ directive and to convey the
new orders formally. Philip heard of these first when his own envoys
returned from Rome. The evacuation of Aenus and Maronea was begun
straightaway and was accompanied by a massacre of Philip’s opponents
at Maronea. Before Appius Claudius, he sought to blame this upon the
factional split at Maronea, but the Senate’s envoys would hear no
defence. They left after condemning the king for his behaviour towards
Maronea and, more significantly, for his ‘estrangement’ towards the
Romans. 10

There is little doubt that the massacre at Maronea was Philip’s doing.
There is equally little doubt that ali the Roman decisions went against
him not because of the justice of the opposing cases, but out of a desire to
reduce the extent of his control and influence by ordering him to step
back. So it had been with Carthage and Antiochus. So it had been with
Philip himself a scant decade and a half before. Philip reacted strongly,
but not openly. He wished to put himself in a position from which he
could resist Roman orders. This required preparation and time. To gain
it he sent to Rome as his advocate and defender his son Demetrius, who
had won friends, favour and a kind of influence whilst serving as a
hostage of his father’s good behaviour during the war against Antiochus.
This part of Philip’s plan was to misfire disastrously.

9 Probably, but not certainly, the consul of 185, Ap. Claudius Ap.f. P.n. Pulcher, but possibly Ap.
Claudius Nero, praetor 195; cf. Walbank i 957 - 79 > hi on xxn.11.4: (b } 8).

10 'H Trpos tovs 'Puifiatovs aWoTpiorys, Polyb. xxn.14.6jcf. xxni.8.2. This is the first appearance
of this uncomfortably open-ended charge. Wielded by Romans to begin with, it will be taken over by
Rome’s friends in the Greek states for use against their political rivals: the Epirote Charops, after
Rome’s defeat of Perseus, can sentence his opponents to death on the charge of ‘thinking otherwise
than the Romans’ (dAAdiyna <f>povovvr€s ’Ptoftatwv, Polyb. xxxn.6.2). Cf. Sherk, Documents 4} (S 1 G
684), and 16 for an appearance of the notion in a more formal context (letter of Q. Fabius Maximus to
Dvme, probably of 1 1 5 b.c.).

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ROME, PHILIP AND THE GREEKS AFTER APAMEA 295

Such, at least, was Philip’s ultimate aim according to Polybius, who
saw Philip’s desire to defend himself against such treatment by Rome as
leading directly to preparations for war, a war conceived and discussed
by the king in secret colloquy with his friends and advisers on the
morrow of Appius Claudius’ visit. 11 This war that Philip planned was,
again on Polybius’ view (xxn. 1 8. io), the war that Perseus undertook. It
will be seen later that Rome’s war against Perseus has its own explana-
tion, but this does not affect anything Polybius says about Rome’s
treatment of Philip or about Philip’s reaction to that treatment. For the
moment, Philip achieved the respite he wanted, and in 183 a Roman
embassy led by Q. Marcius Philippus saw the king withdraw from all his
Thracian holdings. There had been further complaints, but they did not
lead to further Roman orders. For this Demetrius was at least in part
responsible. His success, however, owed itself far less to his diplomatic
ability than to the fact that Flamininus and others saw in him a congenial
successor to the Macedonian throne, a role in which Demetrius was not
unwilling to see himself cast. The young prince’s part in bringing about
an improvement in Roman-Macedonian relations was accordingly exag-
gerated and great favour shown him. The effect of this upon Perseus, the
heir apparent, and upon Philip himself was inevitable. Demetrius re-
turned to Macedon in 183, and his evident popularity at Rome brought
him a kind of popularity at home. All this immediately aroused fears in
Perseus about the succession and concern in Philip that Demetrius was
thinking too much about his Roman connections. Suspicion, fuelled by
Perseus, continued unabated, and in 180 Philip finally arranged the
murder of what he was convinced was, actually or potentially, a danger-
ously disloyal son. That he was right about Demetrius seems clear. 12 It is,
however, hard to say whether there were those at Rome who believed
that the succession of Demetrius (and supersession of Perseus) could
actually be secured, or whether by showing such favour to him they
sought to create dissension and the weakness to which this would give
rise.

Rome’s handling of affairs in the Peloponnese during these years was
less overbearing, but handling it none the less was, and not without
similarity to what was being done in Macedon. All the Roman envoys to

11 Polyb. xxii. 14. 7-1 2. That Polybius’ aetiology of the war against Perseus took this line is
indicated by the run of the narrative implied in the ‘table of contents’ of book xxii at xxu.1.5 (cf.
Derow 1979, 12 n. 36: (d 21)), as well as by the language of, especially, xxn. 14.8-10 which is very
much that of m.6.7.

12 In Livy’s account (xl. 54-56) Philip realized shortly before his own death that Demetrius had
been wrongly condemned and determined that Perseus should not succeed him. This is not credible,
however genuine Philip’s remorse may have been: see Walbank 1940, 238-5 3, esp. 252-3: (d 54). On
Demetrius {ibid.): ‘Vain and ambitious, he had lent himself to clumsy manoeuvring by Flamininus
and his circle, and had himself to thank for his untimely end; Philipcould not afford to let him liveon
as a Roman pretender.’

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296 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

Philip visited the Achaeans also. The question of Sparta’s position vis-a-
vis the Achaean League appeared to have been left in the hands of the
Achaeans after the caution administered through the consul Lepidus in
the winter of 188/7. But ln c ^ e summer of 185, Q. Caecilius, returning
from his mission to Philip, arrived at Argos where the Nemean festival
was being celebrated. Aristaenus, then general, called the magistrates of
the League together, and Metellus castigated the Achaeans for their
harsh treatment of the Spartans. How Metellus came to be there is a
question of some importance. There is no record that his brief included
anything other than Macedonian affairs. According to the account in
Pausanias (vir.8.6, 9.1), he had been approached by some disaffected
Spartans and persuaded by them to intervene. Polybius (xxn.10.14)
reports the suspicion in Achaea that Aristaenus and Diophanes were
responsible for his presence. The two accounts are not incompatible with
one another. They are, however, incompatible with the view that
Metellus had been formally instructed to discuss the Spartan question
with the Achaeans. In the event, Aristaenus did not defend the League’s
conduct, thereby indicating, as Polybius saw it (xxrr. 10.3), his agreement
with Metellus. Diophanes went a step further and suggested to Metellus
that the Achaeans were guilty of mismanagement not only in the case of
Sparta but in that of Messene as well. Lycortas and Archon defended the
status quo, and after discussion this view was adopted by the magistrates
and communicated to Metellus. The latter, having sensed support, was
not satisfied with this and requested that a meeting of the League
assembly be summoned. He was asked to produce his instructions from
the Senate on the matter, but had none, and his request was accordingly
refused. 13 Metellus, in turn, thoroughly vexed at having had nothing
granted to him, refused to receive formally the reply of the magistrates
and went back to Rome without one.

He was followed there by a delegation from the Spartan dissidents, led
by Areus and Alcibiades (former exiles who had been restored to Sparta
by the Achaeans), and by one from the Achaean League, sent to offer a
defence against Metellus’ hostile report. The Spartan question was

13 Polyb. xxii. 10. 1 1 — 12: ‘They refused to summon the assembly, for the laws did not allow it
unless someone brought a written communication from the Senate concerning the business for
which it desired the assembly to be summoned.’ This is made more precise by the Achaean envoys at
Rome later in the same year (xxn.12.6): ‘For it is the law of the Achaeans not to call together the
many (721) ovyKaXeiv tov$ -noXAovs, i.e., not to summon a synkletos ], unless a resolution about alliance
or war needs to be considered or unless someone brings a letter from the Senate.’ This (and the
converse provision that questions of alliance and war were reserved for specially summoned
meetings, synkletoi) represents second-century Achaean practice. How early it became so is not
known, but the clement involving the Senate seems likely to date from the time of the League’s
alliance with Rome (on which see next note). On Achaean synkletoi and syndodoi (regular meetings of
federal council and assembly, of which there were most likely four a year) see Walbank i957“79»
m.406— 14: (b 38).

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ROME, PHILIP AND THE GREEKS AFTER APAMEA 297

referred to the embassy led by Ap. Claudius, to be dealt with after their
visit to Macedonia and Thrace, and the Achaeans were in the meanwhile
urged to treat Roman envoys with the same attention and respect
accorded to Achaean envoys in Rome. The Achaeans forbore to say that
this was what they had done.

At Cleitor in Arcadia in 184 Ap. Claudius sat as judge between the
Achaean League and the dissident Spartans. Lycortas, as general, de-
fended Achaean conduct eloquently (perhaps too eloquently in Livy’s
fine version of his speech at xxxix.37.9— 1 8) and pleaded the sanctity of
the League’s formal resolutions. Ap. Claudius ‘advised the Achaeans to
come to terms while it was still possible to do so of their own free will,
lest presently they be forced to take the same action against their will and
under compulsion’ (xxxix. 3 7. 1 9). Lycortas then asked that the Romans
change what they would have changed and not require the Achaeans to
abrogate laws they had sworn to uphold.

On this note the outstanding questions were referred to the Senate for
decision. In the winter of 1 84/3 no fewer than four groups of contending
Spartans appeared in Rome. The Senate appointed a commission of three
to untangle the disputes and reach decisions agreeable to all. These were
Flamininus, Q. Caecilius Metellus and Ap. Claudius. A large measure of
agreement was reached between the Romans and the dissident Spartans,
and seals were set to the decisions that Lycortas had asked the Romans to
take. Achaean envoys had been sent to Rome at the time, not to
participate in these discussions (in which, consistent with League policy,
they indeed took no part), but to renew the League’s alliance with Rome
and to watch the outcome of the various Spartan demands. Flamininus
invited them to sign the agreement that had been reached. They hesi-
tated, for it involved the repeal of some Achaean sentences of exile and
death. In the end they signed, pleased that it was specified that Sparta was
to remain in the League. A great deal had been at stake. The Peloponnese
was added to the Macedonian and Thracian itinerary of Q. Marcius
Philippus and his embassy of 183 with, presumably, instructions to
communicate formally the Senate’s decisions to the Achaean League and
to see to their implementation.

In the meanwhile the discontent in Messene which Diophanes had
brought to the attention ofQ. Metellus was quickening. Amongst those
who wished to detach Messene from the Achaean League was
Deinocrates. In the winter of 184/3 was * n Rome seeking, by what
means it is not clear, to bring about a change in the situation of Messene.
When he learned that Flamininus, whom he had come to know well
during the war against Nabis, had been appointed as an ambassador to
King Prusias of Bithynia, he immediately reckoned that a Peloponnesian
intervention by Flamininus would do best to guarantee his success.

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298 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

Flamininus attempted to oblige. He stopped at Naupactus on his journey
east in 183 and wrote to the Achaean magistrates, ordering them to
summon a meeting of the assembly. They replied by asking what
precisely were his instructions on the matter. He had more sense than to
press the attempt any further, and Deinocrates’ hopes were dashed. Yet
the Messenians cannot but have inferred that there was sympathy for
their cause at Rome, feeling against the Achaeans, and they would not
have been mistaken.

Messene had probably seceded from the Achaean League by the time
of Flamininus’ demarche, or it may be that the revolt began in earnest after
his failure. It was round the time of Q. Marcius Philippus’ arrival in the
Peloponnese that the Achaeans formally declared war against Messene.
Philippus’ behaviour in these circumstances is not known in any detail,
but it can safely be inferred that he tried to persuade the Achaeans to refer
the matter to Rome rather than deal with it themselves. That is certainly
the direction of his message to the Senate at the conclusion of his embassy
(Polyb. xxni. 9. 8). At the time he reported, there was an Achaean
embassy in Rome seeking Roman support against the rebels in accor-
dance with the treaty of alliance that bound Rome and Achaea. 14
Philippus favoured a different sort of policy, and his was adopted. Clear
in its intent, it was not in the spirit (or even the letter) of the alliance.
Philippus ‘had reported that as the Achaeans did not wish to refer
anything to the Senate, but had a great opinion of themselves and were
attempting to manage everything on their own, if the Senate paid no
attention to their request for the moment and expressed their displeasure
in moderate terms, Sparta and Messene would soon see eye to eye, upon
which (he said) the Achaeans would be only too glad to come running for
help to the Romans’ (Polyb. xxm.9.8— 1 1). Sparta, not yet fully settled,
was kept that way. To the Spartan envoy in Rome the Senate replied, ‘as
they wished the city to remain in suspense, that they had done all in their
power for the Spartans, but at present they did not think that the matter
concerned them’ (xxm.9. 1 1). To the Achaeans’ request that the terms of
the alliance be observed the Senate answered ‘that not even if the people
of Sparta, Corinth or Argos revolted from the League should the
Achaeans be surprised if the Senate did not think it concerned them. And
publicizing this reply, which was a sort of proclamation to those who
wished to secede from the League that they could do so so far as the

14 The treaty was concluded between 197 (Polyb. xvm. 42. 6— 8) and 184 (Livy xxxix. 3 7.9-10),
and the best case yet put forward, Badian 1952: (d 5), is fora date between November 192 and spring
191; cf. Walbank 1957-79, inonxxni.4.i2andxxxix.3.8: (b 38). The form of the Achaean request in
1 8 3 (‘that no one from Italy should import either arms or corn’ (jii otxAci /xijre atrov) into Messenia)
implies that the treaty was of what appears to have been a standard form, the best example of which is
the alliance between Rome and Maronea, probably of the 160s; for the text see Triantofyllos, Arch.
Dell. 28 (1973) [1977] Chron., plate 418; cf. Derow 1984, 234: (b 6).

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ROME, PHILIP AND THE GREEKS AFTER APAMEA 299

Romans were concerned, they continued to detain the envoys, waiting to
see how the Achaeans would get on with Messene’ (xxm.9.1 3-14).

The Achaeans, contrary to the hopes of at least some Romans, got on
well in their handling of the revolt. The war cost them Philopoemen, but
Lycortas carried through to victory and in 182 Messene was restored to
its original position in the League. Upon hearing of this, the Senate,
‘entirely ignoring their previous answer, gave another reply to the same
envoys, informing them that they had seen to it that no one should
import arms and corn from Italy to Messene’ (Polyb. xxin.17.3). No
doubt the Senate had maintained the letter of the alliance while trying at
the same time seriously to weaken the Achaeans. The implication of their
conduct, however, is clear, and it was not lost on Polybius. ‘This’, he
writes, ‘made it entirely clear to everyone that so far from shirking and
not caring about the less important items of foreign affairs, they were
displeased if all matters were not referred to them and if everything was
not done in accordance with their decision’ (xxtti. 1 7.4). Philippus’ ploy
achieved some success in that Sparta does seem to have seceded from the
Achaean League while Messene was in revolt. There too, however, the
Achaean cause prevailed, more peacefully by the look of it. Pro-
Achaeans gained control and the Achaeans, taking Rome’s expression of
lack of interest seriously (or at least making use of it) admitted Sparta
back into the League. An embassy from the Achaeans went to Rome to
inform the Senate about Messene and Sparta. Those in Sparta who would
have had things otherwise also sent envoys, as did the exiles who had not
been taken back and whose part had been taken by Diophanes and some
others. Once again official and unofficial legations were received alike.

About Messene the Senate expressed no displeasure. The Spartan
exiles, however, brought back with them a letter in which the Senate
showed itself in favour of their restoration. The Achaean envoy who had
been in Rome explained that the Senate had written on behalf of the exiles
not out of genuine concern but because of the insistence of the exiles in
presenting their case. It was decided to believe this, and no action was
taken. There the matter might have stood, but when Hyperbatus became
general (for 181/80), he raised the question of how the Senate’s letter
should be dealt with. Lycortas advised no action, arguing that the
Romans would understand the importance of not violating laws and
oaths. The opposite viewpoint was advocated by Hyperbatus and
Callicrates. It was a strong line. They urged the Achaeans to obey the
written order and not to reckon law, stele or anything else more impor-
tant than this obedience. A majority evidently favoured the policy of
Lycortas, and an embassy was sent to Rome to put his case before the
Senate. The envoys were Callicrates, Lydiadas and the young Aratus. On
Polybius’ account (and there is no other), Callicrates no sooner entered

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300 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

the Senate-house than he began to accuse his political opponents and
give the Senate a lecture on Greek politics (xxiv. 8.9-9. 1 5 )- explained
that in all the democratic states there were two parties. One counselled
adherence to the written requests of Rome at the expense of laws, stelai
and everything else. The other maintained that these latter things ought
not lightly to be violated. In Achaea the second group was the more
popular with the multitude. The partisans of Rome reaped contempt and
slander from the mob, their opponents favour and support. But, he said,
let the Senate give indication of their displeasure at this state of affairs and
the men of politics will go over to their side and the mob will follow out
of fear. Let the Senate fail to do this and the policy now more popular will
become yet more so. The advice was easily summarized: if the Romans
wanted their orders obeyed, they should see to it that they supported
those who promised obedience. They should show their displeasure at
such conduct as the recent Achaean leadership had undertaken in resist-
ing Q. Philippus’ efforts to have the Messenian question referred to
Rome (and insisting on dealing with it themselves) and in not restoring
the former exiles.

Callicrates was taken seriously, and ‘now for the first time the Senate
adopted the aim of weakening those members of the several states who
worked for the best, and of strengthening those who, rightly or wrongly,
appealed to its authority’ (xxiv. 10.4). The consequence, Polybius judges,
‘was that gradually, as time went on, the Romans had plenty of flatterers
but few true friends’. This is, in some measure, a tendentious judgement,
but its validity in general is not in doubt. 15 And there is no question at all
about the determination of the Senate on this occasion to put its weight
solidly behind Callicrates and his policy. ‘They actually went so far on the
present occasion as to write not only to the Achaeans about the return of
the exiles, bidding them to contribute to strengthening the position of
these men, but also to the Aetolians, Epirotes, Athenians, Boeotians and
Acarnanians, calling them all to witness for the purpose of crushing the
Achaeans. Speaking of Callicrates alone, with no mention of the other
envoys, they wrote in their official answer that there ought to be more
men in the several states like Callicrates’ (xxiv. 10.6—7). Now able to use
the threat of Rome’s displeasure against his opponents, Callicrates
returned home. The exiles were restored, and Callicrates was elected to
the strategia, ‘unaware that he had been the initiator of great evils for all
the Greeks and most of all for the Achaeans’. 16

15 See Derow 1970: (d 19), but note that the connection between Callicrates’ demarche at Rome and
Perseus’ accession to the Macedonian throne needs very much to be borne in mind; cf. below, pp.
502-3. Other views of Callicrates have been taken: cf. Walbank 1957-79, m on xxiv. 10.8: (b 58).

16 Polyb. xxiv. 10.8, 14-1 5. The generalship was most likely that for 180/79 (and not *79/8), but
see Walbank 1957—79, hi on xxiv. 10. 14: (b 38).

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ROME, PHILIP AND THE GREEKS AFTER APAMEA 3OI

This was not the first time that Rome had set about supporting those
favourable to her in states she controlled or wished to control. She had
been doing so for centuries. But it was the first time that it had been done
so openly as a matter of public policy, and the first time that being
favourable to Rome was openly equated with absolute readiness to obey
Rome’s orders. This was indeed imperialism in a strict and very Roman
sense. 17 In Achaea from the time of the League’s earliest dealings with
Rome there had been a debate between those, like Philopoemen and
Lycortas, who wished insofar as possible to deal with Rome on a basis of
equality, and those, like Aristaenus and Diophanes, who believed that
obedience to Roman orders must take precedence over everything. 18
Callicrates’ mission in 180 and the Senate’s response did not decide the
question once and for all. It did give a great deal of momentum to the
latter group. More important, it changed the nature of the debate by
putting the threat of Roman displeasure as a weapon into the hands of
those who styled themselves pro-Romans. The rules of politics were
thereby altered, surely for ill. So it was for the Achaean League, and so,
we may believe Polybius, it was for the other states of Greece.

The year 180, then, marks a turning-point, but there is a question
whether the ‘evils for all the Greeks and most of all for the Achaeans’ that
followed would have done so, or done so with the same speed and
acerbity, had there not been another turning-point at almost the same
time. In 179 Philip V died, and Perseus succeeded to the throne of
Macedon. Both personality and policy brought him early popularity.
After renewing the Macedonian alliance with Rome at the very outset of
his reign, he recalled under amnesty fugitive debtors and those who had
been driven into exile by sentence of courts or for crimes against the
throne. Publicity of a high order was given to these steps: lists of those
thus to be welcomed back were posted at the sanctuaries of Apollo at
Delos and Delphi and Itonian Athena in Thessaly. In Macedonia itself he
remitted all royal debts and freed those who had been imprisoned for
offences against the crown. Ellenokopein is Polybius’ word for his early
policy (xxv.3.1): ‘to play the Greek’ or ‘to court the favour of the
Greeks’? Something of both. The effect, certainly, and the aim possibly,
was to turn Greek eyes towards himself. For those who wished not to
look towards Rome, or not to have to look only there, there was to be
another focus available. Evidence of both the direction of his policy and
of its success comes from a decree of the Delphic amphictyony of

17 For Roman orders, and their obedience by others, as the basic element in Polybius’ conception
(an informed and correct one, I believe) of Roman imperialism (i.c., the expansion of Roman
imperium), see Derow 1979, 1 — 1 5 , csp. 4-6: (d 21).

18 For Lycortas and Diophanes cf. above, pp. 296-7; for Philopoemen and Aristaenus see esp.
Polyb. xxiv. 1 1-1 3.

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302 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

summer 178. After the liberation of Delphi from Aetolian control by the
Romans in 191-188 the amphictyony was reconstituted as a distinctly
pro-Roman body. 19 But in 178 there are listed among the hieromnemones
two ‘from King Perseus’ ( SIG 636): an achievement of note for the
young king and clear indication of the rapidity with which the good
repute and the influence of the kingdom of Macedon was being resusci-
tated. It indicates also the readiness of the Greeks to forget Philip’s recent
bloody doings in Thrace and his violence towards Athens and Rhodes at
the end of the previous century. Philip’s popularity had waned consider-
ably after his early years on the throne, and with it that of Macedon.
There was much to retrieve, and this Perseus managed with remarkable
efficiency. One cannot but ask whether Roman policy in Greece, in the
later 180s and as defined and enunciated in 180, made that easier. One
must ask also how this Macedonian renaissance was remarked at Rome,
and to this question at least there is a clear answer.

Late in the summer of 1 78 there arrived at Rome an embassy from the
Lycians which had been sent to complain to the Senate about the
domineering behaviour of the Rhodians towards Lycia. The Rhodians
believed that, and behaved as if, Lycia had been given over to them as a
gift by the Roman settlement of Asia Minor in 188. The Lycians
disagreed. Their embassy in 178 bore the desired fruit, as the Senate
decided to inform the Rhodians that inspection of the records had
revealed that the Lycians had been given to them not as a gift, but rather
as friends and allies. So they claimed, but the claim was manifestly false. 20
The reasons for this duplicity are not far to seek and were indeed
recognized at the time. ‘The Romans seemed to be setting themselves up
as arbiters in the matter of the Rhodians and the Lycians with the object
of exhausting the stores and treasure of the Rhodians, having heard of
their recent escorting of the bride of Perseus and of the refitting of their
ships’ (Polyb. xxv.4.7-8). The bride they had brought home to Perseus
was the Seleucid princess Laodice, and in return they had received a great
quantity of wood for shipbuilding. The Senate’s decision about Lycia
signalled Rome’s displeasure with Rhodes, and with Perseus, whose
diplomatic successes are thus seen to extend beyond Greece itself to the
Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean.

From the beginning of his reign Perseus attracted the notice and the
concern of Rome, and he attracted supporters in the various states of
Greece. The two things operated together. There were Rome’s friends
and their opponents in Greece, and there was coming into being a group
favouring closer, or at least improved, relations with Macedon. More

19 On the reconstituted amphictyony cf. Giovannini 1970: (d 29).

20 Compare Polyb. xxv.4.5 (the decision in 178) with Polyb. xxi.46.8, xxii.5.4 (the disposition
made by the Roman commissioners in 188).

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PERSEUS

3°3

and more the latter two categories converged and came to be identified
(not necessarily the same thing), developments which took place against
the background of increasing Roman suspicion of Perseus, evinced early
on and fostered by more than a few of Rome’s friends. In this is to be seen
the reason for the pernicious exacerbation of the division portrayed by
Callicrates, for in the atmosphere of growing hostility between the two
powers failure to follow Rome implicitly became tantamount to treason.
Perseus threatened to provide an alternative focus for Greek politics. In
another world this might have led to constructive tension, but in that
world it led instead to a situation in which one side must perish and fall
prey to the one which sided with victory. Viewed from the other side,
this same set of developments contains the most basic element of the
explanation of Rome’s war against Perseus. The reassertion of
Macedon’s position in Greece was quite simply incompatible with
Roman supremacy there - with, that is, the supremacy of Roman orders
and the closely related desire, displayed clearly by the Senate in the 1 80s,
that all matters of contention should be referred to Rome. There could
not be two arbiters. As Perseus became more and more an alternative
focus, the possibility grew apace that there would be two. As had been
the case with Antiochus from 197, Roman control of affairs was felt to be
at risk. The answer would be the same. This time, however, the oppo-
sition was not concentrated in one people of Greece, as it had largely been
with the Aetolians before, but was there (whether as genuine opposition
to Rome and Roman control, or as opposition to Rome’s friends, or as
positive feeling towards Perseus and his kingdom) inside most, if not
indeed all, of the states of Greece. Therein lies the reason for much that
happened in the years after 180/79 and therein the tragedy.

II. PERSEUS

It is as early as 175 that Livy can say ‘anxiety about the Macedonian war
beset them’ (xLi.19.4). In the previous year embassies had arrived at
Rome from the Dardani complaining of attacks by the Bastarnae and
claiming that Perseus was behind these and in league with the Bastarnae.
Something was clearly afoot (a Thessalian embassy confirmed the report)
and had been since Philip V’s death in 179, but in assessing the charges
one must bear in mind the long-standing antipathy of the Dardanians
towards Macedon and its kings (Livy xl. 57.6). A legation, led by A.
Postumius Albinus (cos. 180), was sent to investigate. This mission
returned to Rome in 175, along with a team of envoys from Perseus, who
came to defend the king against the charge of inciting the Bastarnae. The
Senate, significantly, left the question open. ‘They neither absolved
Perseus of the charge nor pressed it’ (Livy XLi.19.6). They did, however,

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304 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

remember it later when it proved useful to do so. For the moment they
warned him ‘to take the greatest care that he be seen to hold sacred his
treaty with Rome’ {ibid.). The pace of activity on both sides soon
accelerated. In 174 Roman envoys returned from Carthage and reported
that the Carthaginian senate had received by night an embassy from
Perseus. A team of very senior legates was sent to Macedon to conduct
more investigations, C. Laelius {cos. 1 90), M. Valerius Messalla {cos. 188),
and Sex. Digitius {pr. 194). The precise purpose of their mission is not
stated. They returned to Rome early in 173 and announced that they had
not been able to see the king, being given instead stories about his being
ill or being away (both versions they reckoned to be lies). They were,
however, in no doubt that preparations for war were being made and that
Perseus would not long delay recourse to arms. A Macedonian war was
openly anticipated, and prodigies were accordingly attended to.

In fact, Perseus had been away from Macedon during part of 174. The
Dolopians had been proving recalcitrant to Macedonian control, and
there was a move there to refer some matters of dispute to the Senate
instead of to the king of Macedon. Perseus acted quickly, arrived with an
army and re-established firm Macedonian control. This claim of jurisdic-
tion was consistent with the status of the Dolopians under Philip (at least
for a time), but whether or not it was consistent with the Roman order to
Philip in 185 that Macedon was to be confined within its ancient
boundaries is quite another question. A measure of challenge to Rome
must be seen in Perseus’ actions here. From Dolopia he proceeded with
his army to the oracle at Delphi and thence homeward through Phthiotic
Achaea and Thessaly. This was at once a show of force and a show of
restraint and friendship. Initial alarm at his presence in central Greece
was quieted when he made his passage in peace. As a mission of goodwill
it was not without effect.

About the same time, Perseus made a concerted effort to re-establish
relations with the Achaean League. All dealings had been broken off
during the war against Philip and had never been renewed. Support for
this within the League came both from those who genuinely wished
closer ties with Macedon and from those who, in a spirit of moderation,
desired simply that normal relations should exist with Macedon as they
existed with the other independent states of Greece. Callicrates argued
that any move in this direction would be the same as an attack upon
Achaea’s alliance with Rome and accused his opponents of speaking
against Rome. The question was deferred, pending the arrival of a formal
embassy from Perseus (whose approach so far had necessarily been by
letter), but those ‘who feared that this would cause offence amongst the
Romans’ (Livy xn.24.20) saw to it that the embassy was not received. It
soon became clear that their reading of the Senate’s mind was correct.

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PERSEUS 305

The middle and later 170s were years of ferment in a number of parts of
Greece. By 174 a civil war had broken out in Aetolia. At the root of the
conflict was debt, but little more is known. News of this had been
brought to Rome by C. Laelius, who had led the embassy to Perseus in
174. The Senate’s response was quick, and the size and composition of
the embassy that went to Aetolia is indicative of the seriousness of the
problem. It was led by C. Valerius Laevinus {cos. 176), grandson of the
Laevinus who negotiated the Aetolian treaty of 21 1, and included Ap.
Claudius, the ambassador of 184, and three others. They made little
progress. More was achieved in the following year, when a commission
led by M. Claudius Marcellus (probably the consul of 183) brought about
a cessation of open hostilities. The same year saw Ap. Claudius back in
Greece, this time in Thessaly and Perrhaebia where he had been sent in
response to a report that the Thessalians were in arms. He calmed the
situation by the abolition of illegal interest and the imposition of a
schedule for the repayment of just debts. In Crete also, civil disturbances
flared up and were temporarily quelled by the arrival of a Roman envoy,
Q. Minucius, with ten ships. The arguments between the Lycians and the
Rhodians continued with increasing intensity, and to judge from Livy’s
comment in that context (xLi.25.8) there was a great deal more going on
besides.

Why so much boiled over in so many places at just this time we do not
know, but part of the answer (and much of the importance of it) lies in the
fact that it did so against the backdrop of increasing hostility between
Perseus and Rome. Power in Thessaly had been put in the hands of the
well-to-do by Flamininus twenty years before, 21 and it was the oppres-
sive conduct of the creditors that lay behind the present difficulties there.
The Aetolians had been hard put to pay the indemnity imposed upon
them after their war with Rome, and, Polybius would add, their usual
recourse to brigandage was not thereafter available to them. What can be
safely said is that in none of these cases are the warring factions described
as pro- or anti-Roman (or Macedonian), and that in no case is Perseus said
to have been implicated in the troubles. That claim is made only later.
The question of Perseus was not, however, beyond the brief of the
Roman ambassadors who went to Greece in these years. In 173 M.
Marcellus went also to the Peloponnese, where, equipped with explicit
instructions from the Senate (one assumes), he addressed a specially
summoned meeting of the Achaean League. The message he bore was
twofold: to praise the Achaeans for their rejection of Perseus’ overtures,
and to make very clear the hostility which the Romans felt towards the
Macedonian king. Whether Perseus’ activities in these years are to be

21 Livy xxxiv. 5 1.6 (194 b.c.), and see above, Ch. 8.

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306 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

construed as actually directed against Rome is at least a question. About
the direction of Roman propaganda there is no room for doubt. Their
line was firmly against Perseus, increasingly so, and their friends were
expected to follow it.

One of those who followed the Roman line with the most vigour- for
it had long been his own - was Eumenes of Pergamum. Rewarded by the
Romans at Apamea with control over much of western Asia Minor, he
had been Philip’s rival over the possession of the cities in Thrace. He was
Perseus’ rival for goodwill and influence among the Greeks at large. His
generosity in pursuit of this was in keeping with the open-handedness of
his line, 22 as he tried to bind both states and individuals to himself. He
had some success, but more people favoured Perseus. Why? Livy (here
probably reflecting Polybius) offers possible reasons (xlii. 5 . 6 ): ‘whether
because the states were predisposed, on account of the reputation and
dignity of the Macedonian kings, to despise the origins of a kingdom
newly formed, or because they were desirous of a change in their
condition, or because they did not wish everything to become com-
pletely subject to the Romans’. One may doubt that there were many in
the first category, but not that there were large numbers in the latter two
groups. At Rome, by contrast, Eumenes was held in high esteem, and
this mattered more.

Events were moving faster. A five-man commission, led by the
consular C. Valerius Laevinus, was despatched in 173 to observe Mac-
edonian activities and then to proceed to Alexandria to renew Rome’s
friendship with Ptolemy VI, and early in the next consular year both the
consuls of 172 tried to have Macedonia allocated as a province. At this
juncture Eumenes came to Rome himself and sought to quicken the pace
even more. So far the Senate had not levelled specific charges against
Perseus. Eumenes brought with him a prepared list of charges (Livy
xlii. 1 1 — 13). His general contention was the same as Polybius’, namely
that Philip had been planning a war and Perseus was about to execute it.
His kingdom and his army were strong, his diplomacy preternaturally
successful. (Eumenes, tactfully and insidiously, raised the possibility that
it was ill-will towards the Romans that was winning so many over to the
Macedonian cause.) He had married a daughter of Seleucus and given his
sister in marriage to Prusias of Bithynia. He secured a formal alliance
with the Boeotian confederacy and had very' nearly succeeded in gaining
access to Achaea. He had been appealed to by the AetoLians during their
civil strife. Money, troops and weapons were his in unprecedented
amounts. The most famous states of Greece and Asia were looking
towards him increasingly by the day. Abrupolis, friend and ally of the

22 See Robert 1937, 84—7: (e 162).

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PERSEUS

3°7

Romans, had been driven from his kingdom. Outspoken pro-Romans,
one in Illyria and two in Boeotia, had been murdered. Aid had been sent
to the Byzantines, contrary to Perseus’ treaty with Rome. He had made
war on the Dolopians. He had crossed through Doris and Thessaly with
his army in order to aid the worse cause against the better in their civil
war. He had caused confusion and turmoil in Thessaly and Perrhaebia by
offering the hope of a cancellation of debts, the aim being to bring about
the overthrow of the nobility through the agency of the debtors. And
throughout all this Rome’s inactivity had been read as acquiescence.
Whether Eumenes described these events as he did because he saw them
so or because he reckoned that such an account would be needed to
produce the desired effect is not clear. Some of what he related appears
here for the first time. Some does not, and it will be recalled that the
earlier reports of events in Aetolia, Thessaly and Perrhaebia, as well as of
Perseus’ march through central Greece, did not tell against Perseus at all.

Eumenes’ interpretations, however, were both useful and timely. If
they were not all believed at Rome, they were at least adopted as official
Roman propaganda. 23 Pretexts had been lacking. Sometime, probably
not long, after Eumenes left Rome, the embassy led by C. Valerius
Laevinus returned. Their report agreed with that of Eumenes, and they
had more to tell. They brought with them one Rammius of Brundisium,
with whom Roman envoys and generals had been accustomed to lodge
when passing through, who alleged that Perseus had attempted to
suborn him to poison his visitors. Also came Praxo of Delphi. Eumenes,
after leaving Rome, had travelled to Delphi, where, it was claimed, an
attempt was made to assassinate him. Praxo had given lodging to the
alleged assassins, and Perseus was said to have been behind the plot. All
that was enough to go on. No time was lost in declaring Perseus a hostis.
The conduct of the war was to be entrusted to the consuls of 17 1, but
preparations were begun immediately. Diplomatic preparations for the
war were also set in train, with embassies sent to the states and kingdoms
of Greece and Asia. Their aim was both to secure support for the coming
war and to see what inroads Perseus had managed to make against
Roman domination. Of those thus investigated only the Rhodians were
seriously suspect in their loyalty. Dealt with more directly was King
Genthius of Illyria, who was reported by the ever-loyal Issaeans to be
joining in Perseus’ preparations for war against the Romans and attack-
ing their own territory. The Senate despatched ambassadors to complain

23 Sherk, Documents 40 (SIC 64}), is (almost certainly) an official Roman communication to the
Delphic Amphictyony, belonging presumably to the eve of Rome’s war against Perseus. Not
enough survives to permit anything likccomplcte restoration, but the charges against Perseus that it
clearly docs contain are strikingly similar to those brought by Rumcncs in Livy’s account (xlii. 1 1-
13); and cf. below, pp. 308-9, on Q. Marcius Philippus’ meeting with Perseus in the winter of 172/1.

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308 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

to Genthius about his actions and, no doubt, to bid him watch his step.
What effect this had in driving Genthius into Perseus’ camp in fact one
can only guess.

By this time (into the summer of 172) preparations were well under
way. A fleet of fifty ships was being assembled along with two legions of
allied infantry and cavalry. A. Atilius Serranus (pr. 173) was to collect the
force at Brundisium and send it across to Apollonia. The army, with
which Cn. Sicinius (pr. 172) was to cross to Greece and hold the fort
pending the arrival of one of the consuls of 1 71 , was ordered to assemble
at Brundisium on the Ides of February (Roman, i.e. 28 October 1 72 b . c .).
All this proceeded as directed, and when the consular elections were held
on 1 8 February (Roman, i.e. 2 November 172 b . c .), the forces under
Sicinius must have been on their way to Apollonia. The consuls of 171
entered office on the Ides of March (i.e. 27 November 1 72 b . c .), and the
war that had already been set in motion was duly declared by the
centuriate assembly. 24

Rome’s efficiency in preparations and in getting a serious force across
the Adriatic before the onset of winter was notable and an improvement
even on their advance action in 192. But it was not altogether enough.
Perseus’ activity was at least as efficient, and the Roman embassy sent to
Greece under the leadership of Q. Marcius Philippus to secure support
for Rome found the Macedonian preparations to be in advance of their
own. 25 Philippus and his team were ruthlessly effective in dealing with
what confronted them, both tactically and politically.

At Corcyra the envoys decided which of the Greek states each of them
would approach; virtually every one was to be visited. Before they set off
on their several missions a letter arrived from Perseus enquiring, under-
standably, what reason the Romans had for sending troops into Greece
or for garrisoning cities. No written answer was given, but the king’s
messenger v/as told that the Romans were acting for the protection of the
cities themselves. While two of the legates went to Cephallenia and the
western Peloponnese and a third to King Genthius, Q. Marcius and
A. Atilius (pr. 192 and 173) set off on the most important part of the
exercise, travelling first through Epirus, Acarnania and Thessaly. The
pro-Romans were most in evidence, and their ascendancy was further
fostered. After a friendly meeting with the Thessalians, the Roman

24 The chronology of, and a certain amount else surrounding, the immediate background of
Rome’s declaration of war against Perseus does not always emerge with complete clarity from Livy
and Polybius. See Rich 1976, 88-99: (h 20), and, especially on points of chronology and the narrative
in Livy, book xlii, Warrior 1981: (b 42).

25 This embassy left Rome as Cn. Sicinius prepared to cross to Apollonia, thus probably at some
point in November 172, and returned to Rome in January/February 171: see Warrior 1981, 12-13:
(b 42); cf. Walbank 1957-79, 111.290-1: (b 38) (but the date for Philippus’ departure given there is
somewhat too early).

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envoys met Perseus himself. Philippus read out the charges - a list very
close to that brought to Rome by Eumenes and publicized by the
Romans themselves at Delphi. Perseus defended himself, without much
hope that his words would have any effect. Philippus suggested that
Perseus send an embassy to the Senate, offering the hope of settlement.
Perseus took the bait. Philippus appeared to assent grudgingly to the
truce 26 this would require. He had in fact achieved his aim with remark-
able ease: ‘the request for a truce was clearly essential and Marcius was
eager for it and was seeking for nothing else at the conference’ (Livy
xui.43.2). His success was made easy by Perseus’ desire to avoid war
with Rome and (apparently) his belief that negotiation with Rome was
possible. His conduct here gives perhaps the best indication that
throughout the decade the aim of all his activity, both military and
diplomatic, had been to make Macedon such that the Romans would be
‘more cautious about giving unjust and severe orders to the Macedo-
nians’, as Polybius (xxvn.8.3) puts it in an analogous context in the next
year. To Philippus and the Romans Perseus’ willingness to treat gave the
time that was needed. His tactical initiative was blunted. Philippus went
immediately to Boeotia, assisted the Boeotians in repenting of their
federal alliance with Perseus, and, as he had hoped, persuaded them to
abandon their federation altogether. The pro-Romans in Thebes and
elsewhere agreed to go to Rome and to surrender their cities individually
to the faith of the Roman people. Perseus was thereby deprived of an
important ally, and Philippus achieved in Boeotia what he had been
unable to achieve in Achaea a dozen years before. The Achaeans them-
selves were approached next and approached just as were all the others,
without any mark of favour to recognize their previous loyalty. This
occasioned resentment (Livy xui.37.8), but it cannot have occasioned
much surprise. The Achaean magistrates agreed to despatch a thousand
troops to garrison Chalcis for the Romans.

Philippus and his team repaired to Rome, pleased chiefly with the
duping of Perseus - ‘with the time consumed by the truce the war would
be waged on even terms’ (Livy xui.47.3) - and with the dismemberment
of the Boeotian League. Most of the Senate approved, but there were
those, ‘older men and mindful of old custom’, who ‘said they did not
recognize Roman ways in the conduct of that embassy’. 27 All the same,
when Perseus’ envoys arrived they were ordered to leave Rome within

26 Indutiae in Livy (XLII.45.2), at'o^ai'in Polybius (xxvii. 5. 7), which must imply (against Walbank
195 7—79: (b 38 )adloc.) that by the time Philippus met Perseus the war had been declared at Rome; cf.
Warrior 1981, 1 3 with notes: (042). The embassy left Rome no longtime (if indeed at all ?) before the
declaration.

21 Livy XLii.47.4; cf. Diod. Sic. xxx.7. t (indicating a Polybian original for the report). On the
‘ nova sapieniia 7 here complained about and its implications for Roman policy during these years see
Briscoe 1964: (o 8).

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310 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

thirty days after a perfunctory hearing in the Senate. The issue here was,
of course, one of means and not one of ends. There was no question that
something had to be done about Perseus and no question about what that
was. Yet it remains an indication that new attitudes were developing at
Rome, new feelings about how people who were (or might be) hostile to
Rome, or who simply were not Romans, might be treated. This is seen
here. It is seen in the infringement upon the rights of Rome’s Latin allies
administered through one of the consuls of 177 (Livy XLi.9.9). It is seen
in the conduct of M. Popillius Laenas in Liguria in 173 and 172, where the
inability of the Senate to control a consul (and his friends) augured
trouble to come (Livy XLii.7-10, 21-22). It is there in the high-handed
treatment by M. Popillius’ colleague as consul in 173, L. Postumius
Albinus, of Rome’s allies at Praeneste (Livy xlii. 1.7—12), and essentially
the same thing may be judged to be at issue in the attempt by one of the
censors of 169 (supported, it seems, by much of the Senate) to disenfran-
chise freedmen at Rome (Livy XLV.15.1-7). Roman conduct during the
war against Perseus and immediately after it tells the same story.

The war in Macedonia fell to P. Licinius Crassus, who crossed to
Apollonia and took over the area and the troops held by Cn. Sicinius. C.
Cassius Longinus, Licinius’ colleague, was unwilling to be outdone. He
set off with his army and the intention of entering the Greek theatre by
land from the north-west. Reports from Aquileia of his presence there
and the direction of his march alerted the Senate to what was afoot, and
he was eventually restrained. Licinius, in the meanwhile, advanced
through Epirus into Thessaly and was drawn into a cavalry engagement
at Callicinus. The Macedonian horse prevailed, with two immediate
results. Perseus sued for peace, hoping that this taste of Macedonian
bravery might make the Romans ‘more cautious about delivering harsh
and unjust orders to the Macedonians’ (Polyb. xxvm.7.3). He would
have done better to lose the battle, for defeat, as ever, rendered the
Romans intransigent, and angry. They were not altogether without
Romanae artes, and peace then would have left Perseus and his kingdom
intact.

The other immediate result of Rome’s defeat in the field came when
the news of it spread about Greece: ‘the attachment of the many to
Perseus, theretofore for the most part concealed, burst forth like fire’
(Polyb. xxvii. 9.1). Polybius apologizes for this (xxvn.9-10), likening it
to the thoughtless reaction of a crowd at an athletic contest to an
underdog, and reckons that a word reminding people of what evils they
had received at the hands of Macedon and what goods at the hands of
Rome would have put an end to their sentimentality. This may be
doubted: there were pro-Romans about the place to remind them of the
beneficence of Rome. The question to be asked about Polybius’ com-

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PERSEUS

ment is what he means by ‘the many’. Is the word being used neutrally: ‘a
great many people felt sympathy for Perseus’? Or is it being used, as is
usually the case, pejoratively, the reference being to ‘the mob’, and
implying that it was above all the lower classes who were tending
towards Perseus, glad of the discomfiture of Rome and of the ‘friends’ of
the Romans in the various states? It is, of course, the same ‘many’ who
were said by Callicrates in 180 to be favourable to the nationalists and
hostile to those who supported Rome as he did himself. The question is
quite the same as that about the poor and wealthy of Boeotia early in the
1 80s. The answer is also the same. In a word, leading men - Polybius’
politeuomenoi, Livy’s principes , all of them men of substance — were divided
on these issues. The sympathy of the majority of the population, which is
to say the lower classes, was, as Callicrates said, with the nationalists.
Rome was for the pro-Romans and for small and reliable governments,
for the wealthy, that is. Democracies were tolerated as long as they were
reliable, but it must ever be remembered that when the choice of
government lay with Rome, as in Thessaly after the war against Philip
and as in most of Greece after the war against the Achaeans, it was not
democracy that was chosen. Nor did ‘the many’ ever take the lead. The
real question is whom did they follow. The answers - Brachylles,
Philopoemen, Lycortas, later Andriscus even, Diaeus and Critolaus,
amongst others - are consistent in their implication.

Licinius’ defeat at Callicinus was less important in its military conse-
quences. In this respect it was matched by the success he achieved at
Phalanna before going into winter quarters. Somewhat more tangible
success was gained in the opening year of the war by the praetor C.
Lucretius Gallus. He captured the recalcitrant town of Haliartus in
Boeotia, enslaved its population, and after that received the surrender of
Thisbe, where the pro-Romans were put into power and had their
position confirmed by decree of the Senate. 28 But what distinguished the
commands of both Licinius and Lucretius was the rapacity and cruelty
with which they conducted the campaign in Greece. In 1 70 Licinius was
succeeded by the consul A. Hostilius Mancinus and Lucretius by the
praetor L. Hortensius. The consul achieved nothing, the praetor notori-
ety. He put into Thracian Abdera and immediately demanded 100,000
denarii and 50,000 modii of corn. The Abderitans sought time to consult
the consul and the Senate, whereupon Hortensius turned upon the city,
executed the leading citizens and sold the rest into slavery. Abderitan
emissaries reported this to the Senate, which sent envoys to restore the
Abderitans to freedom and to inform the consul and the erring praetor
that the war against Abdera had not been justly undertaken.

23 Sherk, Documents z ( SIC 646) with commentary; see ibid. 3 for the similar and contemporary
situation at Boeotian Coronea (and n.b. Livy XLin.4. 1 1 and the treatment by Robert cited by Sherk).

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312 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

Similar, if on the whole less striking, reports came in with increasing
frequency. Few dared actually to complain: they rather decided to inform
the Senate of the behaviour and exactions of the Roman commanders and
to hope for the best. From outside the Greek theatre such messages were
received from peoples whose territory had been traversed, and mishand-
led, by C. Cassius in his private journey to the war in 1 7 1 . The plaintiffs
were invited to deliver accusations in Cassius’ presence. Whether they
would have done this is not known, as Cassius was taken on, and thus
away from this threat, by the consul Hostilius as a military tribune. From
Greece itself came envoys from Athens. Their entire fleet and army had
been put at the disposal of Licinius and Lucretius. This offer had been
declined, but these commanders had requisitioned 1 00,000 modii of corn.
From Chalcis came reports of plundering and enslavement by Lucretius
and year-round billeting of sailors reckless of their conduct by
Hortensius. The Senate pleaded ignorance, expressed regret, and wrote
to Hortensius with instructions to set things right. Two tribunes insti-
tuted a prosecution against Lucretius. He was condemned unanimously.
It all added up to two years of warfare without any success worth
mentioning and with support in Greece being seriously eroded by the
behaviour of Roman commanders.

Measures were taken. The Greek allies were informed that only
requests for assistance accompanied by a senatus cotisultum should be
honoured. A commission of two was sent to investigate the lack of
success in Macedonia. The consular elections were arranged for January
(Roman, i.e. 19 September-17 October 170 b.c.), and all senators were
recalled to Rome and required to stay within a mile of the capital. Q.
Marcius Philippus was elected to the consulship with Cn. Servilius
Caepio. The commission returned at the end of February (Roman, i.e.
mid-November 169 b.c.) and reported concern amongst the allies and a
general laxity of discipline within the Roman army. When their report
was discussed upon the entry of the new consuls into office, reinforce-
ments of Roman and Latin troops were agreed and the decision was
taken that the new legions formed should have their military tribunes
elected by the people and not appointed by the consuls.

Macedonia fell to Q. Marcius Philippus, as must have been intended.
He had had experience in Greece, which his predecessors in the com-
mand had not, and it would appear that the primary aim in entrusting the
province to him was more diplomatic than military. That had been the
nature of his experience there, and his previous consulship (in 186 b.c.)
had been spent not on the battlefield but in dealing with what was seen as
evidence of serious disaffection in Italy, the ‘Bacchanalian conspiracy’. 29
Diplomacy was certainly the order for the winter. On instructions from

29 See pp. 186 and 227.

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313

the Senate Hostilius sent envoys to the Achaeans, Aetolians and
Acarnanians. The envoys were C. Popillius Laenas {cos. 172) and Cn.
Octavius. The purpose was twofold. In the Peloponnese they attempted
to persuade people of the ‘gentleness and kindness’ of the Senate (Polyb.
xxvni. 3 .3), particularly, it seems, by reporting the Senate’s decision that
orders for material support by Roman generals must be accompanied by
senatus consulta. They also made it clear that they knew who had been
forthcoming in their support for Rome and who, on the other hand, had
been withdrawing from public affairs. The latter, they said, evoked
Rome’s displeasure as much as did Rome’s enemies. Polybius, not
uninvolved, comments: ‘In consequence they created a general state of
anxiety and doubt as to how one ought to act or to speak so as to make
oneself agreeable under the present circumstances. It was said that, when
the Achaean assembly met, Popillius and his colleagues had decided to
accuse Lycortas, Archon and Polybius before it and to prove that they
were estranged from Rome’s policy and were keeping quiet at present,
not because they were naturally disposed to do so, but because they were
watching the progress of events and waiting for a favourable oppor-
tunity to act’ (Polyb. xxvni. 3.6-8). But lack of plausible pretext for this
prevented them from so acting, and the Achaeans were given no more
than a brief and cordial message. It was time for moderation; that was
clear enough.

In Aetolia the message was one of encouragement and kindness but
included a request that the Aetolians give hostages to the Romans. This
was supported by the pro-Roman Lyciscus, but opposed by others with
the backing of the ‘mob’. Another notorious pro-Roman was stoned in
the assembly by the angry people. Popillius delivered a brief rebuke for
this but said nothing further about hostages, and left Aetolia full of
mutual suspicion and utter disorder. The pro-Romans in Acarnania took
the initiative of asking for the installation of Roman garrisons: many,
they said, were falling away towards Perseus and Macedonia. This was
opposed, and the pro-Romans were accused of blackening their rivals
and seeking the garrisons in order to establish their own absolute
domination. The Roman envoys, ‘seeing that the idea of garrisons was
displeasing to the “mob” and wishing to act in accordance with the
policy of the Senate’ (Polyb. xxvni. 5.6), decided against the garrisons
and, with a word of thanks and encouragement, departed. The need for
moderation was clear everywhere. The polarization of the 1 70s was well
on the way to becoming complete, and the moderates in all the states
needed to be shown that they, as well as the strident pro-Romans, could
look forward with hope to a Roman victory. Such sensibilities had for
the moment to be looked after; recriminations and accusations could
wait upon the victory.

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314 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

The diplomacy of the consul was true to character. With the Achaeans
he dealt with apparent generosity. They had thought it expedient to offer
him full military support, but the offer, presented by Polybius in person,
was declined. The Romans were not going to put themselves under any
such obligations. The consul also sought, according to Polybius, to
prevent the Achaeans from acceding to the request of Ap. Claudius
Centho, then operating in Epirus, for five thousand troops. Polybius
professes uncertainty as to whether Philippus wished to spare the
Achaeans the expense of this (more than 1 20 talents) or to keep Centho
idle (xxviii. 1 3.8). As the request was not accompanied by the required
senatus consultum Polybius was able to have the matter referred to the
consul without divulging anything of Philippus’ message. Doubtless it
was not intended by Philippus, but Polybius’ conduct of this affair
‘furnished those who wished to accuse him to Appius with a good
pretext in having thus put a stop to his plan of procuring assistance’
(xxviii. 13.14). In dealing with the Rhodians Philippus achieved a great
success. Strife between pro-Romans and pro-Macedonians was possibly
keener there than anywhere else. In 1 69 the Rhodians sent friendly and, it
was hoped, disarming embassies to the Senate and to the consul. Both
were received kindly, as the circumstances clearly demanded. Philippus
added in a private way a suggestion that the Rhodians should adopt the
role of mediators in Rome’s war with Perseus. This advice was read by
the anti-Romans at Rhodes as a sign of Roman weakness. This was a
mistake. It was also taken seriously and led to an attempt by the Rhodians
at such mediation. This was a disastrous mistake. Polybius inclines
towards the view that Philippus was seeking to make the Rhodians act in
such a way as ‘to give the Romans a plausible pretext for treating them in
any way they saw fit’. 30 Hindsight, he admits, but that is the way it turned
out.

Philippus’ prosecution of the war itself was also more energetic and
more successful than that of either of his predecessors. From a position in
Perrhaebia between Azorus and Doliche south and west of the Olympus
massif he determined to force an entry into Macedonia. The more
obvious routes were held by Perseus’ garrisons, but Philippus found
another over the eastern shoulder of Olympus not far from the Macedo-
nian garrison by Lake Ascuris. The descent over steep and pathless
ground to the plain between Leibethrum and Heracleum was not easy,
and once there the consul could, on Livy’s reckoning (xLiv.6.4— 17), have
been stranded. But Perseus, either in panic (so Livy, ibid.) or realizing
that a Roman army could now be supplied and reinforced by sea in

30 Polyb. xxviii. 1 7.8. That Philippus was counselling mediation in Rome’s war with Perseus and
not in the Syrian war between Antiochus IV and Ptolemy VI is required by Polybius’ remarks in
xxviii. 1 7.7-9: see Walbank 1957-79, m, on xxviii. 17.4: (b 38).

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Macedon, abandoned most of his southerly positions, including Tempe
and Dium. Philippus proceeded to occupy Dium and began a drive
towards the north, but lack of supplies forced him back. 31 The year ended
with the opposing armies separated only by the River Elpeus and
southern Macedonia open to the Romans by both land and sea.

In western Greece as well the situation had by this time altered
perceptibly. A rift within Epirus had been growing, with the
Thesprotian Charops taking an increasingly strident pro-Roman line and
forcing his chief opponent, the Molossian Cephalus, steadily from a
position of neutrality towards outright alliance with Perseus. 32 In 170
two Molossians masterminded a plot to seize the consul Hostilius, a clear
attempt to commit Epirus to the Macedonian cause. The plot failed, but
in the course of 169 the rift became complete. Epirus split, the
Molossians openly supporting Perseus and the Chaonians and Thes-
protians Rome. It was to deal with this situation that Appius Claudius
Centho had sought Achaean help. If the Molossians were not by them-
selves a serious threat, the Illyrian king Genthius was, or might have
been. Perseus had been trying to entice him into open alliance, but
Genthius held out for money which Perseus was unwilling to let him
have. An Illyrian campaign by Perseus in the winter of 1 70/69 had failed
to bring Genthius into the war, but by the latter part of 169 the two had
come to terms. In the light of Roman success on the Macedonian front in
169, the importance to Perseus of Genthius’ adherence is easy to see. The
motivation of Genthius, suspect indeed in Roman eyes but so far not
openly disloyal, is much less obvious. Against the inadequate forces of
Claudius Centho late in the year he was not in serious danger, but the
winter of 169/8 could be counted upon to produce new plans and
preparations at Rome.

The consuls elected for 168 were L. Aemilius Paullus {cos. 182) and C.
Licinius Crassus. Lots were cast for provinces soon after the election, and
Macedonia fell to Paullus. Envoys were immediately despatched to
Greece to ascertain the situations of the Roman armies in Macedonia and
Illyria. They returned to Rome shortly after the new consuls entered
office on the Ides of March (Roman, i.e. 4 January 168), and the
arrangements for the coming campaign were decided on the basis of their
report. Aemilius Paullus would take substantial reinforcements to Mac-
edonia, and the praetor Cn. Octavius would leave with him to take
command of a strengthened Aegean fleet. In response to the changed
situation in Illyria it was decided to send the praetor L. Anicius Gallus
(previously allotted the peregrine jurisdiction), again with reinforce-

31 For a brief discussion, with essential bibliography, of Philippus’ entry into Macedonia see
Waihank 1957-79, 111.541-2: (b 38).

32 On Charops and Cephalus sec Walbank 1957-79, hi on xxvn. 1 5: (b 38); cf. also Polyb. xxx.7 . 1 .

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Jl6 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

merits, to succeed Ap. Claudius Centho in the command against
Genthius. The Latin Games were held early to facilitate early departure
by the new commanders. 33 They arrived in their provinces at the
beginning of spring.

Most of the details of the Illyrian campaign are lost, but there is no
doubt that it was brief. Ap. Claudius Centho began operations early, and
Anicius Gallus came up from Apollonia to take over command at the
Genusus. Within a month of this the war was over. After defeats on sea
and land Genthius shut himself up in Scodra where he soon surrendered.
‘The war was unique in that its conclusion was reported at Rome before
its beginning’ (Livy xnv.32.5).

The Macedonian campaign did not last much longer. Over the winter
Perseus had strengthened his position on the Elpeus and sent strong
garrisons to Petra and Pythium to prevent himself from being taken in
the rear by a force coming round Olympus. Paullus decided against a
direct assault across the Elpeus and opted instead for a clandestine
attempt on Pythium that would start off disguised as a naval move
against the coastal areas of Macedon. Cn. Octavius was ordered to bring
the fleet and supplies up to Heracleum, and on 1 7 J une a picked force led
by P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica marched there from the Elpeus.
Provisioned by the fleet, which then sailed north, he set off inland under
cover of night and after three nights’ marches reached Pythium. An
attack in the early morning of 20 June drove the Macedonian garrison
out. Perseus was thus forced to abandon the Elpeus and fell back towards
Pydna to a position between the Aeson (modern Pelikas) and Leucus
(modern Mavroneri) rivers. On 2 1 J une Paullus and the rest of the army
joined up with Nasica’s force but elected to postpone battle. The Romans
fortified their camp across the Leucus from the Macedonians. That night
the moon went into portentous eclipse, and on the next day occurred the
battle of Pydna. It began as a skirmish across the Leucus but soon turned
into a rout. Twenty thousand Macedonians are said to have been killed;
six thousand who had fled to Pydna were captured there and another five
thousand taken prisoner along the way (Livy XLiv.42.7). 34 Perseus
retreated to his capital at Pella. He had the presence of mind to burn the
royal records but time for no more than that before he fled from there,
ultimately to Samothrace where he surrendered. With that the war was
over. With that the need for moderation was over, and the axe fell.

In the twelve months after Pydna Greece was very much altered.

33 At xuv.19.4 Livy reports that the Latin Games were to be held pr. id. Apr. (i.e. z February 168)
and at XLiv.22.16 that they took place pr. kal. Apr. (i.e. 20 January 168). Whether Ides or Kalends is
correct must be an open question, but the slightly later date seems on balance more likely.

34 For discussion of Paullus’ campaign (including Nasica’s march) and the battle itself, along with
essential bibliography, see Walbank 1957—79, 111.378—90: (b 38).

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PERSEUS 317

During the year before the battle the Achaeans and Aetolians had been
treated with circumspection and a measure of indulgence. During the
year following it Roman ambassadors visited the Achaeans again. This
time they informed them that one thousand individuals (among them
Polybius), whose loyalty had become suspect, were to be deported to
Italy. This list was drawn up by Callicrates and those of his party. This
was harsh, but gentle when compared to the handling of Aetolia, where
550 leading men were murdered while Roman soldiers surrounded the
council-chamber and others driven into exile (Livy XLV.28.7). A fate
even more special was reserved for Epirus, particularly for the
Molossians, who had taken the side of Perseus in the war and from
among whom had originated the plot to kidnap the consul Hostilius in
170. After the laxity of the earlier years of the war the Roman army had
had discipline imposed upon it. The patience of the soldiers was re-
warded when Aemilius Paullus led them home in 1 67. In accordance with
a decree of the Senate seventy towns of Epirus (mostly Molossian) were
given them to plunder. One hundred and fifty thousand people were said
to have been sold into slavery as a result of Paullus’ march to the sea
(Polyb. xxx. 1 5). The domination of the Epirote Charops, who had
learned his Latin in Rome and had learned the force of Rome’s displeas-
ure as a political weapon earlier and better than most, was more than
assured.

In these and the other states of mainland Greece the ascendancy of the
pro-Romans was assured by deportations, bloodbaths and fear. For the
moment, however, the states remained intact. The kingdoms of Illyria
and Macedon were eradicated. The policy was decided at Rome and
implemented in Illyria by Anicius Gallus with the aid of a senatorial
commission of five and in Macedon by Aemilius Paullus and a commis-
sion of ten. The Illyrians were to be free and without Roman garrison and
their land divided into three parts. The first of these was the region of
Pista, the second comprised all the Labeatae, the third the Agravonitae
and the areas round Rhizon and Olcinium. How these divisions were to
function is not specified, but it may be permissible to draw an analogy
with the Macedonian republics created at the same time. Except for some
(as the Issaeans) who had taken the Roman side from the beginning or
who defected to Rome during the war, all were to pay to Rome as tribute
half the taxes they had paid to the king. This tribute, which the Macedo-
nian republics also paid, must be seen in part as a replacement for the
indemnity that the kings would have paid, had they remained. At the
same time, it cannot but suggest something of a continuing subject status
for those who paid it. The Macedonians were similarly to be free and to
render to Rome half the taxes that had gone to Perseus.

Four republics were established from Perseus’ kingdom. The first,

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3 I 8 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

with its capital at Amphipolis, comprised mainly the areas between the
Rivers Strymon and Nessus, with some additions to the east of the
Nessus (but excluding Aenus, Maronea and Abdera) and to the west of
the Strymon (Basaltica with Heraclea Sintice). The second had
Thessalonica as its capital and ran (with the aforementioned exceptions)
from the Strymon to the Axius, taking in eastern Paeonia and all
Chalcidice. The third was based upon Pella and stretched from the Axius
to the Peneus, incorporating Edessa, Beroea and western Paeonia. The
fourth took in the wilder region across Mt Bora to the borders of Epirus
and Illyria; its capital is given by Livy as Pelagonia (xLv.29.9). The four
republics were to be firmly separate entities. Intermarriage across bound-
aries was not permitted, and ownership of land and buildings in more
than one of the parts was prohibited. Only the Dardanians were allowed
to import salt. The third district was disarmed, but the other three were
permitted to maintain armed garrisons on their barbarian frontiers. No
Macedonian timber was to be cut by anyone for ships, and while the iron
and copper mines continued in operation, those of gold and silver were
closed. 35 Politically, the four republics were to govern themselves separ-
ately, each with its own body of elected representatives, or sjnedror, their
constitutional arrangements were laid down by Aemilius Paullus. 36 A
province, but not quite. One may see here an attempt on the part of Rome
to avoid taking over direct control while establishing a system that
would make indirect control as easy as possible. The arrangement sought
to ensure reliability and certainly guaranteed weakness. In less than
twenty years the pretender Andriscus would show how fragile a concep-
tion it was and, perhaps, how little it was wanted by the Macedonians
themselves.

Reprisals came to Rhodes, too. The attempt at mediation that Q.
Marcius Philippus had elicited led almost to a declaration of war against
the hapless Rhodians and all the way to the creation of Delos as a free port
very much more attractive therefore than Rhodes for Aegean traffic. The
state as a whole suffered in time. The leading anti-Romans there were
mostly left to find their own deaths. Even Eumenes of Pergamum fell
under ‘baleful suspicion’, and by 164 a Roman embassy in Asia Minor

35 On Livy’s account the aim was to deny the publicani 2. field of operation: see xlv . 18.4, ‘they (the
mines) could not be run without the publicani , and whenever there was a publicanus cither the rights of
the people was a nonentity or the freedom of the allies destroyed’; cf. Hill 1952, 90: (h 49); Badian
1 968, 1 8: (a 5). It may be relevant that there had been trouble between Senate and publicani during the
censorship of 184, 179 and 169. At the same time, it may be that the Senate felt unsure that these
mines could be operated without the maintenance of some kind of military presence. Whatever the
reason for closing them in 167, they were re -opened without incident in 1 58 (Cassiodorus, Chron. y
under 1 58 b . c .).

36 On the Macedonian and Illyrian republics cf. Larsen 1968, 295-300: (d 41), and Larsen in
ESA R iv. 298-9, 300.

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THE END OF GREEK FREEDOM 319

was openly inviting accusations against the king of Pergamum, placing
him thus in the position formerly occupied by Antiochus 111 in 196 and
Philip V in 185. The futures of Eumenes and Rhodes are part of another
story 37 but serve to indicate that Rome’s will to imperium went on very
much as before. Still, the victory over Perseus did mark the achievement
of an objective, as is indicated by the Senate’s dealings with the Odrysian
king Cotys in 166. He sent an embassy to Rome to ask that his son, sent as
a hostage to Perseus and captured along with the children of that
monarch by the Romans, be returned to him, and also to explain his co-
operation with Perseus. ‘The Romans, thinking that they had attained
their purpose now that the war against Perseus had ended in their favour,
and that it served no purpose to prolong their difference with Cotys,
allowed him to take back his son’ (Polyb. xxx.17.2). There were times
when there was point in maintaining such differences, but now was not
one of them. Things were, for once, in order, and a far-ranging ambassa-
dorial tour of Greece and the east in 165, led by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus
{cos. 177, 163; cens. 169), brought back favourable reports about
everyone.

III. THE END OF GREEK FREEDOM

With the loss of Livy’s continuous narrative after 167 b.c. and the
increasingly fragmentary state of Polybius’ Histories, it becomes imposs-
ible to construct an account that can be full enough to be wholly
satisfying. How far the indications that there are may be extrapolated and
how far silence is to be construed as evidence of anything are questions
that can only be borne in mind as one proceeds. Even about the Achaean
League evidence is patchy, particularly before 147. On five occasions
between 165 and 1 50 the Achaeans are known to have sent embassies to
Rome seeking the return of the detainees or at least that they should have
the charges and suspicions against them put to the test of a proper trial.
On the first four of these occasions the Senate declined, reckoning that
Roman interests were best served by maintaining Callicrates and his
friends in power, and that the continued detention of the Achaeans, on
charges still open, best served this aim. They relented in 1 5 o and allowed
those still alive (fewer than 300) to return, to be buried at home instead of
in Italy, as Cato put it. 38 The atmosphere in Achaea was throughout these

37 The embassy was led by C. Sulpicius Galus (cos. 1 66); for the invitation to traducers of
Eumenes: Polyb. xxxi.6.1-2. The ‘baleful suspicion’ (vnotfiia poxOrjpa) appears in a letter of Attalus
III of Pergamum of 156 b.c. (Welles, RC 61.14) which contains also an appreciation of Rome’s
foreign policy very like that expressed by Polybius in xxm. 1 7.3 (for which see above, pp. 299-300).

38 Earlier attempts: Polyb. xxx.30.1, 32.1-12 (164); xxxii.2.14-1 7 (139); xxxm. 1.3-8 (155);
XXXIII. 14 (134/3). Their release in 130 and Cato’s quip: Plut. Cat. Maj. 9, also printed as Polyb.
xxxv. 6; cf. Walbank 1957-79, m ad lor. (b 38).

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320 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

years one of tension tinged with the bitterness and hatred felt towards
Callicrates by the majority.

That the situation was the same elsewhere is the view of Polybius, and
there is no evidence pointing in any other direction. The work of
Callicrates in Achaea was being done in Aetolia by Lyciscus, in Boeotia
by Mnasippus, in Acarnania by Chremas, in Epirus by Charops. Polybius
saw the deaths of the last four, in quick succession in the early 1 50s, as ‘a
sort of purification of Greece’ (xxxn.5.3), followed by improvement of
relations in the states concerned. Whether a backlash of any magnitude
also followed their deaths one can only guess, but the extent of hostility
towards the Romans in Greece a decade or so later suggests something of
the kind. At the same time the Senate retained its desire to be informed of
all that was going on, and other embassies besides that of Gracchus in 165
made tours of inspection in Greece and the east. The Senate’s desire was
recognized, and disputes, of more or less local kinds, continued to be
referred to Rome. The Senate might decide about these itself, send an
embassy to investigate, or refer the matter to other Greeks for arbitra-
tion. In 164 a territorial dispute had arisen between Sparta and
Megalopolis, and the decision on this was entrusted to the embassy led by
C. Sulpicius Galus, which was to observe the state of affairs in Greece
generally on its way to Asia Minor. The details of his activity in Greece,
known only from Pausanias (vir. 1 1 . 1-3), reveal much. In the territorial
dispute he declined to decide and entrusted the decision instead to
Callicrates. While in Greece he was approached by some Aetolians from
Pleuron who wished to detach their city from the Achaean League. He
allowed them to send an embassy of their own to Rome. The Senate
authorized their secession and sent additional instructions to Galus,
bidding him sever as many cities from the League as he might be able.
There is bias and error in some parts of Pausanias’ narrative of these years
but also a strong basis of fact. If his account here is anything like correct,
it emerges that the Romans were not content to have their friends in
power and that they were desiring to reduce the Achaean League more
than fifteen years before this requirement was officially imposed.

If there was tension within the states of Greece during these years, at
least peace mostly prevailed. The first exception came in the Adriatic,
where in 1 5 6 Rome fought a brief war against the Dalmatians. Polybius’
account of the outbreak of this war is of more than passing interest. In
response to complaints, chiefly from Issa, about Dalmatian piracy, the
Senate sent an embassy to the Dalmatians. The ambassadors were not
properly received and reported as well that violence would have been
done to them had they not made an early and quiet departure. The Senate
heard of this in a mood of great indignation at the awkwardness and
disobedience of the Dalmatians. ‘But their chief motive for action was

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THE END OF GREEK FREEDOM J21

that for several reasons they thought the time a suitable one for making
war on the Dalmatians. For to begin with they had never once set foot in
those parts of Illyria since they had expelled Demetrius of Pharos, and
next they did not at all wish the men of Italy to be utterly undone by the
long peace, it now being twelve years since the war with Perseus and their
campaigns in Macedonia. They therefore resolved by undertaking a war
against the Dalmatians both to recreate, as it were, the spirit and zeal of
their own troops and by striking terror into the Illyrians to compel them
to obey their orders. These, then, were the reasons why the Romans went
to war against the Dalmatians, but to the world at large they gave out that
they had decided on war owing to the insult to their ambassadors’
(nxxii. i j. 4-9). 39 Obedience was still the thing and the readiness to
enforce it evidently greater than it had been before.

Serious trouble lay a few years ahead. The surviving Achaean detain-
ees returned to find what must have been a painfully and alarmingly
familiar situation in the Peloponnese. Sparta was at odds with the rest of
the Achaean League, and while secessionist feelings were on the increase
in Sparta suppressionist ones were growing apace within the League at
large. In winter of 150/49 embassies went to Rome from both. The
Achaean mission was led by Callicrates who died on the way. The Senate
declined to judge the matter just then and promised to send an embassy to
arbitrate. How this dispute would have played itself out had it been
allowed to do so on its own can only be guessed, but Roman determina-
tion in forcing her will upon the Dalmatians must suggest the answer. It
was, however, not allowed to, for once again, as in 180/79, an event in
Macedonia coincided influentially with the affairs of the Peloponnese,
this time fatally. In the north a pretender to the Macedonian throne had
arisen, or ‘fallen from the sky’ as Polybius put it (xxxvr.10.2). Andriscus
easily overcame the slight resistance offered by the Macedonian republics
and quickly amassed a large following there. In 149 a Roman army was
sent under the command of the praetor P. Iuventius Thalna. He met
Andriscus in the field and lost the battle and his life. More forces were
sent in 148 under the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus, a man not without
connections in the area. 40 By the end of the year he had defeated and
captured Andriscus and restored quiet in Macedonia. Having done this
he remained there ominously with his army.

During these two years the Senate refrained from sending its embassy
to the Peloponnese, a delay which can occasion no surprise. It was always
the Roman way to deal with one thing at a time in so far as possible, and
that was very much the way of these years of Andriscus, Carthage and the

39 Preferring the manuscripts at 15.6 (drrdAAt/a#ai) to Reiskc’s misogynistic emendation
(dTrod-qXvvea&ai).

40 The connection goes back at least as far as the ambassador of 185.

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322 ROME, THE FALL OF MACEDON AND THE SACK OF CORINTH

Achaeans. As the Senate delayed, the Achaeans, under the highly popular
leadership of Diaeus and Critolaus, carried on in dealing with Sparta, as
others before them had once carried on in dealing with Messenia. They
did not heed advice from Metellus to wait for word from Rome and had
brought the dispute within sight of settlement when the Roman envoys,
led by L. Aurelius Orestes {cos. 157), arrived in the summer of 147.
Whether the Senate’s message would have been the same had the rising in
Macedon not intervened cannot be known. Evidence of unrest and
hostility towards Rome in Greece cannot have been without effect, and it
was now clear, as it had not been in 149, what an Achaea without
Callicrates would look like. In the event, the message was both clear and
harsh. Orestes summoned the magistrates of the League cities and
Diaeus the federal general and informed them that the Senate had
decided that neither Sparta nor yet Corinth were to belong to the League
and that Argos, Heraclea-by-Oeta and Arcadian Orchomenus were also
to be detached. Orestes (and no doubt the Senate) had clearly been
unwilling to communicate this directly to an Achaean assembly, but the
Achaeans he had summoned rushed from the meeting and did this
themselves. There was a furious reaction, and rage was vented upon
everything that looked like a Spartan. Violence was nearly done to the
Romans’ place of lodging where some Spartans had sought refuge. Upon
hearing of this the Senate despatched another embassy, led by Sex. lulius
Caesar {cos. 157)- They attempted mollification, but the orders for the
removal of the aforementioned cities stood. The Romans did not wish
completely to destroy the League, and obedience was still possible. It
sounds like an ultimatum and may indeed have been one in fact. Caesar
arranged a meeting at Tegea between Spartan and Achaean representa-
tives, but Critolaus prevented anything from being accomplished, plead-
ing that no decisions could be taken before the Achaean assembly next
met, in six months’ time. Caesar and his colleagues departed, and with
this formal communication between Rome and the Achaean League was
at an end. When the Romans declared war, sometime early in 146, the
reason alleged was the treatment of L. Aurelius Orestes and his fellow-
ambassadors at Corinth.

The winter of 147/6 was spent by the Achaeans in preparation for a
war against Sparta with every likelihood that this would mean war with
Rome. Support throughout the Achaean cities was great, and there was
support elsewhere in Greece. 41 For the Achaeans it was a simple ques-
tion: adherence to Roman orders and substantial reduction of the League
or war. They chose to defend their confederacy. Others elsewhere had
come to see clearly the direction that Roman policy and Roman rule were

41 For the evidence of the widespread popular support for the war see above all Fuks 1970: (d 27).

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THE END OF GREEK FREEDOM

323

taking. In the spring of 146 the assembly of the Achaean League met at
Corinth. Polybius comments disparagingly on the predominance there
of manual labourers and artisans (xxxvm. 1 2.5). Evidently feelings for
democracy and nationalism were especially strong amongst these, but
there were very few dissenters. War was declared, ‘nominally against
Sparta but in reality against Rome’ (Polyb. xxxvm. 1 3.6). An embassy
from Metellus arrived fortuitously at the time of this meeting, offering
the Achaeans a last chance to acquiesce peacefully to Rome’s orders. He
must have known by then that L. Mummius, consul of 146, was on his
way to Greece with an army and that the fleet lately at Carthage was to be
sent there. 42 Metellus wished to add the credit for settling this affair to
that already gained for his handling of Macedonia. It did not matter how
the settlement was achieved: when he sent his envoys to offer the hope of
peace he was already starting his march south. The Achaean army under
Critolaus went to lay siege to the rebellious Heraclea, whether because
they thought they had the leisure to deal with this secession or out of
some hope that action there might make it possible to block Metellus’
passage at Thermopylae. There was time for neither, and Critolaus was
killed and his army defeated at Scarpheia in Locris. Advancing Achaean
reinforcements were soon after cut to pieces by Metellus as he swept
towards the Isthmus. There Mummius took over command and routed
the remaining Achaean forces under Diaeus. ‘Corinth opened its gates,
most of its inhabitants fled, the remainder suffered the rigour of a Roman
sack.’ 43 More was to come. The Senate decreed that Corinth was to be
burnt and everything in it sold or carried off to Rome.

A senatorial commission of ten was despatched to assist L. Mummius
in the settlement of Greece. Macedonia became a Roman province,
henceforth to receive a Roman governor. His brief would include
southern Greece, not for a long time a separate province itself. In Greece
confederacies were dissolved and democracy ceased to be the normal
form of government, although some mitigation of these penalties oc-
curred before too long. 44 Greece had been much altered in the aftermath
of the Roman victory of 168. Following the victory of 146 the alteration
was more extensive, more complete, and it was permanent.

42 See Paus. vu. 1 5.1—2 and cf. Polyb. xxxvm. 1 2. 1; on the likelihood of a lacuna before the latter,
cf. Walbank 1957-79, in ad loc.: (b 38). On the fleet see Polyb. xxxvm. 16.3.

43 Benecke, CAH 1 vm.304.

44 Paus. vn.16.9-10; cf. Larsen in tLfAR iv. 306-11, and, on Achaea in and after 146, cf.
Schwcrtfeger 1974, 18-78: (d 51).

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CHAPTER 10

THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

C. HABICHT

I. ASIA MINOR, 188-158 B.C.

The war between Antiochus III and the Romans had been decided in
Asia Minor and it was in Asia Minor, almost exclusively, that territory
changed hands. Antiochus had to cede all his possessions west of the
Taurus mountains to Rome; these amounted to more than one third of
the vast Anatolian block. Rome imposed this condition, like all others,
unilaterally on the king and settled affairs without allowing her allies to
participate. The Senate decided; the allies waited upon its pleasure. The
Greek cities that had sided with the Romans before the decisive battle
were declared free; the Rhodians were given Caria south of the River
Maeander and Lycia. The rest of the territory that had belonged to
Antiochus was incorporated into the kingdom of Eumenes II of Perga-
mum. 1 It was the lion’s share.

The territories Eumenes and Rhodes received were unequivocally a
gift, 2 a gift from Rome, which implied an expectation that both powers
would act as guarantors of the new order and that both would prevent
any development disturbing to Rome. The Rhodian acquisitions, situ-
ated on the southern margin of Anatolia, were not so crucial in this
respect as those of Eumenes; he therefore held the key to the preservation
of the status quo. His newly enlarged realm bordered on three of the four
remaining major powers, that is, on the kingdoms of Bithynia and
Cappadocia and, between them, on the Celtic tribes in Galatia. Eumenes
did not share a border with the kingdom of Pontus in the north, but the
other three powers who were his neighbours all were neighbours of
Pontus.

(a) The Attalid monarchy at its peak

During the war Bithynia and Pontus had remained neutral, whereas the
Galatians and the king of Cappadocia had fought for Antiochus. The

1 Bickcrman 1937: (e 5) on the superiority of the annalistic tradition (Livy xxxvn.j6.i— 6) over
Polybius (xxr.24.6-9, 46.2-1 2). The fate of several cities remains disputed: Bernhardt 1971, 54-71:
(d 7). However, most cases can be settled through the coinage: Seyrig 1963: (b 134).

2 Schmitt 1957, 93-128: (e 77).

3 2 4

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ASIA MINOR, 188-158 B.C.

325

Galatians were punished with a plundering expedition led by the consul
of 189, Cn. Manlius Vulso, who was supported by Pergamene forces.
Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia fared better. He arranged the engagement
of his daughter Stratonice to Eumenes and thereby won the latter’s
protection and the indulgence of the Senate. 3

Having the neighbour-state Cappadocia as an ally did add consider-
ably to Eumenes’ strength, but his other neighbours, the Galatians and
King Prusias I of Bithynia, were his enemies and almost as soon as the
oaths for the treaty of Apamea were sworn, Eumenes found himself at
war with both of them. The causes were intimately connected with a
clause in the peace treaty. Earlier, when the Roman army was on its way
to the Hellespont, Prusias had been inclined to respond to Andochus’
call and join forces with him. A letter from the brothers Scipio, assuring
him that Rome would respect the integrity of his realm, caused him to
remain neutral. He had, however, already seized part of Phrygia, the so-
called Phrygia Epictetus that had belonged to Attalus I of Pergamum.
Attalus’ son Eumenes, in his dealings with the Senate in 189, had
convinced the patres that the disputed area rightfully belonged to him.
The treaty of Apamea stipulated that it be restored. 4 It is strange indeed
that such a clause was incorporated in the treaty with Antiochus. By
remaining neutral, Prusias had served Roman interests and for this
service had been recognized as a ‘friend of the Roman people’. Neverthe-
less Rome now acted against his interests. Naturally enough, Prusias
refused to comply. War was inevitable; it became the first major test for
the new state of affairs in Asia Minor.

Hostilities began c. 1 87 and lasted into 185. Prusias found allies among
those enemies of Eumenes who were also enemies of Rome. He won
support from Philip V of Macedonia, who was then engaged in a bitter
dispute with Eumenes over the Thracian cities Aenus and Maronea; he
probably received aid from the Pontic king Pharnaces; and, most impor-
tant, he received aid from the Galatians, who were led by the chieftain of
the Tolistobogian tribe, Ortiagon, who had recently become king of all
three tribes. Furthermore, Prusias counted among his generals none
other than Hannibal, who, after his escape from Antiochus’ court, had
reached Bithynia via Armenia and Crete. 5

3 Vulso: Stahelin 1907, 50-66: (e 169); Pagnon 1982: (e 49). The dates of Stratonice’s birth and
marriage are disputed: Hopp 1977, 27-9: (e 60); Alien 1985, 200-6: (e 52). Inscription of her statue
erected by the people of Pergamum: IvP, hi, pi. 2.

4 Habicht 1956, 90-100: (e 56); id. PW/ y ‘Prusias’, 1097-1 105; Schmitt 1964, 276-7: (e 50). The
most important document is AE 1940, 44. Restoration to Eumenes: Livy xxxvm.39.i5 (the
corresponding passage, Polyb. xxi.46.10, is corrupt).

5 At the time of the events in Polyb. xxn.8.5 (Errington 1969, 257-63: (d 23): late summer 187;
but see n. 49) war was at least imminent. Hannibal is said to have founded Artaxata in Armenia and
Prusias ad Olympum (modern Prusa).

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

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THE SELF.UC! DS AND THtIR RIVALS

ASIA MINOR, 188-158 B.C.

327

;ity Press, 2008

328

THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

Almost nothing is known about the military operations: Hannibal
defeated Eumenes in a naval engagement; Eumenes won a major victory
over Prusias and Ortiagon, the Galatians ‘and their allies’ in the autumn
of 1 84. 6 Finally Rome had to step in. The Senate had long remained deaf
to Eumenes’ complaints that Prusias resisted the Roman demand. The
patres obviously were caught in the dilemma they had created for
themselves by yielding to Eumenes’ claim, but in 183, after the Scipiones
had lost all their power, a Roman embassy led by T. Quinctius
Flamininus forced Prusias to give in to Eumenes and to agree to
surrender Flannibal, who then committed suicide. Eumenes regained
possession of Phrygia Epictetus and also established control over Gala-
tia. For almost a century the Greeks of Asia Minor had been threatened
by the Galatians; now they hailed Eumenes as ‘Saviour’ ( Soter ) and the
epithet became quite common, though the king never styled himself so.
To commemorate the victory Eumenes enlarged the sanctuary of Athena
‘Bringer of Victory’ ( Nikephoros ) in Pergamum and raised her festival,
founded by his father long ago, to panhellenic rank. In 182 numerous
Greek cities were invited to participate. The new festival, henceforward
to be held every fifth year, was celebrated for the first time in 18 1; 7 by
then the king was involved again in a major war.

This war, fought against Pharnaces I of Pontus and his allies, arose,
our sources say, as a result of Pharnaces’ aggressive ambition. 8 The
Pontic rulers had long wanted to control the flourishing Greek cities on
the south coast of the Black Sea and, in particular, Sinope. Pharnaces’
father, Mithridates III, had failed in an attempt in 220 to subdue Sinope,
mainly because of Rhodian aid to the city. Pharnaces, however, stormed
Sinope in 183. The Rhodians protested in Rome. The Senate, at the same
meeting, listened to Eumenes’ envoys - the king had differences of his
own with Pharnaces — and to Pharnaces’ representatives. The cause of the
dispute is not specified, but it seems to have concerned Eumenes’ newly
won control over Galatia, through which he had become Pharnaces’
neighbour. In any event Galatia was soon the main theatre of action and a
principal subject of the treaty, when peace was finally concluded.

Following its standard policy, the Senate despatched an embassy to
look into the situation. Meanwhile, the war had begun and other powers

6 R iv. Fil. 60 (1932) 446ff.

7 Hannibal’s death: Habicht 1956,96—100: (e 56). Flamininus went on to see King Seleucus IV.
Incorporation of Galatia: Stahelin 1907, 6i: (e 169). Eumenes as ‘Saviour’: Robert 1934, 284 n. i: (b
63); id. 1937, 73 n. 1 : (e 162). Sanctuary of Athena: Ohlemutz 1940, 38: (e 63 ); the festival: Jones 1974 :
(e 6 i), superseding previous work. For silver tctradrachms of Athena Nikephoros from these years:
LeRider 1973: (b i i i).

8 Main sources: Polyb. xxm.9.1-3, xxiv.1.1-3, 5, 14-15, xxv.z, xxvii.7.5, fr. 112; Diod. Sic.
xxix. 22-24; Livy xlii. 2 . 6 ; Just. Spit, xxxvin.6.2. Recent bibliography: Hopp 1977, 44-8: (e 60);
Burstein 1980: (e 12).

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ASIA MINOR, 188—158 B.C.

3 2 9

had become involved: for Eumenes, the king of Bithynia, Prusias II, who
had just succeeded his father, and Ariarathes of Cappadocia; 9 for
Pharnaces, some Galatian chieftains and Mithridates, satrap of Armenia.
King Seleucus IV of Syria almost joined the Pontic king, but in the end
refrained, to avoid violating the treaty with Rome (p. 339). For some
time the initiative lay with Pharnaces. He captured the Greek city of
Tieium in Bithynia and seems to have invaded Galatia. The Roman
ambassadors, who reported back to the Senate, supported Eumenes and
a second embassy was sent out to urge Pharnaces to end hostilities. In 1 8 1
there was a truce, soon violated by the Pontic king, who continued to
ravage Galatia during the winter of 181/80. Eumenes’ three brothers
now urged the Senate to punish the aggressor, but the Conscript Fathers
confined themselves to sending out a third embassy with instructions to
end the war by any means. 10

This embassy arrived in the spring of 1 80, just in time to halt a major
counter-attack by Eumenes and Ariarathes which had already advanced
well into Pontic territory. Peace negotiations were held in Pergamum in
the presence of the Romans. The Pontic delegation played for time, the
Romans returned home in frustration, and the war continued. Eumenes,
just recovered from an illness, now exerted himself to put an end to the
war without Roman support. He greatly enlarged his army and
blockaded the Hellespont in an attempt to weaken Pharnaces, but
pressure from Rhodes forced him to withdraw. 11 In the autumn of 1 80 or
spring of 1 79, he took the field with his allies, and Pharnaces indicated at
last that he was ready for peace.

The peace treaty is described in some detail by Polybius. 12 Pharnaces
had to renounce all his ambitions in Galatia, which thus remained firmly
under Eumenes’ control; he had to restore Tieium to Eumenes (who
then gave it to Prusias of Bithynia); he also had to return whatever he had
taken from Ariarathes and from Morzius, the dynast of Gangra in
Paphlagonia. Ariarathes was to receive 300 talents from. Mithridates of
Armenia as an indemnity. Pharnaces, however, kept Sinope; Eumenes, it
appears, now that his relations with Rhodes were strained, was indiffer-
ent to the fate of a city which had close ties with the Rhodians.

Included in the treaty are several other powers that are not mentioned
as participants in the war: Artaxias, the ruler of Greater Armenia,

9 A decree of Cos at this time praises Ariarathes and his queen Antiochis: Segre and Pugliese-
Carratelli 1972: (e 164); Piejko 1983: (e 158).

10 Of three Roman embassies during the war, the first was ‘to look into the matter of the
Sinopeans and into the differences between the kings’, the second ‘to look more closely into the
differences of the aforementioned’, the third ‘to end the war by any means’.

11 Eumencsexploited perhaps more fully the treaty of 183 with 33 cities of Crete: /Civ. 179; Dunst
1956: (e 54). A fragmentary treaty of his with Lato is dated c. 180: SEG xvi.524.

12 Polyb. xxv. 2; Walbank 1937-79, 111.271-4: (b 38).

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THE SELEUCI DS AND THEIR RIVALS

Acusilochus (unknown); in Europe, the Sarmatian chieftain Gatalos, and
a number of Greek cities, viz. Heraclea on the Black Sea, Cyzicus on the
Propontis (Sea of Marmara), Mesambria (Mesebar) on the west coast of
the Black Sea and Chersonesus (Sevastopol) in theCrimea. Whetherall of
these had participated in the war is disputed. 13 The peace may have come
about partly because the Romans had begun to put pressure on
Pharnaces at the very end of the war. 14

Eumenes had been victorious in two major wars. The confidence that
Rome had placed in him seemed fully justified, and yet in both wars peace
had come only when the Senate finally exerted pressure. Eumenes,
though he had won the alliance of Cappadocia and had established
control over Galatia, though under the treaty of Apamea he was secured
against an attack by a Seleucid king, nevertheless faced Celts, who
resented the loss of their freedom; the kings of Pontus and Bithynia,
who, momentarily weakened, continued to be or again became his
enemies; 15 Macedonia, which remained an enemy; and Rhodes, which
had turned hostile. The situation in Asia Minor was delicate and depen-
dent on continued Roman support for the Pergamene king.

Nonetheless, the kingdom of Eumenes was now the dominant power.
The 1 70s witnessed the height of the monarchy and of Pergamene art. In
the capital magnificent buildings were erected, new festivals created, and
the royal residence finally transformed into a place of splendour. 16 Strabo
calls attention to the sanctuary of Athena Nikephoros (p. 328), to
prestigious votives and to the foundation of libraries. A new festival was
instituted in honour of Asclepius, who now rose to prominence, and of
Heracles; the king’s own brothers were the first to preside over the
games that formed part of the festival. The city was considerably
enlarged and was fortified with new walls. The most famous enterprises,
however, were on the acropolis: the enlargement of the sanctuary of
Athena and, above all, the erection of the Great Altar to Zeus. The major
frieze, displaying the gigantomachy, appears to have been begun soon
after the battle of Magnesia and completed by 1 70, followed by work on

13 Bickcrman 1932: (e i 24) argues that non-participants in the war could be included in the treaty.
Against this view: Dahlheim 1968, 2i3ff.:(H 86). Both opinions have supporters. This writer tends
to agree with the latter.

14 This, however, cannot be inferred from Pharnaces’ treaty with Chersonesus (I PE i 2 402, 3-5,
26-8), traditionally dated to 179, since its true date is c. 155 b.c.: Burstein 1980: (e 12).

15 Prusias II, an ally of Eumenes against Pharnaces, soon rejoined his enemies (as reflected by his
marriage to Apamc, the sister of Perseus, c. 177).

16 The fundamental publications are the volumes of Altertiimer von Pergamon (since 1883); see
details in Hansen 197 1, 485-6: (e 57) (and vols. xi. 2 -.xi. 4 (1973-84), xii (1978), xm(r98i)). Reports
on current work: MDAI( A ) 1 899, 1902, 1904, 1907, 1908, 1910, 1912; Abb. Akad. Berlin 1928 no. 3;
1932 no. 5; Arcb. An £. 1966, 1970, 1973—83. General survey and detailed bibliography in Hansen
1971: (e 57); Allen 1983, 76 - 135 : (e 52).

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ASIA MINOR, 188-158 B.C. 331

the smaller frieze, that of the royal ancestor Telephus, which had not yet
been completed in 158 when Eumenes died. 17

The increased importance of the kingdom caused an expansion and
intensification of its foreign relations. Attalid ambassadors appear in new
areas, such as Thessaly, where common enmity towards Macedonia
seems to have prompted the contact. 18 Increased wealth allowed the king
to give, or at least to offer, money to a large number of Greek states.
Eumenes donated buildings, grain and other goods. To Athens, for
instance, he sent an architect and also, it seems, a foreman to build the
stoa that bears his name, the Stoa of Eumenes, for the benefit of the
spectators in the theatre. 19 He did, however, suffer a few setbacks when
Pergamene diplomacy was tactless; for instance, when the king offered to
pay the Council of the Achaean League and was rebuffed, or when he was
too eager to gain what the Senate had not assigned him; in Thrace his
envoys tried to persuade the Roman commissioners that the cities of
Aenus and Maronea, also claimed by Philip V, were, in fact, an ‘append-
age’ to the gift of the Thracian Chersonese. In the end, the Senate refused
to let either party have them. 20

A visible and important change within the kingdom of Eumenes was
the introduction of a new royal silver coinage, the ‘basketbearers’
( cistophori ). The basket, depicted on the obverse, is associated with
Dionysus, a favourite god of the Attalids. The new coinage was sup-
posed to replace the old silver pieces bearing the portrait of Philetaerus,
the founder of the dynasty. Its circulation was confined to the realm of
the Attalids - the coins are almost never found elsewhere - and within
the limits of the kingdom it was the only lawful coinage. Scholars now

17 Strabo xill, p. 624; Ii/P in no. 3: Prince Athenacus agonothetes of the second celebration. For the
cult of Asclepius in Pergamum: Ohlcmutz 1940, 123-73: (e 63), and IrP in, pp. 1—20. The Great
Altar: Schrammen 1906: (b 197); Kahlcr 1948: (b i 75); Schobcr 195 1: (b 196); Rohde 1982: (e 64). A
head recently found is probably from a statue of Asclepius, perhaps the one by Phyromachus (Simon
1975, 19-20: (1 33), and see p. 360). On the frieze of Telephus, ‘a kind of Aeneid of the Attalids’
(Gruben 1966, 408: (1 16)), sec Stahler 1966: (b 201). Whether the work began early or late in the 1 80s
is disputed. It is almost unanimously agreed, however, that the larger frieze was completed by c. \ 70,
to be followed by work on the smaller frieze. It is, however, argued by Callaghan 1 98 1 and 1982: (b
153 and 153) that both friezes were begun simultaneously and only after 166 b.c. Christians
considered the altar (to pagans one of the seven wonders of the world) ‘Satan’s throne’ (Apoc. John.
3.13, if this is the altar and not the temple of Roma and Augustus or, possibly, of Asclepius).

18 IG ix. 2. 5 12 from Larissa. One ambassador honoured is a well-known kinsman of Cumenes;
another, Demetrius, also honoured at Delos (IG xi. 765-6) and later at Ephesus ( jOAI 50 (1976)
Beibl. 12 no. 4), had charge of Eumenes’ seal. Common interests of Eumenes and the Thessalians:
Poiyb. xxii. 6.

19 Eumenes’ relations with Greek states: Poiyb. xxxn.8.5; Livy XLii.5.3. References in Robert
1937, 84-5: (e 162); and also, for Athens: Ferguson 191 1, 299(0 26); for Delphi: Daux 1936, 497-51 1
(d 1 5); for Miletus: Herrmann 1965: (e 142); for Cos: Sherwin-White 1978, 132-3: (e 168). Stoa of
Eumenes in Athens: Vitr. De Arch . v.9.1. Bibliography in Hansen 1971, 295 n. 18 1: (e 57); add
Thompson 1953, 256-9(0 53).

20 Achaea: Poiyb. xxu.1.6, 7-9; Diod. Sic. xxix.17. Thrace: Werner 1977, i67ff.: (o 55).

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332 THE SELEUCI DS AND THEIR RIVALS

generally agree that the new coins were not minted before 1 88 and that
they were royal money, despite the fact that the pieces lack the portraits as
well as the names of the kings, and that they were struck in various cities.
Recently, the view that the cistophoric coinage began immediately after
the peace of 188 has won wide acceptance, though there are strong
arguments in favour of putting the beginning even later, in either c. 175
or c. 166 when King Eumenes had already fallen out with Rome. 21

Late in 175 Eumenes seized an opportunity to befriend a traditional
enemy; he helped the Seleucid prince Antiochus, youngest son of
Antiochus the Great, to win the throne after the assassination of his
brother, King Seleucus IV (p. 341). It was a masterly move and one that
earned him Antiochus’ gratitude. Relations between the two kingdoms,
traditionally hostile, immediately became cordial and remained so as
long as Antiochus lived. 22 On the other hand, his aid to Antiochus had
alienated Seleucus’ legitimate heirs; this was to have consequences later,
when they regained their inheritance (p. 357).

(b) Rome’s rebuff to Eumenes

Now at the height of his fortunes, Eumenes gambled once too often. As
he had been instrumental in preparing Rome to go to war with
Antiochus III, so again he was instrumental in causing the Senate to
decide to wage war against Perseus of Macedonia. When Eumenes
addressed the Senate in 172, he accused the king of violating the treaty
and preparing war against Rome; later he accused him of plotting the
attempt on his life at Delphi on his way home that had left him near death.
Rome declared war on Perseus, and Eumenes, once again, seemed to
have won, but he failed to foresee that his very success would render
superfluous the role which, for thirty years, he had been allowed to play.
Once the Macedonian monarchy was annihilated, the Senate rebuked
and humiliated Eumenes and gave encouragement to his enemies, the
Galatians and King Prusias. 23 The Senate concealed the political issue in
a personal attack on Eumenes; it voiced allegations of treachery; for
treason, it was insinuated, had been committed by Eumenes in secret
negotiations with Perseus. 24 The Senate courted the king’s brother
Attalus, and even made him a secret offer of the crown or at least a realm

21 Kienast 1961: (b 102); Seyrig 1963: (b 135); Boehringer 1972, 44-6: (b 82); Kleiner and Noe
1976: (b 105); Morkholm 1979: (b i 16). Kleiner and Noe date its introduction to c. 166, Morkholm
prefers c. 175. See further Waggoner 1979: (b 145); Kleiner 1980: (b 104); Morkholm 19821(8119).

22 The theory of Rostovtzeff, 1941, 656-9: (a 3 1), that a period of close co-operation in economic
affairs followed rests on erroneous assumptions and has to bcabandoned: Seyrig 1963, 26-8: (b i 35).
There is now, however, more documentary evidence for the friendship between Eumenes and
Antiochus: Herrmann 1965, 82-7: (e 142).

23 Habicht, P W, ‘Prusias", 11 13-15. Grucn 1984, 569#.: (a 20), denies that there was such
encouragement. 24 Schlcussncr 1973: (d 50 ).

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ASIA MINOR, 188-158 B.C.

333

of his own. 25 The allegations were probably not true. 26 Eumenes had
participated in the war from beginning to end and his brothers Attalus
and Athenaeus had fought at Pydna with a considerable part of his
army. 27

The king himself was convinced that he could easily prove his loyalty
before the Senate and a majority of the senators must have known they
had no valid reason for suspecting him, but they did not want this issue
resolved, so, just after they had heard King Prusias address them and
knowing that Eumenes was then in Italy on his way to Rome, they voted
not to allow kings to speak before them. Eumenes, therefore, under strict
rules of fair play between allies, had a good reason to complain of his
treatment by Rome, though that was the only one, because the situation
had changed since 193. Eumenes then had actually been threatened by
Antiochus’ aggressive expansion, whereas in 172 there was no threat
whatsoever from Perseus. Likewise, Rome in 193 may have had a
legitimate grievance against Antiochus, whereas it did not have any
against Perseus in 172. The two states had been partners in an unscrupu-
lous war and after the victory Rome continued to be unscrupulous.
Eumenes made the mistake of expecting loyalty from a Senate which,
after the defeat of Perseus and the compliance of Antiochus IV
(pp. 344-5), no longer needed him.

In 168, apparently encouraged by the absence of part of the Pergamene
forces in Macedonia, the Galatians rebelled. Eumenes, after two years of
heavy fighting during which he once came close to being captured by the
enemy, finally won a decisive victory, somewhere in Phrygia, and
suppressed the insurrection. It was a hollow victory; before it, Roman
commissioners had secretly encouraged the Galatians; after it, the Sen-
ate, openly hostile, declared his Celtic subjects free. 28 Eumenes, how-
ever, did not entirely comply and his tenacity, in turn, gave Prusias
ammunition for years of denunciations before the Senate of Pergamene
activities in Galatia. 29 Eumenes had fought four times for the possession
of Galatia; for its loss there was but one compensation: contrary to

25 Polyb. xxx. 1-3; Livy xlv. 19-20. They promised him the Thracian cities Aenus and Maronea
as a gift, but when he remained loyal to his brother, declared them free (suppressed in Livy) and
concluded a treaty with Maronea: Arch. Dell. z8 (1973), pi. 418. Gruen 1984, 5 74—5 : (a 20), is
sceptical of the tradition. 26 Most scholars agree, despite minor differences of opinion.

27 Eumenes and the Thessalian cavalry by and large had kept an engagement in 171 from
becoming a Roman disaster: Livy xlii. 59-60. The Thessalians founded a festival to commemorate
the occasion: Arch. Del/. 16 (i960) 185; Bull, epigr. 1964, 227; Kramolisch 1978, 135-6: (d 38).

28 Main sources: Polyb. xxix.22, xxx.1.2, 2.8, 3.7-9, 19.12; Diod. Sic. xxxi.12-14; Polyaenus,
S/rat. iv. 8.1; Welles, RC 52.8—14; Swoboda, Kcil and Knoll 1935, 32 nos. 74-5 (Amlada): (b 202).
FD in. 3. 241-2 (Sardis), discussed by Daux 1932: (d 14). Robert 1934: (b 63) (Tralles). For the
victory in Phrygia sec hP 165, augmented by MDA1( A ) 27 (1902) 90 no. 74. The date of hP 167 is
not 165, but 149 (no connection with this war): Jones 1974, 186-9: (e 61). Stahelin 1907,66-72: (e
169), remains the best modern account. For the freedom of Galatia: Polyb. xxxi.2.

29 Prusias’ allegations (n. 1 34) are in part confirmed by the secret correspondence of Eumenes and
Attalus with the priest Attis of Pessinus (pp. 373-4).

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THE SELEUCI DS AND THEIR RIVALS

Roman expectations, their own conduct and Eumenes’ courageous stand
against the barbarians caused a wave of goodwill and genuine sympathy
for him to spread throughout the Greek states of Asia Minor and the
Aegean world. He was also reconciled with Rhodes, another of the
Senate’s victims. 30

The shift in Roman policy after 1 68 is significant. Eumenes and
Rhodes, Rome’s oldest and firmest allies, dropped completely from
favour and Antiochus IV of Syria, who had been more than loyal
(pp. 344-5), became an object of suspicion, while their enemies — Prusias
II, the Galatians, some cities in Asia Minor that had differences with
Eumenes, like Selge in Pisidia, or were opposed to Rhodian domination,
and the Jewish rebels in Antiochus’ kingdom — all found an open ear in the
curia for their ambassadors’ assertions that Eumenes, Ariarathes and
Antiochus had formed a block with common interests that, if something
less than a formal alliance, was still prepared for common action and was
therefore dangerous to Rome. 31 The Senate, well aware that it had
treated two of these kings badly, found it necessary to watch them closely
through repeated inspections. Nor was that all; the Roman commis-
sioner C. Sulpicius Galus publicly invited accusations against Eumenes.
For ten days in 164 in Sardis, one of Eumenes’ most important cities,
Galus listened to the meanest slanders against a king who was still
Rome’s ‘friend and ally’. 32 The conduct of Cn. Octavius in Syria (p. 3 54)
was similar. Under these cloudy skies Eumenes received another blow: in
164 his two friends Ariarathes and Antiochus both died.

During his last years the Pergamene ruler once more made major
benefactions to several Greek states. 33 In 160/59, his health failing, he
appointed his brother Attalus co-ruler. Eumenes died some time later,
apparently in 1 5 8 . 34

After the war against Antiochus the republic of Rhodes was amply
rewarded by Rome for what it had contributed to the Roman victory.

30 Polyb. xxxi. 6. 6. Welles, RC 52,8-14, and the documents from Sardis and Tralles (n. 28); see
Hollcaux 1924, 325-6: (e 59). Rhodes: Polyb. xxxi.31; Diod. Sic. xxxi.36.

31 Koinopragia (‘concerted action’) is used repeatedly (Polyb. xxx.30.4, xxxi.9.8).

32 Details in A1RR 438-44. Chronology: Walbank 1957-79, 1 1 1 . 3 3 fF, : (b 38).

33 Such as Delphi: FD 111. 3 .a 37 — 9, all of 160/59; Miletus: Herrmann 1965: (e 142); Rhodes: see n.
3°-

34 Appointment of Attalus: Hopp 1977, 3—1 5: (e 60). Eumenes’ death is generally dated to 1 59,
since it is assumed that he died in his 3 8th or 39th regnal year. A new inscription, mentioning his 40th
year, suggests the date must be 158: Petzl 1978, 263, no. 12: (b 59).

33 Main sources: excerpts from Polybius, books xxi-xxx, with Walbank 1957-79, in: (b 38). Also
many passages in books xxxvii-xlv of Livy; most of them are Livy’s adaptations of Polybius’
narrative, others are derived from Roman sources, a few outright annalistic falsifications, for which

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ASIA MINOR, 188—158 B.C.

335

The gift of Caria south of the Maeander and of Lycia added greatly to the
Rhodian realm in Asia Minor, the so-called Peraea. Special clauses in the
peace treaty served Rhodian interests. One imposed an interdiction on
Antiochus against making war on ‘the islands’, others upheld the rights
and privileges of Rhodian property-owners and merchants within his
empire. 36 The Senate was even prepared to grant the city’s demand that
the town of Soli in Cilicia be declared free, despite the fact, duly stressed
by Antiochus’ envoys, that the preliminary treaty had left Cilicia under
the king’s rule. And the Aetolians owed the peace they were granted in
the same year, 1 89, at least in part to the good offices of the ambassadors
from Rhodes and from Athens who spoke in their favour before the
consul in Greece and before the Senate. 37

In Asia Minor Rhodes had to fill part of the vacuum created by the
retreat of Antiochus and to defend the new state of affairs created by
Rome in the south, just as King Eumenes had to defend it north of the
Maeander. Caria as a whole, where the Rhodians had had a small
dominion for some time, seems not to have opposed directly Rhodian
rule, but some cities did not welcome it. Alabanda managed to obtain a
decree from the Senate declaring the city free, that is to say, exempt from
Rhodian domination. 38 An inscription from Apollonia in the Salbace
Mountains suggests that Rhodian domination was less troublesome to
the native inhabitants of the countryside than to the larger cities, who
were afraid of losing their grip on the territories surrounding them. 39 It
is, however, difficult to say whether these instances permit generaliza-
tion. Strong Rhodian influence was felt even north of the Maeander,
where several free cities attached themselves to Rhodes rather than to
Eumenes. In a treaty concluded during the 1 80s Miletus and Heraclea-on-
Latmus agreed not to act contrary to the interests of Rhodes, their
dominant ally. 40

In Lycia, on the other hand, Rhodes encountered stiff resistance. The
Lycians had fought for Antiochus and resented becoming subjects of
Rhodes. In 189 they had envoys from Ilium plead their case before the

sec Schmitt 1957, 140 n. 4, 1500. 1, 2 1 2-1 5: (e 77). Also Diod. Sic. xxix. 1 1, xxx.24, xxxi.j; Livy,
Per. xlvi; Dio. Cass. frs. 66.2, 68.1-3; Zon. ix.23.3; App. Mac. 1 1.2-3, ! 7 * Fragments of Cato’s
speech for the Rhodians in Gell. NA vi.3; Calboli 1978: (h 34). Several inscriptions give details on
the beginning and end of Rhodian domination in Caria and Lycia. For modern work see the
exhaustive discussion of Schmitt 1957, 8 1-172: (e 77), and the survey of Grucn 1975: (e 76); for the
Rhodian dominions in Asia Minor: Fraser and Bean 1954: (e 75).

36 Schmitt 1957, 85: (e 77); Gruen 1975, 65: (e 76).

37 One of the Rhodian delegates may have been Timarchus, honoured by the Aetolians sometime
before 169 (I Undos 195).

38 REG 1 1 (1898) 2 5 8ff. Bibliography in Schmitt 1957, 97 n. 1: (e 77). The city had assumed the
name Antioch before 250, but returned c. 190 to its old name: Robert 1973, 453-66: (b 68 ).

59 Robert 1954, 303-12 no. 167: (e 163).

40 l Mi let 150, 35; for the date see Arch. An%. 1977, 95; Robert 1978, 509-10: (b 69).

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336 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

Senate, whose polite reply encouraged such high hopes in Lycia that the
Confederacy voted to establish a cult of ‘Rome the Goddess Manifest’.
Soon, however, they learned that the Rhodian claim had been upheld; 41
nothing was left for the Lycians except recourse to arms. They fought for
many years against the Rhodians. Finally, in 177, when Rhodes seemed
to be prevailing, a Lycian delegate obtained a decree from the Senate that
the Lycians had not been given to Rhodes as a gift, but as friends and
allies. Encouraged by this decree, the Lycians at once resumed hostilities
and the war continued until, in the end, Rhodes and Rome fell out and the
Lycians won.

From the beginning Rhodian relations with King Eumenes were
delicate. On the one hand, the republic and the king had been rivals for
the spoils of the victory over Antiochus; on the other, both were bound
together by their common interest in the stability of the new order in Asia
Minor. It was for this reason that Eumenes supported the Rhodians in
18 1 against the rebellious Lycians. Soon, however, after the Rhodians
had forced the king to abandon his attempt to blockade the Hellespont
during his war with Pharnaces (p. 329), relations became hostile. The
king thereafter lent clandestine support to the Lycians and denounced
Rhodian policy before the Senate, while Rhodes refused to admit his
envoys to an international festival 42 and two Rhodians, who were asked
by the Achaean League to investigate whether honours granted earlier to
Eumenes by the Achaeans had been legal, exceeded their instructions and
convinced the Achaeans to cancel them all, thereby creating new
disputes. 43

The two sides, however, had more to worry about than their mutual
quarrels once the war between Rome and King Perseus began. Both
rallied to the Romans. The Rhodians, in fact, had no choice. They had no
complaints against Perseus and had nothing to gain from war; on the
other hand, they could not afford to disappoint the expectations of the
Senate. For this reason they turned down the Macedonian ambassadors
who had come to ask Rhodes to mediate. They also obeyed the Roman
demands for military aid, slight as these seem to have been. They were
active against Perseus: once a Rhodian fleet captured a Macedonian
envoy on his way to King Antiochus IV, then campaigning in Egypt.
But the longer the war dragged on, the more the Rhodians felt its adverse
effects on their economy. Once they had to ask the Senate’s permission to

41 Polyb. xxii. 5.3-6; cult of Roma: JHS 68 (1948) 46ff.; bibliography in Mellor 1975, 37 n. 56: (1
25), and Robert 1978, 288 n. 57: (b 70); Sherwin-White 1984, 49-50: (a 34).

42 Polyb. xxvn. 7. 5-7; Livy xur.14.8; App. Mac. 1 1.2—3. Commerce between the former allies
suddenly all but ended in the 170s: Schmitt 1957, 135: (e 77).

43 Polyb. xxvn. 18. 3, xxvni. 7.3— 15, with Holleaux 1938-68, 1. 441-3: (d 35). As Livy XLii.17.7
shows, these honours had been cancelled before 172.

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ASIA MINOR, 188-158 B.C.

337

import grain from Sicily. And the situation grew even worse when
Egypt and Syria also went to war. The interests of Rhodes demanded
that peace be established on both fronts, and the earlier the better. In 169
Rhodian ambassadors went to Alexandria to mediate between the two
kings, but mediation of the Macedonian war was a much more delicate
question. The consul of 169, Marcius Philippus, who was then cam-
paigning without much success against Perseus, seems to have suggested
such an initiative to a Rhodian ambassador in a private conversation. 44
When the Rhodians decided to attempt mediation in 168, they obviously
thought that the recent alliance between Perseus and the Illyrian king
Gentius would have inclined the Senate towards peace, just the opposite
happened. The Senate was more determined than ever to dispose of the
Macedonian kingdom. The Rhodians failed to understand what the
election of Aemilius Paullus to a second consulship and his appointment
as general in Macedonia had meant. When their envoys arrived at
Paullus’ headquarters at Pydna, they were given a frosty reception. Only
a few days later the consul destroyed the royal army on the battlefield.
Other envoys from Rhodes, who had been sent to Rome and had been
kept waiting there, were introduced to the Senate-house only after the
news of the victory had arrived. They had come to mediate a war the
Romans had won. Now they could only offer their congratulations. The
Senate chose to interpret their mission as motivated entirely by the
interests of Perseus and, for that reason, as a hostile act towards Rome.
The ambassadors were told that with this action the friendship between
Rome and Rhodes had come to an end.

The intimidated Rhodians at once sentenced to death the politicians
responsible for the attempt at mediation and made every effort to
conciliate the Romans. It was in vain. In 167, the Senate formally decreed
that Caria and Lycia, given to Rhodes in 188, were to be free. Moreover,
the Carian towns Caunus and Stratoniceia, which had been Rhodian long
before 188 and which had revolted after Pydna and been subdued, also
were granted their freedom by the Senate. These two cities alone had
brought the Rhodians an annual income of i 20 talents and their loss was a
severe blow to the Rhodian economy. Still worse, however, was the
Romans’ gift of the island of Delos to Athens on condition that Delos be
a free port. Traffic shifted from Rhodes to Delos, and Rhodes lost some
140 talents in annual harbour dues. The republic also lost its hegemony
over the League of Islanders, and for a while there was even talk of a
Roman war against Rhodes, promoted by an ambitious praetor, but

44 Polyb. xxviii. 1 7; App. Mac. 17, It remains disputed whether Philippus meant mediation in the
Syrian war, asGruen 1975, 71-4: (e 76)or in the Macedonian war, as Walbank 19 f 7-79, in. 350 — x : (b
38). The latter view seems correct.

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338 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

finally prevented (if the threat was, in fact, intended to be taken seriously)
by a famous speech of Cato. 45

With the Rhodians ousted from Asia Minor 46 and from their he-
gemony over the islands, with their economy profoundly shaken and
their pride shattered, the Senate had fulfilled its purpose ‘to make an
example of Rhodes’. 47 Eventually, in 164, it paid heed to what the
Rhodians had been requesting over the last few years and granted them a
treaty. Friendship was restored, but not, as before, on the basis of equal
partnership.

II. THE SELEUCID MONARCHY, 187-162 B.C.

(a) Selene us J V

Within the short span of only seven years Roman armies had defeated the
Hellenistic world’s two most powerful kings, Philip V and Antiochus
III. While defeat was followed in both cases by a substantial loss of
territory and other severe conditions, Rome had made no effort to
replace either monarch on the throne or to destroy the monarchy. The
fate of the two rulers, however, was different. Philip lived on for
eighteen years and was able to recoup his strength, whereas Antiochus
lost his life in an attempt to raise money from a native temple in Elymais
only a year after the settlement with Rome. His eldest son, Antiochus,
had died six years earlier. The second, Seleucus, had been co-ruler since
189 and was now about thirty years old. He succeeded his father as
Seleucus IV. Our sources are unanimous in depicting him as inactive and
weak. Only one piece of personal evidence survives from his twelve-year
reign, a letter written in May 1 86 to the city of Seleuceia in northern Syria
to request a grant of citizenship for a courtier who had served his father
and himself well. 48

Seleucus was able through diplomacy to regain lost ground. At the
very beginning of his reign he won a reconciliation with two former
enemies in Greece, Achaea and Athens. Political and personal reasons
alike caused him to make an effort in Achaea, since in 1 90 one thousand
Achaeans had come to the aid of King Eumenes and had fought
brilliantly against Seleucus when he was besieging Pergamum. Late in

45 Schmitt 1957, 15 iff.: (e 77); Gruen 1975, 77ff.: (e 76); for Cato’s role: Astin 1978, 1 37ff., 273ff.:
(h 68). Rhodian campaigns in Asia Minor between 168 and 164: Polyb. xxx.5. 1 1-16, 21.2-5,23.2,
31.4-8; 1 Undos 200-2.

46 The Lycian Confederacy expressed its gratitude by a dedication to Jupiter Capitolinus and the

Roman people: C1L i 2 . 7 2 5; Mellor 1978, 321 n. 14: (b 54). The Carian city of Amyzon began a new
era (of liberty) in 167: Robert 1954, 309: (e 163); while another, Antioch-on-Macander, praised the
Romans as the ‘common benefactors of the Greeks’ and instituted a cult of Roma: Habicht 195 7, 242
no. 65: (b 51). 47 Polyb. xxix.19.5.

48 Seleucus: Stahelin, PU 7 , ‘Seleucus IV’. The letter: Welles, RC 45, with Holleaux 1933: (b 52).

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339

the summer of 187, at the request of his envoys, the Achaean assembly
renewed their former friendship, although they politely declined ‘for the
moment’ the king’s offer of a gift of ten warships. 49 Only a few months
later, in April 186, the Athenians, who had supported Rome in the war,
honoured a Seleucid ambassador. The voting of honours implies that
normal relations had been re-established. 50

Seleucus did not fight a single war and came close only once, in c. 1 82,
when Eumenes was fighting against King Pharnaces of Pontus (p. 329)
and Pharnaces offered 500 talents if Seleucus would help him. Seleucus
had already moved his army so that he could intervene, when ‘it occurred
to him’ that the treaty of Apamea forbade his crossing the Taurus
Mountains. 51 His original intention shows that Seleucus had no desire to
come to terms with the ruler of Pergamum, whose predecessors had been
subordinate to the Seleucid kings and who had acquired most of what the
Seleucids had recently lost.

Instead, the king sought out Eumenes’ enemies. Perseus, the Macedo-
nian king, was one and Rhodes was no longer Eumenes’ friend (p. 336).
Seleucus saw his chance. He offered his daughter Laodice to Perseus to
be his queen and Perseus accepted. Since the treaty of Apamea prohibited
Seleucid vessels from sailing west of Cilicia, Seleucus asked the Rhodians
to escort the bride to Macedonia, to which they agreed and used the
occasion to parade their naval strength. The wedding ceremony, in 177,
was an international event. It seems to be reflected in a dedicatory
inscription to the young queen from Delos and a hoard of one hundred
magnificent mint-fresh silver coins bearing the portrait of Perseus, to be
dated before 1 74, found in Mersin in Cilicia; the coins had obviously been
given to one of the courtiers who accompanied the princess. 52 The Senate
was extremely suspicious of the harmony shown by the three powers
involved in this wedding and the one that was soon to follow between
King Prusias II of Bithynia and Perseus’ sister Apame. 53 The Rhodians
later felt the patres’ anger (p. 337).

Perhaps the most significant feature of Seleucus’ reign is his avoidance
of any closer contact with Rome. If this impression is not caused merely

49 This number is the maximum allowed to the Seleucids by the treaty of Apamea, Polyb.
xxi. 45. 1 3. For the date: Errington 1969, 2 57-65: (d 2 j); the conventional date, 185, is defended by
Walbank 195 7—79, 111.9-10: (b }8).

50 Pritchett and Meritt 1940, 117-18: (b 215); cf. Ferguson 1911, 285-6: (D 26).

51 Polyb. fr. 96; Niese 1910, 75-6: (d 46); Diod. Sic. xxix.24; Bevan 1902, 123-4: (e 4).

52 Inscription: 1G xi.1074; coin hoard: Sevrig 1973,47-8: (b 219). The dedication in Delos for the
king by a courtier in 178 may be connected with this event: l Delos 1450A43 (text) and 443 B71 (date).

53 Seibert 1967,43-41(1 32). An indication that Seleucus in 186 wanted the friendship of Maccdon
is the naming of his son Demetrius, whose mother may have been an Antigonid princess: Morkholm
1966, 34: (e 33); Helliescn 1981: (e 22). The political significance of the royal weddings, generally
acknowledged, seems to be underestimated by Giovannini 1969, 85 y . (d 28), and Gruen 1975, 66-7:
(e 76).

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340 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

by the deficiency of our sources, the fact is remarkable: by then an almost
constant stream of yearly embassies from eastern courts was pouring into
Rome; in this period at least seven are attested for Macedonia, at least five
for Pergamum. The Seleucid ruler did send envoys to Rome: he had to
deliver an instalment of the war indemnity every year and he must have
had some contact with the Senate before the Romans accepted the prince
Demetrius as a hostage in exchange for the king’s brother Antiochus,
but, except for these unavoidable and rather technical missions, there
were apparently few, if any, of political importance. The king may well
have realized that he had little to gain from closer connections with
Rome and that he would be wiser to avoid her as best he could.

Seleucus may have been a quiet person, but there is no indication that
he lacked authority within his own realm. As a result of the war against
Rome, some client kings became more or less independent, as, for
instance, Armenia (p. 3 29); in other cases it is impossible to determine the
circumstances. Seleucus had also inherited a cash problem and he was
careful with his expenditures. The scarcity of silver is reflected in the
small quantity of coins minted during his reign and in other numismatic
features. 54 He soon fell behind schedule in paying the indemnity to
Rome. On the other hand, the resources of the kingdom were in no way
exhausted, as his successor would soon prove. Perhaps he was not
concerned with glory, but he did care, as his relations with Rome
suggest, about his dignity and he may well have cared about his subjects’
welfare; under his rule they enjoyed twelve years of uninterrupted peace.

A pious Jew, the author of II Maccabees, records that in Seleucus’ time
the holy city enjoyed peace and lawful government and the king himself
paid for the liturgical needs of the holy temple. Paradoxically, it was this
very temple which is somehow connected with Seleucus’ downfall; the
same author goes on to tell the story of the king’s chancellor Heliodorus,
who was sent to raise money from the temple. For one reason or another,
which later Jewish legend has obscured, the mission failed. Whether
Heliodorus had been bribed or not, it was this failure rather than a plot
with the Ptolemaic court, that prompted him, on 3 September 175, to
have the king assassinated. 55 He proclaimed his victim’s son Antiochus,
then a boy of four or five, king and the dowager queen Laodice regent.

At the time of the murder thedead king’s brother Antiochus happened
to be in Athens, on his way back from Rome, where he had been a
hostage but was replaced in 1 78 at the latest by his nephew Demetrius, a

54 Seyrig 1958, 194-6: (b 132): Morkholm 1966, 31-2: (e 33); Boehringer 1972, 96: (b 82).

55 II Macc. 3.4-40; Bickcrman 1939-44: (e88). Habicht 1976, 209-14: (b io). In 178 Heliodorus
made dedications to Apollo at Delos: Durrbach 192 1,95-6: (b 50); and he received thereat least three
statues, one of them from Seleucus himself with strong words of the king’s affection (IG xi. 1 1 1 2-
14). Heliodorus is occasionally assumed to have been part of a conspiracy formed in Alexandria:
Ploger 1955, 79: (e 107); Bunge 1974, (8 n. 4: (e 9).

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THE SELEUCID MONARCHY, 187-162 B.C.

34 '

son of Seleucus. He thought the boy Antiochus was unfit to rule, so he
decided to take matters into his own hands. When he arrived in Asia
Minor, he was met by Eumenes, solemnly crowned, and then escorted by
Pergamene armed forces to the frontier of the Seleucid kingdom. 56 He
soon overcame his opponents and was proclaimed King Antiochus IV.
As a result of a deal he apparently concluded with the opposing party, he
married his brother’s widow, adopted her son Antiochus, and tolerated
him as his co-ruler for several years. 57

(b) The early years of Antiochus IT'

The events that brought Antiochus to the throne moved so quickly that
scholars have often assumed part or all of them, including the assassina-
tion of Seleucus, had been arranged by Rome and Eumenes, perhaps
with Heliodorus the pawn. 58 No such explanation is required. On the
other hand, the Senate may have welcomed an usurpation which would
bring discord to the dynasty and would likely weaken the kingdom. The
Conscript Fathers must also have realized that their hostage, the legiti-
mate heir Prince Demetrius, was a weapon that could, if necessary, be
used to discipline Antiochus. Swift as the seizure of royal power had
been, it cannot have been completed, as the cuneiform king-list has it,
‘the same month’ Seleucus was murdered, that is, before 22 September
175. No doubt the new king antedated his accession to make his reign
appear strictly consecutive with his brother’s and therefore legitimate.

Antiochus was in his late thirties when he seized power. He had a
stronger personality than his brother; our sources agree that he was high-
spirited, capable, energetic and self-confident; he was also ambitious. He
assumed divine epithets, which no other Hellenistic king had done, such
as ‘God Manifest’ ( Theos Epiphanes ) and, after his defeat of Egypt, ‘The
Victorious’ (Nikephoros ). 59 The sources, in particular Polybius, also
speak of often eccentric behaviour, capricious actions, and even insanity
- Antiochus Epiphanes, they say, was nicknamed Epirnanes, the
‘madman’. Opinions differ on the value of these statements. They could
easily be unfounded gossip, promulgated by the king’s enemies, Deme-

56 App. Sjr. 45.233-4, confirmed and illustrated by the Athenian decree for Eumenes and his
family ( OCIS 248) who arc praised for the assistance given to Antiochus. A copy sent to Eumenes
was found in Pergamum. It was at first believed to be a decree of Antioch, the Seleucid capital, but
recognized to be Athenian by Holleaux 1900: (e 46). See also n. 65.

57 Morkholm 1963,63-76: (b i i 2), and 1966, 36, 41-5 8: (e 3 3), whose main conclusions have been
generally accepted.

58 Bouche-Lcclerq 1913, 241: (e 8); Will 1982, 304-5: (a 40). Just scepticism in Errington 1971,
273: (d 24), and Hopp 1977, 35 n. 6: (e 60).

59 Morkholm 1963: (b i i 2): Theos Epiphanes from 1 73/2 on; Theos Epiphanes Nikephoros since 169/
8. The use of Theos was restricted; it appears on royal coins, but is never used by the chancery’ of the
king. A remarkable portrait of Antiochus: Kyrieleis 1980: (b 176).

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342 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

trius (his nephew and a friend of Polybius) and King Ptolemy VIII
Euergetes II (also a nephew, on his mother’s side). 60 Antiochus’ policy
certainly displays no symptoms of capriciousness or insanity, quite the
contrary: it is steady and prudent. Antiochus proved to the world that his
kingdom was still a power to be reckoned with and that his army was
second only to Rome’s. He had a lasting impact on his subjects,
favourable in most cases, disastrous for the Jews (p. 346).

First of all, Antiochus was more successful than Seleucus in breaking
out of the political isolation that the war against Rome had caused. His
accession transformed the traditional enmity towards the Attalids into a
cordial relationship and wooed Cappadocia, which had been close to
Eumenes for some time, to his side. Antiochus gained further ground
through sumptuous gifts to many Greek states. Benefactions are attested
for Athens, Rhodes, Miletus, Cyzicus, Megalopolis and Tegea, for the
Boeotian and Achaean Leagues, and for the sanctuaries in Olympia and
Delos. 61 The king paid off the last instalment of the indemnity due to
Rome in 173; from that time onwards the Seleucids minted substantially
more coinage than they had in the previous fifteen years. 62 The king had
considerable resources.

His active diplomacy is reflected in the number of extant decrees voted
by Greek states. One of Antiochus’ agents, Eudemus of Seleuceia in
Cilicia, was voted honours by at least seven different states - Argos, the
Boeotian League, Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus, Chalcedon and
Lampsacus - and by some more than once. He received these honours
between 174 and 1 71, the first years of the king’s reign. 63 Many more such
decrees, now lost, must have existed. King Perseus of Macedonia, too,
though slightly earlier, had tried to win the goodwill of Greece, but with
a smaller effort. Many states sent embassies to Antiochus. In 168/7 an
embassy from Delphi came to the court and was assisted by two brothers
in Antiochus’ entourage, Dicaearchus and Philonides from Laodicea in
Syria, of whom the latter was a well-known philosopher. 64

60 Tarn 1951, 183: (f 152); Kiechle 1963, 159: (e 28); Morkholm 1966, 18 1-8: (e 33). For a
different view: Welwei 1963, 62ff: (b 44). Ptolemy Vlll as a source: Ath. X.438D.

61 Morkholm 1966, 54— 5: (e 33) (Cappadocia). For the Greek states, general statements in Polyb.
xxvi. 1. 10— 1 1 and Livy xLi.20.j-* 10. Details in Morkholm 1966, 5 5-63: (e 33). The assumption that
the king contributed to the building of the temple of Zeus at Lebadea in Boeotia has been refuted by
Etienne and Knoepfler 1976, 342 n. 300: (d 25).

62 Indemnity: Livy XLii.6.7; Morkholm 1966, 65: (e 33). II Macc. 8.10 is therefore erroneous.
Volume of coinage: Boehringer 1972, 86: (b 82).

63 Heberdey and Wilhelm 1 896, 108-17: (e 140) (JT/G 644-5); for the document from Lampsacus,
1 Lampsakos 6.

64 OGIS 241 with Daux 1936, 5 1 1-1 3: (d i 5). Since Dicaearchus and his sons are here appointed
thearodoci J the entry of the two brothers in the list of Delphian thearodoci must be later (BCH 4 5 (1921)
24 col. iv, lines 78-80 and pp. 37,41); G. J. Toomer, GRBS 13 (1972) 1 87 n. 45 . For Philonides see n.
138; for a new inscription from Laodicea, dated 174: ISjrie 1261.

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Athens, however, from the beginning was the city that had the closest
ties with the king and profited most from his liberality. Antiochus had
lived there for several years after his release from Rome and had come
from there to win the crown. The Athenians rejoiced at his success and
heaped praises on King Eumenes and his brothers for the aid they
provided. Several statues of the Seleucid king stood in the agora; three
Athenian decrees honouring high-ranking friends of his, and a fourth
decree, voted by the noble clans of the Eumolpids and Ceryces, in
honour of the elder Philonides of Laodicea, still survive. Two Athenian
citizens dedicated statues of Antiochus in the sanctuary of Apollo at
Delos. 65 The king’s most lavish gift to the city was the work he
commissioned, under the direction of his royal architect, the Roman D.
Cossutius, to fulfil his promise to complete the magnificent temple of
Olympian Zeus, left unfinished by the Pisistratids. 66 Construction was
still underway when the king died in 164; the temple was not completed
for another three hundred years.

Antiochus’ first major test was a war with Egypt, begun by Egypt to
recover southern Syria and Palestine, which had been lost to Antiochus
111 in 200. This so-called ‘Sixth Syrian War’ had long been in the making.
Ptolemy V Epiphanes would have renewed hostilities had he not been
assassinated in 1 80. His widow Cleopatra Antiochus’ sister acted as
regent for her son, Ptolemy VI, and kept him from war, but when she
died in 1 76 the new government, led by the king’s guardians Eulaeus and
Lenaeus, prepared for war. They justified it with the claim that the
disputed lands had been promised to Egypt as Cleopatra’s dowry when
she married Ptolemy V in 194/3. 67 Their intentions were so poorly
concealed that Antiochus was very early informed what to expect by a
representative he had sent to the court of Alexandria. When the enemy

65 Antiochus in Athens in the fall of 178 B.C.: Hesperia 5 1 (1982) 60 no. j. Athenian decree for
Eumenes: OGIS 248 (the statues of Antiochus in lines 3 5-6). IG ii 2 . 98 z for the Milesian Mcnesthcus;
for his family: Habicht 1976, 214: (b 10). Robert 1969: (b 67) for Mcnodorus. Morctti, IS Li 34 for
Arridacus. IG n 2 . 1236 (Eumolpids and Ceryces) with the restorations of Robert i960, 109 n. 3: (b
64). IDc'/os 1540— 1 (Athenians).

66 Vitr. De Arch, praef. v. 14.17; Polyb. xxvi.i.ii; Livy XLi.20.8; Strabo ix, p. 396; Wycherley
1978, 1 5 jff.: (b 207). Close to the Olympieum was found the Greek inscription of D. Cossutius P.f.
dues Romattus , probably the architect (IG it 2 . 4099). The Latin graffito of Cossutius , from Antioch
(ISyrie 823), probably refers to a later member of this family which was one of the Republic’s most
active in marble trade and marble work; cf. Rawson 1975: (h 21 i), who, however, is inclined to
accept identification with the architect.

67 Diod. Sic. xxix.29; Porph. FGrH 260F 48; Shore and Smith 1939, 33: (b 220) (death of
Cleopatra). On Eulaeus and Lenaeus: Morkholm 1961, 32-45: (e 134); Robert 1963, 71-6: (b 65).

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THE SELEUCI DS AND THEIR RIVALS

finally attacked in the fall of 1 70 or the early part of 1 69 he was ready. 68 He
counter-attacked and won a decisive victory near Pelusium.

The war was fought while the Romans were fighting Perseus; the
participants, despite their diplomatic efforts in Rome and despite the
attempts of several Greek states to mediate, were left to themselves.
Antiochus won control of almost all of Egypt except for the capital. He
could have had himself proclaimed king and pharaoh and many scholars
believed that this is what he did, but the view prevailing now is that he
rather tried to establish a protectorate of sorts in the name of Ptolemy VI
Philometor, his nephew, with himself as guardian. 69 Antiochus had a
pretext for this in 169 when the young king was in his hands, but the new
government in Alexandria under Comanus and Cineas had the other two
children of Ptolemy V, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II and Cleopatra,
proclaimed king and queen. Philometor, when he was left behind in
Antiochus’ withdrawal, joined them in Alexandria. Antiochus returned
with his army in 168 and laid siege to the capital. Under the circumstances
he could no longer claim that he was acting as Philometor’s protector,
but his ultimate plans are unknown, because suddenly the war became a
mere episode. On 22 June 168 the Romans defeated Perseus. Immedi-
ately afterwards the Roman ambassador, C. Popillius Laenas, appeared
before Antiochus in a suburb of Alexandria and delivered an ultimatum
to the king to withdraw all his forces from Egypt and Cyprus, which he
had just occupied. Antiochus complied immediately and avoided war
with Rome. His compliance, painful as it must have been, shows wisdom
and restraint and effectively disproves the allegations that he was
unbalanced.

Since the king was under no obligation to respect the integrity of
Egypt, it has rightly been said that the Roman demand in 168 added ‘a
new clause’ to the treaty of 188. 70 Popillius’ treatment of Antiochus, an
acknowledged ‘friend of the Roman people’ and a king of flawless loyalty
to Rome, is much the same as the Senate then chose to administer to its
two main allies, Eumenes and Rhodes (pp. 552, 537). Not only was it

68 II Macc. 4,21. Habicht 1976, 219: (b 10) (preparations in Egypt). On the eve of the war,
Antiochus, whose son (the future Antiochus V) had been born a few years earlier, had his nephew
and co-ruler killed (August 1 70) through his minister Andronicus, who in turn was executed a little
later; Habicht op. cit. 222. Outbreak of the war: for the earlier date Skeat 1961 : (b 222), followed by
Morkholm 1966,69 n. 2i:(E55). There are difficulties; early spring 169 may be correct: Walbank
1957-79, hi. 52 iff.: (b 38). On the course of the war: Otto 1934, 1-66: (e 156); Bickerman 1952: (e 7);
Volkmann P\V y ‘Ptolemaios’, 1705-10; Walbank op. cit. 32 iff., 3 5 2 ff . , 402ff.; Will 1982, 31 3-20: (a
40).

69 For the former view: Otto 1934, 5 iff.: (e 156), followed with modifications by Pedech 1964,
1 5 1: (b 26); Fraser 1972, 11.211 — 12: (e i 37). For the latter view: Bickerman 195 2, 402: (e 7); Aymard
1952, 8 5 ff . : (d 3); Morkholm 1966, 8off: (e 33); Walbank 1957-79, 111.358: (b 38); Moorcn 1979,
78 ff.: (e 31). See also Will 1982, 319: (a 40).

70 The sources are collected and discussed in Walbank 1957-79, 111.401-4: (b 38). Antiochus’
restraint: Tarn 1951, 192: (f 152). The ‘new clause’: Will 1982, 322: (a 40).

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345

extremely harsh, not only did it lack the tact previously observed by the
Senate in foreign relations, but none of the three powers had done
anything to deserve it. The Senate simply no longer bothered to conceal
the fact that Rome now had the power to dictate her will. The Roman
aristocracy, it is true, seldom favoured annexation, but their attitude,
often regarded as self-restriction, that is to say, a virtue, 71 included a
moral deficiency: unwillingness to assume the responsibility for the
conditions they had created. 72 Roman policy at this time was imperialis-
tic; it did not allow for meaningful negotiations, for mutual acknowl-
edgement of legitimate political goals, for compromise; there were
demands on one side and obedience on the other. 73

It has been argued that the ultimatum presented by Popillius broke
Antiochus’ spirit and that his subsequent actions became erratic. The
known facts, however, do not sustain this theory and it has rightly been
rejected by subsequent historians. 74 Antiochus accepted what was un-
avoidable and turned his energies to the eastern frontier of his kingdom,
where Roman interference was less likely than in the Mediterranean.
Whether this had been his intention before he was drawn into the
struggle with Egypt cannot be known. In 166, before he set out, he
organized a magnificent spectacle, a festival in Daphne, the charming
suburb of the capital, Antioch, in honour of Apollo, whose temple there
was renowned. In addition to the solemn procession and usual agonistic
features, which attracted large numbers of athletes and artists from far
away, there was a splendid military parade, similar in some ways to a
Roman triumph. Only a year before Aemilius Paullus, the victor of
Pydna, had held comparable festivities in Amphipolis; Antiochus’ festi-
val was obviously, at least in part, an answer to the Roman celebration,
perhaps an attempt to outdo it. The parade of the victorious army from
Egypt was both a demonstration of strength and an opportunity for
Antiochus to review the forces he would use in his eastern campaign. 75

71 This, at least, is the impression created by Badian 1968: (a 5); more strongly Werner 1972, 5 5 7:
(a 39): ‘Selbstbandigung und freiwillige Beschrankung seiner tatsachlichen Herrschafts-
moglichkciten.’

72 Bleickcn 1964, 183: (1 2): ‘Antinomic von tatsachlicher Herrschaft und Mangel an Willen zum
Rcgieren,’ ‘Abcr der ganze Jammer des Ostens war, dass die Romer dicse Sehnsucht nach
Obernahme moralischcr Herrscherpflichten nicht erfullten.’

73 On Roman imperialism: Badian 1968: (a 5); Werner 1972: (a 39); Veyne 1975: (a 38); Musti
1978: (b 22); Harris 1979: (a 21); Richardson 1979: (a 30); Sherwin-Whitc 1980: (a 33); North 1981:
(a 28); Gruen 1984: (a 20).

74 The theory is Otto’s (1934, 8off.: (e 156)), followed by Bengtson 1977, 493: (a 9), but duly
criticized by Pedcch 1964, 1 5 2 n. 278: (b 26); Morkholm 1966, 96: (e 33); Briscoe 1969, 5 1: (d 9). Cf.
Will 1982, 345: (a 40).

75 Polyb. xxx. 2 5-6. Diod. Sic. xxxi.16.2. See Morkholm 1966, 97-100: (e 33), and Walbank
1 95 7 — 79, 111.448-54: (b 38). The far-reaching theory of Tarn 1951, 192-5: (f 152), that what
Antiochus celebrated was in fact the victory of Eucratidas (according to Tarn, his cousin as well as
his general) over Demetrius of Bactria, has been refuted by Altheim 1947-8, n.2off.: (e 122), and
Narain 1957, 5 3ff.: (f 103). Different, but equally hazardous, speculations in Bunge 1976: (e ii).

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346 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

This was just the sort of event to make the Senate again suspicious of
Antiochus. Two Roman embassies, the first in 166, the second in 164,
were sent to explore his state of mind and his intentions. The Romans, it
seems, realized the danger that could arise from co-operation between
Antiochus and Eumenes, both victims of the Senate’s change in foreign
policy, and they were afraid that such a union might attract other powers,
such as Ariarathes of Cappadocia. The first embassy, however, led by Ti.
Sempronius Gracchus (the father of the famous tribunes), was disarmed
by the king’s charm and satisfied by his assurances; the second embassy
arrived in Syria about the time the king met his fate in Iran. 76

It is not for this chapter to describe Antiochus’ administration or
evaluate his foundation of cities, but one part of his internal policy must
be discussed: the conflict with his Jewish subjects.

(d) Antiochus and the Jews 77

The Jews came to regard Antiochus as the archetypal oppressor, ‘the
wicked root’, so wicked that Christians would call him the Antichrist. 78
Their condemnation derived from his desecration of the holy temple and
his persecution of Jews for their religion; the condemnation implies that
the king bears all the responsibility for these acts and that he alone is to
blame for them. The Jewish version has prevailed for centuries; the true
story, however, is different, much more complex and the result of special
circumstances. The king, certainly, had he understood the Jews, could
have avoided the conflict, but nevertheless was not the one who pro-
voked it. The Jewish side took the initiative in the events leading to
persecution and martyrdom and consequently must share the
responsibility.

76 Sources in AfRR i. 438 and 439-40 (where, however, the first embassy is erroneously dated to
165); Walbank 1957-79, III. 33; 454: (b 38). On Cappadocia: Morkholm 1966, 100-1: (e 33). For
Gracchus: Gelzer 1962—4, in. 166-7: (a 19); for the chronology of the second embassy sec II Macc.
11.34-8.

77 The principal sources: I Macc. (from which Jos. ^7x11.137—361 is almost exclusively derived),
a Greek translation of an Aramaic original, first century b.c.; II Macc. y in original Greek, composed
of (i) the account of Judas’ deeds, written by Jason of Cyrene in five books shortly before 1 5 2; (ii) an
abridgement of this with the addition of 1.1-ioa, 2.19—32 and 1 5 .37-9, published in 124 b.c.; (iii) a
revision of this, adding 1.1 ob-2.18 and changing the order of events here and there, to be dated
before a.d. 70. Habicht 1976, 169—77: (b 10). The book of Daniel (esp. ch. 1 1) repeatedly alludes to
the events; its author witnessed the profanation of the temple in December 168, but did not live to see
the temple redcdicatcd in December 165; he also witnessed the persecution of 167, but not its end
early in 163 nor Antiochus’ death late in 164. The book, therefore, was published c. 165. Bickerman
1937, 143—4: (e 86). A couple of documents, besides those inserted in Maccabees^ are preserved in Jos.
A J xii. 2 5 8— 264, discussed by Bickerman 1937, 1 88ff.: (e 87). Recent studies: Schiirer 1973, r 2 5 flf. : (e
1 1 2); Habicht 1974: (e ioo) and 1976: (b 10 and e ioi); Vidal-Naquet 1978: (e 1 18); Bringmann 1980
and 1983: (e 91 and 92) (all with copious bibliography).

78 I Macc. 1.10. Cyprian, ad V or tuna turn xi.i 15: immo in Antiocho antichrist us expressus .

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347

Since their return from exile centuries before, under the Achaemenids,
Ptolemies and, from the year zoo, Seleucids, Jews had been free to live in
accordance with their own law and religion. When Antiochus 111 con-
quered Palestine, he solemnly granted them the right to their own way of
life; 79 the Jewish subjects of his successor, Seleucus IV, appreciated the
peace and prosperity they enjoyed (p. 540). Antiochus IV changed this
idyllic picture when he revoked the privileges and prohibited the practice
of the Jewish religion. What caused such a dramatic change?

Earlier scholarship explained it as Antiochus’ alleged desire to
strengthen hellenism throughout the kingdom at the expense of tra-
ditional native cultures and customs. His motive was said to have been
the conviction that hellenism meant unification and that unification
would give the monarchy greater strength. 80 The primary basis for this
theory was I Macc. 1.4 1—3:

Moreover King Antiochus wrote to his whole kingdom, that all should be one
people, and everyone should leave his laws: so all the heathen agreed according
to the commandment of the king. Yea, many also of the Israelites consented to
his religion, and sacrificed unto idols, and profaned the sabbath (tr. the King
James Version).

More recent research has refuted this view. Such a policy, even if it had
not been unworkable, was simply alien to the way of thinking and acting
of Hellenistic kings and especially to the traditions of the Seleucids, who
(like the Achaemenids before them) had to deal with a great number of
native cultures, for which they had always shown the greatest respect.
Moreover, the theory that such a policy existed is not compatible with
the sources. The statement from I Maccabees quoted above is not just ‘a
manifest exaggeration’, 81 it is false in general and specifically for Judaea,
since the king was not the one who initiated the plan to hellenize the
Jews, but Jews themselves had put this demand before him. When
Antiochus granted their demand, he was unaware of what the conse-
quences of his concession could be.

The Jews themselves took the initiative to adapt their nation to a
Greek way of life. This fact is unequivocally attested in both 1 and II
Maccabees and their testimony deserves credence, since both are hostile to
Antiochus. 82 The story, in short, is this. In 1 74 Jason, the brother of the

79 See the documents issued by him, Jos. AJ xti. 158-144 and 145 146, both discussed by
Bickerman, the former in 1935: (e 8 5), the latter in 1946-8: (e 89).

80 This has long been the dominant theory, held by historians such as Bcvan, W’ilckcn, Meyer,
more recently Otto 1954, 83: (e 156); Tarn 1951, 186: (f i 3 2); Kiechlc 1963, 167-8: (e 28). Fora fair
evaluation and decisive criticism sec Tchcrikover 1961, 173-86: (e 1 1 3 ); Bringmann 1983, 99ft".: (e
92).

81 SoMorkholm 1966, 132 m 3 3 :(e 33); similarly Tcherikover 1961, 183 -4: (e 1 13); Hcngel 1975,

5i6ff.: (e 102). 82 II Macc. 4.4-* 3, with which I Macc. 1.11-13 agrees in all essential points.

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348 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

conservative high-priest Onias, appeared before the king. Jason was the
spokesman for those Jews who had been advocating hellenization. He
offered Antiochus a substantial sum of money if the king would appoint
him to his brother’s place, and he promised more if Antiochus would
permit him to transform Jerusalem into a Greek city, name it Antioch,
build a gymnasium, and institute a corps of youths as Greeks did, an
ephebate. The king granted all his requests and put Jason in charge of the
enrolment of citizens for the city of Antioch . 83 The new high-priest
swiftly carried out his plans; his ‘heilenistic reform’ was met by enthu-
siasm as well as resentment among the Jews.

Nothing indicates that it was Jason’s intention to change the Jewish
faith, but his opponents felt that his reforms affected Jewish religion as
well as their traditional way of life. The policy of segregation from the
outer world had, for centuries, facilitated (or rather made possible) the
preservation of that religion. To open up the gates to Hellenistic
manners was therefore considered a danger, perhaps even a mortal
danger, to the ancestral faith. In addition, there were other reasons for
divisiveness, the struggle for power between the different factions, the
inclination of some families towards the Ptolemies, of others towards the
ruling royal house , 84 and the contrasts between rich and poor, city and
country, priests and laymen. The men selected by Jason to be citizens of
Antioch on the soil of Jerusalem would become a new privileged class
within the nation.

Tension was already running high when, after a few years, Jason was
outmanoeuvred by a certain Menelaus, who offered the king a higher bid
for Jason’s post and secured it. As a consequence more radical reformers
seized power. Menelaus’ followers and their opponents clashed, and the
king had to intervene. The climax came when a rumour spread that
Antiochus, then campaigning in Egypt, had been killed in battle. Jason
seized his opportunity and invaded the country with an army recruited
from Nabataean Arabs, amongst whom he had lived while in exile. He
forced an entry into Jerusalem and tried to regain control of the city, but
finally, after heavy fighting, he was expelled . 85

Antiochus was returning from Egypt when he heard of these events.
He thought there was a rebellion and the Jews were using his preoccupa-

83 For the interpretation of II Macc. 4.9 and 19 sec Bickerman 1937, 59-65: (e 86), and, with
different conclusions, Tcherikover 1961, 161—9, 4 ° 4 “ 9 : ( E i> 5 )» followed by most scholars since;
Habicht 1976, 216-17: (b jo); Bringmann 1983, 83-4: (e 92).

84 The only factions in the sources are the Tobiads and the Oniads; bibliography in Habicht 1 976,
2 1 1 : (b j o). There must have been others. The Tobiad Hyrcanus, who feuded with his older brothers
and took his life after the accession of Antiochus IV, may have supported the house of Scleucus I V or
the Ptolemies.

85 II Macc. 4.23-9, 43-50. Menelaus also had Jason’s predecessor Onias killed through the same
royal minister who was held responsible for the murderof Antiochus’ nephew and co-ruler in 1 7o(n.
68). The battle in Jerusalem: II Macc. 5.5-7.

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THE SELEUCID MONARCHY, 187-162 B.C. 34 C)

tion with a major war to stab him in the back. 86 He attempted to suppress
the insurrection with punitive measures. He removed part of the treasure
of the temple, garrisoned Jerusalem and Mount Gerizim, the religious
centre of the Samaritans, and, shortly thereafter, by royal decree in the
autumn of 168, prohibited the practice of the Jewish religion and
demanded the worship of pagan gods. The temple was transformed into
a sanctuary of Zeus. 87 The great majority of Jews, it seems, obeyed the
king’s orders. Some who did not suffered death, among them several
who refused even to simulate compliance, when the opportunity was
offered by the authorities. There were martyrdoms, but the surviving
stories, however edifying and famous, are legendary. 88

Open resistance to the oppression came from two sides, from the
group of the ‘Pious’ (Hassidim), and from people living in the country-
side. The Hassidim, apparently influenced by intellectuals, were so pious
that they even refrained, in the beginning, from defending themselves on
a Sabbath. The resistance from the countryside was more pragmatic. The
men around Mattathias and his sons from Modein realized that, if the
Jewish faith was to have a chance to survive, religious scruples had to be
subordinated to the needs of the day. Led by Mattathias’ son Judas
Maccabaeus, they began a guerrilla war. Progress was slow but steady. 89
The Jewish rebels defeated royal troops in more than one skirmish, and
late in 165 even recaptured Jerusalem and the area of the temple. The
king’s garrison kept control of the citadel only, where the high-priest
Menelaus and all the Jews who were loyal to him and to the king took
refuge.

The royal government had taken the insurrection lightly in the
beginning, but now felt the need to change its policy. The king realized
that the persecution of Judaism, a measure he took against the supposed
insurrection, had in fact caused insurrection. Consequently, he took the
first step and withdrew the oppressive order. In a letter directed to
Menelaus he declared an amnesty for all Jews who put down their arms
before an appointed day. He also reaffirmed the principle that Jews
should be free to live in accordance with their own law. 90 The formula
included freedom of religion. It is clear that the king hoped to end
hostilities by this act. Judas and his followers, however, continued the

86 1 1 Mace. 5.11.

87 I Macc. i.2off.; II Macc. 5.1 iff. Bringmann 1980 and 1983: (E91 and 92) argues that Menelaus
suggested these measures to the king, for purely political reasons.

88 II Macc. 6.18-31, 7.1-42. For the late origin of ch. 7: Habicht 1976, 17 1: (b 10); for the
martyrdom of Eleazar (ch. 6) ibid. 173.

89 Sabbath: 1 Macc. 2.32-8, 41; II Macc. 6.1 1. The story of Mattathias (I Macc. 2) is suppressed in II
Macc., which is coo! towards the Maccabean or Hasmonean family. Etymology and meaning of
Judas’ surname remain disputed: Schiirer 1973, 138 n. 49: (e 112).

90 The king’s letter is preserved in II Macc. 1 1.27-32, discussed in Habicht 1976, 7-18: (e ioi), and
Bringmann 1983, 4off: (e 92).

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THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

war, because the king still backed the hated Menelaus. A large army, led
by the chancellor Lysias, marched towards Jerusalem in the summer of
1 64 to crush the rebellion. Judas soon had to negotiate and to accept most
of Lysias’ conditions. A few details were left to the discretion of the king,
but Antiochus died at this very moment and the decision passed to his
son, Antiochus, who succeeded him at the end of 164; the new king,
however, was only nine years old, so the decision was actually made by
Lysias, his guardian. This time, at the beginning of 163, the government
unconditionally and solemnly granted the Jews religious freedom and
the right to live as their ancestors had. 91 The relationship between the
crown and the nation that had existed from 200 to 168 was restored. In
order to show how serious its intentions were, the new government
sacrificed Menelaus. He was executed and replaced by Alcimus, who was
expected to be acceptable to orthodox Jews and, in fact, the Hassidim did
make their peace with him and with the king. The war for the God of
Israel was over.

(e) Antiochus in the easfi 1

In the spring of 165 King Antiochus began the campaign in the east from
which he was not to return. Before leaving he appointed his son
Antiochus co-ruler and the chancellor Lysias guardian of the boy.
Sources for the campaign are extremely meagre and modern theories on
the causes and aims of the expedition are therefore contradictory. There
is, however, agreement on one essential fact: some of the eastern satra-
pies needed to be reinforced, some that had been lost needed to be
recovered. Forty years before, the king’s father, Antiochus III, had made
a strong and successful effort to consolidate his authority throughout his
eastern dominions. His defeat at the hands of the Romans, however, had
undercut his power and shaken his prestige; it undoubtedly caused
repercussions in the east and encouraged those who wished to throw off
Seleucid rule.

That this is what actually happened can be at least partially corrobor-
ated from the scanty evidence. Iranian troops, numerous in the royal
army at Raphia in 217 and at Magnesia in 190, are absent at Daphne in
166. The satraps of Greaterand Lesser Armenia, Artaxias and Zariadres,
who had been appointed by Antiochus III, both assumed the title king

91 The document, IJ Macc. 11.22-6, refers to the death of the king as a very recent event.

92 Sources: Polyb. xxi.9; Diod. Sic. xxxi. 17a; App. Syr. 46.236, 66.349 and 352; Tac. His/, v.8.4-
5; Porphyr. FGrH 260F 38, 53, 56; I Macc. 6.1-16; II Macc. 1.10— 16, 9; Jos. A] xn.354— 361. Modem
works: Meyer 1921, 216-23: (1 26); Altheim 1947-8, 11.3 5-50: (e 122); Tarn 195 1, 2 1 3ff.: (f i 5 2);
Narain 1957, 5 3ff : (f 103); LeRidcr 1965, 311-21: (e 149); Morkholm 1966, 166-80: (e 33); Will

1982, 348-55: (a 40)-

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after 1 8 8 and henceforward acted as independent rulers. 93 The case of
Bactria is similar. King Euthydemus 1 had been forced to bow before
Antiochus III, who had then reinstated him. After 1 90, however, there is
no sign that any Bactrian ruler was a dependent of the Seleucid king.
Bactria and the adjacent satrapies, Sogdiana, Aria and Margiane, were
definitely lost to the Seleucids. The new realm was also safe from any
immediate Seleucid attack, since the Parthians had occupied land be-
tween the two. 94 Farther to the south, in Persia, the homeland of the
Achaemenids, a local dynasty of priests and princes had risen to power.
By the first years of the reign of Antiochus IV at the latest, these so-called
fratadara had won their independence from royal authority and the
control of at least part of Persis around Persepolis and Istakhr. 95 More to
the west, in the land of the Elamites, Antiochus the Great had encoun-
tered stiff resistance, which led him to his death in 187; his misfortune
caused (or strengthened) the drive for independence in Elymais. 96

Antiochus’ expedition has to be viewed against the background of a
disintegrating empire. What his ultimate goals were is hard to say and a
matter of controversy. Tarn’s opinion that the king intended to restore
Alexander’s empire by recovering Parthia, Bactria and India has been
refuted by subsequent scholars as excessive and utopian. 97 Closer to the
truth seems to be the view that he wanted to protect western Iran,
endangered by the Parthians and by local uprisings, and to recover lost
territory where he could, 98 but a definite answer, if at all possible, can
only come from an assessment of the king’s actions before his premature
death.

First, he invaded Greater Armenia and defeated Artaxias, who was left
on the throne as a vassal king. 99 Several passages of the elder Pliny,
though difficult to interpret, seem to show that Antiochus also cam-
paigned in the area of the Persian Gulf, where he refounded a colony of

93 Strabo xi. pp. 5 28, 5 3 1; Polyb. xxv.2. 1 2, xxxi. 16; Diod. Sic. x.xxi. 1 7a, 27a; Plut. Luc. 31.3-4. It
may be more than coincidence that the name of Artaxias’ father was Zariadrcs (Zariatr), as revealed
by two Aramaic inscriptions: Dupont-Sommcr 1946-8: (B49). Artaxias naming his capital Artaxata
shows his self-esteem. Some recently found Greek inscriptions show that Hellenistic influence in
Armenia was already considerable around 200: Habicht 1953: (e i 39); Trcvcr 193 3, 1 13-46: (e 172)
(which I have not seen).

94 For Bactria in this period see, besides the major works of Tarn 1951: (p x 5 2) and Narain 1957: (f
103); Simonctta 1958, 1 5 4^”.: (f 144); Will 1982, 330-2: (a 40). For the Parthian kingdom: Dcbcvoisc
1938: (e 132); Junge, P W ‘Parthia’; for the sequence and genealogy of the earlier kings: Wolski 1962:
(e 178). See further LeRider 1965, 31 iff.: (e 149).

95 Stichl 1959: (e 170); Schmitt 1964, 46-50: (e 50).

96 Stichl 1956, 1 3ff., and 1959, 375 * 379: (e 1 14 and 170); LeRider 1965, 349^".: (e 149); Will 1982,

35 V- ( A 40). 97 See n. 75.

98 So Stiehl 1959, 375ff.: (e i 70), and Morkholm 1966, i66ff: (b 33), both emphasize the attempt
to strengthen royal authority in Elymais and Persis. More generally: Will 1982, 352: (a 40),
‘reaffirmer la presence seleucidc’ (in Iran).

99 The fate of Zariadrcs was probably similar; Meyer 1921, 217: (1 26).

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3 5 2 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

Alexander under the name Antioch on the site of the later Spasinu
Charax. The victories of Numenius over the Persians, recorded by the
same writer, may well belong to the same or another, perhaps simulta-
neous, expedition. 100 The king’s presence, probably in 164, in Ecbatana
in Media can be inferred from the renaming of the city ‘Epiphania’ in his
honour; one source, in fact, does report that he marched from Persepolis
to Ecbatana. It is also attested that he attempted to raise money from the
temple of Nanaia in Elymais, but had to retreat before the opposition of
the natives. Soon afterwards, the king fell ill and died in the autumn of
164 in Tabae in Paraetacene. 101

The facts so far related show that Antiochus regained control of
Armenia and that he attempted to regain lost territories in Persis and
Elymais. The key question, however, is whether he planned to invade
Parthia or not. Many historians have assumed that Parthia was his target;
their assumption is based on the king’s itinerary and a passage in Tacitus;
others disagree. 102 His itinerary seems not to furnish any clues, at least as
long as Tabae has not been located. The answer, therefore, must be
sought in the following passage of Tacitus:

After the Macedonians gained supremacy, King Antiochus endeavoured to
abolish Jewish superstition and to introduce Greek civilization; the war with the
Parthians, however, prevented his improving this basest of all peoples; for it was
exactly at that time that Arsaces had revolted. Later on, since the power of
Macedon had waned, the Parthians were not yet come to their strength, and the
Romans were faraway, the Jews selected their own kings (His/, v. 8.4-5, tr. C. H.
Moore).

Some scholars identify this Antiochus as Antiochus VII, who cap-
tured Jerusalem in 134 and lost his life during a campaign against the
Parthians in 129; some, though they concede that the sentence about
Jewish superstition and Greek civilization can fit only Antiochus IV,
maintain that the allusion to a Parthian war fits only Antiochus VII; but
the king in question, it is clear, is one and the same throughout, that is,

100 Plin. HN VI. 1 38-139, 147: Antioch, for the coinage of which sec Morkholm 1970: (b i 14).
Numenius: Plin. HN vi.i 5 2. Opinion is divided whether he served Antiochus III or Antiochus IV;
several scholars are undecided: LcRider 1965, 303, 310: (e 149).

101 Morkholm 1966, 1 1 7, 17 1-2 n. 22: (e 3 3)(Epiphania). Ecbatana: II Macc. 9.2-3. The account is
not too reliable, and ch. 9, in fact, inventsa fictitious letter of the king: Habicht 1976, 3— 7 :(e tot); but
the accuracy of the reported itinerary need not be doubted. Temple of Nanaia: Polyb. xxxr.9. 1-2;
Porph. FGrH 260 f j 3. Different accounts of other writers are discussed by Holleaux 1916: (e 23).
See also Mendels 1981: (e 30). Tabae has not been located, but cannot have been far from Gabae
(modern Ispahan): Weissbach, PIP', ‘Tabai’; Treidler, P IP', ‘Paraitakenc’.

102 Most scholars agree that Parthia was his target. Morkholm 1966, 176-7: (e 33), however,
argues that Parthian aggression began only later(which is true for Media). Antiochus could have had
other reasons than Parthian aggression for waging war (see below).

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353

Antiochus IV. 103 The Tacitus passage derives ultimately from either
Polybius or Poseidonius; 104 it attests to a war between Antiochus IV and
the Parthians — Antiochus, therefore, may be assumed to have intended
to invade Parthia.

In support of this view it has been pointed out that what is known
about his campaign closely resembles the famous ‘Anabasis’ of his father,
who had succeeded in regaining the Parthian king’s formal recognition
of his supremacy. 105 The Parthian king Mithridates I (Arsaces V), who
succeeded his brother Phraates I (Arsaces IV) c. 171, was the first
Parthian monarch to strike coins and the coins bore his own portrait, 106
which proves that he considered himself a sovereign ruler and therefore
implies the cancellation of the treaty that his father had concluded with
Antiochus III. This, then, may well be the ‘revolt’ of which Tacitus is
speaking and which would have prompted Antiochus Epiphanes’ reac-
tion. Antiochus’ ultimate goal, it seems, was the subjugation of the
Parthians, but he died before hostilities began and his army was soon led
home.

The king died in his prime. He could not accomplish what he intended
and it is idle to speculate how he would have fared against the Parthians,
had he lived longer. It is, however, worth noting that the Parthians, so far
as is known, did not attack Seleucid territory (p. 363) for more than
fifteen years to come, and it need not be doubted that - Parthia aside - the
presence of the king and his army in the eastern satrapies encouraged
those loyal to the dynasty. Antiochus, on the whole, was an able
monarch, committed to his duties. His only serious mistake had been his
misjudgement of the situation in Judaea, but as soon as he realized that
his policy was a failure, he changed it. The Romans denied him a major
success in the south; death prevented him from trying his strength in the
east.

(f) Antiochus IV

The king was succeeded by his son Antiochus V Eupator, who was
under the tutelage of the chancellor Lysias. Epiphanes is said to have
changed this arrangement shortly before he died by substituting a certain

103 As argued by Kolbe 1935, 56-7: (e 103) (followed by Jacoby ad P'GrH 260 f 5 5-7); Altheim
1947-8, 11.36: (e 1 22); LcRider 1965, 3 1 2: (e 149); and Will 1982, 354: (a 40). Antiochus VII, on the
other hand, was able to impose his conditions on the jews, and several years before his Parthian
campaign.

104 Meyer 1921, 268 n. 3:(t 26). Jacoby, /oc. r/V. (n. 103). See also Jacoby’s remarks on Poseidonius,
PGrH 87 f 69 and 109.

105 Altheim 1947-8, n.36ff.: (e 122). For Antiochus 111 see Holleaux 1930, 138-43: (d 34);

Herzfeld 1932, 37-8: (b 171). 106 LcRider 1965, 311-23: (e 149).

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Philippus, who was with him in the east, for Lysias. Most scholars have
accepted the story of this substitution, though some have doubted it; for
good reasons, since the young Antiochus was in Lysias’ hands. Philippus
probably advanced the claim as a pretext for seizing power. 107 The news
about Philippus reached Lysias when he seemed to be on the verge of
wiping out the Jewish rebels. It forced him to compromise and the high-
priest Menelaus was made the scapegoat (p. 350). Lysias then took the
field against Philippus, defeated him, and had him executed. 108 King and
guardian seemed safe.

Trouble, however, lay ahead for both of them, first from the still
malignant Roman Senate, and second from the king’s cousin Demetrius,
who had been deprived of the throne by Antiochus’ usurpation in 1 75. A
Roman embassy had come to see Epiphanes (p. 346) when he was in the
east. On the way to Antioch the ambassadors contacted the Maccabean
party that was negotiating with Lysias in the autumn of 1 64, wrote them a
short letter, and promised them their advice. Moreover, they ‘agreed’ to
some concessions Lysias had already made, 109 which was tantamount to
supporting rebellious subjects of a king who was an ‘ally and friend’ of
Rome. Strange as their conduct was, it is not unique; that same year C.
Sulpicius in Sardis invited accusations against King Eumenes, another
‘ally and friend’ of Rome. 110 About a year later another Roman embassy,
headed by Cn. Octavius, arrived at Antioch to inspect matters under the
new regime. When Octavius discovered that the king, in violation of the
treaty of Apamea, possessed a fleet and elephants, he had the ships burnt
and the animals hamstrung. The Romans must have known about these
violations all along and they had not cared, so it is hard to say what caused
the Senate to enforce the letter of the old treaty at this time. Anyway,
these actions caused an uproar in the city of Laodicea and Octavius was
murdered by a certain Leptines (early 162). 111

The murder put Lysias in a difficult position with Rome; his relations

107 I Macc . 6.14, 55; Jos. AJ xii. 360. Accepted by Meyer 1921, 221 : (1 26); Morkholm 1966, 1 72: (e
33); Schiircr 1973, 166: (e 1 12) and Will 1982, 353: (a 40). Disputed by Niesc 1910, 218 n. 6: (d 46);
Be van 1950, 5 14: (e 8 3); Habicht 1976, 248—9: (b 10); and Cruen 1976, 79-80: (e 20): Antiochus IV
‘would not likely give incentive for chaos after his death’.

,oe I Macc . 6.63; II Macc. 9.29; Jos. ^yxn.386. I Macc. is silent about Philippus’ fate; the second
says he escaped to Egypt; Josephus has him executed. Josephus is probably correct and the
statement of II Macc. erroneous, owing to a confusion between Philippus and Onias, the son of the
Jewish high-priest Onias III: Bouche-Lcclerq 1913, 310 n. 2: (e 8); Habicht 1976, 249: (b 10).

109 II Macc. 1 1 .34— 7; Habicht 1976, 7ff.: (e 101), where earlier opinions are cited, including those
which dismiss the letter as a forgery; Paltiel 1982, 252: (e 37); Bringmann 1983, 47!!.: (e 92).

1,0 Above p. 334. The present writer cannot agree with the attempt of Gruen 1976, 78: (e 20), and
1984, 581: (a 20), to belittle the importance of this and to deny, in general, that Roman policy at this
time was often malignant.

111 The career and embassy of Octavius: Miinzer, P IF, ‘Octavius’ 1810-14. See further the decree
of Argos in his honour, BCH 81 (1957) 181-202, and, for the incident in question, P. Here. 1044, col.
9 iff., as discussed by I. Gallo, Frammenti Biografici da Papiri ( Rome 1980) 1 1 5 — 17.

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355

with the new king of Cappadocia, Ariarathes V, were tense because
Lysias had executed Ariarathes’ mother, a Seleucid princess, and sister.
The chancellor did what he could to conciliate both Rome and
Ariarathes. He sent an embassy to Rome to offer apologies and returned
the bones of Antiochis and her daughter to Cappadocia, but he was
unpopular in Syria 112 and his position remained shaky. As soon as a
strong pretender appeared, Lysias and his protege, the boy-king
Antiochus, were helpless.

Late in 162 a pretender arrived. Demetrius, the son of Seleucus IV, had
spent at least sixteen years as a hostage in Rome. It is significant that he
had been kept in Rome long after the indemnity demanded by the treaty
of 188 had been paid off (in 173, p. 342), and it is easy to speculate that the
Senate had kept him partly in connivance with Antiochus, who had
seized the throne that rightfully belonged to Demetrius, partly as a
weapon that could be used against Antiochus, should he fail to satisfy the
wishes of Rome. 113 After Antiochus’ death Demetrius approached the
Senate, argued that it was absurd to hold him hostage for Antiochus’
children, and demanded his restoration to the throne of his father. The
Senate refused, as Polybius states, because they assumed that it would be
easier to deal with an under-aged king and his guardian than with a full-
grown king. Cn. Octavius was sent out to enforce the treaty of 188. After
his murder, Demetrius, now twenty-three years old, approached the
Senate once more, against the advice of Polybius, this time only with the
request that he be released, but was rebuked again. 1,4 Shortly thereafter,
he escaped with the help of paternal friends, of Polybius and an ambassa-
dor of Ptolemy VI, perhaps also with the tacit approval of influential
Romans. By the time his escape was discovered it was too late for pursuit.
The Senate confined itself to sending another embassy to the east, headed
by Ti. Gracchus, to look into conditions in Greece, Asia, and especially
Syria. 115

On his way home Demetrius seems to have avoided the territory of
Eumenes. From a port belonging to the Lycian Confederacy, which had
become independent in 167, he sent a message to Rome saying that his

112 Pdyb. xxxi. 7. 2-4. The circumstances under which the ladies left Cappadocia arc not known,
but may have been connected with the death of Ariarathes IV: Breglia Pulci Doria 1978, 121-2: (h
128). For Queen Antiochis see n. 9. Lysias: Polvb. xxxi. 8. 6, 12.4.

1.3 Will 1982, 322: (a 40), suggests that the ultimatum transmitted by Popillius in 168 may have
contained an allusion to Demetrius and his rights.

1.4 Polyb. xxxi. 2 with Walbank 1957-79, 111.463-6: (b 38); App. Sjr. 46.238 (first attempt); Polyb.
xxxi. 1 1; App. Sjr. 47.241-2; Just. Epit. xxxiv.3.8. Polybius advised him ‘not to stumble twice on
the same stone’.

1.5 Polyb. xxxi. 1 1 — 1 5 , eyewitness and personal friend of several key persons involved; Gclzcr
1962-4, hi. 16 1-4: (a 19). It has often been suggested that the Scipios, perhaps also the Acmilii,
favoured, or tolerated, Demetrius’ escape; for instance Badian 1958, 108: (a 3). Sceptical is Gruen
1984, 665 n. 246: (a 20). Embassy of Gracchus: Polyb. xxxi.23.

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THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

target was not his cousin. King Antiochus V, but the chancellor Lysias,
who had failed to avenge the murder of Octavius. That fooled no one
and, in fact, as soon as Demetrius had landed in Syrian Tripolis, he
proclaimed himself king, seized Apamea, the military capital of the
kingdom, and marched on Antioch. Lysias and Antiochus were cap-
tured. Demetrius had them executed; before the end of 162 he was
acknowledged as king throughout the empire. 116

III. THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 1 62— 129 B.C.

(a) Demetrius P 1 7

From the day of his accession Demetrius faced tremendous problems.
Within his realm were men loyal to the house of Antiochus or men who at
least used such a pretext to further their ambitions. The most powerful
was the Milesian Timarchus, satrap of Media and perhaps of Babylonia as
well; he was aided by his brother Heraclides, once director of the king’s
finances. 118 Timarchus wasted no time in proclaiming himself, on his
coins, ‘Timarchus the Great King’. He annexed adjacent territories and
concluded an alliance with Artaxias of Armenia, who now reappears as
an independent ruler. 119 Timarchus and his brother had been sent to
Rome more than once as ambassadors and had the support of many
Roman senators, gained, reputedly, through bribery. 120 Timarchus, or

1,6 Zon. ix. 25. 6-8; I Macc. 7.1-4; II Macc. 14. 1-2; App. Syr. 47.242. Chronology: Volkmann
1925, 389: (b 143); Schiircr 1973, 129-30: (e 112).

117 Principal sources: Polyb. 111.5.2-3, xxxi.33, xxxn.2-3, 10-11, xxxin.6, 18-19; Diod. Sic.
xxxi. 19. 19a, 27a, 28-30, 32.32a, 36.40a. The only coherent narratives surviving come from Jewish
authors and focus on Syria and Palestine: I Macc. 7-10; 11 Macc. 14-1 5 (ending with Nicanor’s defeat
in 161); Jos. AJ xii. 389— xni. 62. References to their works will only be given in special cases.
Josephus from book xm on, close as he remains to I Macc., has alsoconsulted another well-informed
source, either Nicolaus or Strabo, that ultimately derives from Poseidonius; Schurcr 1973, 21-2,
with bibliography: (e i i 2). The other literary sources consist of scattered references, mainly App.
Syr. 47.243—244, 67.3 54— 3 5 5, 70.367; Livy, Per. xlvi-xlviii; Strabo xm, p. 624; Porph. FGrH 2 60 f
32.14; Just. Epii. xxxiv. 1—2, xxxv. 1-2; Zon. ix. 24.8-9, 25.8.

1,8 Timarchus: Olshausen 1974, 216-17: (1 29). Heraclides: ibid. 212—13. In Miletus the brothers
dedicated the bouleuterion (meeting place of the Council) to King Antiochus IV: Milet 1.2, nos. 1-2;
Tuchelt 1975: (b 204). Some 250 years later, a Milesian claimed descendancy from ‘King Timarchus’:
Hommel 1976: (e 144). The Milesian Eirenias also had influence with Antiochus IV: Herrmann
1965: (e 142). On the other hand, the party of Demetrius in Miletus is represented by Apollonius and
by his sons Menestheus, Meleager and Apollonius, who are called generals of Demetrius in an
epigram from Miletus (Peek, GV 1 1286). All four appear repeatedly in Polybius; Menestheus was
honoured by the Athenians (n. 65). Apollonius was governor of Coele Syria under Demetrius II (I
Macc. 10.69).

119 Timarchus’ coins, including a gold stater, are rare; most of them were melted down by
Demetrius. Timarchus seems to have minted coins in Ecbatana and Seleuceia on the Tigris: Jenkins
1951, iff.: (b 99); LeRider 1965, 332-4: (e 149); Houghton 1979: (e 25). For military operations:
Diod. Sic. xx.x1.27a; for Artaxias, p. 351.

120 Harris 1979, 90: (a 21), observes that this is the first attested instance of large-scale bribery of
senators.

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THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 162-129 B.C.

357

an Elamite dynast by the name of Hycnapses, may have controlled Susa
for a part of 162/1. 121 Ptolemy, satrap of Commagene beyond the
Euphrates, defected at the same time 122 and the Maccabees, now striving
for the independence of J udaea, took up arms against all who were loyal
to the high-priest and the king.

In addition, there were enormous external difficulties, the greatest of
which was the hostility Demetrius had provoked in Rome by escaping
and by pretending in the east that he had the Senate’s approval. The
Senate’s hostility, once it became known, strengthened all forces that
were opposed or disloyal to Demetrius. The king himself immediately
felt isolated. The situation was worse than when Seleucus IV became
king. Demetrius could not hope for any help from Eumenes, who had
been active in placing Antiochus on the throne Demetrius had now
reclaimed, nor from Cappadocia, which had been close to Eumenes for
twenty-five years.

Demetrius worked hard to overcome these difficulties. He tried to
placate the Senate; through Menochares he contacted first Ti. Gracchus,
then the Senate, but the results were not reassuring. 123 He offered the
hand of his sister Laodice, the widow of King Perseus, to his neighbour
and cousin, the newly crowned Ariarathes V of Cappadocia, in an
attempt to win his friendship. Ariarathes must have been flattered, but
the Romans on the spot pressured him to decline and he then added insult
to injury by making the affair public in Rome. 124 Demetrius did succeed
with another project: he married offNysa, daughter of Antiochus IV, to
King Pharnaces of Pontus, but Pharnaces, himself isolated and rather
weak after his defeat in 179 (p. 329), was little help. 125

Demetrius had more success within his kingdom. In Judaea his
troops, previously defeated, were finally victorious and seemed about to
suppress the rebellion. 120 Much more important, however, was his swift
recovery of the eastern satrapies. Timarchus had obtained a decree from

121 Suggested by LeRider 1965, 86 nos. 65, 346-7: (e 149), because of a coin with the legend ‘King
Hycnapses’, minted in Susa. The alternative date c. 150 is perhaps more likely.

122 Diod. Sic. xxxi. 19a. More generally xxxi.z7a: ‘some of his own satraps became disloyal’.

123 Polyb. xxxi. 33. He won the personal support of Ti. Gracchus. Demetrius’ gift of grain to
Rhodes (Diod. Sic. xxxi. 36), where Menochares and Gracchus met, may have been promised or
delivered on this occasion. On the embassy to Rome, p. 358.

124 Diod. Sic. xxxi. 28 attests that it was pressure by, or regard for, Rome that made Ariarathes
turn down the offer; Just. Epit. xxxv.1.2. Gruen 1976: (e 20) unconvincingly argues that there was
no pressure. The negotiations belong to winter 161/60, since Ariarathes’ embassy was in Rome
before autumn 160.

125 The marriage is mentioned, as a fairly recent event, in the Athenian decree, I Delos 1497 bis, of
160/59, now firmly dated: bibliography in Hopp 1977, 4 n. 8 : (e 60). The context makes it clear that
Nysa was the daughter of Antiochus IV, not of Antiochus III or his eldest son, Antiochus:
Morkholm 1966, 60: (e 55).

126 Judas defeated Nicanor in the battle of Adasa, but soon he lost a battle and his life against
Bacchides (autumn 1 6 1 ): Meyer 1921, 256-52: (1 26); Schiirer 1973, 168-75: (e 112).

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the Senate that he was king as far as the Romans were concerned. 127
Although this was far from official recognition, it was tantamount to an
assertion that Rome did not recognize Demetrius and was, therefore,
injurious to his cause. Encouraged by this, Timarchus invaded Mesopo-
tamia with a large army and reached Seleuceia-Zeugma, where he
planned to cross the Euphrates and invade Syria, but he was defeated and
killed by Demetrius, in 1 6 1 or 160. This victory enabled the king to
recover the upper satrapies. In Babylonia he was hailed as ‘Saviour’
(Soter) and the epithet became part of his royal title. 128

Demetrius’ main concern remained the unsettled relations with Rome.
He had approached the Roman ambassadors through Menochares and
had been encouraged by Gracchus’ reaction, 129 so he now sent
Menochares to Rome. Menochares was admitted to the Senate chamber
early in 159, some time after Ariarathes’ envoys had been praised there
for announcing the king’s rebuttal of Demetrius. Menochares offered
Rome a crown of 10,000 gold staters, said to be a token of gratitude for
the hospitality shown Demetrius while he was there. He had also
brought those responsible for the murder of Octavius. The senators were
divided on how to respond; in the end they accepted the gift, though not
the men extradited by the king, and decreed that the king would find
Rome amenable if he complied with the Senate’s wishes (these, however,
were not specified). 130 Whether this response implied the formal recogni-
tion of Demetrius as king has been debated, but this is not the crucial
issue, since Demetrius did not need Roman recognition to be king. The
Senate, for this reason, did not commit itself; instead, it announced that
Demetrius would be tolerated as long as he was obedient. This was all but
a declaration that Rome considered itself Demetrius’ master; moreover,
insofar as the decree seemed to confer some sort of recognition, it was
dishonest, because a short time before, in 161, at the request of envoys
from Judas Maccabaeus, the Senate had granted an alliance to Demetrius’

127 Diod. Sic. xxxi. 27a, where the wording is slightly corrupt but the meaning not in doubt.
Gruen 1976, 85 : (e 20), whose view, however, that the decree ‘was no more than a polite formality’ —
or an ‘innocuous statement’, 1984, 45: (a 20) — seems unrealistic. The text has Timarchus coming to
Rome in person, certainly a mistake: Meyer 1921, 240 n. 3: (1 26). Perhaps He raclides approached the
Senate on his behalf: Will 1982, 368: (a 40).

128 A cuneiform tablet from Babylon, dated 14 May 1 61, mentions Demetrius as king and seems to
presuppose his victory: Parker and Dubberstein 1956, 23: (b 214). Forcoins minted after the victory
see Kiithmann 1954, 4-5: (b 109). Demetrius as ‘Saviour’: App, Syr. 47.242.

129 Polyb. xxxi. 3 3.2-4. Menochares seems to be the man who received a statue in Delos as one of
the ‘first friends’ of King Demetrius in charge of his correspondence, I Delos 1543. He seems also to
be mentioned in PHerc. 1044, fr. 10.2-3, where Cronert restored [ov]\v(x<*p 7 } v - This violates the
syllabic division, and the second letter is, in fact, omicron: Capasso 1976, 55: (1 3). Since King
Demetrius himself appears in line 1, the restoration [M 7 }]\voxap 7 jv is compelling.

130 Polyb. xxxii. 2— 3; Diod. Sic. xxxi. 29.30; App. Syr. 47.243; Zon. ix.25.8. Both Polybius and
Diodorus quote the main sentence as rtv^trat twv <f>i\av 9 pu)iru)v Arj^rptos, (av to Itcavov rroiy ry
ouyKXrfTip Kara Ttjv ttjs &PXVS (£ovolav.

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THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 162-129 B.C. 359

Jewish subjects. This act, whatever its actual or potential effects, was
incompatible with normal relations between Rome and the Seleucid
kingdom. 131

Demetrius now knew that he could expect no support from Rome, but
Cappadocia soon seemed to present an opportunity to improve his
position and take vengeance on Ariarathes. King Ariarathes IV had been
married to Antiochis. The queen is said to have believed she was barren
and so had faked the birth of two boys, Ariarathes and Orophernes; later,
however, she did give birth to Mithridates. When he was born she
revealed the truth, the false princes were sent abroad, Mithridates took
the dynastic name Ariarathes, and in 163 succeeded his father. The
supposedly false prince Ariarathes disappears from history, but his
brother Orophernes claimed the throne. The truth behind this sensa-
tional story cannot be known, but Orophernes may well have been, in
fact, a genuine son of the former king. It was undisputed that he was born
before Ariarathes V. 132 In any case Demetrius stepped in and supported
him. In 159/8 Ariarathes was driven out of the country. 133

In the summer of 1 5 8 he went to Rome and asked for help. He was kept
waiting for a long time, during which he courted individual senators, as
did, and with greater success, the envoys of Orophernes and Demetrius.
Eventually, in 157, the Senate decreed that Cappadocia be divided
between the two rivals. Orophernes, it seems, refused to comply, but
Ariarathes now received active support from Attalus, the new king of
Pergamum, and in 156 Orophernes, already unpopular at home, was
defeated and Ariarathes reinstated by Pergamene forces. Demetrius,
apparently, had not protected Orophernes, though he did give him
asylum in his capital.

It is perhaps more than coincidence that just at that time (156) the
territory of Attalus was invaded by another of his enemies, King Prusias

131 l Mace. 8. 17-30; Jos. A J xn.41 5-419 (a different text), xiv.233 (letter of C. Fannius, cos. 161,
on behalf of the Jewish envoys); II Macc. 4.1 1; Just. Epit. xxxvi.3.39. Sec Meyer 1921, 246-7: (1 26);
recently Giovannini and Miillcr 1971, 166-71: (e 98); Fischer 1974: (e 94); Timpe 1974: (e j 16);
Gauger 1977, 153-328: (b 9); Vidal-Naquct 1978, 859-60: (u 118); Gruen 1984, 748ff.: (a 20).
Problems abound, but the fact that a treaty was concluded in 1 6 1 is beyond doubt; Gauger’s criticism
of the sources is excessive.

132 Diod. Sic. xxxi. 19.6-8 (a shorter and slightly different version in Zon. ix.24.8), discussed by
Breglia Pulcia Doria 1978: (e 128). It is obvious that the story reflects what Ariarathes V wanted
known.

133 Demetrius was promised 1,000 talents for his aid by Orophernes (App. Syr. 47.244, with
whom Diod. Sic. xxxi.32 is in agreement) and received at once 600 and a crown of 70 talents.
Orophernes set aside a sum of 400 talents as a cash reserve in the temple of Athena in Pricne. While
chronology is uncertain, Demetrius would hardly have taken any serious action before his envoys
returned from Rome; 160, therefore, as advocated by Hansen 1971, 125: (e 57), is unsuitable. On the
other hand, it was Attalus who counteracted the expulsion of Ariarathes, Diod. Sic. xxxi.3za, where
the name Eumenes is a mistake; see Hopp 1977, 79 n. 1 10: (e 60). Since Eumencs died in 1 58 (n. 34),
Demetrius’ invasion of Cappadocia may be dated to 158.

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THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

II of Bithynia. The causes of the war are unknown, but for years Prusias
had been complaining to Rome that Eumenes and Attalus were trying to
regain some control of Galatia, despite the Senate’s declaration in 166
that Galatia was to be free. Nor is the reason Prusias took up arms at that
particular moment known. It could have been the opportunity presented
by the involvement of Pergamene forces in Cappadocia; it could have
been a bribe offered by Demetrius. In any event, a battle was fought,
Attalus’ forces were defeated, and a war began that lasted for two
years. 134 Both sides presented theircase before the Senate, which, in turn,
intervened with no less than four embassies. In 155, after a treacherous
assault that violated a truce and affected Roman envoys as well as
Attalus, Prusias succeeded in driving his enemy into the capital, but was
unable to take Pergamum. He ravaged the sanctuaries outside the city: of
Athena Nikephoros, a memorial of his father’s defeat in 1 83 (p. 328), and
Asclepius, from which he looted the famous statue of the god, a work of
the Athenian Phyromachus (n. 17), and other objects.

Having been repelled from the harbour-town of Elaea by Attalus’
kinsman Sosander, he turned homeward and ravaged the territory of
Attalus and the cities under his protection. During the following winter
Attalus prepared for a major counter-attack; reinforcements came from
Ariarathes V and from the Pontic king Mithridates IV who, sometime
after 159, had succeeded his brother Pharnaces. 135 Roman intervention
prevented the resumption of hostilities in the spring of 154, but Prusias’
intransigence caused the Romans to terminate their friendship with him.
Prusias, now influenced by Roman pressure and the threat from a large
fleet, to which Rhodes, Cyzicus and others had contributed, finally
yielded. No territory changed hands, but Prusias had to turn over twenty
battleships, restore whatever he had taken, and pay indemnities to
Attalus and a number of Greek cities. In many ways the war resembles
the earlier one between Eumenes and Pharnaces (p. 328): the reaction of
the Senate was slow and reserved, a major counter-attack against the
aggressor was curtailed by Rome, and the aggressor only minimally
punished. Rome had no intention of weakening the Attalids’ rival.

There was a sequel to this war which had its origins in the quarrel in
Cappadocia. Orophernes had deposited 400 talents in Priene (n. 1 3 3), but
after he had been expelled, Ariarathes claimed the money as a possession
of the kingdom. The Prienians refused. Orophernes, it seems, had lived
in Priene when he was in exile from the court, and later rewarded the city,

134 Prusias’ complaints: Habicht 1957, PIP', ‘Prusias’, 1 1 1 3-15. Sources for the war: ibid. mtff.
Recent bibliography: Vitucci 1953, 75-82: (e 176); Habicht 1956, 101-10: (e 56): Polyb. xxxn.15
belongs to book xxxm, between chs. 1 ai^d 7. Hopp 1977, 74-9: (e 60). The route of Prusias’ retreat
has been reconstructed bv Robert 1937, 111-18: (e 162).

135 Mithridates made a dedication on the Capitol in Rome (C/JL i 2 . 730); Mcllor 1978,525-700. 5:
(b 54). For the date (not earlier than 160/59) see n. 125.

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THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 162-129 B.C.

361

which in turn endured hardship out of loyalty to him. 136 Priene was
attacked, its territory ravaged by the forces of both Ariarathes and
Attalus, who bore a personal grudge against the city. Priene sought help
from Rhodes, to no avail, and then from Rome. Enough is preserved of a
decree of the Senate, inscribed on the temple of Athena in Priene, to show
that Rome did intervene; the magistrate-in-charge was instructed to
write to both kings and the Prienians were finally able to return the
money to Orophernes, their benefactor. 137

The events of 1 57-1 54 in Cappadocia and Asia undoubtedly dimin-
ished the prestige of Demetrius; moreover, his personality showed more
and more characteristics that made him unpopular. He did not, as
Antiochus IV had done, reach out to his subjects or include them in royal
spectacles; he preferred seclusion and was reputed to be a drunkard. How
serious his interest in Epicurean philosophy was, is hard to say, but it
certainly did nothing for his image among his subjects. 138 The people of
Antioch hated the king for his harshness. Orophernes was able to stir
them into a major uprising, in an attempt to win the throne of his cousin
for himself. Demetrius suppressed the rebellion with measures which
made him look even worse in the eyes of many and did not prevent the
Antiochenes from rebelling again. 139 Worst of all, he made a serious
political mistake. With Rome already hostile and Attalus and Ariarathes
his enemies, he now antagonized Ptolemy Philometor. In 155/4 Deme-
trius bribed Archias, the Ptolemaic governor of Cyprus, to betray the
island, for which the Seleucids had always had an appetite. Archias,
however, was caught and tried; during the trial he hanged himself. 140

Ptolemy was infuriated. He joined Attalus and Ariarathes and the

136 Orophernes had been sent to Ionia, probably to Priene (Diod. Sic. xxxi.19.7; Polyb.
xxxii. 1 1. 10). He dedicated the cult statue of Athena Polias, in whose bases have been found the only
existing coins of the king: Rcgling 1927, 8fF., 44ff.: (b 127); Kleiner, PW, ‘Priene’, 1 195. He also
donated a statue of the Demos, if the letter to the city (Welles, RC 63) is in fact his. He almost
certainly made these gifts while king, between 1 3 8 and 1 5 6. Priene participated in a festival held by
Demetrius I, before or after Orophernes had found refuge with him ( IPriene 108, lines 152-3).

137 The main source is Polyb. xxxm.6 (see also Diod. Sic. xx.x1.3z), with two fragmentary
documents, the second being part of the Senate’s decree (Sherk, Documents 6). From the order of
excerpts from Polybius the episode belongs to one of the years 15 5/4-1 5 3/2: Walbank 1957-79,
111.61-2: (b 38). The most likely date is 1 54, shortly before or after the peace between Attalus and
Prusias, when Pergamene and Cappadocian forces were united in Asia.

138 On the king’s relations with Philonides from Laodicea in northern Syria see PHerc. 1044, with
Gallo (n. 1 1 1), fr. 27, pp. 1 52-3. The fragmentary state of the papyrus presents many problems;
nevertheless it seems that Philonides had been Demetrius’ teacher before 175, that he participated in
efforts to spare Laodicea punishment after the murder of Octavius, and that he was the head of a
school in the capital that was visited by the king himself.

139 Just. Epit. xxxv. 1.3-4. Orophernes was imprisoned in Selcuceia in northern Syria. Antioch’s
hostility endangered Demetrius again in the affair of Andriscus.

140 Antiochus III attempted to take Cyprus by surprise in 197. Antiochus IV took it in 168, but the
Romans forced his immediate withdrawal. Demetrius’ move: Polyb. xxxni.5; for the chronology:
Walbank 1957-79, m. 41-2, 546: (b 38), who rightly rejects the dates 158/7 (Otto 1934, 1 12 n. 6: (e
156) and 1 5 1/50 (Volkmann 1924, 53-4: (b 142)).

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362 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

three kings, as Polybius says, ‘converged on Demetrius’. 141 Attaius had
prepared the instrument years before, when he was reacting to the
overthrow of Ariarathes. A young man by the name of Balas lived in
Smyrna; he claimed to be the son of Antiochus IV, to whom he bore a
striking resemblance. Attaius had him conducted to Pergamum, invested
him, as he had done with Antiochus IV in 175, with the diadem and the
royal purple, and called him by the dynastic name Alexander. He settled
him close to the Seleucid border under the protection of the Cilician
dynast Zenophanes, whom Attaius had supported in a quarrel with
Demetrius, and he had the rumour spread through Syria that Alexander
would soon come to claim his father’s throne. 142 In 1 5 3 the time seemed
ripe for a move. Under the guidance of the Milesian Heraclides, who had
once been in charge of Antiochus’ finances (p. 356), Alexander Balas,
with Antiochus’ daughter Laodice at his side, appeared in Rome; in 1 5 2
he obtained a decree from the Senate that granted him permission to
claim ‘the throne of his ancestors’ and even promised Roman support. 143

This was a signal that Rome wanted Demetrius overthrown. There
was no need for material aid. Heraclides gathered an army in Ephesus
with the help of Attaius. Before October 1 5 2 Alexander made a landing,
perhaps with ships supplied by Ptolemy, in Ptolemais, where the garri-
son betrayed the city to him. The Maccabean party under Judas’ brother
Jonathan, courted by both king and pretender, finally chose the latter,
who appointed the Hasmonean rebel high-priest. At first Demetrius was
victorious, but eventually, though he fought courageously, he lost a
battle, the kingdom, and his life in the summer of 150. 144

(b) Kings and usurpers^

Perhaps it was inevitable that the new king, Alexander, should execute
his predecessor’s son Antigonus, his wife Laodice, and a number of his

141 Polyb. III. 5. 3: ovoTpa<f>€VTwv « t* auTov tcjv aAAtov fiaoiXttov.

142 Diod. Sic. xxxi. 3 2a. Zenophanes was perhaps the dynast of Olba, as suggested by Hopp 1977,

80 n. 1 19: (e6o). On the role of the Pcrgamene king see Ritter 1965, 1 37-8: (131). Most pagan sources
call Balas an imposter (App. Sjr. 67.354, 70.367; Trogus, Pro/, xxxv; Just. Bp//, xxxv. 1.6—7; Ath.
v.21 1 a; Livy, Per. lii). This is undoubtedly what Polybius, the friend of Demetrius, wrote. On the
other hand, the Jewish tradition, obliged to Balas for privileges, presents him as a genuine son of
Antiochus (1 Mate. 10.1; Jos. AJ So is he regarded by Strabo xm, p. 624, and, of course, by

the decree of the Senate (n. 143).

143 Polyb. xxxni. 18. 12; Gruen 1976, 91-3: (e 20). Shortly before, the Senate had received
Demetrius’ son Demetrius coolly.

144 Alexander seems to have become master of Tyre and Sidon in 152: Kiithmann 1954, 8: (b 109).
Jonathan: Tcherikover 1961, 2 3 2 fF. : (e i i 5). The latest date for Demetrius is at present 1 June 1 5 1 (or
a date sometime between 6 April 151 and 26 March 150). The earliest date for Alexander is 21
October 1 50: Parker and Dubberstein 1956, 23: (b 214). It remains a puzzle, for whom the bronze
coin with ‘King Antiochus’ and the date 1 5 1/50 was minted, apparently in Antioch: Heichelheim
1944: (B 9i); Bellinger 194;: (b 79).

145 Jewish sources: I Macc. 10-15; Jos. BJ 1-48-50, A] xin.35-224. In addition, besides those
quoted in the notes, App. Syr. 67-8, 355-358; Livy, Per. p. 145, 21 5 Rossbach; Just. Bpit. xxxv. 1-2,
xxxvi. 1; Charax, FCrH 103 f 29.

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THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 162-129 B.C. j6j

friends, but Alexander was not by nature a cruel man. Twenty-three
years of age when he became king, more affable than Demetrius had
been, he was popular at first, the more so because he cultivated the
memory of Antiochus IV, whose son he pretended to be. He wore the
radiate crown in tribute to him; he assumed the title ‘Son of God’
( Theopator ) and had his bronze coins struck with the epithets Epiphanes,
Nikephoros and Eupator, all characteristic of Antiochus IV and Antiochus
V. 146 He also restored certain privileges, once granted by Epiphanes, but
cancelled by Demetrius, to some Syrian cities. 147 In reality, however,
Alexander was a creature of foreign kings and the puppet of Ptolemy
Philometor. Although his prestige may have been given a boost by his
marriage to the Egyptian king’s daughter Cleopatra, that memorable
event, which took place in Ptolemais, was not so much a pledge of
continued Egyptian support as a symptom of mounting Ptolemaic
influence in Seleucid affairs. 148

It soon became apparent that Alexander, despite some familiarity with
Stoic philosophy, cared little for duty. Much of the daily business he left
to favourites, in particular to his minister Ammonius. While the king
himself mostly resided in Ptolemais, two other men, Hierax and
Diodotus, governed the capital. He had so little control over his realm
that two cities in Syria, Aradus and Marathus, fought each other in a war
caused by the corruption of Ammonius. Alexander made no attempt to
restore royal authority over Judaea, where Jonathan had risen from
rather despicable beginnings as a rebel to the dignity of high-priest. His
elevation into the circle of the king’s favourites - he was an honoured
guest at the royal wedding - marks the level to which the kingdom of
Seleucus I had fallen. 149

Worst of all, Alexander remained apathetic even after he had lost two
important satrapies, Media and Susiane, in 148/7 (or soon thereafter). No
wonder, then, that at the first challenge to his rule he found himself
deserted by the very men who had once helped him win the throne:
Attalus and Ariarathes did not lift a finger in his support, and Ptolemy,
his father-in-law, even joined the side of the pretender. The challenge
came from the quarter where it might have been expected, from the sons

146 For Theopator see Maricq 1958, 378-82: (b 180); for the rest: Volkmann 1924, 6 iff.: (b 142).
Portraits of Alexander: Charbonncaux and Laumonier 1935: (e 13); Morkholm 1981: (b i i 8).

147 El-Zcin 1972, 164—5: (e 17), for the autonomous coins of Apamea. For coins of Antioch and

Seleuceia with the legend ‘of the brother peoples’ ( 'ASeXtfxhv sometimes thought to

illustrate the erosion of royal authority, see Rigsby 1980, 242-8: (e 39).

148 The coins minted for the occasion have Cleopatra in the foreground, Alexander behind her:
Ktithmann 1954 , 9-10: (b 109). Ptolemaic influence is revealed by the royal mints in Syria changing
from the traditional Attic standard of Seleucid coins to the Phoenician standard of the Ptolemies.

149 Diod. Sic. xxxii. 9c, xxxm.3 and Livy, Per. l, call Alexander downright incompetent. His
connection with philosophers, hardly more than superficial familiarity: Ath. v.21 ia~d. The war of
the cities: Diod. Sic. xxxiu.5; Rey-Coquais 1974, 1 31: (e 1 59): Morkholm 1975-6: (b i i 5). Jonathan:
Meyer 1921, 253-6: (t 26).

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of Demetrius I, Demetrius and Antiochus, who had been sent to Asia
Minor by their father before he made his last stand. Demetrius the son,
when he was hardly more than thirteen years old, undertook an expedi-
tion to avenge his father. Determined to do away with the man whom he
regarded as an imposter, he landed in Phoenicia in 147 with an army of
mercenaries collected mainly from Crete and the Greek islands. For some
time his moves seem to reflect the dominant influence of a Cretan by the
name of Lasthenes. 150

Although some of the sources imply that Alexander was almost
immediately overthrown, the decisive battle did not take place until two
years later, in the summer of 145. Not much is known about those two
years, except that the Jews under Jonathan fought successfully against
Apollonius, whom Demetrius had appointed satrap of Coele Syria. 151
Eventually Ptolemy Philometor intervened and decided the struggle. He
brought an army into Palestine on the pretence that he was coming to
support his son-in-law. Heaccepted the welcome of numerous cities, but
put his own garrisons into them and suddenly turned against Alexander,
according to some authors because he had come to despise his conduct,
according to others because Alexander refused to extradite his minister
Ammonius, whom Ptolemy accused of being responsible for an attempt
on his life. 152

The change of face occurred in Ptolemais in the presence of
Alexander’s queen. Ptolemy promised her to Demetrius with whom he
concluded an alliance. Alexander was forced to leave the capital; he went
to Cilicia to muster an army. Meanwhile Antioch was in an uproar; the
mob killed the hated Ammonius, but they did not support Demetrius,
for fear that he might seek revenge for their treatment of his father. They
received Ptolemy with enthusiasm, and applauded the attempt of
Alexander’s former ministers Diodotus and Hierax to crown him with
the diadem of the Seleucids. The king declined. He might have feared
Rome’s reaction and seems to have been satisfied with Demetrius’
promise to cede Coele Syria and Palestine, which the Ptolemies had lost
fifty-five years before. 153 Ptolemy managed to reconcile the city and

150 Jos. A J xiii. 86, 1 26—7 ; cf. I Macc. 10.67, 1 1 -3 l ~ z * Just. Epit. xxxv.2.2. Lasthenes may well be
Lasthenes, son of Eunomos, from Cnossus who was honou red as proxenos, some time after 168, by an
Epirote tribe in Butrinto: Cabanes 1974, 130 no. 10: (d 1 1). There are only two other individuals of
that name attested in Crete, but from a different time: Masson, BCH 107 (1983) 396-7.

151 Schiirer 1973, 181: (e 112); Bar-Kochva 1976: (e 2).

152 Diod. Sic. xxxii. 9c; I Macc. 1 1.10; Jos. AJ s 111.106-107. According to 1 Macc. y Ptolemy really
wanted to establish himself on the throne of the Seleucids, and the attempt, real or fictitious, was
only a pretext for changing his alliance. Different is Josephus’ story that the crown was forced upon
him. Josephus, however, is as partial tohimas I Macc. is to Alexander. Ptolemy’s conduct in Antioch
(below) seems to disprove the accusation that he wanted to be king of Asia.

153 Diod. Sic. xxxiu. 9c; Livy, Per. lii; I Macc. 11.12-13; Jos. AJ xiii. 109-1 16. According to
Josephus, the marriage between Demetrius and Cleopatra was concluded before Alexander died.
Regarding Ptolemy’s refusal, Josephus aptly remarks that he/ was afraid of Rome’s reaction. A
dedication by Demetrius in honour of Ptolemy has been fotwid in Paphos, SEG xm.585.

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THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 162— 1 29 B.C. 365

Demetrius; Demetrius was acknowledged as his father’s heir to the
throne.

Alexander arrived with an army, was defeated in a battle fought near
Antioch, at the River Oenoparas, but escaped and fled for refuge to an
Arab dynast, who, a few days later, had him murdered. His head was
brought to Ptolemy, but Ptolemy himself had been severely wounded
and soon died. Demetrius was the sole winner and he acted in cold blood.
He could not stop Ptolemy’s field army from retreating to Egypt, but he
seized his elephants and had his garrisons in the coastal cities slaughtered.
No more was heard about the ceding of Palestine. Demetrius also
stopped Jonathan’s attempts to storm the citadel of Jerusalem, still
occupied by a Seleucid garrison and Jewish hellenizers. Jonathan paid
homage to the king in Ptolemais and extorted some major concessions
from him. 154

Demetrius II, now called ‘The Victorious’ ( Nikator ) like the founder
of the dynasty, seemed safe on the throne of his ancestors, but a grave
mistake soon jeopardized his position. With the exception of the merce-
naries with whom he had come, he dismissed his forces, that is to say, the
regular Seleucid army. They became restless and bitter and created
serious difficulties. In Antioch the unemployed soldiers and the general
population, harassed by Demetrius after their protector, King Ptolemy,
had disappeared, rallied to attack the palace. The king had only Jonathan
to call upon. Jonathan responded; three thousand Jewish soldiers came
to the king’s rescue and got the upper hand in a vicious battle fought in
the streets of Antioch. 155 In Apamea, the main arsenal of the kingdom, a
citizen named Diodotus - he called himself Tryphon, was perhaps of
Macedonian origin and probably the same man who, together with
Hierax, had administered the capital and proclaimed Philometor king -
collected the jobless and unruly soldiers and took possession of the
elephants and all the armour stored in the city. He then persuaded an
Arab dynast, perhaps the emir of Emesa (Homs), to hand over
Alexander’s son Antiochus, a boy two years old, and proclaimed him
King Antiochus VI in late summer of 145. 156

Demetrius, at first contemptuous of Tryphon, was soon forced to send

,S4 The battlefield: Strabo xvt, p. 75 1; for the identification Honigmann, P W, ‘Otvoirdpas’, 2255.
For main events: Polyb. xxxix.7; Diod. Sic. xx.x11.9d and 10. 1; App.Tyr. 67.35 jjTrogus, Pro/, xxxv;
Just. Epit. xxxv. 2. 4 ; Livy, Per. lii; I Mace. 1 1. 14-19; Jos. AJ xm.i 16-1 19; Porph. EGrH 260 f
32.1 5. The latest date for Ptolemy, 15 July 145, even if posthumous, approximately dates the battle:
Skeat 1955, 34: (b 221). Demetrius and Jonathan after the battle: Schiirer 1973, 182: (e 112).

155 Demetrius’ cruelty in Antioch: Diod. Sic. xxxm.4; Just. Epit. xxxvi.1.1; Livy, Per. lii,
ascribed by Diodorus to the influence of his chancellor, probably Lasthenes. The war in Antioch: I
Mace. 11.42-51; Jos. AJ xm. 134-142.

156 On Tryphon sec Hoffmann, PU/ y ‘Tryphon’, 715-22; Schiirer 1973, 183-97: (e ii 2). Since
there are coins of Antiochus VI from year 167 of the Seleucid era which ended in October 145, all
these events must have followed each other in rapid succession. It is significant that Antiochus took
the epithet Dionysus Epipbancs and that he (Tryphon) had posthumous coins of Antiochus IV

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an army against him. The usurper defeated it and grew in strength. He
won Chalcis on the edge of the desert and in 145/4 forced Demetrius to
abandon Antioch and to retreat to the adjacent coastal town of
Seleuceia. 157 Tryphon then made generous offers in Antiochus’ name to
Jonathan, who was embittered because Demetrius had used his people to
extricate himself in Antioch and then had revoked his earlier conces-
sions. An alliance was concluded that guaranteed Jonathan his position
as high-priest, confirmed all earlier privileges and appointed Jonathan’s
brother Simon to be Antiochus’ satrap of the coastal region between
Egypt and Tyre. The treaty created an opportunity for the Jews to attack
the cities which remained loyal to Demetrius in that region, to seize them
in the name of Antiochus and, should the new king fail, to annex them.
Jonathan, in fact, captured Ascalon and Gaza. He also fought success-
fully in Galilee against the forces of Demetrius, while his brother Simon
captured the fortress of Beth-sur in southern Judaea itself. 158

Meanwhile there was fighting in northern Syria. Despite some set-
backs, Tryphon kept gaining ground, until he controlled, besides Anti-
och and most of its hinterland, the coastal cities of Aradus, Orthosia,
Byblus, Berytus, Ptolemais and Dora; Demetrius held on to Seleuceia,
Laodicea, Sidon and Tyre. Tryphon also occupied Coracesium, a strong-
hold in western Cilicia, and encouraged Cilician pirates to raid the
territory controlled by Demetrius; the internal struggle for control of the
Seleucid empire contributed much to the rapid spread of Cilician
piracy. 159

Once he had gained the upper hand in the struggle, Tryphon became
more concerned about his ally Jonathan than about his royal foe, and
with good reason, for Jonathan had had success after success; he had
captured (through Simon) Joppa and fortified Jerusalem. It must now
have been obvious that he was striving for an independent Jewish state,
especially if he had indeed sent ambassadors to Rome and received

Epiphanes minted, whose grandson he pretended to be: Kiithmann 1954, 17 : (b 109); Morkholm
1963, 71: (b 1 12), and 1966, 185: (e 3 3) (who wants Alexander to be the one who minted these); El-
Zein 1972, 153—4, 2io n. 29: (e 17).

157 Diod. Sic. xxxiii. 4a. Retreat of Demetrius to Seleuceia: Livy, Per. lii (Cilicia according to Jos.
Aj xiii. 145). In 145/4 Antioch minted first for Demetrius (IGCH no. 1 593), then for Antiochus VI:
the change dates these events. Antiochus’ pieces of 146/ 5 must therefore have been struck
somewhere else, probably in Apamea: El-Zein 1972, 231 n. 45 : (e 17). The letters TP Yon his coins
show Tryphon’s prominence.

158 Schiirer 1973, 183-6: (e 1 1 2).

159 A paradoxical victory of Demetrius’ general Sarpedon over an army of Tryphon is recorded
by Poseidonius, PGrH 87 F 29, a later victory of Demetrius over Antiochus, dated to 140/39, by
Porph. FGrH 260 f 3 2.16. Ptolemais began to coin for Antiochus in 144/3. Not Berytus, said to have
been destroyed by Tryphon (Strabo xvi, p. 756), but Byblus minted for him: Seyrig 1950, 9-12: (b
131). On the other hand. Tyre and Sidon minted continuously for Demetrius II. For Coracesium:
Strabo xtv, p. 668.

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THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 162-129 B.C. 367

encouragement from the Senate. 160 Before the winter of 143/2, Tryphon
turned against him. 161 After some manoeuvring, he took Jonathan
prisoner in Ptolemais and moved on Judaea, but the Jews did not yield as
he had expected; they elected Simon to his brother’s place and defended
themselves. Tryphon tried to take Jerusalem with a surprise assault and
failed when a heavy snowfall prevented his cavalry from attacking; he
returned to Ptolemais and had Jonathan killed. 162 Soon thereafter, he had
his ward murdered and himself proclaimed king, with the additional title
of Autokrator. For the first time there was a king who did not even
pretend to have a connection with the royal house, and in fact made it
quite clear that he wanted to do away with all tradition. 163

It was a natural consequence of these events that Simon now
approached Demetrius and concluded an alliance with him. The king
granted him all his former privileges (over which he had no control
anyway) and only a few months later, in June 142, Simon, who had taken
the city of Gazara (Gezer), finally forced the garrison in the citadel of
Jerusalem to surrender: ‘The yoke of the Gentile was taken from

160 As reported by I Macc. 12. 1-4 and Jos. A] xm. 165-165. Opinions are divided whether there
was in fact such an embassy: so Fischer 1970, 96^.: (e 1 8); Gauger 1977, 278-85: (b 9); or whether the
report is only a doublet of Simon’s embassy a little later: so Momigliano 1950, 148-9: (e 105);
Giovannini and Muller 1971, 170 n. 5 5: (e 98), with whom the present writer agrees. The question
remains open in Schiircr 197$, 184: (e 112) and Gruen 1984, 748: (a 20).

161 The Jewish writers give as Tryphon’s reason his desire to become king and his fear that
Jonathan might not let him have his way. As to the chronology, winter 145/2 was the time of great
distress for the Jews, after Jonathan had been killed (1 Macc. 1 2.52-4; Jos. A J xm. 194-196). The
year must therefore be Jonathan’s last and Simon’s first. Simon’s first year is equated with Scl. 1 70 in
1 Macc. 1 5.41-2, but the same events are equated with Scl. 169 in II Macc. 1.7. The use of Q\ u/u?
depicting the Jewish situation in both I Macc. 15.5 and II Macc. 1.7 proves that these arc the same
events. It follows that the date in 1 Macc. reckons from the era in spring 5 1 2, the date in II Macc. from
that in spring 51 1. See Bickcrmann 1955, 259-41: (e 84); but also Bringmann 1985, 2 iff. and his
entire ch. 1 : (e 92).

162 Schiircr 1973, 1 86-8: (e i 12), with bibliography, n. 42, on the identification of Jonathan with
the ‘Wicked Priest’ of the Qumran texts.

Tryphon’s assumption of the title Autokrator , his dating, not by the Selcucid era but by his
own regnal years, and the symbols he chose for his coins show his break with Selcucid tradition:
Scyrig 1950, 1 2.54: (b 1 5 1). A marble head of Tryphon with the diadem is said to have been found in
Syrian Chalcis, one of Tryphon’s strongholds, and intentionally damaged after his fall: Fischer 1971:
(b 166). The chronology of Tryphon’s accession and Antiochus’ murder is vexed; Hoffmann, PIF',
‘Tryphon’, 720-1. Most of the ancient authors date these events to 1 39, but I Macc. 15.31 clearly
indicates spring 141, and this is corroborated by the fact that Antiochus’ last coins are dated 142/1,
the earliest of Antiochus VII 139/8. Since this king seems to have disposed of Tryphon swiftly,
Tryphon can hardly have lived until 1 36/5. His coins bear numbers of years 2, 3 and 4 and should be
dated 141/40, 140/39 and 139/8. The attempt of Baldus (1970: (e 1)) to show that Tryphon
proclaimed himself king in 142/1, but kept Antiochus as his (dependent) co-ruler until 1 39/8, isopen
to serious objections: Fischer 1972: (e 19). It follows that the assertion of the authors that Tryphon
became kingin 1 39/8 must be abandoned: Seyrig 1950, 12 -i 7 :(b 151); Schiirer 1975, 1 51, 189 n. 2 :(e
112). Tryphon may, however, not have killed Antiochus VI until 139/8, when he learnt that
Demetrius was in Parthian captivity. The following equations have to be made: Scl. 171 (142/1) is
Antiochus Vi’s last and Tryphon’s first year; Sel. 174 (1 59/8) is Antiochus Vll’s first and Tryphon’s
last (fourth) year (and Simon’s fifth year).

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THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

Israel.’ 164 From then on, the Jews counted the years of their own leader,
‘year one of Simon’, an obvious manifestation of their belief that they
were independent and of their determination to remain independent. In
September 141 an assembly of the Jews, held in Jerusalem, praised
Simon in a long decree, intended mainly to confirm by theirown free will
the honours the king had bestowed upon him, the high-priesthood and
the leadership of the nation. At the same time, an embassy that Simon had
sent to Rome returned with a decree of the Senate that guaranteed, as far
as Rome was concerned, the integrity of Jewish territory. 165 For the
second time in history, there was an independent Jewish state.

The alliance between Demetrius and the Jews did not so much
strengthen the king as weaken Tryphon. In 142/1 Demetrius, Tryphon
and Simon, each controlling parts of Syria and Palestine, were almost
deadlocked. Tryphon asked for Roman support to improve his position
and was rebuked in a peculiar manner: the Senate accepted his gifts, but
had them inscribed with the name of Antiochus VI, the king Tryphon
had murdered. 166 Eventually Demetrius began a major effort to change
things to his advantage. In the course of the year which began in autumn
141/40 he left Seleuceia and went to Mesopotamia, which had remained
loyal. He intended to push back the Parthians, who had taken advantage
of the struggle within the Seleucid realm to invade Seleucid territory.
Demetrius hoped to enhance his prestige with a victory and create an
army strong enough to crush Tryphon. He was defeated and taken
prisoner, sometime in 140/39 (p. 371).

When his younger brother Antiochus, who was in Rhodes, learned of
this, he decided to take over. He had difficulty entering the kingdom,
however, since Tryphon controlled most of the coast. Several ports
closed their harbours, but Cleopatra, his brother’s wife, besieged by
Tryphon in Seleuceia, not only received him but also accepted him as her
husband (she had already heard that Demetrius had married a daughter
of the Parthian king). The forces of Demetrius that still operated in that
region must have joined Antiochus also, and in 1 39/8 he was proclaimed
King Antiochus VII. He soon concluded an alliance with Simon.
Tryphon was defeated in northern Syria and besieged in Dora in Phoeni-

164 Schiirer 1973, i9i-2:(e n 2), where the surrender of the citadel of Jerusalem isdated June 141;
142 has to be preferred (see n. 1 6 1 ).

165 The document for Simon: I Macc. 14.27—45; Schiirer 1973, 193—4: (e 112). Despatch of the

embassy: I Macc. 14.24; its return: ibid. 14.40. The return also appears in I Macc. 1 5 . 1 5, under the year
1 39/8 (beginning in autumn 1 39), which has created great difficulties (Schiirer, op. cit. 195—6 nn. 16-
1 7). It has, however, been shown that I Macc. 1 5 . 1 5-24 is not only inserted in the w rong place, but is a
forgery: Giovannini and Muller 1971: (e 98). The decree of the Senate is perhaps the one transmitted
by Jos. A] xiv. 145-148, used as the basis on which to fabricate the forged document (see, however,
n. l 70). The embassy should have been in Rome in 142: Schiirer, op. cit. 194—7, with bibliography,
esp. Giovannini and Muller; in addition, Fischer 1974, 90 - 1 : (e 94); Gauger 1977, 261-310: (b 9);
Gruen 1984, 749: (a 20). >66 Diod. Sic. xxxui.28a.

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THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUC 1 DS, 162-129 B.C. 369

cia. He escaped to Apamea, his home town. There, unable to defend
himself any longer, he took his own life. 167

Once Tryphon was dead, Antiochus VII gained swift recognition
throughout the Seleucid empire. Antiochus Sidetes - the nickname
comes from the city of Side in southern Asia Minor, where he had been
brought up - was a young man, twenty years of age, able and gallant. On
his coins from 135/4 onwards he is ‘King Antiochus’, with the addition
of ‘Benefactor’ ( Euergetes ) and, during his last year, ‘The Great’ (Megas).

After Antiochus had established himself firmly on the throne, he had
to deal at once with two major problems: his Jewish subjects, who were
developing an independent state within his realm, and the Parthians,
who had taken advantage of the internal struggles in Syria to occupy
large parts of the kingdom. The Parthians, who also held his older
brother Demetrius in captivity, posed the more important and the more
difficult problem, but logic demanded that the Jewish question be
resolved first. The king had already shown his intentions. When he was
besieging Tryphon in Dora, the Jewish leader Simon sent 2,000 picked
troops to assist him. The king, with victory well in hand, refused their
service and thereby signalled that he regarded the treaty with Simon as
void. He demanded the recognition of his sovereignty and the restitution
of several towns recently seized by the Jews; when he learned that Simon
was prepared to make only minimal concessions, he resorted to force.
For a while Simon’s sons, who now led the army, seem to have held their
ground against the king’s general Cendebaeus. The king had to take
matters into his own hands; in 135 he invaded Judaea.

By then Simon was dead. A few months earlier he and two of his sons
had fallen victim to a plot conceived by his son-in-law Ptolemy, who

167 I Macc. curiously docs not record his end. Most of Tryphon’s coins were melted down by
Antiochus VII, but inOrthosia 3} pieces, all in mint condition, have been found. Thirteen are dated,
all to Tryphon’s last year. Orthosia was the place he stopped last before meeting his destiny: Seyrig
1950, 1-23: (b 1 3 1). By coincidence, Frontin. St rat. 11.1 3.2 says that Tryphon had coins scattered to
slow down the pursuing horsemen.

168 The literary sources survive only in scattered pieces. The fragments of Poseidonius in FCrH
87. Sec also Diod. Sic. xxxiv.i, 15-19, 21; I Mace. 15.10-16.24; Jos. A] xm. 224-259 (partly
following Nicolaus of Damascus, FCrH 90) and BJ 1.5 1-63; Trogus, Pro I. (and Just. E pit. xxxvi,
xxxviii, xxxix, xlii); App. Sjr. 68.35 8-360; Livy, Per. lvii-lix; Jul. Obscq. ad a. i 30; Oros. v. 10.8;
Euseb. Chron. 1, pp. 255-6 Schoenc. Valuable precision can be derived from the coinage of
Antiochus VII, Phraates II, Camniscires and other rulers: LcRider 1965, 361—86: (e 149); Strauss
1971: (b 139); and from Babylonian cuneiform tablets: Olmstead 1937: (b 213) and Parker and
Dubberstcin 1956: (b 214). A dedication from Ptolemais/Akko which was thought to refer to
Antiochus VII is for his son Antiochus IX: Fischer 1970, 102-9: (e 18). Modern accounts: Meyer
1921, 265-73: (1 26); DcSanctis 1907-64, iv. 195-206: (a 14); Schurer 1973, 198-207: (e 112); Will
1982, 410-16: (a 40). For Antiochus’ eastern campaign: Fischer op. cit.

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37 °

THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

wanted to seize power for himself (r. March 135), with or without the
king’s knowledge. John, however, another son, happened to be in
Jerusalem at the time of the murder; he secured his father’s position for
himself and drove Ptolemy out of the country. 169 Almost immediately he
had to face the attack of the royal army and soon found himself besieged
in Jerusalem. The siege went on for a year. Hostilities were interrupted
once by a truce to allow the Jews to celebrate the Feast of Tabernacles, to
which the king himself contributed gifts, but, soon after, famine forced
John to ask for terms. Antiochus’ counsellors advised him to extermi-
nate the Jewish nation or at least enforce radical changes in their way of
life, but the king granted peace with moderate conditions and dismantled
the fortifications of the city (c. October 1 34). 170 About the same time he
sent rich gifts to P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, who had visited the east
in 139 and now had assumed command in Spain. 171

Seleucid authority over the Jewish nation had been restored, but not
for long. A few years later, when Antiochus’ efforts to resolve the
Parthian question had ended in disaster, royal authority vanished from
Judaea. An ancient writer observed that Antiochus VII was the last of
the Seleucids to rule over the Jews. 172

Nothing is known about Antiochus’ activities from the time of his
success in Judaea until he began his eastern campaign in 1 3 1 . 1 73 He was
probably engaged in preparations for the expedition which, as he must
have anticipated, would be a serious task, for the situation in the east had
deteriorated since Alexander’s rule.

The Seleucid princes, because of their internal feuds, had neglected the
dangerous growth of Parthian power far too long. They had remained
lethargic in the face of severe losses. 174 In the early 160s, it seems, the
Parthian king Mithridates I struck coins with his own portrait, which
implied that he no longer acknowledged Seleucid suzerainty. Antiochus
IV made plans to invade, but died before he could carry them out
(p. 3 52). Scholars once believed that Parthian aggression began shortly

169 Schiirer 1973, 197-202: (e 112). I Macc. ends its narrative with John’s accession, thereby
avoiding mentioning his surrender in 134.

170 Poseidonius, FCrH 87F109 (Diod. Sic. xxxiv.i); Jos. A] xm. 236-247; BJ 1.61; Just. Epit.
xxxvi. 1. 10; Plut. Mor . 1 84EP. Coins of Antiochus VII were minted in Jerusalem. The decree of the
Roman Senate in favour of the Jews, preserved in Jos. A] x iv. 145—148, may date from December
134, i.e. from the time immediately after the city’s surrender; A 1 RR 1.491 n. 2, admitted as a
possibility by Giovannini and Muller 1971, 165: (£98), who, however, argue for 142; sccalso n. 165,
furthermore Rajak 1981: (e 1 10).

171 Livy, Per. lvii, discussed by Astin 1967, 127 and 138-9: (h 67).

172 Just. Epit. xxxvi. 1. 10.

,73 Speculations on ‘many wars against neighbours’ (Just. Epit. xxxviii.io.ii) in Bouche-
Leclcrq 1913, 370: (e 8).

174 The fundamental study on the eastern satrapies of the Seleucids, based largely on the study of
the coinage, is LeRider 1965, 361—80: (e 149). References that can easily be found there are given only
in special cases.

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THE DECLINE OF THE SELEUCIDS, 162-I29 B.C. 3 7 1

after the death of Antiochus IV and that they conquered Media as early as
c. 160. It has since become clear that Demetrius I continued to strike
coins in Ecbatana, the capital of Media, and that his successor Alexander
also had coins minted there. In addition, a dedication from Bisutun in
Media, dated to the summer of 148, proves that a Seleucid governor-
general was in charge of the ‘upper satrapies’. Mithridates occupied
Media only in c. 147. 175 Camniscires, the ruler of Elymais, seized Susa and
the satrapy of Susiane about the same time. 176 Alexander Balas apparently
did not react to the simultaneous loss of two major provinces. The
Parthian king now followed the example of the rulers of Bactria and of
the usurper Timarchus (p. 356) and styled himself ‘The Great King’.

The next blow fell in 141 . Mithridates invaded and occupied southern
Mesopotamia. Cuneiform tablets attest to his rule in Babylon and in
Seleuceia on the Tigris in July 141 and, before October of the same year,
in Uruk. 177 Demetrius 11 , then involved in his struggle with Tryphon,
nonetheless responded to the call of his eastern subjects. In the spring of
140 he marched on Parthia. Persis, Elymais and Bactria gave him
substantial support and he was successful at first, but in Media one of
Mithridates’ generals defeated him and took him prisoner (1 39). 178 The
Parthian king now assumed the title ‘King of Kings’ and had his prisoner
displayed in the regions Demetrius had reconquered or come to
reconquer. He then assigned him a residence in Hyrcania and married off
one of his daughters to him. Mithridates was also victorious in a battle
fought, probably in 140, against the Elamites at Kut-el-Amara, where the
Schatt-al-hai joins the Tigris; he took Susa and Susiane away from them,
but he did not hold them long: coins show that Susa and the satrapy
Susiane were under the control of an independent ruler, Tigraios,
perhaps the successor of Camniscires, for several years, c. 138-132.

Mithridates, thearchitect of Parthian greatness, died in 1 38 and his son
and successor Phraates II had to face the challenge of Antiochus’
expedition in 1 3 1 . 179 Antiochus’ army, including a strong contingent of
Jewish soldiers commanded by the high-priest John in person, was
larger than any Seleucid army had been for at least forty years. The
Seleucid king was victorious in three successive battles, one of them
fought against the Parthian satrap Indates on the River Lycus (Zabu el u)
between Gaugamela and Arbela. He reconquered Babylonia; when he
entered Babylon, he assumed the title ‘The Great King’. 180 He soon

175 The lower chronology has now generally been adopted. The dedication from Bisutun: Robert
1963, 76: (b 65). 176 LeRider 1965, 349-54: (e 149); Strauss 1971, 109-40: (b 139).

177 OJmstead 1937, 12-13: (b 213); LeRider 1965, 363-4: (e 149).

178 Diod. Sic. xxxiii. 8, xx.x1v.15; App. Syr. 69.363-364; Porph. FCVf/ 260F32.16; Just, lipit.
xxxvi. i.zff.; I Mace. 14. 1-3; Jos. AJ xm. 184-186.

179 The sources are transcribed in full in Fischer 1970, 29-35: (e 18).

,ao Just. Epit. xxxvm. 1 0.6. IDelos 1547-8.

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37 2 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

recovered Seleuceia on the Tigris, Susa and Susiane, and he invaded
Media, where the final scene was played. Phraates was concerned enough
to open negotiations, but he refused Antiochus’ demand for his subordi-
nation and released Demetrius, who twice had escaped and twice been
caught; he hoped that concern for his crown might move Antiochus to
retreat.

When the winter of 130/29 came, the large Seleucid army and the
enormous number of camp-followers had to be distributed in groups
throughout the country. The native population, who suffered from the
mere presence of so many foreigners and who also were harassed by
them, turned hostile towards the army they had welcomed a few months
before. A large number of them, obeying Phraates’ orders, attacked all
the camps on a given day. When Antiochus left his own encampment to
go to the rescue of one of the posts, he encountered the Parthian army,
which far outnumbered his own force. His staff suggested retreat to the
hills, where he would be safe from the enemy’s cavalry. The king,
however, refused. He fought bravely, but several of his high-ranking
officers and part of his army deserted and he lost the battle and his life
(spring 129). Phraates is said to have remarked, ‘Y our drunken audacity
has tripped you up, Antiochus, for you expected to gulp down the
kingdom of Arsaces in big wine-cups.’ 181 He ordered the king’s remains
to be sent back to Syria. He also tried, in vain, to recapture Demetrius,
who escaped to Syria.

The victory, however, was decisive. Parthia kept Media and recovered
Babylonia and Susiane. For a year or so, a local dynast, who had been a
satrap of the Seleucids, Hyspaosines of Charax, seized power in Babylon
and Seleuceia, but this was a mere episode (128/7). 182 Parthian control
over both places was re-established by 126/5. Phraates intended to invade
Syria after this victory, but he was forced to deal with unexpected
trouble. He had hired ‘Scythians’, probably Tocharians, for the war
against Antiochus; they arrived after the battle, but still demanded to be
paid. When the king refused, they invaded Hyrcania. Phraates fought
them and was defeated and killed in a battle in which the remnants of
Antiochus’ army, pressed into Parthian service, deserted to the enemy,
thereby avenging their king ( c . 128).

The defeat and death of Antiochus VII has rightly been called ‘the
catastrophe of hellenism in continental Asia and at the same time of the
Seleucid empire’. 183 The casualties were enormous; there was not a single
household in the capital of Antioch, it was said, that did not mourn the
death of one of its members. Never again did a Seleucid king dare to take

181 Ath. X.439DE, tr. A.S. Bradford. 182 LeRider 1965, 368: (e 149).
183 Meyer 1921, 272: (1 26), and 1925, 67: (e 152).

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ASIA MINOR, 158-129 B.C.

373

the field against the Parthians. The eastern satrapies beyond the Euphra-
tes were lost forever. The kingdom, once by far the largest of all
Hellenistic monarchies, was now reduced to Cilicia and northern Syria.
The Jewish high-priest John Hyrcanus 184 extricated himself unharmed
from the disaster in Media and swiftly regained his independence from
the Seleucid princes who followed Antiochus VII. These princes were
not much more than condottieri, fighting against their cousins, against the
growing and increasingly aggressive power of the Jews, against the
Nabataean and Ituraean Arabs, the Greek cities in Syria and Phoenicia,
and the local dynasts. The final agony of the Seleucids had begun.

IV. ASIA MINOR, 158-129 B.C.

(a) The last A ttalids and the origin of Toman Asia

When Eumenes II died in 158, his son Attalus was too young to rule. 185
The kingdom passed to Eumenes’ brother Attalus, whom Eumenes had
already made his co-ruler, undoubtedly with the understanding that
his son was to succeed him. Attalus had always been loyal, even when his
loyalty incurred the Senate’s disapproval (p. 552). An expression of this
loyalty was Attalus’ formal epithet Philadelphos (‘the one who loves his
brothers)’). Attalus made it clear from the beginning that his brother’s
son was to be his heir. He also married his brother’s widow Stratonice.

With the accession of Attalus II relations with Rome improved, since
the Senate harboured no grudge against him as it had against Eumenes.
The change, however, was only superficial; there was no change in the
Roman policy that had penalized the kingdom by setting Galatia free
(p. 333), and Roman suspicion about Pergamene activities was kept alive
by the repeated charges of enemies, especially Prusias II and the Gala-
tians. Eumenes and Attalus were accused of secret activities in Galatia (p.
334); the accusations were not without foundation. Soon after his
accession Attalus considered using force to regain some control of
Galatia, and all his advisers but one shared his view. A unique document,
a secret letter written by Attalus c. 1 5 8 to the priest of Pessinus in Galatia
(published much later), gives a valuable insight into the matter.

184 For the surname and its origin: Schiirer 197), 201 n, 2: (e 112).

185 A birth-date in the sixties seems to follow from Polyb. xxxni.18.2. For the vexed question
who were the parents of Attalus III: Hansen 1971,471-4: (e 57); Hopp 1977, 16-26: (e6o); Walbank
I 957 ” 79 » ni.417-18: (b 38); Allen 1983, 1 89-94: (e 52). On balance, the view seems preferable that he
was the son of Eumenes and Stratonice, not to be easily reconciled with Polyb. xxx.9.6 (an oddly
phrased addition to the text after 1 38 b.c.). The alternative seems to be that he was Eumenes’ son by a
concubine. There are decisive arguments against the view once widely held, that he was born in 1 71
as the son of Attalus (II) and Stratonice, and there is little to recommend the opinion of Vatin and
Hopp that he was borne by Stratonice to an anonymous natural father; against: Polyb. xviif .4 1, not
discussed by Hopp or Walbank.

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When we came to Pergamum and I assembled not only Athenaeus and Sosander
and Menogenes but many others also of my ‘relatives’, and when I laid before
them what we discussed in Apamea and told them our decision, there was a very
long discussion, and at first all inclined to the same opinion with us, but Chlorus
vehemently held forth the Roman power and counselled us in no way to do
anything without them. In this at first few concurred, but afterwards, as day
after day we kept considering, it appealed more and more, and to launch an
undertaking without their participation began to seem fraught with great
danger; if we were successful the attempt promised to bring us envy and
detraction and baneful suspicion -that which they felt also toward my brother-
while if we failed we should meet certain destruction. For they would not, it
seemed to us, regard our disaster with sympathy but would rather be delighted
to see it, because we had undertaken such projects without them. ... I decided,
therefore, to send to Rome on every occasion men to make constant report of
cases where we are in doubt. . . , 186

Nothing shows more clearly than this document how the Senate’s
message after the Third Macedonian War to its former allies came to be
understood at the court of the Attalids: they were to have no independent
policy. Action in pursuit of policy was restricted to cases where it served
Roman interests (as in the support given to Ariarathes in 1 5 7, p. 559, or
to the Syrian pretender Alexander, p. 362), or where no Roman interest
was at stake. Self-defence, of course, was still tolerated, as in 156, when
Prusias attacked Attalus (p. 3 5 9), but the Senate intervened, when, in the
aftermath of that war, Attalus and Ariarathes took punitive action
against the city of Priene (p. 361). The Senate’s concern in Asia Minor
then was to preserve th e status quo. Little room was left for Attalid policy.

It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that the Senate did not react
sooner and more strongly than it actually did to Attalus’ one display of
adventurous spirit; in 149 Attalus was instrumental in having his old foe
Prusias of Bithynia overthrown. Prusias had sent his son Nicomedes to
Rome to petition the Senate for an exemption from the payment of the
rest of the indemnity which he owed to Attalus under the treaty of 154.
He is also said to have instructed Menas, should the mission fail, to have
the prince assassinated, since he wanted to leave the throne to another
son. When the matter was discussed in the Senate, Attalus’ ambassador
Andronicus easily won the day by demonstrating that the indemnity did
not cover the amount of damagedone. Menas revealed his instructions to
the prince, the two contacted Andronicus, and the Pergamene promised
Attalus’ support if Nicomedes would rise against his father. In a town in
north-western Greece on their way home Nicomedes was proclaimed
king in the presence of Andronicus, some Pergamene and some

*86 Welles, RC 61. The traditional interpretation of this document, attacked by Sherwin- White
1984, 39-40: (a 34), seems to be correct. See also Gruen 1984, 591 n. 87: (a 20).

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Bithynian troops. Attalus received him in his capital and demanded from
Prusias the cession of part of his kingdom to Nicomedes. When this was
rejected, he invaded Bithynia. Prusias informed the Senate, convinced
that Rome would not tolerate such a flagrant breach of the peace. In fact,
Roman intervention was so slow and so hesitant that the Senate’s
partiality became obvious, much to the anger of Cato. Prusias was
abandoned by his subjects, his troops, and the Romans; he was killed by
his son’s soldiers in Nicomedia in the temple of Zeus where he had
sought refuge (149). Attalus had helped Nicomedes II to the Bithynian
throne. 187

There was a sequel to this war. Prusias’ last resort had been five
hundred Thracian soldiers, sent at his request by his kinsman Diegylis,
the king of the Thracian Caeni whodwelt in the hinterland of Byzantium.
Diegylis is described as utterly vicious and cruel; he harassed the Greek
cities, particularly those in the Thracian Chersonese, the Gallipoli penin-
sula, which had become Attalid territory after the war against Antiochus.
He seized and burned down Lysimacheia. Attalus declared war and
defeated and killed Diegylis in or shortly before 145. The city of Elaeus
(Gallipoli) praised him as ‘Saviour and Benefactor’. After some time,
however, the Thracian raids began again, and when the Attalid dynasty
ended and there was no Attalid governor in charge of the Chersonese and
the Thracian lands, Thracian pressure on the Greek cities seems to have
increased. 188

During this time Attalus twice showed his loyalty to Rome by
supporting Roman armies: in 148 in Macedonia against Andriscus with
his fleet, in 146 against the Achaeans with a detachment of soldiers under
the command of his general Philopoemen, who also had charge of the
king’s seal as is shown by a dedication erected in his honour in the
Heraeum of Samos by Attalus himself. Several works of art from the rich
booty of Corinth found their way to Pergamum and some were still there
to be seen by Pausanias in the later second century a.d. 189

187 Habicht, P IF', ‘Prusias’, 1 1 20-4. Walbank 1957-79, 111.673: (b 38), suggests that Prusias’ order
to assassinate the prince may have been invented to justify the conspiracy of Menas and Nicomedes.
For Cato’s role: Astin 1978, 125: (h 68). The Numidian king Massinissa also seems to have given
support to Nicomedes ( IDelos 1577). Attalus II, in a dedication in Pergamum after the victory,
unabashedly and falsely stated that Prusias had violated the treaty of 154, concluded under the
auspices of Rome ( OGIS 327)! See also OGIS 299, with Jones 1974, 188: (e 61).

188 For Diegylis sec Diod. Sic. xxxin. 14-15, xxxiv. 12 (his son Zibelmius); Strabo xin, p. 624;
App. Mi/hr. 6; Trogus, Pro l. xxxvi. Attalus in Gallipoli: CRAI 1917, 25-8; CQ 1 1 (1917) 1-2. See
also the dedications from Panium, OGIS 303-4. For the date of the expedition see OGIS 330, with
Robert 1928, 439-41: (b 62), and 1935, 76-8: (e i 6 i); Jones 1974, 1 89: (e 61). For the renewal of
Thracian incursions, OGIS 339, 12-16 and 55. In general: Hopp 1977, 96-8: (e 60).

199 War against Andriscus: Strabo xm, p. 624; Z on. ix.28; Hopp 1977,93-6: (e6o). Achaean War:
Paus. vm. 16. t, 8; Pliny, HN vn.126. For Philopoemen: Paus. loc. ci AIDAIf A) 44 (1919) 30 no.
16; Plut. Mor. 792A. He must have been the successor of Demetrius (n. 18).

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376 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

In the capital Attalus completed the smaller frieze of the Great Altar
(n. 17) and built and dedicated the temple of Hera ‘the Queen’ ( Basilis ) in
the vicinity of the upper gymnasium. In conformity with the tradition of
the royal house he made rich donations to various Greek cities and
sanctuaries outside the kingdom, the most lavish of which was the
erection of a magnificent stoa in the agora of Athens. 190 Within his realm
Attalus founded or refounded a number of cities, among which were
Philadelphia in Lydia and Attaleia in Pamphylia that still bears his name
today. 191

When the Roman ambassadors to the east, led by Scipio Aemilianus,
visited Pergamum in 139 they found a well-organized and stable king-
dom. 192 The king, by now over eighty years of age, had done much to
strengthen it. He was on good terms with his Cappadocian neighbour
and had contributed to the decline of Seleucid power. Bithynia, formerly
a country hostile to the Pergamenes, was now ruled by a king indebted to
Attalus. The old monarch had not only repelled Thracian aggression
against his European territories, but also succeeded in expanding his
kingdom there. In 1 39 it could hardly have been foreseen that a few years
later the monarchy of the Attalids would disappear.

Attalus died in 138 and was succeeded by his nephew Attalus III
P/ji/ometor who loves his mother’). 193 A letter from Attalus to Ephesus,
the home of one of young Attalus’ teachers, shows how seriously the
king had taken the responsibility of preparing the crown prince to
govern. Other inscriptions show that Philometor had been given some
royal functions to perform several years before his uncle died. 194 It was

190 For the temple of Hera: MDAI( A) 37 (1912) 283 no. 6. For the Stoa of Attalus and its
dedicatory inscription: Thompson and Wycherley 1972, 103-8: (b 203). Attalus and Ariarathes V as
princes were thought to have dedicated in Athens a statue of the philosopher Carncades, as their
teacher ( 7 G ii 2 .378i). The dcdicants, however, could be Athenian citizens named after the kings: so
Mattingly 1971, 29-32: (d 43). For donations in Miletus see Herrmann 1965, 96-7: (e 142); Muller
1976, 5 3 n. 99: (e 1 5 5); Hopp 1977, 6-1 3: (e 60). A gift to Iulius on Ceus: 1 G xn.5.625. A royal
delegation paid respect to the sanctuary of the Cabiri in Samothrace (/C xn.8.170, 79).

191 Hansen 1971, 1 7 7 fT. : (e 57); Hopp 1977, 102-4: (e 60). Attaleia: Strabo xnt, p. 667.

192 Astin 1959: (e 123); Knibbe i960: (e 146).

193 Strabo xiii, p. 624, gives Attalus twenty-one years. Cistophoriccoins show that year 21 was his
last and Attalus Ill’s first year: Kleiner 1972, 18-23: (b 103). This must then be 1 39/8, since Eumenes’
last year (year 40) can only have been 1 59/8 and this was also Attalus’ first year. Consequently, the
fourth year of Attalus III that appears in two of his letters (Welles, RC 66.19, 67. 1 7) was 136/5 and
not, as is usually assumed, 135/4.

194 Letter of Attalus: / 0 > 1 / 47 (1964-5) 2 no. 1, with emendations listed in Rigsby 1979, 45 n. 26:
(e 160). Participation in the government: Welles, RC65 line 14,66 line 9; Swoboda, Keil and Knoll
1 9 3 5, 3 3—4 no. 75 : (b 202). For the sequence and chronology of the three letters published there sec
also Magie 1950, 774: (e 150), and Hopp 1977, 70-4: (e 60). There is a dedication of 146/5 from the
gymnasium in Pergamum by the new ephebes, in honour of Prince Attalus (MDAI(A) 29(1904)
1 70 no. 14); it tells nothing about the age of Attalus {pace Hopp, p. 25). Apollonius, son of Demetrius
(col. 11.48), may be the son of the former minister of Eumenes’ seal (n. 18), and Dionysius, son of
Asclepiades (col. 1.47), will be the eponymous magistrate of Pergamum in 105, as attested in the
document Jos. A} xiv.149; he therefore held office at the age of c. 58 years.

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377

not the latter’s fault that the nephew did not live up to people’s expecta-
tions. Attalus III, Diodorus says, was ‘unlike his predecessors’. 195 He is
charged with cruelty, disregard for his responsibilities, and a preference
for the study of various sciences. Except for the last, it is extremely
difficult to assess the validity of these charges. The king is accused of
having many of his predecessor’s counsellors and their families slaugh-
tered in the royal palace by the most brutal barbarians in his service. No
names or other details are given, except that the king is said to have
suspected some of his victims of having been implicated in the death of
his mother (who was still alive in October 1 36) and his bride Berenice,
others of plotting. The few surviving documents issued by Attalus III
give no indication that he did in fact neglect his duties, but neither do
they prove that he did not. 196 In the autumn of 133 the Roman Senate
formally decreed that all of Attalus’ acts, down to the day before he died,
should remain valid (p. 378). This shows the Roman opinion, at least,
that whatever the king’s qualities, the administrative routine was carried
out more or less normally.

The sources also say that Attalus III was hated by his subjects and that
they longed for his overthrow. The charge, however, may have been
invented in order to make the Roman takeover look desirable. Decrees
praising Attalus survive and honours were bestowed upon him. On the
other hand, official documents of this kind do not prove that he was, in
fact, popular. 197 Attalus was an active investigator of a variety of sciences
and some art techniques: pharmacology, botany, zoology, medicine,
agriculture and metalwork. He planted, cultivated and tested drugs, and
apparently wrote works on a variety of such topics. The ancient scholars
Varro, Columella, the elder Pliny and especially Galen speak of his
achievements seriously and with respect. 198 Such interests and activities,
however, were not regarded as befitting a king and this eccentricity may
well have been the origin of the accusation that Attalus neglected his
duties.

Because of the extreme deficiency (and obvious hostility) of our
sources, Attalus III will always remain an enigmatic figure, but the
sources do bear out the fact that he was ‘unlike his predecessors’. Apart
from internal affairs, his reign seems to have been uneventful. Chance
alone preserves the information that the king once fought a successful

195 Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 3. For his rule sec Magic 1950, 30-2: (e 150); Hansen 1971, 142-7: (e 57);
Hopp 1 977, 107-20: (e 60). References have been kept to a minimum. That it was Attalus who had
the grammarian Daphitas executed for stinging verses about the royal house is far from certain,
although Fontenrose i960: (e 5 5) has convinced several scholars including Hopp 1977, 1 19 n. 66: (e
60). See Braund 1982, 3 5 4—7: (e 125). 196 Welles, RC 66-7, perhaps also 68-9.

197 OGIS 332; MDAI( A ) 32 (1907) 3 1 1 no. 33; ibid. 33 (1908) 375 no. 1. See also n. 194. Nicander
of Colophon (or rather Nicander II) dedicated a hymn, the beginning of which survives, to the king:
Gow and Schofield 1933, 7-8: (1 14). 198 References in Hansen 1971, 144-5: (e 57).

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378

THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

campaign and was granted extravagant honours by the people of Perga-
mum on his return. Whom he fought, where and when he fought is not
known. 199 Even less illuminating is the information that in 1 34/3 he sent
(as did Antiochus.VII of Syria) splendid gifts to Scipio Aemilianus who
was campaigning in Spain - he must have met him more than once and
certainly did so in the capital in 1 39. 200

The one truly memorable event of Attalus’ reign is his bequest to
Rome: before he died in the spring of 133, without family or heir, he
willed whatever was his to the Roman people. 201 The king’s testament
took the Romans by surprise. The first to react was the tribune Tiberius
Gracchus; he introduced a bill with a provision that the bequest be used
to help finance his agrarian programme. He also declared that the Senate
had no right whatsoever to deal with something bequeathed to the
Roman people. 202 Only after Gracchus’ death was the Senate free to act.
As already mentioned, a decree was passed that all measures taken by the
deceased king down to the day before he died should remain valid and
not be changed by the Roman representatives who were to be sent to
Asia. Acceptance of the bequest is clearly implied, 203 and, in fact, before
the end of the year, a committee of five Roman legati, headed by the
pontifex maximus Scipio Nasica (who, as the murderer of Gracchus, had
become highly unpopular), went out to settle affairs. The committee ran
into difficulties. Not only did Scipio die soon after his arrival in Perga-
mum, but a pretender to the throne challenged Rome. 204

Soon after Attalus’ death, Aristonicus, who claimed to be and may
have been an illegitimate son of King Eumenes 11 , had himself pro-
claimed King Eumenes III, as coins with the abbreviated title and name
show. 205 At first he had considerable success, partly owing to the fact that
the Romans were involved in internal feuding, the last stages of the

199 OGIS 332; see foP in, p. 3, and Hopp 1977, 111-12: (e 60). 200 Cic. Deiot. 19.

201 Main sources in Greenidge and Clay i960, 11-12: (b 212).

202 Plut. 77 . Gracch. 14; Badian 1972, 712-14: (h 32). The statement seems to have referred
specifically to the cities in Attalus’ kingdom. The bill may never have been passed.

203 OGIS 435 (Sherk, Documents 1 1) with the comments of Drew-Bear 1972: (e 1 34), superseding
all previous work. As Drew-Bear has shown, OGIS 4 36 lines 1—5 (Sherk no. 13) is from another copy
of the same decree. Gruen 1984, 603-4: (a 20), dates these documents to 129 b.c.

204 The bilingual funerary inscription of Scipio has been found in Pcrgamum: MDA\( A) 35
(1910) 483 no. 77; Tuchelt MDAI (/) 29 (1979) 309-16.

205 Demonstrated by Robinson 1954: (b 129) from cistophoric tetradrachms, dated to years 2, 3
and 4, and minted in Thyatira, Apollonis and Stratoniceia-on-Caicus. Another from Synnada with
the legend BA AP has been interpreted Ba(ot\€ojs) 'Ap(ioTovtKou) y ‘King Aristonicus’, most
recently by Hopp 1977, 1 2 iff.: (e6o), who theorizesfrom this that Aristonicus’ usurpation occurred
during Attalus’ lifetime, that the usurper took the title ‘King Aristonicus’ and changed it, after
Attalus’ death, to ‘King Eumenes’. If correct, this would shed new light on Attalus’ motives for the
bequest, but such a change is extremely unlikely, and the absence of a date year I would then be very
hard to explain. The theory collapses, in any event, since this coin is considerably earlier: Kleiner and
Noe 1976, 8 1: (b 105); perhaps referringto King Ariarathes IV: Morkholm 1979, 52-4: (b i 16). See
further Adams 1980: (b 76) with Gruen 1984, 595 n. ioi: (a 20).

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ASIA MINOR, 158-129 B.C.

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Spanish War, and a slave revolt in Sicily and so were slow to decide upon
the bequest and slow to react to the usurpation. Most of the major cities
seem to have opposed Aristonicus; some, if not most, had been declared
free in Attalus’ will. For Pergamum this was the confirmation of an
already existing state of affairs, but for others, like Ephesus, a new
grant. 206 Pergamum immediately reacted to Aristonicus’ move with a
decree designed to strengthen the citizen body; this was passed before it
was known whether Rome would accept the bequest. 207 Among the
Greek cities only Phocaea is known to have joined Aristonicus spontane-
ously. Others like Samos, Colophon and Myndus (in Ionia and Caria) had
to be taken by force.

Aristonicus has sometimes been regarded as the leading spirit of a
social movement. He is said to have mobilized the slaves and the rural
poor against the free and the wealthy in the cities. The evidence does not
bear this out. Aristonicus, it is true, after he had suffered some setbacks,
appealed to poor people and to slaves. It is also true that he called his
followers ‘citizens of Sun-city’ ( Heliopolitai ) and that the Stoic philos-
opher Blossius of Cumae joined him after the death of Tiberius Grac-
chus, to whom he had been close. These facts, however, prove only that
Aristonicus was eventually forced to look for support where he could
find it. Nothing suggests that he began as a social reformer or that he was
transformed into one. His goal most likely was political: to establish
himself as the successor of the kings. An appeal to the lower strata of
society in emergencies was common in antiquity. Most of the usurper’s
support during the war will have come from those who had political and
national reasons rather than the desire to change the conditions under
which they lived.

The war must have begun in 1 3 3. 208 Aristonicus was opposed by much
of the urban population as well as other inhabitants of the former
kingdom, by the kings of Asia Minor allied with Rome, Nicomedes II of
Bithynia, Mithridates V of Pontus, Ariarathes V of Cappadocia, and

206 That Attalus in his will reaffirmed the freedom of Pergamum is attested in the Pergamene
decree cited n. 207, line 5. Rigsby 1979: (e 160) has shown that the ‘era of the province of Asia’ from
154/3 is, in fact, a municipal era of Ephesus - so, independently, Adams 1980 511-14: (b 76)
probably motivated by a grant of freedom to the city in Attalus’ will.

207 OGIS 338; Hopp 1977, 131—5: (e 60).

208 The principal modern works are Vavfinek 1957: (e 69); Dumont 1966: (e 155); Carrata-
Thomcs 1968: (e 150); Hansen 1971, 150-9: (e 57); Rubinsohn 1973: (b 30); Vavfinek 1975: (e 70);
Hopp 1977, 1 3 1-47: (e6o); Dclplace 1978: (e i 53); Adams 1980: (b 76); Collins 198 1 : (e 151); Braund
1985, 21-3, 49ff.: (e 1 26); Gruen 1984, 592^: (a 20); ShcrwinAVhite 1984, 84-8: (a 54). Inscriptions
referring to the war (besides those cited in other notes): IGRom iv. 1 3 1 (Cyzicus); jOAI n ( 1 908) 69
no. 6, perhaps also LIP' 504 (Halicarnassus); Hollcaux 1919: (e 24) from Bargylia with Jones 1974,
191-2: (e 61), and Herrmann 1974, *57-8: (e 143); Herrmann 1962, 5 no. 2: (t 14 1) (Maeonia);
tLpigraphica Anatolica 5 (1984) 157 (Gordos). General allusions to the war are to be found in Robert
1937, 459-67: (e 162), from Bargylia; OGIS 339.16-24 from Sestos; IG xn Suppl. 1 16 from
Mcthymna; foP 14 from Pergamum.

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380 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

Pylaemenesof Paphlagonia, and by Byzantium and other cities abroad. A
Roman army under the consul and pontifex maximus Publius Licinius
Crassus finally arrived in 131, but Crassus was soon defeated and killed in
a battle near Pergamum; Ariarathes was another casualty. Crassus’
successor, the consul Marcus Perperna, defeated Aristonicus in 1 30 and
took him prisoner in Stratoniceia-on-Caicus, but Perperna died while the
victory celebrations, to be held in Pergamum, were being prepared. 209 So
the consul of 129, Manius Aquillius, assumed command, had the last
strongholds of Aristonicus’ followers stormed, and brought the war to
an end. With the assistance of ten senatorial envoys he transformed the
kingdom of the Attalids into the Roman province of Asia. 210

(b) Rhodes after 164 b.c. 2U

Once the Senate had capped the humiliation of the Rhodians in 164 by
granting them the treaty they had long been petitioning for, Rome could
indulge in a more generous attitude. The Senate agreed to allow Rhodes
to acquire the Carian city of Calynda, whose inhabitants preferred
Rhodian rule to the domination of Caunus. The Rhodians, to show their
gratitude, voted to erect a colossal figure of the people of Rome. In Caria,
at least, Rhodes remained attractive to a number of smaller towns,
especially to those that had uneasy relations with larger cities; Ceramus
for one, it seems, at her own initiative, was granted a treaty by Rhodes
e. 163. 212

Since the Rhodian economy had been hard hit by the Roman punitive
measures, Rhodes was quite prepared to accept royal donations - and
what they implied - from such men as Eumenes II in 161/60 and

209 The identity of this Stratoniccia (as opposed to Carian Stratoniceia) has been argued by
Broughton 1954: (e i 29), and established when the coins minted there were recognized as coins of
Aristonicus (n. 205). For the victory of Perperna and the festival to be held in Pergamum see IPriene
108.225-52, 109.91— 5 ; for the victories of both Perperna and Aquillius see OGIS 695.89 with n. 17.
Perperna granted a privilege to the sanctuary of the Persian Artemis, Anaitis, in Hicracome in Lydia:
Tac. Ann. iv.62.2; Robert 1948, 57-8: (b 61).

2.0 Strabo xiv, p. 646; Shcrk, Documents 25.15. Gruen 1984, 605—8: (a 20), argues that transform-
ation into a Roman province came considerably later. For several years Aquillius was occupied with
the building of roads and several milestones survive: CIL i 2 .646~5 1 ; Magic 1950, 15 7-8, 1048-9: (e
150); he returned to celebrate a triumph in 1 26. Pergamum established a cult of Aquillius, which still
existed two generations later: Jones 1974, 197-8: (E 61).

2.1 The principal sources are Polyb. xxxi.4-5, xxxi.ji; Diod. Sic. xxxi.56; for the Cretan war:
Polyb. xxxni.4 (Diod. Sic. xxxi.57), xxxnr. i 5.2, 15.5-17; Diod. Sic. xxxi.58, 45—45 ; Trogus, Pro/,
xxxv; IL/ndos p. 1009, and perhaps also. 5 */C 7 67 5 . The date is disputed: Robert, in Holleaux 1958-68,
iv. i. 1 75 n. 2: (d 55). For the Rhodian squadron in the Third Punic War see App. Lib. 1 1 2.5 54. A
Rhodian delegation in the sanctuary of the Cabiri in Samothrace,r. 1 50: IG xti.8. 1 71, 65. In general:
Schmitt 1957, 171-80: (E77); Sherwin-White 1984,50-6: (a 54); for the cult of Roma: Melior 1975,
27-56: (1 25).

212 Michel, Recueil 458, with Robert 1935, 60-1: (e 161). For later Rhodian activities in Caria, c.
150, see Holleaux 1919, 16-19: (e 24); Robert 1957, 465: (e 162).

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381

Demetrius I at about the same time. 213 It seems significant that the
donors were kings whose relations with Rome were rather delicate. Part
of what Eumenes promised was left for Attalus II to pay after Eumenes
died in 158. Perhaps these gifts influenced the Rhodians to lend Attalus
naval support in his war against Prusias (n. 1 34) and, in that same year, to
decline a request from Priene to intervene when Attalus and Ariarathes
were ravaging Prienian territory (n. 137). In any event, they had their
hands full with a war of their own against Cretan cities (1 5 5-1 5 3) and it
was not going well at all. The cause of the war may be connected with
Rhodian attempts to suppress Cretan piracy. Allusions in Polybius and
Diodorus make it clear that the Rhodians suffered unexpected defeats
and that the Cretans were on the attack in several places, such as
Carpathos, where they were finally repelled, and Siphnos, which they
seized through treachery and brutally sacked before they were forced to
retreat and were destroyed. Both sides appealed to the Achaean League
in 154/3 f° r military assistance, but the Achaeans kept out of the struggle.
At last, prompted by a Rhodian embassy, Roman envoys seem to have
laid the war to rest.

A Rhodian squadron participated in the last Roman war against
Carthage in 147, but the destruction of Carthage may not have been
welcomed in Rhodes; it certainly meant the disappearance of a competi-
tor, but probably also the loss of a partner in international trade . 214 The
destruction of Carthage was witnessed not only by Polybius, but appar-
ently by the most famous Rhodian of his time, the Stoic philosopher
Panaetius, who was a friend of Scipio Aemilianus and who appeared
again in his entourage during the latter’s famous mission to the east in
140/39. 215 After Rhodes had been reduced to a second-rate power, men
such as Panaetius and his pupil Poseidonius made the island a famous
cultural centre that rivalled Athens and surpassed Pergamum. Its philo-
sophical school, throughout the later second and the entire first century,
attracted eminent Romans. Their respect for Rhodians such as Panaetius
may well lie behind the phrase in a decree of the Senate, passed in 135,
upholding an earlier decision made by Rhodian arbitrators in a quarrel
between Priene and Samos: ‘It is no easy matter for us to change what the
people of Rhodes, on whose arbitration both sides had agreed, have
ruled .’ 216

2.3 For Eumenes: Diod. Sic. xxxi.36; for Demetrius, n. 123. Polybius scorns the Rhodians for the
acceptance of Eumenes’ gift, probably because his fellow-Achaeans had shown greater pride
rejecting an earlier offer by the king: n. 20. See Walbank 1957-79, 111.515: (b 38).

2.4 Schmitt 1957, 278: (e 77).

2.5 See Blinkenbcrg in I Undos, pp. 501-2; for the Roman embassy of 140/39: Astin 1959: (e i 23);

Knibbe i960: (e 146). 216 Sherk, Documents 10, b jo-ii.

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582 THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

v. epilogue: roman policy in the east, 189-129 B.C.

It can be argued and has in fact been argued that Roman policy in the east
during the third century was defensive, reacting only to developments
that seemed to endanger Rome’s security. Roman policy in the second
century, on the contrary, was aggressive, often treacherous, unpredict-
able, cruel and immoral. These verdicts are mainly based on the account
of the contemporary historian Polybius. He was Greek, to be sure, but he
cannot be accused of anti-Roman bias. Being himself a victim of an
arbitrary Roman action, he had, in his misfortune, the good luck of being
well treated by the members of a powerful Roman family. During the
many years he spent in Rome he came to admire the efficiency of the
Roman state and some of the ideals of the nobility. Above all, he was
fascinated by the unfailing instinct for power displayed, individually and
collectively, by Roman senators. And he was overwhelmed by the
dimensions of Rome’s growing empire. Rome’s arm already reached out
to the whole of Italy and Sicily, to Africa, Spain, Greece, Asia Minor, the
Near East and Egypt. For Polybius this was the universe. He never
ceased to be a Greek and a patriotic Achaean, but he eventually persuaded
himself that the conquest of the world by the Romans was not only a great
and memorable achievement, but that it was also beneficial for those
conquered.

Nevertheless it is this admirer of Rome who reports many of the
actions which made Roman policy in the east unique and awful. It has
been observed, rightly I think, that his standards were different from
ours, that he was more inclined than modern historians to tolerate acts of
questionable morality, if a worthwhile political gain resulted. 217 It is,
however, fairly obvious that Polybius must have gone through some
pain before he arrived, on balance, at a favourable verdict of Rome’s rise
to world power. A good many passages in his work suggest at least that
he felt some uneasiness, that he had reservations about Roman actions.
However, the deficiencies of the Greek states and the Greek society from
which he came and the respect and honour paid to him personally by
some of the most eminent Romans undoubtedly made him more inclined
to stress the glorious rather than the dark features of Roman
expansion. 218

Be that as it may, it is notso much Polybius’ judgement that is relevant
here as that of those who read him in order to form an opinion on Rome’s
rise to world power. They cannot fail to notice that, from the end of the
third century onwards, Roman policy was aggressive. In 200, for in-
stance, the Romans had reasons for going to war with Philip (mainly the

2,7 Walbank 1972, 1 7 1—3 : (b 39). 218 Walbank 1972, 166-73, 178, 181: (b 39).

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ROMAN POLICY IN THE EAST, 189— 1 29 B.C. 383

indecisive peace of 205), but hardly a sufficient cause. They had no
obligation whatsoever towards Athens, Aetolia or Rhodes, and a very
slight one, at best, towards Attalus. Some of Philip’s actions, however,
caused concern. But the Romans made no serious attempt to settle the
disputed questions through negotiations. Instead, they presented Philip
with flat demands that made war unavoidable.

No sooner was Philip defeated than the Senate proclaimed that all the
Greeks of Asia should be free. This was a statement unwarranted by the
events, unacceptable to Antiochus and therefore hazardous to the peace.
It was, moreover, altogether needless, unless it was meant to provide
some basis for future Roman intervention. It is therefore significant that
this doctrine was promptly abandoned as no longer useful after
Antiochus’ defeat: it had served its purpose. True enough, Antiochus
himself had played into the Romans’ hands when he tied himself to the
Aetolians and made the fatal mistake of invading Greece. Nonetheless,
the conflict originated from unwarranted and provocative declarations
on the part of Rome. Twenty years later, when the Romans declared war
on King Perseus, they had no cause at all. Perseus was willing to avoid
war by almost all means, but was not given a chance. The fate of the
Carthaginians in 149 was similar. It cannot be denied that Roman policy
had become aggressive by the end of the Hannibalic War and that after
the victories over Philip and Antiochus the veil dropped from Rome’s
aggressive character.

Macedon and Carthage had been enemies, Antiochus neither enemy
nor friend. It was for the allies and friends to experience the treacherous
character of Roman policy. The assurances given to Prusias of Bithynia
in order to keep him away from Antiochus’ camp were withdrawn as
soon as Antiochus was defeated, and part of Prusias’ realm was given to
his foe Eumenes (p. 325). Rome’s oldest and firmest allies in the east,
Pergamum and Rhodes, fared even worse, once Macedon was extin-
guished (pp. 332, 337)- It was utterly dishonest of the Senate to play the
prince Demetrius against his father, King Philip, or Attalus against his
brother, King Eumenes (p. 332), or the Galatians against the latter
(p. 333). The same class of nobles that had assured Demetrius I that he
would find Rome amenable if he satisfied Roman expectations soon
thereafter gave its support to an obscure pretender, although Demetrius
had done no harm to Rome (pp. 357-8).

Roman policy was also unpredictable, since wherever the Senate
concluded that a situation could be exploited to Rome’s advantage, it did
so without much regard for legal claims. In 189 the Senate gave away
large parts of Asia Minor as a gift. Twelve years later the Rhodians were
formally told that the gift had not been a gift, and eventually it was taken
away from both Rhodes and Eumenes (pp. 336-7, 333). Likewise, there

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THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

was nothing in the treaty with Antiochus III preventing the Seleucid
king from making war against Egypt. But in 168 Rome threatened
Antiochus IV (who had not been the aggressor) with war, if he did not
withdraw from Egypt and Cyprus (p. 344). This was tantamount to
adding a clause unilaterally to the treaty. Nor did Rome hesitate to
violate that treaty to a degree that made it obsolete. When it was
concluded the parties had established peace and friendship between
themselves. Loyalty was to be expected and was in fact observed by the
Seleucids. Rome, on the contrary, contacted and encouraged rebellious
subjects of Antiochus Epiphanes and even accepted them as allies
(pp. 354, 358—9). Roman policy, it may be said, was determined by
political considerations; to these, questions of law and morality were
subordinated. Philip V was the first to complain openly about this, when
he realized that the peace he had concluded with Rome went contrary to
his expectations; it was not only the end of hostilities, but also the
beginning of Roman interference in his affairs. 219 Philip recognized what
soon became more and more apparent: that Rome did not intend to
negotiate but to give orders.

If indeed the Senate considered itself to be the final arbiter of world
affairs, then the notorious arrogance of Roman representatives in the east
is easily explained. Aemilius Lepidus displayed such arrogance in his
encounter with Philip as early as 200, Cornelius Lentulus in his dealings
with Antiochus III in 1 96, the consul Acilius in 1 89 vis-a-vis the Aetolian
ambassadors. Similar was the conduct of Popillius Laenas towards
Antiochus in 168 (p. 344), of Sulpicius Galus towards Eumenes in 164 (p.
334) and of Octavius in Syria (p. 354). Even cases of outright criminality
were taken lightly by the Senate: nothing suggests that T. Flamininus
was censured for having acquiesced in the murder of the boeotarch
Brachylles, and the treacherous conduct of Marcius Philippus’ dealings
with Perseus, although criticized by some senators, was approved by the
majority of the House. 220

There is no need to elaborate on Roman cruelty, since the phenom-
enon is well known. The treatment of Epirus in 167 may be cited as just
one example, inflicted on the unlucky country by a man who was
considered by many to be a model of Roman virtue, L. Aemilius Paullus.
The ways in which the second-century Senate handled international
affairs and conducted its foreign policy show that it was fully aware of
Rome’s superior power. This superiority was recognized early and far
beyond the frontiers of Rome. About 180 b.c. the Achaean Callicrates
formulated his political doctrine that the Achaeans, while being allies of

2,9 Polyb. xxiii. 2.7; Livy xxxix.26, 28.

220 Flamininus: Polyb. xvm.43. ‘Pilate’s role’, Waibank 1957-79, 111.180: (b 38). Philippus:
Briscoe 1964: (d 8).

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ROMAN POLICY IN THE EAST, 189-129 B.C. 385

Rome, could do nothing better than to regard Roman requests as orders
to be obeyed, superior even to the laws and the treaties of the Achaeans
themselves. 221 It is therefore no surprise to find the same Callicrates later
stating that the Achaeans without Roman authorization should not make
war with anybody nor give military support to anybody. 222 By that time
King Attalus of Pergamum too had been forced to admit that he had
better avoid any move that could be viewed by the Romans as a sign of an
independent policy (p. 374). If there had still been doubts about the
superior power of Rome or the Senate’s determination to exploit it even
in areas that seemed of no immediate concern to Rome, they were
dispelled by the fate of Macedon, the retreat of Antiochus from Egypt
and the punishment inflicted upon Eumenes and Rhodes. This is clear
from the facts and is also explicitly stated by Polybius, who says that
thereafter ‘it was universally accepted as a necessary fact that all must
submit to the Romans and obey their orders’. 223 This feeling was so
general that when the free city of Athens in the later part of the century
granted the guild of artists some privileges, it was found desirable to add
‘provided that nothing in this is found contrary to the Romans’. 224

When Polybius announces that he decided to continue his narrative
beyond the year 168 which capped the rise of Rome to supremacy and
when he adds that this would also enable his readers to see how' those
subject to Roman domination reacted to it, he thought this period an
important one for forming a judgement about Roman domination by
both contemporaries and posterity. 225 Rather surprisingly, he nowhere
discusses the problem thoroughly. Only a partial answer is given in a
long chapter (xxxvi.9), where he quotes anonymous Greek voices either
condemning or defending Roman policy and Roman domination. There
are parallels for such a method in ancient historiography, w'hich allows
the historian to discuss controversial issues u'ithout openly committing
himself. 226 There has been much discussion as to w'hether Polybius
himself sides with the attacking or the defending opinions. 227 His opin-
ion may lie between, but what matters more is that to those who judge
Roman policy from a distance in time the attackers seem to have by far
the stronger case.

It is perhaps the most significant feature of Roman policy that the
Senate was not prepared to regard a settlement w'ith another major
power - even if it was made after a decisive victory and therefore
advantageous to Rome — to be final. As Philip learned in 200 and again in
1 8 5 and Perseus somewhat later, peace with Rome as far as the Senate was

221 Polvb. xxiv. 8-1 3; Errington 1969, 2ooff.: (d 23). 222 Polyb. xxxm. 16.7-8.

223 Polyb. hi. 4. 3, tr. W. R. Paton. 224 FD 111.2.68, 60. 225 Polyb. 111.4.6-7.

226 Compare the anonymous Athenians judging Aicibiades on his return to Athens in 408 (Xen.
Hell. 1.4.13-17 ) or the famous discussion about Augustus in Tac. Ann. 1.9-10.

227 Discussion and bibliography in W’albank 1957-79, 111.663^.: (b 38).

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THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR RIVALS

concerned was only an intermediate stage. So was the peace with
Antiochus of 1 89, as his son, Antiochus IV, came to realize in 1 68, and so
was the peace of 201 with Carthage. For republican states of lesser
strength, there were other means to secure their obedience: the treaty
between Rome and the Aetolians obliged the Aetolians to respect the
maiestas of the Roman people; the treaty granted to Rhodes in 164 may
have carried a similar clause. The Achaeans, however, who had been
allied with Rome from the early years of the century, paid for their first
firm opposition to an arbitrary Roman act with the destruction of
Corinth and the dismemberment of their League.

No doubt, second-century Rome was driven to extend its power,
whether deliberately, as Polybius asserts, 228 or by instinct. The result was
that all major Hellenistic states, whether monarchies or republics, were
either eliminated, reduced to the role of satellites of Rome, or henceforth
entirely negligible. Whereas Hellenistic culture survived and proved
strong enough to conquer even Rome, political domination shifted to
other powers, to the Romans, the Parthians, the Jews. It now was for
them to decide whether to protect Hellenistic culture, as the Parthians
tried to do from the beginning and the Romans learned to do, or whether
to attack it, as seemed natural for the Jews (although the Hasmonean
dynasty adopted a good many Hellenistic features). There can be no
doubt that Roman policy in the second century played into the hands of
native, non-Greek people in Egypt and in the Near East. Roman policy
thereby contributed at least to the rise of the Hasmoneans and to the
expansion of the Parthians. By adding to the difficulties of the Seleucids,
Roman policy made it easier for the Parthians to reach the Euphrates; in
an indirect way the Romans put self-imposed limits on the possible
growth of their empire. When they supported the Jews against their
Seleucid masters, the Romans created major problems for their own
descendants. There was, however, a long time to come before the
Romans, in the days of Pompey, themselves took over Syria and Pales-
tine, and still more time before they annexed Egypt. On the other hand,
Macedon, Greece and a large part of Asia Minor were their direct
responsibility by 129. It may safely be doubted that Roman domination
improved conditions of life for those who inhabited Macedon and
Greece. For Roman Asia, on the other hand, it is beyond doubt that life
became much harder when the Romans took over from the kings. The
hardships brought about by the methods of exploitation used by the
publicani are well known. They led to violent reaction in 88, when, on the
instigation of King Mithridates Eupator, the Romans and Italians
throughout the province were slaughtered. After that, Asia had to suffer

228 Derow 1979: (d 21).

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ROMAN POLICY IN THE EAST, 189-129 B.C. 387

for two more generations: from the punishment inflicted by Sulla, from
the last Mithridatic War, the civil wars between Pompey and Caesar,
between the murderers and the heirs of Caesar and finally between
Antony and Octavian. A time of respite came only after Octavian’s final
victory. A century had gone by since the establishment of the Roman
province. In its turn Asia had experienced more oppression and violence,
more poverty and injustice than under its previous masters, the Persians,
Alexander, the Seleucids or the Attalids. Roman rule in the east during
the Republic enriched many Romans; for those subject to it, it was
anything but beneficial . 229

229 This chapter was delivered in 1984.

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CHAPTER 11

THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

A . K . N A RAIN

I. INTRODUCTION

No history of the Greeks can be considered complete without an account
of their shared experience in the ancient east. In the Achaemenid period,
when the Persian empire extended from Greece to Gandhara, a meeting
between the east and the west had taken place. Indian soldiers in the
Persian army fought on Greek soil, and Greeks such as Scylax made
explorations in India for the Persians. Babylonian documents record that
in the fifth century b.c. there was an Indian settlement in Nippur and its
inhabitants were warriors who had served in the army and had received
land; they could lease their plots but had to pay state taxes and perform
state duties . 1 An Indian woman, Busasa, kept a tavern in the town of
Kish . 2 There were also some Greeks settled in the far eastern parts of the
Persian empire: some had been allowed to dwell there as a reward for
their assistance to the Achaemenids, while others were exiled as a
punishment for their recalcitrance . 3 Because the lonians were either the
first or the most dominant group among the Greeks with whom people
in the east came in contact, the Persians called all of them Yauna , and the
Indians used Yona and Yavana for them . 4 Panini of Gandhara, in the fifth

1 Dandamayev 1972, 3 5 ff. : (f 41); Bongard-Levin 1 985, 63-4: (f 3 1). In relation to this chapter as
a whole see also CAH Pis. to Vol. VII. /, pp. 25-32.

2 Olmstead 1948, 148: (f 117).

3 Rawlinson 1912, 32: (f 129); Narain 1957-80, 2—3: (f 103); Cozzoli 1958, 273 n. 6: (f 37); Will
CAH 2 vii. i. 30; Holt 1984, ch. 5: (F69). Apart from the definite reference in Herodotus vi.9 there are
other references in Herodotus and later sources which provide circumstantial evidence for the
presence of Greeks in the far eastern parts of the Achaemenid empire before Alexander’s arrival
there; cf. Herodotus iv. 204; Diod. Sic. xvii.i 10.4-5, a Iso the con tents list of book xvii; Arrian v. 1-4;
Curtius vii. 5. 28— 35. Cf. Hegyi 1966: (f 64), who draws attention to Herodotus iv.142 that the
lonians ‘did not regard the Persian rule as an intolerable slavery. . . . The serving of the Persian king
and loyalty to him brought for the Greeks not only reward but at the same time also the appreciation
and respect of their compatriots.’

4 Narain 1957—80, 165—9: (f 103); Tottossy 1977, 1 29—3 5 : (f i 5 3 a). But here I am using the terms
‘Greeks’ and ‘Yavanas’ not only as equivalents but also in a very broad sense to include the
Macedonians from Yugoslavia as well as the Libyans from Barca in Cyrenc, along with the Greeks
from various cities in Asia Minor and the mainland Greece, who came to the east before, during and
after the time of Alexander.

388

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INTRODUCTION

}89

century b.c., knew their script as Yavanam. 5 The imperial money econ-
omy of the Persians showed mixed circulation of their own darics and
sigloi with the Athenian Owls and the Indian Bent-Bar coins . 6 Doubtless
the settlers must have earned their living by craft and commerce, and
participated in the exchange of goods, services and ideas taking place in
the Persian empire.

In the course of his campaign in the eastern parts of what remained of
the Persian empire Alexander had met with some of these first settlers.
They ‘had not ceased to follow the customs of their native land, but they
were already bilingual, having gradually degenerated from their original
language through the influence of a foreign tongue ’. 7 Alexander is
recorded as having massacred some for the crimes their ancestors had
allegedly committed and fraternized with others because of their associ-
ation with Dionysus . 8 But Alexander brought with him a new wave of
settlers and he is believed to have founded several cities in the east.
Although conclusive evidence of the identity and location of their
material existence still remains to be discovered, and it is difficult to
determine whether true poleis, ‘cities’ in the political sense, or only
katoikiai, military foundations, were meant , 9 there is sufficient circum-
stantial evidence to assume clusters of peoples from various Greek cities,
and of the Macedonians and others, settling in Bactria and other regions

5 Ashtadhyayl iv.1.49. Panini also associated the Yavanas with the Kambojas, cf. his Ganapatha
178 on 11. 1. 72. 6 Narain 1957-80, 3-5: (f 103).

7 Diod. Sic. xvii. 1 10.4-5; Curtius vii.5.29.

8 E.g. massacre of the Branchidae (Strabo xi.11.4, xiv.1.5; Plutarch, Moralia 557 b; Curtius
vii. 5. 28-3 5) and fraternization with the Nysaeans of Kohi-i-Mor (Arrian v.1-2, vi.2-5). Some
scholars refuse to believe in the massacre of the Branchidae, for hardly any satisfactory reason. Tarn
1948, 67: (f 1 5 1), calls it a ‘clumsy fabrication’; Bernard 1985, 123—5 : (f 24). Holt 1984, 174 n. 36: (f
69), who accepts the existence of pre-Alexander Greeks in Bactria, considers it ‘unnecessary’ to
postulate a large population of them. He thinks that the Barcaeans were ‘apparently no longer there
by the time of Alexander’s arrival’ and that the Branchidae ’were all destroyed’. But if Holt is right
(and not Tarn) on the issue of the wholesale annihilation of the Branchidae, and the evidence of
Diod. Sic. xvii. 99. 5 and xvm.7.2-9 about the mass killing of the Greek colonists of Alexander in
Bactria must be considered. Tarn’s dilemma (p. 72) of accounting for the large number of Greeks in
Bactria remains unsolved; his postulation that the Selcucids must have encouraged settlements in the
area on a large scale is hard to substantiate in light of the available evidence and their political fortune
there. On the other hand ‘it is hardly necessary to think of large scale importation by Seleucids’, as
Dani 195 7, 198-9: (p 42), points out, with a reminder about the British in India. Exception has been
taken to my earlier statement that the Greeks of Bactria were mostlj descendants of earlier settlers,
e.g. Walbank 195 8, 1 26: (f i 57); Holt 1984, 174: (f 69); but see also others, e.g. Klima 1958, 173: (f
77), who consider my supposition ‘very plausible’. It is true that the documentation is not so full as
one would like it to be, but that is so for the entire history of the Greeks of Bactria and India. The
question here is not so much about the number as about the character and composition of the Greek
population involved in the creation of a new state in Bactria and India. It is not to deny the role of the
post-Alexander Greeks, even though most of them were not very happy to be in the area and were
eager to return home, but to establish a balance in the dynamics of the then prevailing historical
forces there by including the role and interests of the pre- Alexander Greeks and their Indo-Iranian
relations, which provided a locus standi as well as support, in the rationale of their success.

9 Koshelenko 1972, 59-78: (f 79); id. 1979, chs. 4 and 5, esp. 2 1 2-2 1 : (f 80); Holt 1986: (f 66);
Musti 1984, 189-90: (f 1 o 1 a), discusses the matter in the context of the Seleucids.

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390 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

CHORASMIA

Tashkent

^ \SOGDIANA ~ JkJE; ]

X S r> £ 0*

"T^ Xhanum^

fk actrao o ^ x.

Qunduz fVGiigilfejfe

S BACTRIA Anin d “ UDYAIIAty 5 :

— - — V4 Bajajr 0 f y'-

— T Kabul ° GANDHARA^A :

■AROPAMISADAE Peshawar Taxila ^
i ( f Ghazni

MARGIANE

Herat

N^Bannu

o Sialkot

J^Kandahar , ' l

ARACHOSIA

GEDROSIA

PATALENE

Land over 1 .000 metres

1500km

900 miles

Map 14. The Greek lands of central and southern Asia.

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INTRODUCTION

39 '

of eastern and southern Afghanistan, either voluntarily or on orders of
Alexander according to his plan. It is possible that some of his garrisons
and military outposts established as part of the logistics of his campaign
survived to develop into ‘cities’ after his death and were named after him.

Be that as it may, Greek settlements of this second phase were more
mixed in composition than the first ones. These Greeks who cherished
their individuality and freedom, and considered the Macedonians as
barbarians, were never a cohesive group in their original homes; nor did
they form such a group in their new homes in the east. If Alexander’s
victory had kindled hopes and aspirations among the first settlers and
their subdued elements had burst forth to revive their old traditions, the
mixed responses they received from Alexander and the Macedonians
created rivalries and hostilities among their restive elements which could
be contained only with difficulty and by force. They would rise in revolt
not only after Alexander was dead but even before, at the rumour of his
death . 10 The Greeks in the east seem never to have liked the Macedo-
nians; the appointment of Stasanor, a Greek and not a Macedonian, as
satrap to administer Bactria in 320, and his virtually independent behav-
iour are significant facts. Perhaps the Greek elements, because of older
roots in Bactria, were able to muster local support in their favour from
the Iranian nobility, who not only owned vast tracts of land but had also
shown their mettle in warfare . 1 1 Because of the non-military role of those
among them who lived by commerce and crafts, they were active
participants in the local society and economy. The existence of pseudo-
Athenian coins and other imitations and mintings of local origin in
Afghanistan suggests that some of the settlers involved in trading and a
money economy had established workshops for striking coins when they
found a disruption in the flow of money from the west during the last
days of the Persian empire. Mintings from these workshops, along with
those of some of the ambitious local satraps, are known to have been
circulating in Afghanistan during the confused period of the invasion,
and probably in the days of transition, before Alexandrian and early
Seleucid issues could become available to bring stability into the
system . 12

10 Diod. Sic. xvn.99.3; xvni.7. i; Curtius ix.7.1-3. Note the example of Athenodorusand the role
of the native Bactrians. It is surprising that some scholars play down the animosity between the
Greeks and the Macedonians. It is not simply a question of their desire to return home being no
different from that of the Greeks (Briant 1975, 6 3 : (f 103)), this matter needs to be discussed at
length. Will, CAM 2 vii.i.30, concedes that, ‘There is a problem here. . . . But the fact remains that
there were large numbers of Greeks in Bactria, that they revolted in 525 and then again in 323, that
they survived despite their defeat and the accompanying massacres, and that once calm was restored
the satrap appointed to Bactria was a Greek (the Cypriot Stasanor) and not a Macedonian.’ Sec also
Koshelenko 1979, i82ff.: (f 80).

11 Narain 1937-80, 3—6: (f 103); Musti 1984, 212-13: (f ioia ).

12 Narain 1937-80, 5—4: (f 103); Head 1906, iff.: (f 63); Schlumberger and Curicl 1933, 3ff.:
(f 138); but see Bernard 1985, 26-33: (f 24); cf. Mitchiner 1973, 1. 1—27: (f 101).

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39 2

THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

Kashgar

SOGDIANA

Ai Khartum

lactra

Qunduz

BACTl

Beg ram

Kabul

Bamiyarr

Bajaur

Peshaw)

Ghazni

Bannu

Trade route

Land over 1 .000 metres

lo Kandahar

SCALE

300km

Chandigarh

Quetta

Map 15. Bactria and North-western India.

When Seleucus regained Babylon and Antigonus yielded the eastern
domains to him, Seleucus became Alexander’s successor in the east only
de jure. To claim his inheritance he had to mount a campaign in that area
once he was free from his western involvements. But it was already too
late. Chandragupta Maurya had overthrown the Nandas, whose might
had deterred Alexander’s army from crossing the River Hyphasis (Beas).
As a result of his confrontation with Chandragupta, Seleucus had to cede
most of Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush as well as Baluchistan to
the Mauryas . 13 The two families entered into a matrimonial alliance, and
Chandragupta gave five hundred elephants to Seleucus which the latter
found useful in his combats in the west. North of the Hindu Kush, in

13 Some scholars do not include Aria in the list of provinces ceded to Chandragupta Maurya by
Seleucus.

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INTRODUCTION

393

Bactria and adjoining areas, the anti-Macedonian Greek elements, who
probably also had some local support, as well as some satraps of eastern
origins, had become unco-operative and, wherever possible, indepen-
dent for all practical purposes. There is no clear information about
Seleucus’ own movements in the north. But it is generally assumed that
the appointment of his son Antiochus I as a co-ruler or viceroy, and the
campaigns of Demodamus beyond the Syr Darya, as well as the minting
and circulation of some coins in the region, constitute sufficient evidence
for the acceptance of Seleucid jurisdiction over Bactria. However, the
return of Antiochus I to his western affairs in 28 1 seems to have provided
an opportunity to the restive Greeks to rise again. The last definite
reference to Antiochus’ control of Bactria is in a Babylonian record of the
years 276—274. It refers to twenty elephants which the governor of
Bactria, whose name is not given, had sent to the king. 14 But the classical
sources and the numismatic evidence indicate that the Seleucid jurisdic-
tion over Bactria continued until at least a couple of years after the death
of Antiochus I in 261.

According to Justin, Diodotus (Theodotus), ‘governor of the thou-
sand cities of Bactria, revolted and assumed the title of king, and above all
the other people of the east, influenced by his example, fell away from the
Macedonians’. 15 The Greek-Macedonian dichotomy in eastern affairs is
also reflected in Apollodorus, the author of the Parthica , when he refers
to ‘the Greeks who caused Bactriana to revolt from the Syrian kings who
succeeded Seleucus Nicator’, and states that ‘those kings subdued more
of India than the Macedonians’. 16 Unfortunately the work of
Apollodorus is lost but, in spite of the doubts expressed by Strabo, the
fragmentary quotations preserved by the latter provide both insights and
reasons for caution. An example is Strabo’s statement, following
Apollodorus, about these Greeks of Bactria that ‘more tribes were
subdued by them than by Alexander - mostly by Menander {at least if he
actually crossed the Hypanis towards the east and advanced as far as the Imaus), for
some were subdued by him personally and others by Demetrius, the son
of Euthydemus the king of the Bactrians; and they took possession not
only of Patalene but also, on the rest of the coast, of what is called the
kingdom of Saraostus and Sigerdis. In short, Apollodorus says that
Bactriana is the ornament of Ariana as a whole; and more than that, they
extended their empire even as far as the Seres and the Phryni.’ 17

Similarly there are other statements in Strabo based on Apollodorus,
e.g. ‘when those kings [i.e. the Greeks who caused Bactriana to revolt]
had grown in power they also attacked India’, and ‘. . . any parts beyond

14 Austin 1981, 240: (a 2). 15 Justin xu.4.

16 Strabo xv.1.3. Burstcin 1985, 51—2: (a ioa), has drawn attention to the insistence on the
Grukness of those who revolted. 17 Strabo xi.ii.i.

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THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

the Hypanis of which an account has been added by those who, after
Alexander, advanced beyond the Hypanis, as far as the Ganges and
Palibothra’. 18 Now, these Greeks of Bactria have left no history of their
own, and the classical sources, both in the west and in the east, do not
have more than a few jumbled statements made only when they are found
to be of some relevance to the subjects which constitute their own
interests. Ignored by ancient historians in both areas, they have been
squeezed out between the two and attract our attention largely on
account of their beautiful coinage, which has become the main source for
their history.

It is interesting that both the western and the Indian classical sources
refer to only eight or nine kings of the Bactrian Greeks. 19 But their coins
bear at least thirty-one names of kings and two of queens. However,
numismatists and historians have concluded, on justifiable grounds, that
some of these names represent more than one king, thus increasing the
number of kings to forty or more. 20 Between them they cover a time-span
of about two hundred years and territories extending, at one time or
another, from Sogdiana to the Punjab, making forays even farther in
both directions. The only way the time and space involved in their
history can be rationalized is by assuming the simultaneous rule of more
than one king, not always belonging to the same family, sharing roles of
power. Any attempt to arrange them in linear succession or assign them
to only one or two dynastic families is next to impossible in the present
state of our knowledge.

II. THE EARLY RULERS

Whether the Greeks of Bactria under Diodotus gained their independ-
ence from the Seleucids as a result of open revolt or through a gradual
transition to power is a topic that the present author has discussed
elsewhere. He still believes that Diodotus broke away to freedom in
c. 256 b.c. 21 Before the Parthians celebrated their freedom from the

18 Ibid. xv. 1. 3, 27-8.

19 The kings named in the western classical sources are: Diodotus (Theodotus) and his son of the
same name (Strabo, Trogus and Justin); Euthydemus I (Polybius and Strabo); Demetrius I, son of
Euthydemus I (Polybius and Strabo); Eucratides I (Strabo, Justin and Aelian); Menander (Strabo,
Trogus, Justin, Plutarch and Periplus ); Apollodotus (Trogus and Periplus). To these may be added
Demetrius II rex Indorum , a contemporary of Eucratides I, and the unnamed son of the latter who
murdered him (Justin). The Indian Puranas speak of eight Yavana kings but do not give their names,
cf. Pargiter 1913, 44ft.: (f 119).

20 Compare lists in Narain 195 5—76: (f io2);Lahiri 1965 : (f 83); Mitchiner 1975: (f ioi); also see
older catalogues of coins in the British Museum (Gardner 1898-1966: (f 53)), Lahore Museum
(Whitehead 1914: (f 160)), Indian Museum, Calcutta (Smith 1906: (f 148)).

21 Narain 195 7-80, 12-16: (f 103). Some prefer a round number 2 joand others date the event still
later. See Wolski 1947, 13—70: (f 16 5 a); id. 1956-7, 35-52: (f 166); id. 1982, 131—46: (f 167); Will
1979, 1.301—8: (a 40); Musti 1984, 21 3-16, ucfff.: (f ioia), notes the ‘high’ and ‘low’ chronology of
Bactria’s secession; see Bikerman 1944: (f 25) and Newel! 1958, 245: (f 114) for ‘high’ chronology.

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Seleucids in 248/7 b.c., Diodotus, king of Bactria, had already been
succeeded by his son of the same name. Both the father and son struck
coins in gold and silver with their canting badge of Zeus hurling a
thunderbolt; 22 Athena, Artemis and Hermes appeared on their copper.
The coin portraits of Diodotus I show him with an older face and a
double chin; those of Diodotus II, on the other hand, show him as a
younger man with a sharp angular face. 23 In fact the older face of the
former shows that he had already been a satrap for a time before he
became king, and the absence of mature features for the latter is in
keeping with the information that the reign of Diodotus II was cut short
by his untimely death at the hands of Euthydemus. 24 For reasons of
monetary expedience and commercial advantage the Diodoti issued
some coins with the name of Antiochus as well, a practice the elder
Diodotus had begun as a satrap. 25 Diodotus I considered himself a
saviour of the Greeks in Bactria; some of his coins include the title of
Soter. 2b

Doubtless the coins of the Diodoti were struck in Bactria, as were also
some of the early Seleucid coins, before Diodotus I became king, which
were meant for circulation in the east. Newell assigns most of them to the
mint of Bactra because ‘this city represents the nearest large commercial
and political centre to the spot where the Oxus Treasure was unearthed’;
and what constitutes for him finally the determining factor is that the
particular group of Seleucid issues which he assigns to Bactra ‘leads
directly into the immediately following issues of the Bactrian kings
Diodotus and Euthydemus I, whose coins would have been struck in
Bactria only — never in Parthia or in the lands south of the Hindu Kush.
The only logical location for a large and active royal mint would be at
Bactra.’ 27 But the findspot of the Oxus Treasure has never been certain.
Convincing claims have now been made in favour of locating it north of
the Oxus. 28 Moreover, the relevant group of control marks
( A©<9>.) have nothing in them to suggest the name of Bactra or
its other name, Zariaspa, nor can they represent the name of Diodotus. 29
Percy Gardner, the first to discuss the problem, thought that these coins
were struck at Dionysopolis, which he equated with Nysa, ‘a city of the
Paropamisus identified by General Cunningham with the modern
Begram, near Cabul’. 30 Sir Henry Howorth equated it with Nissa in

22 Narain 1955-76, 5-4: (f 102); Mitchiner 1975, 1.39-44: (f 101). Trevor 1940, 115: (f 154),
thought that the coin-type suited the name Diodotus, ‘the gift of Zeus’.

23 Cp. illustrations in Mitchiner 1975, 1.40, 42: (f 10 i). Also Pis. to Vol. VII. /, pi. 28.

24 Polyb. xt. 39. 25 Narain 1957-80, 16-17: (f 105); Mitchiner 1975, 1.36, 59-40: (p 101).

26 Narain 1957-80, 17: (f 103); Mitchiner 1975, 1.4 1 : (f 101); Macdonald 1922, 440: (f 89), and

Tarn 195 1-84, 201: (f 152), regard these issues as commemorative medals struck by Agathocles; cf.
also Holt 1984, 69-91 (f 69). 27 Newell 1938, 229: (f 114).

28 Litvinsky and Pichikiyan 1981, 133-67: (f 88).

29 Narain 1957—80, 14—15: (f 103). 30 Gardner 1879, 12: (f 52).

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396 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

Parthia . 31 Newell rightly rejected the location of the mint in Paropamisus
or Parthia in favour of Bactria; and, since he did not find a Dionysopolis
or Nysa listed in Bactria, he proposed Bactra on the basis of the
circumstantial evidence available to him . 32 But now the discovery of the
Graeco-Bactrian city at Ai Khanum provides a welcome solution. One of
the control marks listed above (@) — the first in the group because it was
used on the earliest series of the joint coinage of Seleucus and Antiochus
— has been found stamped on the exceptionally large brick covering a
sarcophagus belonging to the earliest chronological phase of habitation
in Ai Khanum so far known . 33 Bernard has noted the presence of this
monogram on the brick but finds the mirage of Bactra too attractive to
abandon and still follows Newell . 34 This is strange because he has even
found evidence for the existence of a mint at Ai Khanum . 35 The commer-
cial importance of Badakshan in antiquity, because of lapis lazuli, is
generally recognized. If this monogram can be resolved to read
Dionysopolis as Gardner and Howorth thought it did, in spite of their
differences, not only does the mint stand identified but also the ancient
name of Ai Khanum. The proximity of Ai Khanum to Takht-i Sangin,
the recently suggested location of the Oxus Treasure, adds further
support to our view. The geographical situation of Ai Khanum in the
remote eastern parts of Bactria and the commercial viability of
Badakshan are in themselves cogent reasons to assume an early Greek
settlement there. Ai Khanum lies a little too far to the east of the route
followed by Alexander from Bactria to Paropamisadae to be one of the
Alexandras . 36 On the other hand, its geographical position might very
well be the reason why Diodotus, a governor of an eastern province of
Bactria, found it safe to raise a rebellion. Only future discoveries can
settle whether or not the city was renamed later as Diodoteia or
Diodotopolis. Even if the control mark (@) is not taken as indicative of a
city name, or that of a governor, but that of a moneyer, it cannot be
denied at any rate that the coins bearing this monogram, and at least some
of the others belonging to this group , 37 were minted in the workshops at

31 Howorth 1888, 295: (f 71). 32 Newell 1938, 228#.: (f 114).

33 Bernard 1973, 9, pi. 97 : (f i i).

34 Bernard 1985, 39^: (f 24); also Bernard and Guillaume 1980, 9ff.: (f 19),

35 Bernard 1985, 3 5 ff. : (f 24). Attention may also be drawn to the observation made by Alexander
Grant, in Gardner 1879, 1 • ( F 5 2 )* about the placeof discovery of the OxusTreasure that it was ‘eight
marches beyond the Oxus at an old fort, on the tongue of land formed by two joining rivers’. Could
not Ai Khanum itself be considered a suitable alternative to the site of Takht-i Sangin for the ‘Oxus
Treasure’? 36 Engels 1978, 97, map. 12: (f 46).

37 According to Newell 1938, 246: (f i 14), this group includes monograms which have the Greek
letter delta as the principal element. Some of these, e.g. A A , which are found on many Seleucid
coins including those of Seleucus I and Antiochus III, were probably minted in other workshops:
Narain 195 7-80, 1 5: (f 103). But see Bernard and Guillaume 1980, 1 8—19: (f 19); Bernard 1985, 55 ff.:
(f 24).

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Ai Khanum and not in Bactra. Later, if and when the Diodoti moved
their capital to the city of Bactra, they probably used other workshops,
too, in Bactra as well as elsewhere in their kingdom, known to have had
many cities.

Not much is known about the career and achievements of the Diodoti.
It is agreed that they ruled over Sogdiana, and possibly in Margiane too,
which bordered on Parthia. 38 It is therefore not surprising that the
Parthians feared the might of Diodotus I and that no sooner had he died
than they made alliance with his son Diodotus II, 39 which provided
security and strength to both the new states and frustrated Seleucus II’s
attempts to reassert Seleucid hegemony in the upper satrapies. Accord-
ing to Strabo, when the Greeks took possession of the country of
Bactriana they divided it into satrapies, but he does not give their names
and it is not easy to identify them or their satraps. 40

Perhaps one of the satraps was Euthydemus, a native of Magnesia. 41
According to Polybius he took possession of the throne of Bactria by
destroying the descendants of those who had revolted against the
Seleucids. Although this statement is not specific it is believed that
Euthydemus came to power after killing Diodotus II. 42 Grousset and de
la Vallee-Poussin thought that he was a satrap of Sogdiana, but Cunning-
ham put him in charge of Aria and Margiane. 43 Since the first encounter
of Antiochus III with Euthydemus in 208 b.c. took place on the banks of
the River Arius, the latter was then definitely in possession of it. But since
we have no evidence for including Aria in the kingdom of the Diodoti,
and since it was included in the list of four satrapies ceded to
Chandragupta by Seleucus, it is most likely that Euthydemus started his
career as a satrap of the outlying satrapy of Margiane, close to Parthia,
and it was only after he occupied the Bactrian throne and possibly when
the Mauryan empire was in the process of disintegration after the death
of Asoka that he took possession of Aria as well. 44 Probably it was this
expansion of the Bactrian kingdom westwards that alerted Antiochus III
and prompted him to march against Euthydemus, not only to restrain
him from having further designs and punish him, but also thereby to try

38 Narain 1957-80, 17: (f 103). 39 Justin XL1.4.

40 Strabo xi. 5 16. Tarn 1951-84, 1 1 3-14: (f 1 5 2), thought that these satrapies were the Seleucid
eparchies and that ‘the Greek kings of Bactria were in fact the originators of what became the almost
universal organisation of Asia in the first century b.c.’, and that this ‘might date from Diodotus’.

41 This was the Lydian city of Magnesia ad Sipylum: Macdonald 1922, 440: (f 89); Newell 1941,
274: (f 115).

42 Polyb. xi. 39; Narain 1957-80, 18: (f 103); Walbank 1957-79, n. 264-5 and 312-13: (b 38).

43 Grousset 1929, 53: (f 55); de la Vallee-Poussin 1930, 253: (f 44).

44 Out of the four satrapies ceded to Chandragupta by Seleucus, it appears that Aria being the
farthest to the west was the first to be lost after the death of Asoka, c. 232 b.c. It was not lost to the
Seleucids but to the Greeks of Bactria, and the time coincides with the rise of Euthydemus.

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398 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

once more to recover as much as possible of the east lost by Seleucus . 45

The consolidation of Graeco-Bactrian power was largely thanks to the
achievements of Euthydemus and his successors. Polybius gives an
account of Antiochus Ill’s expedition against Euthydemus and how it
concluded, after the latter had withstood a two-year siege of Bactra,
through the help of a mediator, Teleas. Having recognized Euthydemus’
status and promised to marry his daughter to Demetrius, a son of
Euthydemus, and having received in return some elephants, Antiochus
III crossed the Hindu Kush and returned to his own kingdom by way of
Paropamisadae, Arachosia, Drangiana and Carmania. No details of his
engagements and successes or failures, if any, are given by Polybius
except that he renewed his family alliance with Sophagasenus, ‘the king
of the Indians’, who added some more elephants to his force . 46

Polybius reveals an important fact, which was conveyed to Antiochus
by Euthydemus, that there was an imminent danger of hordes of nomads
approaching from the north and of Bactria relapsing into barbarism.
Therefore, after Antiochus Ill’s departure from Bactria, it appears that
Euthydemus directed his attention to the north. He used his resources to
consolidate his holdings in Sogdiana and probably succeeded in pushing
his frontiers towards Chinese Turkestan. Strabo’s statement that the
Greeks of Bactria extended ‘their empire even as far as the Seres and
Phryni’ seems relevant . 47 This is evident also from the provenance, and
barbaric imitations, of the coins of Euthydemus and Demetrius on the
one hand and the striking of some nickel coins by a Euthydemus II, who
could be another son of Euthydemus, on the other . 48 Survival of some
Greek numismatic terms like satera for stater, and trakhme for drachm, in
the Kharosthi documents of Chinese Turkestan adds further strength to
this view . 49 Having succeeded in containing the danger from the north,
Euthydemus looked in other directions. Tarn thought that Euthydemus
occupied the Parthian satrapies of Astauene and Apavarktikene and
perhaps part of Parthyene, which became the Bactrian satrapies of
Tapuria and Traxiane . 50 Tarn may be right in postulating activities of
Euthydemus in the westerly direction because of his earlier possessions
in Margiane and Aria and their proximity to Parthia.

Written sources know only of Demetrius as the son of Euthydemus,
but numismatic evidence strongly suggests at least one more son, who
bore the same name as his father. Perhaps Demetrius was the elder and
Euthydemus II was the younger of the two. Both issued coins with their

45 Seleucus 11 had failed to achieve success in the east. Antiochus 111 succeeded at least in
containing the rising power of the Bactrian Greeks. Successors of Euthydemus did not look
westward for expansion in central and western Iran but southward and eastward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. 46 Polyb. xi.39. 47 Strabo xi.ii.t— 2. 48 Narain 1957—80, 27: (f 103).

49 Ibid. 25-7. 50 Tarn 1951-84, 88: (p 152).

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realistic portraits on the obverse and Heracles on the reverse, now
standing and crowning himself, and not seated as on the coins of their
father. Since the coins of Euthydemus II always portray him as youthful
without any variation, and are not copious in number, it appears that he
was a joint or sub-king in charge of affairs in the north, who either
predeceased his father while still young or had only a brief tenure during
the reign of his brother Demetrius, who succeeded his father.

But the classical sources appear to have mixed up Demetrius I, son of
Euthydemus I, who was old enough in 206 b.c. to have been offered a
Seleucid princess in marriage by Antiochus III, and Demetrius II, the rex
Indorum , who was a contemporary of Eucratides I. Demetrius I issued
coins on the Attic standard with unilingual legends only. On his main
type he is shown wearing an elephant scalp on the obverse and the reverse
has a standing Heracles. Demetrius II, on the other hand, with an
altogether different face, is shown either bareheaded or wearing a flat
kausia on the obverse of his main types, and with either Zeus or his
daughter Athena on the reverse. He issued coins with both unilingual
and bilingual legends on the Attic and Indian weight systems respec-
tively. 51 Demetrius I, taking advantage of the disintegrating Mauryan
empire in its outlying western parts and of the death of Antiochus III in
187, appears to have extended the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom to
Arachosia, which explains the listing of a Demetrias-in-Arachosia by
Isidore of Charax, 52 as well as the use of the coin-types of both
Euthydemus and Demetrius I by the early Scytho-Parthians in
Arachosia. 53 About Carmania there is no evidence, and the possibility of
Drangiana and parts of Gedrosia being included in his kingdom remains
to be clearly determined. 54 Paropamisadae and Gandhara were the last
regions of the Mauryan empire in the west, ruled by Sophagasenus and
Virasena or their successors, respectively, to be lost to the Yavanas. The
task of conquest was left to Demetrius II. But before we return to him we
must notice how history repeats itself once again. Just as Euthydemus
came to power after overthrowing the Diodotids there were others, too,
who had followed his example. 55 Of these the earliest were Antimachus
Theos, who preceded Demetrius II, and Eucratides Megas, whose time
overlapped with both of them.

Antimachus Theos has been overlooked by ancient historians, but his

51 For coins sec Narain 195 76, 4-5 (Demetrius I), 6-7 (Demetrius II): (f 102). Also see

Mitchiner 1975, 1.5 5-61: (f ioi), who lists their coins without separating the two series; Lahiri 1965,
106-10, pi. 12 and 15: (f 83), distinguishes two Demetrii but his classification of types is different
from Narain.

52 For Demetrias-in-Arachosia see Isidore of Charax, Parthian Stations , p. 9 (ed. Schoff, 1976);
Tarn 1951-84, 94: (f 152).

53 For both ‘standing Heracles’ and ‘seated Heracles’ were adopted by the Scytho-Parthian kings;

Narain 1957—80, 24, 160: (f 103). M ibid. 24-5. 55 Strabo xi.9.2.

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THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

coins leave no doubt about his powerful and very individual personality
among the early group of Graeco-Bactrian kings. While his relationship
to either the Diodoti or to Euthydemus may be debated , 56 it is known
that he issued some commemorative medals in the names of both
Diodotus I and Euthydemus I . 57 He was probably a satrap in charge of a
province in the northern or north-eastern region of the kingdom of
Euthydemus. When Demetrius I became busy in expanding the
Euthydemid power in the south, Antimachus carved out his independ-
ence. To legitimize his position he issued commemorative medals and
adopted the title of Theos. His main coin-type showing on the obverse his
realistic portrait with a mysterious smile has attracted much attention . 58
Like other early kings, he issued unilingual coins of Attic weight and his
favourite deity was Poseidon. But he was the first among them to strike
the Indian type of square or rectangular copper coins with the figure of
an elephant on one side and with a thunderbolt, the attribute of Zeus, on
the other . 59 Probably he crossed the Hindu Kush and found it necessary
to match the Indian money circulating in the region for local needs. It
was left to Demetrius II to strike bilingual coins to mark the actual
occupation of territories in Paropamisadae and western parts of
Gandhara.

The coins of Demetrius II link him with Antimachus Theos, and
indirectly more with the Diodotids than with the Euthydemids . 60 He was
no doubt later than both Antimachus I and Demetrius I, but a contem-
porary of Eucratides I. He was the first king to issue silver money on the
reduced Indian weight standard with legends in both Greek and Indian
Prakrit; he also issued some square copper bilinguals on the Indian
model. His favourite deities were Zeus and Athena. For his copper he
used the thunderbolt and the trident, attributes of Zeus and Poseidon
respectively; he used other devices related to the earlier issues of the
Diodotids and of Antimachus I. He wears the same headdress as
Antimachus with whom it is tempting to see a resemblance, rather than
to Demetrius I. It is significant that the monogram used on the bilingual
copper of Demetrius II is the same as on the square copper of
Antimachus I . 51

Demetrius II adopted the epithet of Aniketos and he was the first
Graeco-Bactrian king to translate his epithet into an Indian language . 62
With Kabul and western Gandhara in his hands he could cross the Indus
and occupy Taxila, but there is hardly any evidence that he did so in the

56 Smith 1906, 5: (f 148); Rawlinson 1912, 62: (f 129).

57 Narain 1955-76, 5-6: (f 102); Mitchiner 1975, 1.73—4: (f ioi ).

58 Tarn 1951-84, 92: (f 152); Trever 1940, 7: (f 154); but see Holt 1981, 20 n. 5: (f 65).

59 Narain 1955-76, 6: (f 102); Mitchiner 1975, t.75: (f ioi).

60 For a discussion see Narain 1957-80, 29-31, 54-7, 50-3: (f 103). 61 Ibid. 52.

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material remains of the city. 63 Perhaps his ambition was cut short by the
defeat he suffered at the hands of Eucratides. At any rate Taxila did not
become part of the Yavana domain before Agathocles, and success
farther east was to wait for Menander. Possible references to a Demetrius
in the Indian sources are extremely dubious. 64

It is not clear whether Eucratides was a satrap of one of the northern
provinces of the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom or was a soldier of fortune.
There is hardly any evidence to establish his ties with the families of
Diodotus, Euthydemus or Antimachus. Nor is there any satisfactory
reason to associate him with the Seleucid Antiochus IV. 65 If the com-
memorative medal struck by him depicts the jugate busts of his father
and mother, who is shown wearing a diadem, we may assume a royal link,
which probably provided him a locus standi among the Graeco-
Bactrians. 66 Justin states explicitly that he rose to power in Bactria,
‘almost at the same time that Mithridates ascended the throne among the
Parthians’. 67 Later, Aelian also remembered him as a ruler of Bactria
when a certain Soras was ruling over a city, Perimula, inhabited by fish-
eaters, in South India. 68 Since nothing is known about Soras, Aelian’s
information is of no use. But the synchronism established by J ustin dates
the rise of Eucratides c. 171 b.c., which seems correct since Timarchus in
162 is known to have imitated the well-known Dioscuri coin-type of
Eucratides I, with the title of Megas, which the latter could have adopted
only after some remarkable success and notin the first years of his reign. 69
According to Justin, Eucratides fought various wars and in spite of his
losses he withstood a five-month siege by his contemporary rex Indorum
Demetrius II and, having repulsed him by continual sallies with a
garrison of only three hundred soldiers, he escaped and ‘reduced India
under his power. But as he was returning from the country, he was killed

62 Apadihata is a rarely used Prakrit word to translate the Greek word Aniketos.

63 Narain 1957-80, 5 3: (f 103). Only one coin was found in the Taxila excavations: Marshall 1951,

11.798: (f 98). 64 Narain 1957-80, 39 - 44 . i74“9 : (f io 5).

65 Ibid. 56-7. Tarn 1951-84, 197: (f 152), thought that Laodice, probably the mother of
Eucratides, was a sister of Antiochus 111. Holt 1981, 41: (f 65), thinks that Laodice was a
Euthydemid princess.

66 But the possibility that the Heliocles- Laodice coin was not in commemoration of the parents of
Eucratides but the marriage of his son has also been considered: von Sallet 1879, 23ff., 103: (f 156).

67 Justin xli.6.i.

68 Aelian, On the Characteristics of Animals xv.8 (cf. translation by Schofield (1958) 111.218—19).
This source refers to Eucratides only in passing as a ruler of Bactria when a city in South India,
Perimula, was ruled by a certain Soras; it does not yield any new information. Moreover, the Indian
king and his date are not identified.

69 It is generally accepted that Mithridates I came to power in 171. Timarchus became king in 162
or 161: Bellinger 1945, 40-4: (b 79), and Houghton 1979, 21 3-17: (e 25). Eucratides I issued coins
first without any epithet, and they show him bareheaded on the obverse and mounted Dioscuri on
the reverse; Narain 195 5-76, 9-10: (f 102). Mitchiner 1975, 1.88-9: (f 101), attributes the issuance of
this coin-type to what he calls the ‘Middle period’ and dates it in 165-160. He puts the Apollo type of
Eucratides 11 in the ‘Early period’ of Eucratides 1. But cf. Narain 1957-80, 71, 107: (f 103).

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402 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

on his march by his son, with whom he had shared his throne, and who
was so far from concealing the murder, that as if he had killed an enemy,
and not his father, he drove his chariot through his blood, and ordered
his body to be cast out unburied .’ 70 We may speculate on the name of the
killer son, but that he could be someone else’s son is unlikely, for why
should Eucratides make anyone else’s son his socius regni? A Heliocles was
definitely his son but if Plato was another, it was probable that the
former, who took the title of Dikaios, was a loyal son; and the latter, who
adopted arrogantly the epithet Epiphanes and flamboyantly issued coins
with Helios driving a quadriga, could be the parricide, who was soon
superseded by Heliocles . 71 This tragic end of Eucratides at the peak of his
success at the hands of a parricide, so vividly described by Justin, leaves
no scope for a longer reign and further expansion of domain by him.

Most probably Eucratides was able to usurp power in the north when
Demetrius II Aniketos was busy occupying new lands in the south, in the
Paropamisadae and western Gandhara. His success against Demetrius II
and the consequent possibility of a brief presence in ‘India’ were no
doubt the final features of the career cut short by his son. Justin’s
reference to the several wars Eucratides fought makes good sense on the
supposition that they took place before his engagement with Demetrius
II. For he must have consolidated his control over considerable parts of
the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom before taking on Demetrius II. One
cannot help having the impression from Justin that the entire career of
Eucratides was spent fighting wars. And if Justin’s comparative assess-
ment in favour of the Parthians against the Bactrians combined with
Strabo’s reference to Bactria losing two satrapies to Parthia is related to
Eucratides , 72 one wonders if his assumption of the title Megas was more
an expression of ambition on the part of an usurper than a statement of
unmixed achievements. His unique twenty-stater piece 73 is more an
example of flamboyance and a competitive role against his contemporary
rivals like Agathocles than of any monetary or political significance. In
fact the way Eucratides is depicted on his main coin-type and the
representation of the Dioscuri as charging vigorously on the reverse of
his coins complement the character as known from Justin. Doubtless
Eucratides was a brave warrior and one of the notable rulers among the
Graeco-Bactrians, who could be emulated by other ambitious rebels of
his time like Timarchus . 74

70 Justin xli.6.

71 Tarn 1951—84, 219-20: (f 152); Bivar 1950, 9-12: (f 26); Narain 1957-80, 70-3: (F 103).

72 Strabo xv. 1.3, xi.11.2; Tarn 1951-84, 219: (f 152).

73 S- Narain 1956, 217-18: (f 1 1 3); Mitchincr 1975, 1.9 1 : (f ioi).

74 Tarn 195 1-84, 218: (f 1 5 2); Bellinger 1950, 3 14: (f6); Houghtoni979, 213— 17: (e 25). All coins
of Timarchus bear the title Basilcus Mcgalou, and the assumption is that he adopted Eucratides’ type
and title by virtue of his alliance. If Timarchus would not be considered a ‘Great” king because of the
title Mcgalou he adopted, why should Eucratides be so considered on ibis ground?

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THE EARLY RULERS

403

Nevertheless recent attempts to represent him as greater than the
evidence actually requires, and to extend his tenure to twenty-five years
or more, are hardly convincing . 75 To relate the beginning of an era from
the accession of Eucratides 76 requires more imagination than one can
justify at present. There is nothing of substance in Aelian which would
support any special claim to greatness . 77 So also there is hardly anything
in the text of the inscription found on an ostracon at Ai Khanum to
support the theory that the figure 24 there is the regnal year of
Eucratides . 78 Similarly, in order to associate the end of Ai Khanum with
that of the reign of Eucratides, and not later, we need more substantial
evidence than is presently available, particularly when the work at the
site is still incomplete . 79 There are reasons not only to doubt even the
inclusion of Badakshan in the domain of Eucratides but also to think of a
destruction of the site in 145 b.c., which is the later date suggested for the
end of the reign of Eucratides . 80 It has been shown that the Y uezhi were
still north of the Oxus in 1 28 b.c. and that the incursions of the Scythians
from the north, on account of the Y uezhi pressure, could not have taken
place much earlier and that they were taking place in westerly directions
affecting the Parthians and causing the deaths of two of their kings . 81
There do not seem to be grounds to revise the chronology of Eucratides:
he ruled fromc. 171 to 1 5 5 b.c. Much of the problem appears to be largely
the result of a failure to recognize that all the coins which bear the name

75 Mitchiner 1975, 1.65-72: (f 101), dates him c. 171-135 b.c. Simonetta 1958, 173: (f 144), and
Bernard 1980, 442-4: (f 17); id. 1980, 24-7: (f 19); id. 1985, 97 ff.: (f 24), date him 170- 145 b.c. See
alsoFussman 1980, 36-7: (f 51); Holt 1981,41-2: (f6j); Rapin 1983, 369-70: (f 127). But see Tarn,
1951-84, 219: (f 152), and Bellinger 1950, 314: (f 6), who believe Eucratides died in 159/8 b.c.

76 Bernard 1980, 442: (f 17); id. 1985, 102: (f 18), but he docs not identify the Soras mentioned by
Aelian, although the synchronism with Soras is central to his argument. Nilkanta Sastri 1972, 61:
(f 1 16), who knew Aclian’s source for Soras, only suggested that the word is derived from Tamil
Sola, perhaps standing for Cola, one of the early ruling clans or dynasties of southern India which,
though known from the time of Asoka, came to prominence during 9th- 1 2th centuries a.d. It is not
clear whether the Soras of Aelian was the personal name of a king or the name of the clan or dynasty.
Even if it was a personal name we have no means of knowing his identity or date. To find a date for
Eucratides on the basis of this synchronism is arguing in a circle.

77 It is nothing more than a very casual reference to ‘the time when Eucratides was ruler of
Bactria’. Aelian does not add anything about Eucratides’ date or his achievements. It is asking too
much to agree with Bernard’s statement: ‘Le synchronisme dont il fait ctat montre que 1 c regne
d’Eucratides dut servir a dcs historiographies de 1 ’Asie Ccntrale, des Grecs sans doute, comme point
de repere chronologiquc pour des evenements exterieurs au domaine propre de la colonisation
grecquc. On mesure en mcme temps par la le retentissement qu’cut dans les regions voisines de
(’empire grec ce regne qui put ainsi servir de reference a celui d’un potentat de la cote meridionale de
PInde.’ It may be noted that Aelian was not a historiographer of Central Asia, and also that the city of
Perimula in extreme South India cannot be regarded as a region bordering the so-called Greek
empire.

78 There is no mention of Eucratides before or after the number 24. The missing part following
the number is supposed to contain references to month and day. This is somewhat unusual; one may
compare this with the examples ofinscriptions which refer to reckoning systems related to the names
of Menander, Azes and Kanishka.

79 The excavations at the site had to be discontinued for reasons beyond the control of the

excavators. 80 Bernard 1985, 97#.: (f 24). 81 Narain 1957-80, 128-42: (f 103).

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4°4

THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

of Eucratides are not the issues of a single king. This has led to a merging
of the career and coinage of at least two kings of the same name,
Eucratides I Megas and Eucratides II Soter. 82 That there were at least
two of them was first suggested as early as 1738 and since then it has been
supported by many, including the present author. 83 Whether the second
was a son or a grandson of the first may be argued, but that there was
more than one king who issued all the coins bearing the name of
Eucratides seems beyond question. 84

Among the notable early Graeco-Bactrian kings, Pantaleon and
Agathocles are generally considered as brothers and as ruling around the
same time as Eucratides I. A recent discovery of an Agathocles coin
commemorating Pantaleon supports the theory that, of the two,
Pantaleon was the elder brother who probably ruled and died before
Agathocles. 85 This commemorative coin is the last of a series issued by
Agathocles which included commemoration of Alexander, Antiochus,
Diodotus, Euthydemus and Demetrius. Probably the two brothers
started as joint or sub-kings and Agathocles took over after a brief reign
by Pantaleon. It is more than likely that, when Eucratides I Megas was
usurping power in Bactria and Demetrius II was heading towards
Paropamisadae and the Indus, these two brothers were harassing
Eucratides in the several wars mentioned by Justin and holding forts in
north-eastern and eastern Bactria against Eucratides I. 86 The commemo-
rative medals issued by Agathocles were probably meant to strengthen
the legitimation of his position in Bactria as against Eucratides I the
usurper. 87

82 It is difficult to believe that a usurper who was killed by his own son ruled over Bactria and
India for 36 years (Mitchiner) or even 25 or 26 years (Bernard, Holt) at a stretch in the history of a
large group of kings (about forty) belonging to several families and torn by relatives and in-fighting
within the limited span of about two hundred years. In view of the very realistic old age portraits of
Euthydemus I among the early kings and of Strato among the later ones it is hard to accept that if
Eucratides had actually ruled for such a long period his mints did not find any reason to strike at least
some coins showing his old age, even towards the close of his reign. Bernard’s theory identifying the
year 24 in one of the ostraca inscriptions found in the ‘Treasury’ of Ai Khanum as belonging to the
reign of Eucratides is a speculation which neither this text, nor for that matter any of the inscriptions
of the ‘Treasury’, supports. Contrast for example the case of the Bajaur casket inscription of
Menander where the name of the king is mentioned, after the year.

83 Narain 1957-80, 71: (f 103); Bayer 1738, xxxix, 95: (f 5). Bernard 1985, 97: (f 24), mentions
Bayer’s date for the end of Eucratides approvingly but does not refer to the latter’s division of coins
between Eucratides I and II. While some recent writers (Mitchiner 1975, 1.65-72: (f ioi); Holt 1981:
(f 65)) have assumed, without convincing reasons, that the coins bearing the name of Eucratides
belong to only one king, the classification by Bayer has been widely accepted.

84 Narain 1957-80, 123-4: (f 105). In view of the murder of Eucratides while returning from
‘India’ and of his name being remembered more as a king of Bactria, and not of India, it is not
unreasonable to postulate that most of the square copper coins listed under his name were actually
posthumous mintings. Round bilinguals in silver and copper with the Dioscuri (Mitchiner 1975,
1.96-7: (f ioi)), on the other hand, were no doubt his issues.

85 Narain 1957—80, 59-60: (f 103). For Agathocles commemorating Pantaleon see Francfort

1975, 19-22: (f 48). 86 Justin xu. 6; Narain 1957-80, 5 8ff.: (f 103).

87 Tarn 1951-84, 201, 263, 439-40, 44 6_ 5>: ( F 152); Narain 1957-80, 60-1: (f 103).

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So far nothing is known about Pantaleon and Agathocles from the
literary sources. But numismatic and archaeological evidence shows that
their activities were mostly confined more to eastern rather than to
western parts of Bactria. Perhaps Eucratides I was able to control the
western and even central parts of it, as well as some territories north of
the Oxus. Discoveries at Ai Khanum seem to favour the Euthydemids
and/or the rivals of Eucratides in eastern Bactria, for it is their coinage
which overwhelmingly predominates there . 88 On the other hand, coins
of Pantaleon and Agathocles are rare in the western parts of Bactria.
Their unilingual tetradrachms, and the commemorative medals issued by
Agathocles, were struck on the Attic standard. Their favourite deity,
Zeus, associates them with the Diodoti and Demetrius II. Significantly
their round copper and nickel coins which are unilingual - as against the
square, rectangular or triangular ones which are bilingual — depict on the
obverse a young Dionysus wearing an ivy wreath, with thyrsus over his
shoulder, and a panther on the reverse. These coins, which have been
found at Ai Khanum , 89 are certainly important if the depiction of
Dionysus could be an allusion to Dionysopolis, probably the ancient
name of Ai Khanum . 90 Moreover, the occurrence of this type also on
nickel indicates that these coins were meant for circulation, like those of
Euthydemus II, in the north-eastern parts of the kingdom which obvi-
ously included Badakshan and probably extended even towards Chinese
Turkestan, if Strabo’s reference to Greek extensions in the direction of
Seres and Phryni is correct . 91 While both the brothers struck some
copper bilinguals with an Indian Yakshi goddess and maneless lion,
Agathocles also issued coins with additional types . 92 The most signifi-
cant of them are not only those which use the Buddhist motif of Chaitya
and devices found on the local coins of Taxila , 93 but the rectangular silver
bilinguals which represent for the first time the hero-gods Vasudeva and
Sarhkarshana 94 of the Brahmanical Bhagavat cult to which later
Heliodorus, the envoy of Antialcidas of Taxila to Bhagabhadra of
Vidisha (near Bhopal), was devoutly affiliated . 95 It is not without signifi-
cance that the two brothers are the only ones among the Bactrian Greeks
who introduced on their coins the Indian Brahmi script in addition to
Kharosthi, which was normally used in the Indo-Greek bilingual coin-

88 Only ten coins bearing the name of Eucratides have been noticed in the two hoards found at Ai
Khanum as against 1 1 2 bearing the name of Euthydemus (if two kings of the name of Euthydemus
and Eucratides are not to be distinguished).

89 Cf. Bernard 1985, 65: (f 24). 90 Narain 1986: (f 112); see above pp. 396-7.

91 Strabo xi.11.1; Narain 1957-80, 25-7: (f 103). 92 Mitchiner 1975, 1.81-4: (f 101).

93 Ibid. 1.81—3. For local Taxila coins see Allan 1954: (f i).

94 For the Agathocles coins showing the Indian deities see Bernard 1 97 1 , 44 1 : (f 8); Narain 1973,
73-7: (f 107), the coins which are of silver were mistakenly mentioned as of copper by me; Filliozat
1973, 123: (f 47); Audouin and Bernard 1974, 8-21, pi. t: (f 2); Mitchiner 1975, 1.80: (f ioi).

95 For Heliodorus’ affiliation to Bhagavat cult sec Narain 1957-80, 118-19: (f 103).

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406 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

age. 96 In fact the six coins of Agathocles with the legend in Brahmi script
which have been found at Ai Khanum are among the earliest examples of
this script found outside the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. 97 Agathocles
was the first Yavana king to possess Taxila and initiate a forward policy
of extending patronage to Indian religions and cults, both Buddhist and
Brahmanical. He probably opened, or used, more northerly passes and
routes than the usually frequented ones in the south to reach Taxila, and
thus made commercial and cultural contacts easier between north-
eastern and eastern Afghanistan on the one hand and north-western
Pakistan on the other. 98 This was probably because Eucratides 1, or his
family, was controlling most of the southerly passes and routes for a
while, which would not allow their use easily to his rivals and their
associates.

III. MENANDER

The policy initiated by Agathocles was followed by Menander. It is
generally accepted that Menander was married to Agathocleia, probably
a sister or daughter of Agathocles. 99 Menander is the only Graeco-
Bactrian king whose name has survived in Indian classical sources. 100 He
is the first, and one of the only two definite names out of possibly three or
four of the Graeco-Bactrian kings, known from inscriptions found in
South Asia. 101 He was surely the most famous of the Yavana kings,

96 Narain 1955-76, 7-8: (f 102); Mitchiner 1975, 1.81, 84: (f 101).

97 It is difficult to date any Brahmi inscription in South Asia before the time of Asoka. Even he
used Kharosthi for his inscriptions found in the north-western parts of the Indian sub-continent.
The only pre-Greek use of this script may be noted on some local coins of Taxila and adjoining
regions, and they are rare. In the light of this not only the use of Brahmi by Pantaleon and Agathocles
is significant but more so the discovery of some of these coins at Ai Khanum. Of added importance is
the discovery of large bricks with the stamp of a Brahmi letter juxtaposed with a Greek monogram:
Narain 1986, 797-801: (f no).

98 This is indicated not only by the presence of punch-marked coins but also by reference to
Karshapanas in the ostraca inscriptions of the ‘Treasury" at Ai Khanum. Archaeological discoveries
show that the Badakshan region was in communication with Gandhara through the northern routes
and Swat valley. 99 Tarn 1951-84, 78, 225: (f 152); Narain 1957-80, 75: (f 105).

100 Cf. Milindapanha, the Pali Buddhist text, edited by Trenckner 1928: (f ioo) and translated into
English by Rhys Davids 1890, 1894: (f ioo). For the Chinese version of this work cf. Demivielle
1924-5, 168: (f 45); Pelliot 1914, 415-19: (f i 21); Levi 1936, 126: (f 87). See also Abhayanandi’s
commentary Mahavritti on Jainendra’s Vyakarana , edited by Lazarus 1918, 286: (f 84), where the
name of Menander is lndianized as Mahendra: Narain 1957-80, 83: (f 103). There is also a reference
to King Minara of Tukharas in Taranath’s History of Buddhism (in Tibetan), identified with Menander
by Lassen, cf. Narain 1957—80, 98: (f 103).

101 The other is Antialcidas referred to in the Besnager pillar inscription of Heliodorus, cf.
Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India , No. 5; Narain 1957—80. pi. 6: (f 103), for text and
illustration; Burstein 1985, 53: (a ioa). The Bajaur casket inscription in Kharosthi is srill the only
inscription which gives the name of Menander and possibly his regnal year: Narain 195 7 — 80, pi . 6: (f
103), for text and illustration. A recent publication, Sharma 1980: (f 142), claiming to have found an
inscription in Brahmi characters with the name of Menander, is very misleading, for not only is the

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MENANDER 407

remembered as Milinda in the Buddhist tradition. According to the Pali
Buddhist work Milindapanha ( Questions of King Milinda ), he was born in a
village called Kalasi, not far from Alasanda, probably an Alexandria,
which was about 200 yojana from Sagala. 102 Probably he was assigned to
govern the satrapy of either Arachosia or Paropamisadae, his home area,
because of his matrimonial links, and he rose to kingship about the time
that Eucratides I died, c. 155 b.c. 103 His marriage to a royal princess,
Agathocleia, must have contributed to the legitimation of his rule. In any
case it is clear from the dialogue he had with Buddhist monk Nagasena
that Menander came from a family of kings. 104

The variety and the wide provenance of his coinage affirm the
importance and extent of his power. His appearance is vividly rendered
on his Attic tetradrachm by ‘a fine portrait in very high relief which is of
exceptional quality even among the masterpieces executed by other
artists on Bactrian coins’. 105 It has been well observed that ‘the owner of
the austere and intellectual features on this unique Greek tetradrachm
could well have engaged in debate with a Buddhist sage’. 106 The
favourite deity of his coinage is Athena which might or might not have
been copied from the archaising statue of Athena Alkidemos at Pella but
which surely associates Menander with Diodotus and Demetrius II. 107
Some gold staters bearing the bust of Athena and an owl but with no
legends are usually attributed to Menander. 108 The striking of bilingual
silver tetradrachms, though first started by Demetrius II, became a

name not at all there to read but also it is palaeographically much later in time than Menander: see
Verma 1981, 77-80: (f i 55); Gupta 1985, 200-1: (f 59). I too have personally examined it and find no
basis to support Sharma.

One may wonder if names like those of Strato, Philiskos ( = Philoxenos), Hermaios in the Greek
inscriptions found at Ai Khanum could be of those who became kings later. In the absence of royal
titles and other indications this may be nothing more than wishful thinking. There is the example of
Theodamus whose Kharosthi inscription has been noticed by Konow 1929, 6: (f 78); but no coin of
Theodamus has been found.

102 Tarn 195 1-84, 41 , 420: (f i 5 2); for the identity of SSgala see Narain 1957-80, 172-3: (f 103).
But I do not rule out its identity now with Sanghol near Chandigarh, which will extend the actual
control of the Yavanas further east than Ravi, a limit I had suggested earlier. The site which is now
being excavated has already yielded rich material for the Saka phase; the Greek phase still remains to
be excavated.

103 Narain 1957—80, 77: (f 103). Most scholars accept this date with a plus/minus of five years.

104 Milindapanha , ed. Trenckner 1928, 329: (p too); Narain 1957-80, 74: (f 103).

105 Jenkins 1968, 109: (p 75). Kraay 1973, 161, see esp. fig. 167: (f 81).

107 Jenkins and Kraay {opp. citt.) see in this type a Macedonian descent of Menander. But note the
specific information about Menander’s birthplace in the Milindapanha and cf. Tarn 195 1-84, 99, 3 10,
420-2, 432—3: (f 1 5 2); Narain, 1957—80, 74—5: (f 103). Also note Tarn, op. cit. 269, who thinks that
adoption of Athena goes against Menander being a Buddhist, and he plays down his adoption of the
Buddhist symbol, the Dbarma-cbakra = ‘wheel of law’, on his copper.

108 Whitehead 1940, 105-6: (f 162); Narain 1957-80, 99: (f 103). Almost all specimens with any
indication of provenance seem to have come from Charsadda, cf. Haughton 1958, 66: (f 62). If the
isolated Greek letter alpha on these staters represent the regnal year of Menander, they were perhaps
struck in the very first year of his reign: Bivar 1970, 126: (f 30).

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408 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

normal practice from the time of Menander . 109 But it is the copper
coinage in various denominations which provides the large variety of
types used by Menander . 110 He adopted two epithets, Soter and Dikaios,
on his money . 111 Often his coins bear single Greek letters in addition to
the monograms, and it has been argued that they represent either the
regnal years of the king or marks of value . 112

The Shinkot (or Bajaur) Buddhist casket inscription , 113 which men-
tions Menander’s name and one of his regnal years, probably marks the
introduction of an era that continued to be used even by the Saka kings
who followed the Yavanas in the upper Indus valley for a system of
dating using Greek month-names for their records in Kharosthi . 114
Numismatic, epigraphic and archaeological evidence agree that
Menander ruled over much of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and his king-
dom certainly included Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Quetta, Bannu,
Peshawar, Taxila, Swat and Sialkot . 115 With much of Afghanistan and
Pakistan under him, Menander was well placed to expand either to areas
north of of the Hindu Kush at the cost of the successors of Eucratides I,
or eastward at the cost of the fragmentary successor states of the
Mauryan empire. So far, the numismatic evidence for his activities north
of the Hindu Kush is tenuous . 116 On the other hand, Heliocles I is more
likely to have ruled over much of Bactria in the north and he was
probably the last among those whose domain included territories even
north of the Oxus . 117 The coins of Heliocles I constitute one third of the
entire Qunduz hoard, and they were also the latest Graeco-Bactrian types
imitated by the Yuezhi and possibly by some of the other nomadic chiefs

J 09 Bivar is incorrect in stating that the bilingual tetradrachms were ‘unknown before the time of
Menander’: Bivar 1970, 134: (f 30).

1,0 Narain 1957—80, 99: (f 103). So far 18 varieties have been listed in Narain 1955-76, 14-15:
(f ioz), 2oin Lahiri 1965, 1 5 3-62: (F83),and 24 in Mitchiner 1975, 11. 1 30-9: (f ioi). Also Pis. to Vol.
VII. /, pi. 36.

111 Narain 1957-8, 99-100: (f 103). Some scholars have seen in the two epithets two kings of the
name of Menander: Lahiri 1965, 160: (f 83).

112 Bivar 1970, 123 ff. : (f 30), contra MacDowall 1975, 39#.: (f 91).

1.3 Majumdar 1937—8, 1 — 10: (f 96); Narain 1957-80, pi. 6.1: (f 103).

1.4 This era has also been named as the Old Saka Era. Thomas 195 2, 1 1 1— 12: (f i 5 3), was perhaps
the first to suggest that the Sakas used an era of Greek origin. The use of Macedonian month-names
such as Apellaios (Hadda, year 28), Artemisios (Wardak, year 5 1), Audunaios (Kurram, year 20),
Daisios (Sui Vihar, year 1 1), Panemos (Taxila, year 78) in the Kharosthi inscriptions of the later
Saka-Pahlava kings supports the hypothesis. Its association with Menander was suggested by
Narain 1957-80, 142-4: (f 103); see also Wheeler 1962, 125: (f 159); Smith 1958, 178: (f 146), id.
1977-8, }3<>-i: (f 147), where he states 158 as the starting date; Bivar 1970, 126: (f 3).

1.5 Narain 1957-80, 97: (f 103).

1.6 This is mainly based on the Attic tetradrachm of Menander. Now there are two specimens, cf.
Mitchiner 1975, 11. 1 20: (f ioi); Narain 1957—80, 97: (f 103); Jenkins 1968, 109: (f 75). Plutarch called
Menander a Bactrian king.

117 Narain 1957—80, 70-2, 104-6: (f 103); id. 1955—76, 12—13: (f 102).

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MENAN DER

409

in the Oxus valley. 118 But the Attic tetradrachms of Menander and his
gold staters, 119 along with the references in Apollodorus and Plutarch,
may indicate as well his impact in some parts of Bactria proper even if not
north of the Oxus.

There is certainly some truth in Apollodorus and Strabo when they
attribute to Menander the advances made by the Greeks of Bactria
beyond the Hypanis (modern Gharra, a tributary of the Indus) and even
as far as the Ganges and Palibothra. 120 There is hardly any reason to
doubt the subjugation of territories up to the Hypanis by Menander.
That the Yavanas advanced even beyond in the east, in the Ganges—
Jamuna valley, about the middle of the second century b.c. is supported
by the cumulative evidence provided in the Indian sources. Y ugapurana
records their attack over Saket (Ayodhya) and their reaching as far as
Kusumadhvaja (Pataliputra), but returning home post-haste because of
their internal dissensions. 121 Patanjali’s grammatical treatise refers to the
Yavanas besieging the cities of Saket and Madhyamika (near Chittor). 122
Kalidasa alludes to the defeat of an advancing Yavana unit at the hands of
Vasumitra, the grandson of Pushymitra who had overthrown the
Mauryas, on the banks of the River Kali Sindhu in north-central India. 123
Since all these accounts are generally datable c. 150 b.c. or a little later,
they fit in very well with Menander’s time and his role as known from
coins and from the western classical sources. But the Yavanas were not
able to make territorial gains in the Ganges-Jamuna valley. 124 White-
head believes that the Indo-Greeks could have done no more than
conduct cold-weather campaigns or make long-distance raids. 125 While
this may be so, we must also look for deeper causes for the failure of the
Indo-Greeks to find a foothold in the Ganges-Jamuna valley. 126

To enable Menander to conduct his campaigns in various directions
and to maintain firm control of his domain a well-planned administrative
system and able joint or sub-kings and military commanders were as
necessary as local co-operation. ‘Strategoi’ and ‘Meridarchs’ are known

1,8 Out of 627 coins recorded from the Qunduz hoard 221 are of Heliocles I: Curiel and Fussman
1965, 1 3: (p 59); earlier information about number ofcoins in Bivar 1955, 2: (f 27), and Narain 195 7—
80, 106: (f ioj), is incorrect. Also the exact site of the discovery is known as Khist Tepe on the River
Oxus (Amu Darya) near Qunduz. 1,9 Mitchiner 1975, 11.120: (f ioi).

120 Strabo xi.i 1.1-2, xv. 1.27-8.

,2t See for reference and discussion on the relevant text Narain 1957-80, 84—5, 174-9: (f *03).

122 Patafijali’s Mahabhashya 11. 1 18-19 Kielhorn (f i 20). An echo of the Yavanas besieging the city
of Mathura has been noted also in a later grammatical work, Abhayanandi’s Mahavritti on
Jainendra’s Vyakarana , 286 Lazarus: (f 84); cf. Narain 1957-80, 83 n. 6: (f 103).

123 Kalidasa’s Malavikagnimitra 227-8 Misra: (f 76). For the identity of the river see Narain 1 9 5 7—

80, 82: (f 103). 124 Ibid. 82-90.

125 Whitehead 1940, 92: (f 162); but cf. Marshall 195 1, 1.32 n. 4: (f 98).

126 Narain 1957-80, 90-5: (f 103).

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410 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

from inscriptions . 127 Apollodotus, if there was an earlier one , 128 could
have been a joint king, and as we have suggested elsewhere, Antimachus
II, Polyxenus and Epander were probably his sub-kings . 129 Menander is
also known to have appointed Indians to high administrative positions;
one name which has survived is that of Viyakamitra, the governor of
Swat valley (Udyana ). 130

Of the joint kings and sub-kings of Menander suggested above,
Apollodotus alone is mentioned in the western classical sources. Out of
the two references available , 131 the present author had raised questions
about one of them, and argued that both the literary and the numismatic
evidence indicate the existence of only one Apollodotus, who flourished
later than Menander and could be one of his sons . 132 Tarn had thought
that both Menander and Apollodotus were lieutenants of Demetrius I
and were responsible for spearheading his military campaigns in India . 133
With the revised opinion about Demetrius I and Menander, this theory is
out of the question. Moreover, the recent discovery of a unilingual Attic
tetradrachm in the name of Apollodotus 134 resolves the problem in
favour of having two kings of the same name, one earlier and another
later. But it is still difficult to place Apollodotus I before Eucratides I in
Kapisa . 135 The kausia headdress of Apollodotus on the obverse and
Athena on the reverse of the Attic tetradrachm link him with
Antimachus Theos on the one hand and Demetrius II and Menander on
the other. Apollodotus I may now be counted as a junior contemporary
of Menander, probably a brother and a joint king . 136 It is possible that he
staked his claim after the death of Menander, during the regency of
Agathocleia when Strato I was a minor, and was able to wrest power
during a gap in the long reign of Strato I . 137 Apollodotus II then would
be a son not of Menander, as I thought earlier, but of Apollodotus I. In

127 Narain 1957-80, 95: (f 103). For the texts of the inscriptions see Konow 1929: (p 78).

128 For a discussion of the problem: Narain 1957-80, 64#.: (f 103); id. 1957, 12 iff.: (f 104);

Guepin 1956, iff.: (f 56); Jenkins 1959, 2off: (f 73); MacDowall and Wilson i960, 22iff.: (f 90).
With the recent discovery of an Attic tetradrachm with the portrait of an Apollodotus different from
those on the bilingual coins, the question now appears solved in favour of two kings of the same
name: Bernard 1974, 307: (f 13). 129 Narain 1957—80, 95—6: (f 103).

130 Viyakamitra of the Shinkot (Bajaur) casket inscription of Menander’s reign, ef. Narain 195 7—
80, 79-80, 95: (f 103).

131 Trogus’ Prologue xli and The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea 47 Schoff.

132 Narain 1957-80, 64-9, 122-7: (f 103). Contra Jenkins 1959, 2off: (f 73); MacDowall and

Wilson i960, 22 iff.: (f 90). 133 Tarn 1951—84, 141—56: (f 152).

134 Petitot-Biehler 1975, 37-9, pi. 5.50: (f 122). 135 Narain 1957-80, 64, 122—4: (f 103).

136 I have shown the weakness of the theory which dates Apollodotus 1 before Eucratides 1 :
Narain 1957-80, 64—9, 122—9: (f 103). In view of the new tetradrachm, if we must have two
Apollodoti the earlier one can only beabout the time of Menander. Tarn may be partially rightabout
treating him as a contemporary of Menander, though 1 do not agree with the whole scenario
presented by him regarding the role and relationship of Apollodotus I: Tarn 1951—84, i4ff.:(F 152).

137 Narain 1957-80, 146-8: (f 103).

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MENANDER

4 1 1

any case the coins bearing the name of Apollodotus are abundant and are
often found in association with those of Menander. Among those
attributed to Apollodotus I, besides the new tetradrachm, the most
remarkable ones are the silver square coins with the device of an elephant
and a bull, and bearing a bilingual legend . 138 Menander appears on his
coins both as a youth and as well advanced in middle age; it is most likely
that he ruled for about twenty-five years and died c. 1 30 b.c. According to
the Buddhist sources he handed over his kingdom to his son and retired
from the world, but Plutarch reports that he died in a camp . 139 Be that as
it may, it is generally agreed that his son and successor, Strato, was not of
age, and therefore Menander’s queen, Agathocleia, ruled as a regent and
became the first woman among the Graeco-Bactrians to mint coins . 140

If Menander’s name has survived in Indian sources it is because of his
affiliation to Buddhism and patronage of that religion. His dialogue with
the Buddhist monk Nagasena as recorded in the Questions of King Milinda
is a lucid exposition of early Buddhist doctrine . 141 One of his copper
coin-types depicts the Buddhist Dharma-chakra, the Wheel of Law . 142
The fact of his conversion to Buddhism finds an echo in Plutarch’s
statement that at Menander’s death ‘the cities celebrated his funeral as
usual in other respects, but in respect of his remains, they put forth rival
claims and only with difficulty came to terms, agreeing that they should
divide the ashes equally and go away and should erect monuments to him
in all their cities ’. 143 For this is unmistakably Buddhist and recalls the
similar situation at the time of the Buddha’s passing away. Menander’s
connection with Buddhism is preserved also in the Chinese, Indo-
Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist traditions of later times, and like Asoka
and Kanishka, he became a legendary figure . 144 We do not believe with
Tarn that Menander adopted the faith only nominally and as a matter of
policy against the Brahmanical leadership of the post-Mauryan kings
with whom he fought . 145

Menander’s achievements and period show Graeco-Indian power at
its apogee. He certainly ruled from Kabul in the west to Chandigarh in
the east, and from Swat in the north to Kandahar in the south. Extension
of his authority in Bactria, even if not as far as the Oxus or beyond it, may
not be out of the question. Thus if the impact of Yavana power was felt in

138 Narain 1955-76, 26—7: (f 102); Mitchiner 1975, 11.116-17: (f ioi).

139 Plutarch, Moralia 821 d-f. 140 Narain 1957-80, 1 10 — 1 1 : (f 103).

141 Early Buddhist philosophy is explained in the text in the form of questions and answers. But
see Tarn 1951—84, 414—36: (f 152), for an excursus on ‘The Milindapaflha and Pscudo-Aristcas’.

142 Narain 1955-76, 15: (f 102); Mitchiner 1975, 11.134: (f ioi); see also above, n. 107.

143 Plutarch, Moralia 821 d-f.

144 This is clear from the various versions of the Mtfindapanha and the survival of Menander’s
name in Tibetan tradition: Narain 1957-80, 98: (F103).

145 Ibid. 97—9; Tarn 1951—84, 175: (f 152).

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412 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

the Ganges— jamuna valley as well as in western India , 146 and if it
manifested itself in trade and commerce, art and religion from the latter
half of the second century b.c. onwards, the credit goes to Menander. His
extensive coinage and its predominance over those of other Graeco-
Bactrian and Graeco-Indian kings, the expansive kingdom and above all
the survival of his name both in the western and eastern sources surely
make him the greatest of the Yavana kings.

IV. SUCCESSORS OF MENANDER

After Menander there began the process of decline and fall of the Graeco-
Bactrian and Graeco-Indian kings. During the century that followed
Menander more than twenty rulers are known to have struck coins . 147
While their names are yet to be discovered in any literary source of the
west or of the east, already a new king, Thrason, has been added to our
list from a recent discovery of one of his silver drachms . 148 The possibi-
lity of another king, Theodamus, is so far known only from an inscrip-
tion on a seal found at Bajaur . 149 In the absence of even the slender clues
which have been available hitherto from the literary sources, the task of
historical reconstruction of this later phase is frustrating indeed. While
some numismatic conclusions can be made to indicate probabilities, any
historical arrangement is bound to be very hypothetical and open to
more criticism than can be levelled against the arrangement for the earlier
period. At any rate it is clear that these kings, after Heliocles I in the north
and Menander in the south, cannot be put in a linear succession, ruling on
an average not more than five or six years. It is evident that they belonged
to several families and more likely than not some of them were striking
coins as joint or sub-kings concurrently with the ruling sovereigns.
Monograms, irrespective of their interpretation, and the provenance of
their coinage, in spite of imperfect records, indicate a waxing and waning
of territories, whether for external or internal reasons. The present
author has divided these later rulers and their territorial holdings on the
basis of the predominating type of their coins and their consistent

146 Narain 1957-80, 94-5: (f 103). The evidence of the Peripius may also be recalled here.

147 Narain 1957-80: (f 103); chapters 5 and 6 deal with them: see p. 104 for their names, and for
their coin-types. See Narain 1955-76, 15-37: (f ioz).

148 So far only one specimen of this coin is known, in a private collection in Bombay. It has on the
obverse the bust of the king and on the reverse Athena hurling a thunderbolt. The Greek inscription
on the coin reads Basileus Mcgalou Thrasonos and the Kharosthi reads Maharajasa Mahatasa Tbrasasa. I
have seen the photograph of the coin and it is reported by Robert C. Senior in his Sale List 4 of
January 1983:^ 1 4 1 ). The coin is said to have been found with Menander drachms.

149 Konow *9^9, 6: (f 78). On palaeographical grounds Konow dates the seal in the ‘first half of
the first century of the Christian era’, and that he could be a king depends upon the interpretation of
the prefix su( = Saka shau = king) before the name. If the date suggested is true, Theodamus could be
a satrap under the Saka-Pahlava rule.

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SUCCESSORS OF MENANDER 4 1 3

geographical distribution. 150 It has rightly been observed that ‘we get an
impression of the simultaneous rule of more than one king, of mutual
antagonism, confusion, and of civil war. The Yavanas seem to have been
their own worst enemies.’ 151

Heliocles I was probably the last Graeco-Bactrian to rule on both sides
of the River Oxus until about 140, when he was succeeded by his son
Eucratides II. Sometime during the reign of the latter the Yuezhi from
Chinese Central Asia had arrived in the region north of the Oxus. Pushed
by them, some of the Scythians from the north crossed the Oxus at points
near its central bend and, moving westward, harassed the Parthians
during the period c. 138—1 24 b.c. Phraates II and Artabanus II perished in
their battles against them. But, finally quelled by Mithridates II, they
were obliged to move southward through Merv and Herat to Seistan
(Drangiana) where they found a new home. 152 We do not know if, and to
what extent, the Bactrian Greeks suffered from their movement south-
ward at this time; their passage through Parthia might have been
disturbing, if at all, only marginally in the west; at least none of the
Bactrian Greeks is known to have suffered the fate of the Parthian kings.
It is only later, after several generations, when these Scythians move
northward from Seistan, that the Bactrian Greeks suffer from their
activities. 153

While Eucratides II (140-130 b.c.), represented by 130 coins in the
Qunduz hoard, no doubt ruled in central and western Bactria, and
Archebius (130-120), Heliocles II (120— 1 15) and Antialcidas (1 1 5-100)
filled the succession roster in his group, 154 things were not so smooth in
the eastern and southern parts of the Graeco-Bactrian and Graeco-Indian
domains after Menander’s death. This was more because of internal
reasons than external. Menander’s son was a minor, so that for the first
time a woman took charge of the state. She was Menander’s queen
Agathocleia, who acted as regent for some time before his young son
Strato I could rule on his own. She struck some coins with her own
portrait, and on others she is shown jointly with Strato. Her portrait has a
very ‘Indian’ look about it as regards features, hairstyle and even in what

150 Narain 1957—80, 101-5: (f 103). 151 Whitehead 1923, 308: (f 161).

152 Strabo xi. 9. 2 probably refers to this period. Mithridates 11 dislodged these Scythians from
western parts of Bactria: Narain 1957-80, 134, 140-1: (f 103).

153 The evidence of the Qunduz hoard indicates that the Greeks were still in control of central
parts of Bactria; if they suffered at all it must have been in the western parts closer to Parthia. The
Scytho-Parthians (Pahiavas) came to power in Seistan after or about the time of Mithridates IPs
death and the independence of Gotarzes in Babylonia, c. 88 b.c. It is a generation later that Azes 1 is
known to have ovcrstruck the coins of Apollodotus 11 and Hippostratus: Narain 1957-80, 140-2:
(f 103).

In the Qunduz hoard, out of 627 there were 144 coins of Eucratides, 22 1 of Heliocles I and 1 30
of Eucratides 11 ; there were only 3 of Antialcidas: Curiel and Fussman 1965: (f 39).

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414

THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

is visible of the dress . 155 She adopted the title Basilisses Theotropou. iib
Apollodotus I, who may have been a joint or sub-king during the time of
Menander, probably did not like the regency of Agathocleia and encour-
aged defections in the Menander group. Along with him, or following
soon after, others such as Antimachus II and Zoilus I, in whose group
Lysias was included, founded their own establishments wherever they
could . 157

This provided an opportunity for Andalcidas, a member of the
Eucratides group, to extend his power in Gandhara and become a king of
Taxila, while Antimachus II was in possession of the Swat valley . 158
Lysias, one of the Menander group and a contemporary rival of
Antialcidas, fought with him in the remaining portions of Afghanistan; if
one of his coins was indeed found in the Ai Khanum hoard, against none
of Antialcidas, Lysias could have been holding briefly the remote north-
eastern part of the Bactrian Greek kingdom before the Yuezhi crossed
the Oxus and forced Lysias and his group to contend with Antialcidas in
the southern regions of Afghanistan . 159

Antialcidas, surely one of the better known of the later kings, is known
to have sent an envoy from Taxila, Heliodorus, to the court of
Bhagabhadra, an Indian king of central India. By the time Antialcidas’
rule ended in Gandhara c. ioo b.c. the Yuezhi had crossed the Oxus and
occupied Bactria proper, bringing to an end the Bactrian Greek holdings
there, confining them in regions south of the Hindu Kush and in the
enclaves of the Indo-Afghan borderlands and in the upper Indus and
Swat valleys. But from these regions, too, they were squeezed out in the
next few decades by the Sakas, coming from the north through the Pamir
passes, and by the Scytho-Parthians, known as Pahlavas to Indian
sources, moving upwards from Sacastene (Seistan) to Ghazni and then to
Gandhara . 160

Among the last kings of the various groups, some are known to have
minted more coins than others. Though almost all of them struck a few
unilingual coins in the Attic system, the main bulk of their coinage
remained bilingual in the Indian system of weight. If quantitatively
Strato I and II, Apollodotus II, Diomedes, Nicias, Hippostratus and
Hermaeus appear to dominate the period, it is Amyntas who steals the

155 Haughton 1948, 134-41: (f 61); Narain 1957-80, no: (f 103).

156 lbid.\ Whitehead 1970, 216: (f 164). 157 Narain 1957-80, 112—14: (f 103).

Ibid ;

159 A hoard of coins found by farmers during 1973—4 at Ai Khanum, but not from the
excavations, contained at least 141 and possibly more coins; the other hoard found in the stratified
excavations in October 1973, on the other hand, contained only 63. One coin of Lysias is included in
the reconstructed inventory of the hoard but is considered as an ‘intrusion’ by Holt 1981, 9-10:
(f 65). 1 do not see any reason to agree, not only in view of the incomplete evidence but also because
five coins of Lysias as against one of Antialcidas were included in the Qunduz hoard.

160 Narain 1957-80, 152-8: (f 105).

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CONCLUSION

show by minting the largest silver coins and by adopting the title of
Nikator , 161 Hermaeus was the last king .’ 62 By marrying Calliope, prob-
ably a regnant queen belonging to another family , 163 he made the last bid
to unify the Greeks of Bactriaand India. But it was too late: by the middle
of the first century b.c. the three-pronged movement of the Yuezhi-
Kushan, Saka and Pahlava ethnic groups had already divided the king-
dom between themselves . 164

v . CONCLUSION

The Bactrian Greek state did not arise out of a conquest as did the
Achaemenid empire or that of Alexander in the east; it was also not an
immediate successor-state of Alexander like those of the Seleucids and
Ptolemies. On the contrary, it arose out of a revolt and it lived with a
series of them: Diodotus revolted against the Seleucids, Euthydemus
against the Diodoti and Eucratides against the Euthydemids. It was not a
monolithic dynastic state like those of the Seleucids or Ptolemies, but one
in which related and unrelated families, legitimate successors as well as
usurpers, ever feuding, somehow adjusted for their existence as a com-
posite state. They survived through a story of recurring conflicts and
changing authorities and loyalties. At no time in its life of about two
hundred years did any one king, or any one of the dynastic groups, rule
over the entire kingdom, consisting of those regions in the east where
Alexander had to deal with high resistance not only from the Iranians and
Indians but also from the Greek settlers, and where he had both
experienced the toughest of his battles and also ordered more massacres
than in the west. In spite of the in-fighting and the condition of flux, this
composite state was able to maintain its identity and survive for a long
period. Above all, military force combined with economic control
provided security as well as prosperity and enabled the state to last as
long as it did. While the military strategy and administration were fought
out by the rulers within their own fold, the economic and political
structure of the state was shared with the local elites with such social
relations and acceptance of religious systems as to reduce the gap
between the ruler and the ruled so that finally they became one.

It is not possible to affirm that this entire state was ruled from one
capital city throughout its existence. In the beginning it could have been
Bactra or Zariaspa, or most probably, as the evidence now emerges, it
was the city at the site of Ai Khanum, perhaps named Dionysopolis (or

161 Curicl and Fussman 1965, 46, pis. 52-3: (f 39); Mitchiner 1975, 11.219: (f ioi).

162 Narain 1957-80, 157-64: (f 103).

163 Ibid. 161-2. For illustration of the joint coin see Mitchiner 1975, 11.226: (f ioi).

164 Narain 1957—80, ch. j passim-, (f 103).

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416 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

Diodoteia) until it was moved by Euthydemus to Bactra . 165 No doubt,
however, by the second century b.c. there was already more than one city
from which the government was administered . 166 If there was any
satrapal division of the state at the outset, as may be inferred from Strabo
and others , 167 it was soon found to be redundant because of revolts and
resultant fragmentation which made such large territorial jurisdictions
out of place. At any rate it is agreed that it did not have the triple Seleucid
division of satrapy, eparchy and hyparchy . 168 Probably the institution of
satrapal office yielded to that of the joint kings and sub-kings, sociusregni,
the office mentioned by Justin in the case of Eucratides I . 169 They were
supposed to assist the king in the administration with more freedom and
power than a satrap. Coins also indicate that at times a queen could be a
regent for a minor son, or even a co-ruler as in the example of Hermaeus
and Calliope. The only name of an administrative position which has
survived in inscriptions is that of Meridarch , 170 an institution not heard
of in the Seleucid system . 171 Perhaps the Bactrian Greeks believed in
having only lower or smaller units of administration, consisting of a
district or a division rather than large provinces, and these were put
probably under the direct control of the king or his joint or sub-kings.
Assuming that the Sakas and Pahlavas followed the Bactrian Greeks and
adopted aspects of their administration and nomenclature, one may infer
from their inscriptions that some strategoi were probably also appointed;
they represented the coercive element of the state . 172 In the case of the
Sakas, the strategoi do not appear to have been in full charge of the
satrapies because they had also the Kshatrapas and Mahakshatrapas in
their administration. But if the latter were the equivalents of sub-kings
and joint-kings of the Bactrian Greek state, the strategoi may have been in
charge of the frontier or strategic military settlements. Or perhaps a
system of dual administration dividing the ‘civil’ and ‘military’ roles was

165 While there is no doubt that Bactra/Zariaspa was the capital of the state under Euthydemus (as
is clear from Polybius, for it was there that Euthydemus had withdrawn and held out against
Antiochus III), there is no specific evidence whether it was the capital of Diodotus from the very
start; in view of the Ai Khanum evidence it seems more likely that his capital was in the remote
north-eastern part of Bactria before it was moved to Bactra, whether or not by Diodotus himself.

166 Besides the one at Ai Khanum and Bactra we may visualize a chief city at each of the following
locations (in some cases perhaps more than one): in the Qunduz valley, Begram, Charsada, Taxila
Sagala and the Swat valley.

167 Strabo xjui 1.2; also indirectly in Justin xu.6. Based on Ptolemy’s evidence, Tarn envisages as
many as nine province-names east of the Paropamisadae during the time of Menander in addition to
several others in other regions of the Bactrian Greek kingdom (195 1-84, 240: (f 152)).

168 Ibid. 242. 169 Justin xli .6.

170 Konow 1929, 1-5: (f 78). Two Meridarchs are known from inscriptions, Theodorus in the
Swat valley and one whose name cannot be read at Taxila.

171 Tarn 1951-84, 242: (f 152).

172 Ibid. 24 1 . But there is no actual reference to the office or to a name of an incumbent during the
period of the Bactrian and Indian Greeks (if the indirect evidence about Viyakamitra is not
accepted). Strategoi are known only from later Scytho- Parthian coins.

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CONCLUSION

417

in operation. One may even postulate that the strategoi were the links
between the king and the Meridarchs. The Milindapanha refers to the
amacca , a Pali word ( amatya in Sanskrit) which may be translated as
‘ministers’ or ‘councillors’, who were always available to advise
Menander; the text mentions the names of Anantakaya (Antiochus),
Devamantiya (Diomedes ?), Sabbadinna or Dinna (Dion) and Mankura
(a non-Greek?) as Menander’s amacca , 173 Could they be taken as equiv-
alents of the ‘Friends’ (pbi/oi) of the Seleucid system ? 174 While no specific
information is available on their inter-state diplomatic relations with
kings or kingdoms to their west, there is evidence for the despatch of an
envoy, Heliodorus, from Taxila by one of the Indo-Greek kings,
Antialcidas, to the court of Bhagabhadra, an Indian king in Central
India . 175 This envoy, said to be a son of Dion, could be a son of Dinna, an
amacca of Menander . 176

No doubt the Greeks of Bactria and India presided over a flourishing
economy. This is clearly indicated by their coinage and the monetary
exchange they had established with other currencies. But again there is
not much to enlighten us about their fiscal administration and monetary
management. We are still in the dark as to whether the monograms on
their coins stand for mints or moneyers, or both. But we do know from
the recent discovery of ink inscriptions on vases at Ai Khanum that there
were functionaries involved in the accounting and storage of money and
goods received . 177 Whether these accumulations were items of tribute or
revenue receipts, or the wealth of a business magnate resulting from
trade and commerce, may be questioned. But from such names as
Oxeboakes, Oxubazes, Aryandes in these documents, the participatory
roles of the Indo-Iranians in their management are evident. The occur-
rence of Kharosthi letters with Greek monograms on the coins, as well as
of Brahmi along with Greek on an important funerary monument, tells
the same story . 178

The affluence and the scramble for wealth and power, which must
have been a major reason for the in-fighting and political fragmentation
of the state, in turn also sapped the military strength of the population
and made them more a nation of shopkeepers than of energetic soldiers.

173 Milindapanha 11 , The Questions of King Milinda Part 1 , 47 #.: (p ioo).

174 See Walbank, CAH 2 vii.i.68-71. He notes, ‘kings. Friends and army are often mentioned
together as three focal points of importance in a Hellenistic kingdom’ (n. 25).

175 It is likely that Antialcidas sought the friendship of this king from Vidisha (Bhopal) in Central
India to strengthen his hold over Taxila because the Indo-G reeks under Menander had suffered a
reverse in that area: Narain 1957—80, 82: (f 103).

176 Since Antialcidas came to occupy Taxila soon after the death of Menander it is not unlikely
that the former wisely chose a son of one of the ‘ministers’ of Menander for the post of an envoy.

177 Rapin 1983: (f 127).

178 Tarn 1951-84, 356: (f 152), for Kharosthi letters, and Narain 1986: (f 1 10) for Brahmi.

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418 THE GREEKS OF BACTRIA AND INDIA

The observation of Zhang Qian, the Chinese envoy to the Yuezhi, about
Bactria in 129/8 b.c. seems appropriate: 179

The Daxia, situated in the south of the Oxus river . . . have walled cities and
houses. . . . They have had no great kings or chiefs. Some cities and towns had
small chiefs. Their soldiers were weak and feared fighting. They were skilful in
trade. When the Da Yuezhi migrated westward, they attacked and defeated them
and subjugated all the Daxia.

A long period of interaction with the peoples and cultures of the region
made the Greeks of Bactria and India part of the local milieu. They had
kept their identity as long as they could before they were absorbed in the
melting pot of south Asia. They were socially integrated into the caste
system of India, they became Buddhists and Hindus, master craftsmen
and architects, adopted Indian names and titles, and wrote in Indian
script and languages. In this process they not only internalized many
ideas and institutions of Iranian and Indian origin but also made abiding
contributions to various aspects of the life and culture of south Asia, for
example in art and iconography, literature and drama, astronomy and the
calendrical system.

While the literary sources, both Indian and western, yield little infor-
mation, material remains have proved comparatively more rewarding,
particularly those from the recent but still incomplete excavations at Ai
Khanum. A brief glimpse of how the east and the west interacted there
may be apt here. 180 Of the public structures at Ai Khanum, while there
are such typically Greek items as a gymnasium and a theatre, albeit with
an ‘oriental’ touch, the builders had turned to Persian models for their
concept and execution of the palace construction, though Graeco-
Bactrian elements may be discerned in the architectural embellishments.
If the plan of private apartments and the flat roofs of the buildings were
characteristically eastern and of non-hellenic inspiration, the use of an
ornamental edging of terracotta lines gave them a Greek look, as did the
decor of cylindrical stone columns and rectangular stone pilasters. But
the importance the inhabitants gave to their luxurious bathrooms was
not Greek. Although the gymnasium was protected in the Greek tra-
dition by Hermes and Heracles and the presiding deities on the coins
generally belong to the Greek pantheon, the three temples discovered at
Ai Khanum are not Greek at all: their massive structure standing on a
high three-stepped podium and other details were borrowed from
Iranian or Central Asian tradition; one of them, a large stepped platform

179 Shiji ch. 123, translation of the passage by Kajuo Enoki in Narain 1957-80, 139: (f 103).
,8 ° See a splendid summary of the result of work at Ai Khanum in Bernard 1982: (f 23). The
account that follows is based essentially on this report. See also P/s. to Vol. VU. /, pp. 25-7 with pis.
26 and 27.

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at the south-west corner of the acropolis, could belong even to Indian
tradition. The Greeks followed their own custom of burial, but the rites
they performed in the temples were not hellenic. Similarly, while Greek
inscriptions on stone and imprints from papyrus manuscripts have
survived to indicate their links to Delphi and the elite’s love for Greek
poetry and philosophy, and while there are Greek inscriptions on the
vases found in the so-called ‘Treasury’, the use of Aramaic, Brahmi and
Kharosthi scripts may also be noted . 181 If among the settlers and func-
tionaries of the city there were Greeks of various origins as well as
Macedonians, there were also, as mentioned above, people of Iranian and
other backgrounds. In the arts, too, examples of Greek tradition as well
as those belonging to Iranian, Indian and Central Asian traditions
abound. While iconographic elements of their deities remained mostly
Greek in their execution, artists were aware not only of local canons and
practices but they also introduced innovations in technique that were
rarely seen in Greece. These are particularly noticeable in the depiction of
cult figures and in making monumental statues and mural bas-reliefs.
Bernard has observed that the taste of these people ‘remained tradition-
ally Greek, even to the point of perpetuating an outdated Classical
style ’. 182 This is well taken; it underscores the pre-Alexander elements in
the east, the ‘hellenic’ as against the ‘Hellenistic’. Tarn observed that ‘it
must be emphasised that Greeks were not in India for the purpose of
Hellenising Indians, and there is no sign that they ever attempted to do
so; they had come to India for a definite purpose, which had failed, and
they stayed there to rule what they could because there was nothing else
they could do ’. 183 When the Greeks of Bactria and India lost their
kingdom they were not all killed, nor did they return to Greece. They
merged with the people of the area and worked for the new masters ; 184
contributing considerably to the culture and civilization in southern and
central Asia, they became part of its history. I still believe ‘they came,
they saw, but India conquered ’. 185

181 For Aramaic see Grenet 1983, 373-81: (f 54).

182 Bernard 1982, 158: (f 23).

183 Tarn 1951-84, 375-6: (f 152).

184 Besides those who must have been absorbed in administrative positions or in army there is also
the example of the slave Agesilas, one of the architects in the time of Kanishka.

185 Narain 195 7-80, 1 1: (p 103). About thirty years ago when 1 wrote this line, most of about fifty
reviews (in eight languages) which I saw took this as my leitmotif-, some agreed with me and others
did not. But as I said in the preface of my book, it is not easy to settle matters conclusively. In
response to a recent remark that my assessment, as counterpart to that of Tarn, ‘is no less
ethnocentric’ (Holt in his Introduction to the latest reprint edition of Tarn’s book, p. v), I only refer
to another statement: ‘it must not be thought, however, that Dr Narain writes from a narrowly
nationalistic viewpoint - far from it: he has gone fully into the evidence on both sides and is
scrupulously fair in his treatment of it’: Jenkins in his Review in the Journal of the Rojal Central Asian
Society 1957: (f 72).

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G R AECO-BACTRI AN AND INDO-GREEK KINGS

APPENDIX I: THE GR AECO-BACTRI AN AND THE
INDO-GREEK KINGS IN CHRONOLOGICAL AND
GENEALOGICAL GROUP ARRANGEMENTS

256—248

248-235

Diodotus I
Diodotus 11

235—200

Euthydemus 1

200- 1 8 5

Demetrius 1

200— 1 90

Euthydemus 11

195—185

Antimachus I

185-180

Pantaleon

185-175

Demetrius 11

180-165

Agathocles

171-155

Eucratides 1

155-15°

Agathocleia =

Menander

155-153

Plato

140— 1 25

Apollodotus I

Heliocles I

140—130

Eucratides II

130-125

Zoilus 1

Antimachus II

1 30-1 20

Archebius

1 30-1 20

Agathocleia

& Strato I

125-120

Polyxenus

125-115

Philoxcnus

Heliocles II

uo-95

Strato I

120-1 10

Lysias

115-100

Antialcidas

1 1 5-1 10

Thrasos

Epandcr

no-95

Apollodotus II

100-95

Theophilus

Nicias

Diomedes

95-90

Artemidorus

Pcucolaus

Strato I & 11

95-80

Telephus

Hippostratus

Amyntas

85-75

Dionysius

Strato 11

80-75

Apollophancs

75~55

Calliope =

Hermaeus

Note: The dates given above, which are by no means absolute because of the very nature of the
evidence, are revised estimates from earlier conclusions (Narain 1957-80, 181: (f 103)). So also the
genealogical group arrangements of the kings are not strictly genealogical but indicate direct or
indirect kinship in an extended family sense either by descent or by marriage. Those listed in the first
three groups cumulatively appear to form one internal group succeeding the Diodoti. The fourth
group may be treated as external started by an usurper, Eucratides I.

APPENDIX II: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS OF THE
GRAECO-BACTRIAN AND INDO-GREEK KINGS

The territorial assignments indicated below are based on conclusions of earlier
work (Narain 1957-80: (f 103)) and some revisions made in the text above. Just
as the chronology of the kings and joint/sub-kings are often overlapping, their
territorial jurisdictions also often overlap. The political geography has been
divided into eleven territorial areas based on numismatic distribution and other
evidence. They are numbered as follows:

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CHAPTER 12

ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK
WORLD

ELIZABETH RAWSON

I. THE ROMAN TRADITION

It is difficult to look directly at the Rome of the late third century and
isolate her characteristics and traditions; too little contemporary evi-
dence survives. Perhaps we may do best to attempt to see her first
through the eyes of two contrasted writers, Polybius and Fabius Pictor.
Polybius wrote in the middle of the second century, but tried to describe
the Romans in his first book as they were at the time of the First Punic
War, while his extended account in book vi of their institutions is meant
to be a picture of these as they were at their best, near the start of the
struggle against Hannibal.

That ‘best’ should give us pause, and of course Polybius’ sources were
primarily aristocratic Romans looking back to an idealized past. But
Polybius is not entirely uncritical. His Romans are also more unlike his
own familiar Greeks than is sometimes supposed. 1 Above all, they are
soldiers: immensely courageous, partly because subject to a strict and
indeed terrifying discipline, 2 though also spurred on by praise and
rewards; persistent to the point of obstinacy — they think that force can
control even the weather, and thus, impressive as their rapid and
determined building of a fleet against the Carthaginians was, they have
frequently met disaster at sea. 3 Their haughtiness, especially in defeat, is
imposing, but sometimes impractical. At a later point Polybius notes
their thoroughness when sacking a town - they even dismember the
dogs. In book vi he shows a great admiration not only for the structure
and weapons of the legion, so different from those of the Greek phalanx,
but for the whole way in which a campaign is organized, following it
from the first enlistment of the men to the measuring of the camp. King
Pyrrhus of Epirus is supposed to have wondered if a people so well
organized in military affairs could be called barbarian; Polybius certainly
does not call the Romans so - it is their Gallic enemies whom he regards
as typical barbarians, brave but often disorganized and so not really

1 As by Momigliano 1975, 2 2: (1 27), 2 Polvb. 1. 17.11.

3 Polyb. 1.20.11—13, 37-7 _IO > xxvn.8.8.

422

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THE ROMAN TRADITION 423

formidable. But some of his Greek characters do call the Romans
barbarians, and indeed at the start of the second century the playwright
Plautus was still ready to apply the word to them and their language, if
primarily just to mean non-Greek 4 (he also identifies them as porridge -
eaters, pultipbagi 5 )-, while Cato was to complain that the Greeks called the
Romans Opici, assimilating them to rough Italic tribes of southern Italy
against which the Greek colonial cities had long struggled . 6

The other fact that Polybius stresses is the sheer size of the Roman
military and naval effort. The manpower resources of Rome and her
Italian allies were, in the eyes of a Greek from the Peloponnese, enor-
mous; her navies in particular larger than anything a Greek power could
produce . 7 In general, he regarded the Romans even of the third century
as wealthy, though simple in their way of life. He notoriously admired
Roman piety and the role given to religion in public life , 8 for he held that
this contributed to the obedience of the lower, and the traditional
integrity of the upper, class (he believed that none of the latter took
bribes until shortly before the period in which he was writing). He is
thinking of the fear of divine punishment in this and a future life, a fear
which in fact Greek and Etruscan influence were probably largely
responsible for imposing on the Romans. There were still primitive
aspects to Roman religion; in times of crisis, says Polybius, when he
reaches the disasters of the first years of the Hannibalic War, the Romans
think nothing unworthy of them in their effort to placate the gods . 9 This
is perhaps a veiled reference to the sacrifice involving the burial of a
Gallic and a Greek couple (though it was the Sibylline books that advised
this, a collection of oracles in Greek supposedly originating at archaic
Cumae but acquired at an early date by the Roman state). Polybius
describes openly the more harmless, if uncivilized, custom of the women,
who sweep out the shrines with their hair in such emergencies.

He also admires the Roman political system; but here it is true that he
does, with some violence, assimilate it to the Greek pattern of the ‘mixed’
constitution, or rather, in his case, a ‘balanced’ constitution . 10 In rough
outline, however, there were similarities between Greek and Roman
institutions, if Rome is regarded simply as a city-state; and Polybius, at
least in the surviving parts of his work, gives us little idea of the way in
which Rome had already gone beyond this conception, especially
through bestowing the status of civitas sine suffragio and Latinitas, and
how by colonization and alliance she had come to dominate Italy. (As
early as 215, however, her ability to colonize widely, caused as he

4 Plaut. As in. n, Most. 828, etc. 5 Plaut. Mostell. 828, Poen. 54.

6 Pliny, HN xxuc.14. 7 Polyb. 1.26.8-9, n** 4 * 8 Polyb. vi.56.

9 Polyb. 111.112.9. 10 Polyb. vi.ii.ii.

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ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

thought by the generous granting of full citizenship to freedmen, had
struck Philip V of Macedon. 11 )

If it is always complained that Polybius, in book vi, draws his
horizontal divisions — consuls, senate, popular assembly — without
counterpointing them with the vital vertical divisions resulting from the
clientelae of the great nobles, he does note, for his own time, how an
aristocrat is expected to spend his days in the Forum, collecting support-
ers by defending clients in the courts; and also the narrowly legalistic
outlook that led most Romans religiously to fulfil their pecuniary
obligations, but never to go an inch beyond them. 12 And the materialistic
attitude which regarded the acquisition of wealth, so long as it was done
in acceptable ways, as one of the most important things in life, comes
over clearly; as it does in a genuine late third-century document, the
eulogy of L. Metellus, given at his funeral in 221, and also praising his
military achievements, prominence in the Senate, and many children. 13
Opportunities for the acquisition of wealth (except by gaining booty)
must, however, have been limited at this time, when Rome’s economy
was largely agricultural; it is Cato, not Polybius, who looks back to this
tradition, saying that our ancestors, if they wished to praise a man,
praised him as a good farmer and cultivator. 14 The lex Claudia of 218
limited the extent to which a Roman senator or his son might engage in
trade (and thus incidentally barred one route to foreign contacts, while it
was probably also forbidden, by this or another law, to senators to own
land abroad); but foreign trade at least was still restricted in volume.
Opportunities for conspicuous consumption were also limited: Cicero
thinks C. Duilius, who had won a victory in the First Punic War, and who
liked in his old age to be accompanied of an evening by a torchbearer and
a flute-player, on the Greek model, was absolutely unexampled. 15

Polybius perhaps also underestimates the strength of aristocratic
family feeling, in spite of his well-known description of a great man’s
funeral, with masked figures representing all his prominent ancestors; 16
which he regarded as admirably calculated to inspire youthful members
of the family to seek the fame that rewards valour. He notes too that
young Scipio Aemilianus was under intense pressure to live up to the
traditions of his house, and we can well believe that this was so when we
read the surviving epitaphs of third- and second-century members of the
family — though one, dating from as early as the late third century, pauses
to note that its subject’s beauty, forma, was equal to his virtus, a sign
probably of Greek influence, perhaps primarily Homeric. 17

11 SIG 543. 12 Polyb. xxxi. 23. 1 1, cf. 26.9-28.9. 13 Pliny, HN vn. 139.40.

14 Cato, Agr. praef.

15 Cic. Sen. 44 (another version has it that they were privileges officially granted).

16 Polyb. vi. 5 3-4. 17 ILLRP 309.

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THE ROMAN TRADITION 425

Polybius has nothing to say about the arts or intellectual activities at
Rome in the third century, perhaps because they did not seem to him
worth talking of, though he criticizes Greek states that lack education
and the arts. Cicero tells us, however, that the only complaint he had of
Roman institutions was that no public provision was made for educa-
tion; it is a pity that this passage is lost . 18

What Polybius does is to show us what aspects of Rome’s tradition a
Greek could believe to be the cause of her great achievements, even
believe to be better than their Greek equivalents. The Romans, partly
because of their inbuilt reverence for ancestral tradition, partly perhaps
in response to Greek admiration, were slow to modify these aspects. In
spite of the famous tag from Horace, the conqueror was never taken
wholly captive; the vitality of the Roman tradition was greater than that
of almost any other area that came under the influence of Greek civiliza-
tion, in part of course because the Romans were in fact the conquering
and not the conquered or colonized partner.

It was possible to stress the connections, not the differences, between
Greeks and Romans. The senator Fabius Pictor, who wrote a history of
Rome in the Greek language, perhaps shortly after rather than during the
Hannibalic War, attempted to prove not only that her policy in her recent
wars had been eminently just, but that she was to all intents a Greek city.
He was trying, no doubt, to redress the balance against the pro-
Carthaginian historians from Sicily and Magna Graecia, in an unprece-
dented attempt to influence Greek opinion . 19 He accepted, of course, the
story of Aeneas’ coming to Latium, which had been current for a long
time, and which fitted Rome nicely into Greek legendary history, though
it did not make her Greek. But we now know that he had Hercules’ visit
to Italy , 20 and perhaps to the site of Rome, and he almost certainly had the
tale of the Arcadian Evander’s settlement on the Palatine. (He also had
accounts of legendary connections between Sicily and Latium, which fell
out of the tradition when Sicily lost all political importance.) For the
actual foundation of Rome by Romulus and Remus he seems to have
followed a Greek writer, Diodes of Peparethus (though Diodes may
have been building on a genuinely Roman version ), 21 and it is hard to
doubt that he knew Timaeus’ great history dealing extensively with the
western Mediterranean, though Roman historians seem to have made a
point of differing from Timaeus wherever possible.

Fabius also had an account of an old festival, the Ludi Romani,
probably designed to show how Greek Rome was . 22 His naivete is shown

18 Cic. Rep. iv.}. 19 Gclzer 1962-4, 111.5 1: (a 19); Momigliano 1966, 55: (b 18).

20 Alfoldi 1974, 589: (h 275). 21 Peter, HRRef. frs. ja-b.

22 Ibid. fr. 16. The thesis was perhaps not first introduced into the passage by Dionysius, who is
our direct source.

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4^6 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

by his belief that the games, and their cost, had not changed since their
foundation in the early fifth century b.c., but in spite of his desire to
prove a thesis, his description is perhaps reasonably accurate for his own
time. He apparently began with an account of the Greek customs
involved in the preliminaries to the games which the Augustan
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, our immediate source, has passed over.
Dionysius does describe the procession, the sacrifice and the games
themselves, quoting from Homer (as possibly Fabius had not done) to
prove that early Greek customs lay behind the Roman ones. The chariot-
races, the musical instruments, the dancers in armour or dressed as satyrs
all recall Greece; the images of the gods are carried in ‘showing the same
likenesses as those made by the Greeks, with the same dress and symbols
as they have in Greece’. Victorious athletes are rewarded ‘in the most
Greek of ways’, with wreaths. The passage provides a number of puzzles,
but it is probably true that some of the customs mentioned were archaic,
and ultimately of Greek origin, perhaps (though not necessarily) filtered
through Etruria; while others were doubtless comparatively recent im-
ports, either from Magna Graecia or Sicily, from both of which Rome
received much influence, from the late fourth century; or even from
Greece itself, with which Rome was in direct if occasional touch.

Fabius will hardly have seemed to his readers to prove more than the
‘faint traces of a common origin’ which Plutarch says that the Greeks
admitted at the time of Flamininus’ first passage to Greece in 198 b.c. (as
indeed they must have done when they allowed the Romans to compete
in the Isthmian Games in zz8). 23 By that time the pace of hellenization
had quickened dramatically. But the term is often used in altogether too
undefined and undifferentiated a fashion. We must distinguish many
elements in it, and many sources of origin, establishing which aspects of
it the Romans were at different stages able to admire or absorb, and
which they would only very slowly come to appreciate or would even
positively reject.

II. THE HANNIBALIC WAR

During the first years of the Hannibalic War Rome was too hard-pressed
to look much beyond her immediate problems in the west, except that the
Senate turned in its anxiety to whatever religious means could be found
for obtaining the gods’ favour; and this meant turning not only to such
traditional Italic institutions as the ver sacrum, but also to the Greek ones
recommended by the Sibylline books, which as we saw were or pur-
ported to be an archaic collection of Greek oracles. Thus in z 17 a lecti-

23 Plut. Flam. 11.4; Zon. vm.19.7.

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THE HANNIBALIC WAR 427

sternium , a Greek rite not in itself new at Rome, by which the images of
the gods were placed on couches and offered feasts, was held to the
twelve Great Gods, chosen and paired according to Greek concep-
tions. 24 In the next year Fabius Pictor, later the historian, was sent to the
oracle at Delphi. The Romans had probably dedicated gifts, and con-
sulted the oracle, occasionally from early times. They were to turn to it
again some ten years after Fabius’ visit. 25 The Sibylline books also
recommended the vowing of a temple to Venus Erycina, whose cult in
Sicily showed Greek as well as Punic influences. 26 Games to Apollo, who
was probably still felt to be a Greek god (his temple was outside the
pomerium or city boundary and he was worshipped Graeco ritu) were
instituted in 212 and paid for by public collection (a Greek custom
which, introduced in this time of financial stringency, became common);
they were made regular in 208 - all this on the advice both of the Sibylline
books and the native prophecies of Marcius. In 208 a Roman envoy was
told to attend the Olympic Games while in Greece (though for political
purposes). 27 In 205 Rome even sent to her most distant ally, Attalus of
Pergamum, to help her import the rites of the Great Mother from
Phrygia, as Delphi and the Sibylline oracles had commanded. 28 Both
Venus Erycina and the Great Mother were actually given temples within
the pomerium ; perhaps the connections of both cults with the Aeneas
story made them seem not wholly foreign, but it is noteworthy that both
were firmly adapted to their new context. Venus of Eryx did not bring
her temple prostitutes with her, and was regarded as a goddess of victory
rather than love, and the orgiastic elements in the worship of the Mother
were strictly controlled, her eunuch priests being restricted in number
and activity, and the post strictly confined to foreigners. The traditional
structure of Roman religion was never, in our period, to be broken
down.

The Senate does not seem to have had very much prejudice against
foreign rites in themselves, in spite of its action in 2 1 3 in repressing what
Livy calls foreign superstitions. It acted through a praetor to destroy a
mass of written prophecies, prayers and books on sacrifice, which were
leading to irregular practices even in the Forum and on the Capitol,
especially by women, and to the financial exploitation of the rural plebs
gathered in the city during the war. It was then primarily a police
measure, rather than an attempt to extirpate foreign influence as such. 29

24 Livy xxii.10.9: c f. SIC 589, a Uctisternium to the 12 Olympian gods at Magnesia.

25 Livy xxii. J7, xxhi.i 1, xxvm.45.12. 26 Livy xxn.9.7, 10. 10, xxm.jo.13, } I * 9 *

27 Livy xxv. 12. 15, xxvi. 23. 2, xxvn. 11. 6, 23.3, 35.5-4.

2 * Livy xxix. 10.4-11.8. It is perhaps unlikely that the Roman envoys went themselves to
Pcssinus to fetch the sacred stone as Livy reports; it may have come from the Megalesion at
Pergamum, as Varro, Ling, vi.15, supposes. 29 Livy xxv. 1.6-12.

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428 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

Both the Ludi Apollinares and, when they came to be set up shortly
after the War, the Megalesia of the Great Mother, were ludi scaenici , at
which plays were produced. The first production of a real Latin play was
believed to have come in 240 with Livius Andronicus’ first adaptation
from a Greek original; this is the better of two ancient chronologies, but
is not quite universally accepted. Livius was a freedman, traditionally
from Tarentum, and possibly enslaved on its fall in 272. It is not
inconceivable that plays in Latin were already known in the Latin-
speaking towns on the borders of theatrically-minded Campania, and
companies of Greek actors from the Greek city of Neapolis there may
even have reached Rome. 30 It is clear, from late red-figure vases and
other evidence, that both Magna Graecia and Campania were familiar
with performances of Attic tragedy, especially Euripides, and of New
Comedy, as well as of their own burlesque dramas in Greek, which in
Campania at least had led to imitations in the Oscan language, though
perhaps these did not take written form. It was from flourishing Oscan-
speaking Capua, near Neapolis, that Naevius, Rome’s second play-
wright, came; he wrote both comedies and tragedies on Greek models
(Livius too wrote both, in unGreek fashion: there was clearly a shortage
of authors). Sicily also had theatrical traditions, and it is often thought
that many Romans developed a taste for drama there in the First Punic
War. It has been objected that armies are ‘almost perfect non-conductors
of culture’; but many Englishmen did come to Italian opera when
fighting in Italy in the Second World War.

Even if its beginnings are slightly earlier, it seems to have been in the
last two decades of the third century that Roman drama gained its real
hold and arrived at some kind of maturity; the Ludi Plebei, set up about
220, were or soon became scaenici as well. Naevius was active till near the
end of the Hannibalic war; by then, Plautus had begun to write comedy.
The Romans seem to have ignored plays by Sicilian or Italiote authors,
perhaps because of their growing contempt for these areas and increasing
interest in ‘real’ Greece, even if this still had to be largely mediated
through the west. Of many of the plays produced by the Roman poets we
have only the titles. Those of the tragedies suggest, as is often pointed
out, that the Romans were (not surprisingly) interested in the legends of
the Trojan War, and also that they were not averse from stories about
Dionysus and Dionysiac religion, which had made its way into Italy and
was thus not unfamiliar; but that, perhaps, they avoided the hostile
portraits of Odysseus that were to be found in a number of later fifth-
century tragedies, since he was much honoured in the western areas he
was thought to have visited. If Roman taste could really be reflected in

30 Fraenkel 1960, 439: (h 180).

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THE HANNIBALIC WAR 429

this wav, the poets must have had an extensive repertory of models from
which to choose.

The plays may have been known originally as much by the Greek
author’s name and title as by those of the Latin adapter, or so some
passages of Plautus would suggest. 31 Dress and setting remained strictly
Greek, but the adaptations were in many respects remarkably Roman.
Livius and Naevius probably established many of the traditions of the
Roman stage: for tragedy, in particular, the elevated language, exploiting
the native love of alliteration, assonance and play on words; and, for both
tragedy and comedy, the remarkable expansion of the parts of the
accompanying flautist and the actors as singers. Whether this was done
under the influence of Hellenistic Greek, or native Italian, semi-dramatic
forms is still disputed; it is also possible that trained choruses were hard
to obtain in Rome (some tragedies at least do seem to have had a chorus,
though comedies do not), and that the musical element had therefore to
be transferred to the actors.

Possibly under the stimulus of the Hannibalic War and the national
feeling it provoked came the first creation of a literature based on Greek
forms, but Roman in content. All Naevius’ praetextae , plays based on
Roman history, may date from this period (the Clastidium certainly does);
they were perhaps all, like that, produced for such special occasions as the
triumphs or funerals of great men. There is no good evidence that
Naevius set any comedies in Italy. But we have Cicero’s warrant for
regarding his historical epic concerning the First Punic War as a work of
his old age and so of this period. 32 Though the plays had been written in
metres adapted from the Greek, the helium Punlcum was still in the to us
somewhat mysterious ‘Saturnian’ verse, which Livius Andronicus had
employed for his adaptation of Homer’s Odyssey. How far Naevius was
influenced in his choice of subject by Greek historical epics, which he
may or may not have known, and how far by the strong feeling of the
Romans for their less as well as their more distant past, we cannot tell.

According to a notice in Livy, in 207 Livius Andronicus (by now
surely very elderly) composed for the state a hymn to J uno, to be sung by
a chorus of virgins 33 - in other words a partbeneion , probably new in its
kind at Rome, though old-fangled in Greece by now. There is a slight
possibility that Livy’s source here was accepting the lower and less
reliable chronology for the poet, and that the hymn was really written
some time earlier. According to the Augustan scholar Verrius Flaccus
(accepting the later date), Livius’ hymn led to permission being given for
a guild of ‘scribes and actors’ (supposedly linked because Livius both
wrote and acted; the guild was conceivably already in some sort of

31 Plaut. Poen. i in particular: Aristarchus’ Achilles.

32 Cic. Sen. 50. 33 Livy xxvii.37-3, cf. xxxi.12.9.

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43° ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

existence) to meet and make dedications in the temple of Minerva on the
Aventine . 34 If poets were associated thus with government or other
clerks, scribae proper, this shows us how unused to creative writers Rome
still was. The history of this institution is obscure; what, for example,
was its relation to the society of parasiti Apollinis, who were actors of
some kind, possibly the less well-regarded mimes? This body, according
to another passage of Verrius (often, however, disbelieved) existed
during the Hannibalic War , 35 having perhaps been founded with the new
games to Apollo. At all events it is interesting that actors in Rome were
under the protection of Minerva or Apollo, or both; they were not, as in
Greece, associated with Dionysus, and organized into companies of
artists bearing his name. There may have been some precedent in Sicily
for linking Apollo with the theatre , 36 but it may be that, as with Venus
Erycina and the Magna Mater, the Romans were trying to avoid the
emotional and extravagant.

Greek medicine, like Greek drama, was percolating into the city at this
time. We happen to know that a Greek from the Peloponnese, who
specialized in wounds, set himself up in Rome with state assistance just
before the war, and was remembered later as the first representative of
Greek medicine in the city . 37 Since we can hardly doubt that doctors
from Magna Graecia or Sicily, in both of which there were strong if now
perhaps old-fashioned medical traditions, had reached Rome before this,
the notice is further evidence of the Romans’ growing disregard for the
Greeks of the west. But Greek medicine did not altogether ‘take’ at
Rome yet, as we shall see; the Peloponnesian was regarded as a butcher,
and few or no Romans took up the profession; none tried to translate
Greek medical literature into Latin.

As the war went on, armies were again committed to Greek-speaking
areas, in Magna Graecia and Sicily, and the attempted intervention of
Philip V of Macedon in support of Hannibal led to the first formal
alliance of Rome with a state of old Greece — the Aetolian League,
unfortunately a predatory and comparatively unsophisticated people
later to prove a liability. The terms of the treaty, which included one by
which Rome was to have all the moveable booty in any Greek town taken
by the allies, including the enslaved population, do not suggest that she
was eager to recommend herself to Greek public opinion, though on one
occasion a general, professing favour to the Greeks, did permit ransom,
noting it as a non-Roman custom . 38 One or two other alliances followed,
however, including those with (probably) Athens, with Sparta and with

34 Fcstus, Gloss. Lat. 446 L. 35 Festus, Gloss. Lai. 436, cf. 438.

36 Webster 1964, 237: (h 219) — if not Apollo, at least the Muses.

37 Peter, HRRel. Cassius Hemina fr. 26. 38 Livy xxvi. 24.11; Polyb. ix.42.

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King Attalus of Pergamum. But Rome’s naval superiority prevented
Philip from invading Italy, and the Romans pulled out of Greece entirely
on the conclusion of the Peace of Phoenice in 205. There had been
considerable diplomatic activity, however, and the Senate doubtless
found itself better informed about affairs in Greece than it had ever been.
Meanwhile, as Polybius says, the eyes of the Greeks were turned onto the
great struggle playing itself out in the west, and several Greek historians,
mainly westerners, took Hannibal as a hero, a bias that Fabius Pictor was
probably to try to redress. Another Roman senator, Cincius Alimentus,
who had actually been taken captive by Hannibal, also wrote a history of
Rome in Greek. Between them they established the position that histori-
ography, with its military and political slant, was a respectable activity
for a Roman senator, at least in old age, revolutionary as this might
appear.

How far, at this time, had the helienization of the dominant political
elite, or of some members of it, progressed? The answer is probably ‘not
very far’, though we know too little about education in Rome at this
period to be sure - and it should be remembered that Greek civilization
was felt to be dependent on, or even identical with, Greek paideia,
education. There is some evidence that in the upper classes Roman boys
were taught mainly within the family, until they were entrusted to a
distinguished public figure to gain experience of the courts and politics
under his wing; military service from the age of seventeen (earlier in
crises) would cut short such training, at least as a full-time occupation.
There was one theory later that the first school for learning one’s letters
was set up by a freedman of Sp. Carvilius, supposedly the first man in
Rome to divorce his wife, perhaps about 2 30 b.c. ‘Letters and Law’ were
to Plautus the staple of education, and Cicero as a boy still learnt by heart
the archaic code of the Twelve Tables. 39 Literature, to the Greeks the
basis of real education, was first taught according to Suetonius by Livius
Andronicus donti forisque , in his house and elsewhere - perhaps in his
master’s house and those of other nobles, rather than in a real school. 40
His Latin Odysseia may have been produced primarily for teaching
purposes, but Suetonius, who may have had no evidence, thought he also
taught Greek literature — primarily no doubt Homer in the original.
Many Romans of various classes will have known some Greek, though
they may often have spoken it with a Sicilian or Italiote accent: a number
of nobles bore Greek cognomina, presumably nick-names in origin, and
one was actually called Atticus - had he been to Athens, or did he just
speak unusually pure Greek? — while at the start of the century an
ambassador had attempted, disastrously, to address the Tarentines in

39 Plut. Quaest. Rom. 59, cf. 54; Plaut. Mostcll. 126; Cic. L tg. 11.59. 40 Suet. Gram. 1.2.

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43 2 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

Greek. Some Romans may have read a certain amount in Greek too (the
priestly decemviri who were responsible for consulting the Sibylline
books must always have been able to read oracular Greek verse). Given
the Roman regard for the past, and the fact that historiography was to be
the first prose genre produced in the city, one suspects that Timaeus and
other western historians were among the best known authors. A reading
public for Latin can hardly have existed; Latin plays seem long only to
have been known from performance, though Greek plays were always
much read in Athens and elsewhere.

Fortunately Plutarch was interested in the question of Greek culture as
it affected the subjects of several of his biographies, and there are scraps
of other evidence concerning the same figures. None of these famous
men need be typical even of their own class, but their cases may be
suggestive.

Fabius Maximus, the great Cunctator, was to be written up as the
traditionalist opponent of the hellenizing Scipio Africanus. But two
Fabii had been envoys to Alexandria in the third century, and it was as we
saw a Fabius who was sent to Delphi (as a much earlier ancestor was
supposed to have been) and was later to take the great step of writing a
book in Greek. Cicero says (and historical statements in his dialogues
usually have some basis) that Fabius Maximus had read much ‘for a
Roman’, and knew the history of foreign wars as well as of Rome’s. 41 Fie
might have read some Greek, probably Sicilian, historians. Fie brought
back one statue from the capture of Tarentum in 209, the giant Hercules
of Lysippus; but statues were traditional booty, and the Fabii claimed
special devotion to Hercules, who, though Greek in origin, had long
been naturalized in Rome and Italy. 42 Fabius is not recorded as taking any
other advantage of his opportunities at Tarentum. The famous M.
Marcellus, the ‘sword of Rome’ while Fabius was her shield, went a step
fu rther. Plutarch says that he admired the Greek culture that he had not
had time to acquire (in fact, opportunities had doubtless been restricted
in his youth); even after his Gallic campaigns in the 220s he sent spoils as a
gift to Delphi, and also to King Hiero of Syracuse (perhaps his family
already had ties with Sicily, as others certainly did, here or in Greek-
speaking areas of southern Italy). At the sack of Syracuse in 2 1 1 Marcel-
lus tried to save the great scientist Archimedes; it was as a military
engineer that he had impressed the Romans, but Marcellus brought back
to Rome Archimedes’ celestial globes, keeping one for himself, though
nothing else according to Cicero, 43 and dedicating the other in a temple
where all could see it. We hear nothing of his annexing books, but he

41 Cic. Sen. 1 2 (but belia is often excised on the grounds that domestica bella means civil wars, which
the Romans had not had; domestica et externa could mean simply ‘native and foreign history’).

42 Pliny, HN xxxiv.40; Plut. Fab. 1. 43 Cic. Rep. i.zi.

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carried off many works of art, boasting even to the Greeks, according to
Plutarch, that he had taught the Romans to admire Greek art. 44 It is
paradoxical, but also fateful for their attitudes to Greece, that the visual
arts, which on the whole they despised, were one of the elements of
Greek civilization that the Romans accepted most easily; but their local
art was ultimately Greek-influenced, and indeed minor Greek artists had
worked in Rome and elsewhere in central Italy, so that the contrast with
Greek art proper was not too shocking. Marcellus, who naturally became
patron of the city he had taken, also dedicated gifts from the booty at
distant Samothrace, with which Rome felt a link through Aeneas, and at
Rhodes, with which naval state she had probably long had some sort of
connection. He also erected a gymnasium for the people of Catana in
Sicily, which perhaps suggests some sympathy with the Greek way of
life, though hardly a desire that Romans should take to exercising
naked. 45 Marcellus had also spared the general population of Syracuse,
though Fabius may have enslaved that of Tarentum, and Valerius
Laevinus certainly did that of Agrigentum (though he had made the
treaty with the Aetolians, and was now no doubt their patron, as his son
was to be). Their possession of Greek slaves was also to be significant for
Roman attitudes, and the tension in these between admiration and
contempt.

Even leading members of the generation that emerged in the later part
of the Hannibalic War, who were later to have a great deal to do with the
Greek world, probably had little formal Greek education. Cato, who
claimed to have spent his youth labouring on Sabine hillsides, clearly had
none, though if it is true that, just at the end of the war, he met the
hellenized South Italian Ennius and studied Greek literature with him,
he was anxious to remedy the omission, to some extent at least. 46 Scipio
Africanus is a difficult case to evaluate, since Polybius has probably made
him over in the likeness of a Hellenistic statesman, and attributed to him
characteristics, such as scepticism in religion, perhaps implausible in a
Roman of this period: while our annalistic sources have worked him up
as a contrast to the traditionalist Fabius Maximus. But it is probably true
that, possibly already as aedile in 213 and then subsequently in his
command in Spain, he showed an awareness of the traditions of Hellenis-
tic kingship, as aedile distributing oil to the plebs, and later telling the
Spaniards that they might regard him as kingly, though he could not take
the title; while he showed a courtesy and restraint to a captive lady that
was surely modelled on Alexander’s (if not on that of Alexander’s own
model, Xenophon’s Cyrus). 47 He may even have been responsible for
equating the idea of a Roman consul with that of a king, by using the

44 Piut. Marc. 21.5. 45 Plut. Marc. 30.4-5. 46 See n. 116. 47 Poiyb. x.38 and 40.

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ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

symbols of Roman office as presents for a foreign monarch. He sent gifts
to Delphi from Spain. 48 In Sicily, before his invasion of Africa, he is
supposed to have adopted Greek dress and spent his time in the theatre,
palaestra and baths, shocking his quaestor Cato and provoking an official
investigation: but the story, only in Plutarch, is often thought a throw-
back from the later quarrels of Cato and Scipio. 49 And it should be noted
that Scipio’s heroes, according to Polybius, were the Sicilians Dionysius
and Agathocles, who might be seen as a rather old-fashioned choice (or
perhaps only a personal one — they had fought Carthage); 50 while Cicero
says of Scipio’s son that he united his father’s greatness of soul with
richer learning. 51

It is likely that T. Quinctius Flamininus, the conqueror of Philip V and
‘Liberator’ of Greece, also acquired little doctrina in his earlier years. We
know that he spoke Greek fluently and got on well with Greeks; 52 but
this would seem to be the fruit of the time he spent at Tarentum in the
Hannibalic War, and there is no evidence that he had a real Greek
education. An ability to speak colloquial Greek, or even to understand
the more flowery language of formal orations, does not, it should be
remembered, imply an ability to cope with the language of Homer or of
fifth-century Attic authors, let alone other dialects. And it is dubious to
what extent Flamininus took up Greek ways; a coin with his image struck
in Greece shows him bearded in traditional Roman fashion (though
Scipio appears, on Spanish coins thought to represent him, as clean-
shaven). 53 But to both Scipio and Flamininus we shall have to return.

III. CONTACTS WITH THE GREEK WORLD
IN THE EARLY SECOND CENTURY

The Second Macedonian War (200-197) brought Rome into direct
contact with the Greek world and initiated a period of unprecedently
rapid social and cultural change. Relationships of many different kinds
between the two peoples began to be formed. The armies that cam-
paigned in Macedon and Greece against Philip, and a few years later in
Asia Minor as a result of the declaration of war against Antiochus of
Syria, returned home with few losses, enriched by booty and often
perhaps with new ideas of refinement and luxury (as later moralizing
historians supposed — engraved plate, elegant stuffs and inlaid furniture
are picked out, with music-girls and other luxurious accompaniments to

48 Livy xxx. 1 5 .1 1-1 2; App. Pun. 32.137 - sometimes disbelieved. Delphi: Livy xxvm.45.12.

49 Plut. Cat. Mai. 3.7; Astin 1978, 14: (h 68).

50 Polyb. xv.35. si Cic. Sen. 35. 52 Plut. Flam. 5.5.

53 Scullard 1970, 41, 248: (h 77). Cell. NA in. 4 shows that middle-aged men generally shaved in
the mid-second century.

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CONTACTS WITH THE GREEK WORLD 435

feasts, and the regarding of cooking for the first time as an art); one
modern estimate suggests that over half the adult male population
fought at some time in the army, though of course not all of it in the
east . 54 Some Romans, mostly captured in the Hannibalic War rather than
later, actually served as slaves in Greek parts — i ,200 in Greece according
to Plutarch, whose figure perhaps does not include Latins and Italians;
these the Achaeans ransomed, and Rome probably exerted pressure to
recover those in other areas . 55 Such men, many no doubt humble
countrymen, would have brought home a peculiarly intimate knowledge
of Greek domestic manners — or of Greek agriculture; ordinary soldiers,
however, were often billeted on the local population.

There were some Romans along with the Campanian and other south
Italian traders and businessmen (also some Latins, especially from
Praeneste) who began to be more prominently visible in Greece and the
Aegean, though not yet in the numbers typical of the second half of the
century. They might turn out to be long-term settlers, who put their sons
through the local schools or even their adopted city’s ephebeia (an
organization giving young men a period of now only tenuously military
service, with a little intellectual education sometimes thrown in), held
local priesthoods or were initiates at Samothrace or Eleusis, and took a
prominent part in local life, being rewarded with proxenyships and other
honours. But it cannot be doubted that they were often in touch with
family or friends in Italy, and that some at least retired in old age to their
original homes, bringing with them a certain knowledge of Greek
language and life; a few had probably even been patrons of literature and
the arts.

More temporary were the visits to the east of Roman senators, a good
few of whom were, increasingly, sent out on fact-finding or arbitrational
embassies. Some came from families developing, in the traditional
manner, clientelae in areas newly come under Roman influence. Such, for
example, were the patrician Claudii, who had long had links in
Campania, Sicily and Magna Graecia. Two at least now served under
Flamininus, one was on the commission sent out to advise Vulso in Asia;
subsequently Claudii went as envoys to Macedon, the Achaean League,
Sparta and even Syria — but hardly ever to Africa or the west. On these
embassies they will have stayed with local magnates, or in the special
guest-houses for Roman visitors attested in more than one Greek centre;
they will have given and received gifts and political advice. But it is
interesting that there is no evidence for any of the Claudii being inter-
ested in Greek art or literature; it is unlikely that many Roman aristocrats

w Peter, HR Kel. Piso fr. 34; Livy xxxix. 6.7-9; Hopkins 1978, 33: (h 99).

55 Plut. Flam. 13.4-3. Livy xxxvn.60.2: 4,000 Romans and Italians restored by the Cretans
(number from the unreliable Valerius Antias). Victims of piracy, in part?

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436 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

really were. They probably took to Greek manners and luxury, however;
Cato delivered a speech against the mores of one Ap. Claudius Nero, a sure
sign.

At the same time, there were now many more Greeks in Rome, as in
central Italy in general. There clearly came to be many humbler Greek or
Greek-speaking settlers; though traders and sailors maybe did not always
get beyond Puteoli in Campania or at most Ostia, whence small boats
perhaps under local masters took wares up the Tiber to the port of Rome
(to which additions and improvements were made between 193 and 1 74),
yet for Plautus the language of business and shipping is largely Greek.
When war with Perseus of Macedon broke out in 171 there were
Macedonian residents, as well as envoys, who were told to leave the city
and Italy. 56 Above all, of course, there was the influx of Greek-speaking,
or at least partly hellenized, slaves into Italy; many were put to agri-
cultural tasks in the country, helping, in certain areas, to transform the
nature of agriculture, but not all entirely insulated from the surviving
free peasants; some, including the well-educated, of whom there were
clearly a number, worked in the swelling households of the rich, espe-
cially at Rome. If they were freed, some might be given small properties
by their masters, like (no doubt) the model smallholder C. Furius
Cresimus held up to admiration by a later second-century historian; 57
others engaged either on their own behalf or that of a patron on business
ventures of many kinds.

Rome took foreign hostages, for example, Philip’s son Demetrius and
other Macedonians, then rotating hostages from the Syrian court -
though not all stayed in Rome, some being farmed out to country towns.
We know that the Syrian prince Demetrius at least, who came to Rome as
a child, mixed on familiar terms with young Roman aristocrats. 58 A few
notables, such as the younger Charops from Epirus, 59 came (like most of
the hostages, with a suite) to be educated in Rome. There were also
perpetual queues of Greek envoys, leading citizens come from various
states to appeal to the Senate and to treat it to displays of elaborate Greek
oratory which, though interpreters were used, most members may have
been increasingly able to follow. The speeches doubtless included
exempla from Greek history, the examples or illustrations thought so
necessary by rhetoricians, and also compliments to Rome, perhaps as
having a mixed constitution on the approved model, or as the successor
to the great empires of the past, especially Persia and Macedon. (One
Roman, a certain Aemilius Sura, seems to have taken up this last idea in

56 Polyb. xx vi 1. 6. 3. 57 Peter, HRRel. Piso fr. 33. MRR puts the occasion c. 191.

58 Polyb. xxxi. 2. 5. 59 Polyb. xxvn.15.4 - perhaps in the 170s?

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CONTACTS WITH THE GREEK WORLD

437

some sort of book. 60 ) Even kings came - Amynander of Athamania was
expected to make a great impression in 198, on account of his title, but
after the repeated visits of Pergamene and other royalty, such a petty
Balkan kinglet would have cut little ice. 61 Sometimes envoys were forced
to stay for a considerable period of time; there was bad congestion in 1 84
owing to a great influx of embassies with complaints against Philip. And
a Greek inscription shows one group of ambassadors, perhaps around
1 70, who had attended each morning at the receptions of great Romans
to gain their favour, and worked on the patrons of the city they were
representing by visiting them in their homes. 62

The two races met, then, at all levels; they did not actually mingle
much, except in so far as freed slaves became for most purposes full
Roman citizens, and their sons wholly so. But legal intermarriage
between Romans and foreigners, peregrini, was not allowed, and what has
often been a fertile source of cultural influence was thus not available to
the Romans.

One way of measuring the impact of the new relationship is by study of
the comedies of Plautus. Most cannot be precisely dated, or even securely
attributed to a single man, whose very name poses problems; but they
certainly run from the dosing years of the Hannibalic War through the
succeeding period into the 180s. The stage, for the historian, has the
advantage of addressing, and needing to please, a wide if unfortunately
not precisely definable audience, of whose tastes something can be said.
This audience included all classes - special seats for senators were
established in 195. 63 Women and probably slaves were present. The
shows were free; to some of them many country people may have been at
leisure to come in, either because the games fell at slack times of year or
also because, as some argue, where subsistence agriculture prevails
peasants tend to be underemployed. In fact, Plautus’ comedies, though
clearly written for Rome, may also have been seen in the country towns
of the ager Romanus and Latium, for a manager or dominus gregis would
wish to keep his actors, who were often his slaves, in fairly continual
employment, and besides this there can be no doubt that especially in
southern Latium and the now increasingly Latin-speaking parts of
northern Campania there was a lively theatrical life, probably partly
independent of Rome. It was indeed primarily through the stage that
Greek culture impinged on the poorer classes (and through the visual
arts, always especially important to the illiterate, and from which,

60 Swain 1940: (1 34) for the date of this work; he suggests that Ennius knew the idea too, though
it was not yet taken up generally in Rome. But Mendels 1981: (e 30) dates Sura much later.

61 Polyb. xvm. 10.7.

62 Polyb. xxhi.i; SIG 656 (with new readings by P. Herrmann. ZPE 7 (1971) 72-7).

63 Livy xxxiv. 54.4.

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438 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

especially with the aid of an aedituus or verger in a temple, many may have
learnt something of Greek mythology as well as Roman history).

Though the palliata, as the name implies (it refers to the Greek pallium
or cloak), deals with Greek characters, and indeed is closely based on
Greek originals, it becomes more and more possible, as our knowledge
of Greek New Comedy advances, to identify Roman changes and
additions. Both what is Greek and what is Roman in these plays is
informative.

The recent tendency has been to abandon the low estimate of Plautus’
audience that used to be common. This audience clearly has some
knowledge of the theatrical traditions that now went back over a
generation, and can pick up references and parodies. It sometimes likes
to know who wrote the original play. It prefers comedies to be set in
‘Athens of Attica’, as ‘more Greek’; though in fact various cities of
germana Graecia , ‘real Greece’, do appear, it is necessary to be defensive
about a play that takes place in Syracuse, and a character offers a girl as
dowry ‘a thousand good Attic log/ (stories or plots?) without a Sicilian
one among them ’. 64 The audience also has a basic knowledge of Greek
myth (though only basic, and Plautus himself, who as Fraenkel shows
inserts many of the mythological references, occasionally makes mis-
takes), just as it has heard of some figures of Greek history (Alexander
and the great Sicilians, primarily), the sages Thales and Solon, and even
the artists Apelles and Zeuxis, though these are only names; it does not
know the philosophers, apart from Socrates (and there are two general
references to the poverty of the Cynics) 65 -in contrast to the audiences of
the first century, who are expected to relish jokes about Democritus and
Epicurus. Rhetors, obviously not yet known in Rome, are not mocked,
though there is a general jeer at Greeks who walk about with books
under their arms but also create drunken disturbances . 66 The Greeks
indeed are regarded as dissipated, as the word pergraecari suggests, and
their slaves are undisciplined. Plautus takes his spectators into what must
be for them to some extent an amoral, fantasy world, peopled by idle
young men and their courtesan mistresses, cunning slaves and greedy
parasites; but his specifically Roman references, often legal or military,
bring them back to the real one, where his standards tend to be conserva-
tive and traditional.

The audience also knows, and probably itself employs, a good many
Greek words, clearly considered vulgar, since the middle-class characters
rarely use them. Some can be shown to be South Italian or Sicilian;
opinions differ on whether they were mostly picked up by soldiers on

64 Plaut. Men. Proi. 7ft., Pers. 594.

65 Plaut. Mostell. 775, Pseud. 552, Men. 409, Poen. 1271, Epid. 626; Cynics: Pers. 125, Stick. 704;

Socrates: Pseud. 465; Thales: Rud. 1005, Bacch. 122, Capt. 274. 66 Plaut. Cure. 288.

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campaign or introduced to Rome by slaves, traders and others. One also
suspects that some of the female spectators wear the fashionable articles
of apparel with Greek names that are the subject of complaint; 67 perhaps
many respectable matrons still avoided these, but the terms of the lex
Oppia of 215 show that already matrons had abandoned the traditional
toga for ‘multicoloured dresses’. 68

It is true that this audience prefers low to high comedy — Plautus
greatly elaborates the role of the slaves, and sometimes that of the
parasite, cutting down on the more serious middle-class characters — and
it is fond of descriptions of horrific punishments inflicted on slaves. But
it does not want, or does not get, much direct presentation of violence or
obscenity. In fact, though the plot is rarely uplifting - sometimes the
reverse — Plautus keeps much of the sententiousness that marked Greek
New Comedy, even expands it; we know that later at least Roman
audiences greatly enjoyed the moralizing they heard on both the comic
and the tragic stage (and anthologies were made from it). This, for
Plautus, is ‘philosophizing’, and seen as learned and Greek. In the
absence of many other sources of moral advice, it may be that ordinary
Romans articulated many of their moral perceptions by what they
experienced in the theatre.

Plautus also assumes a certain level of literacy in most of his spectators;
words are described as differing by a single letter, slaves read and write.
Fraenkel contrasts Plautus’ work with the anonymous German travesties
of Shakespeare’s plays given in seventeenth-century Germany by the
‘English Comedians’, to the great advantage of both the Roman drama-
tist and his audience. 69 Indeed, though the Roman stage never produced
a Shakespeare, the Roman public was perhaps not much inferior to that
on the Bankside.

Naturally, some members of the oligarchy, who were becoming
deeply involved in Greek affairs, were more profoundly influenced by
Greek ideas than the average spectator in the theatre. But the old idea that
Flamininus or the Scipiones were influenced in policy by sentimental,
basically literary, philhellenism is not plausible. As we have seen, they
had probably not read much Greek literature; and if Rome intervened to
protect the Greeks against Philip, it was doubtless largely to punish the
latter for his ‘stab in the back’ during the Hannibalic War, and his later
rupture of the Peace of Phoenice, and also in response to the inherent
pressures of the militaristic society of Rome. 70 If the Greeks were
subsequently declared free, this was to weaken Macedon while not
committing Rome to garrisoning or administering a large new territory;
when the principle was not convenient to her she abandoned it, reward-

67 Plaut. Epid. 225#. 68 Livy xxxiv.1.3.

69 Fraenkel 1960 387: (h 180). 70 Harris 1979, 212: (a 21).

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ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

ing for example her friend the king of Pergamum with territory. But
favour to Greece was expressed more than once, and we need not doubt
that the Romans’ feelings towards the Greeks were different from those
they held towards Gauls, Spaniards or Carthaginians. Flamininus (who
had probably not scrupled to enslave any Greeks proper, perhaps chiefly
Thessalians, who had fought in Philip’s army at Cynoscephalae) pro-
fesses amity and high moral sentiments in his surviving letter to the
Chyretians . 71 It is worth noting that the letter is not in very good Greek,
whoever actually wrote it, and indeed those responsible for translating
Latin documents were for a long time varyingly inept, sometimes
incapable even of coping with the definite article that Greek has but
Latin lacks; though a technical vocabulary of Greek terms for Roman
institutions did rapidly emerge, and where letters are concerned, the
basic framework of the Hellenistic chancery style may have been adopted
even before 200 b . c . But even generals in the east would not seem to have
used Greek secretaries, who were certainly not employed by the state at
Rome, where the scribae of the Treasury seem to have translated decrees
of the Senate that needed to be communicated to the Greeks into a
language that must have struck the latter as barbarous. If the Romans
wrote to the Greeks in Greek of a kind, they seem usually to have spoken
to them in Latin, which an interpreter translated.

To return to Flamininus, Plutarch probably does not mean to imply
that he himself composed the Greek elegiacs placed on his dedications at
Delphi, and indeed this is barely conceivable . 72 No other patronage by
him of Greek (or Roman) writers is recorded, though he naturally carried
sculptures to Rome as booty . 73 It was probably his Greek clients who set
up a statue of him at Rome with a Greek inscription . 74 And much of his
subsequent favour to Greeks will be thanks to the fact that he regarded
himself as their patron, though being their patron may also have led him
to feel sympathy for them; he certainly cared exceedingly for praise and
honours from them.

Scipio Africanus, of course, was to treat on equal terms with Hellen-
istic monarchs, visit and correspond with them; he became personally
friendly with Philip, and (it was thought, too much so) with Antiochus.
In letters he and his brother Lucius assert benevolence to all Greeks, or
that the Romans are not opposed to kings as such, as is widely believed . 75
Both made dedications at Delos, and Lucius at least was represented in a
statue at Rome wearing Greek dress . 76 But Lucius’ choice of the bastard
title Asiagenus (rather than Asiaticus) suggests an indeed rather surpris-
ing ignorance of Greek. Africanus himself lived in modern splendour

71 Sherk, Documents 33. 72 Plut. Flam. 12.6-7.

73 Livy xxxiv 52.4; also precious vessels in huge quantity. 74 Plut. Flam. 1.

75 Sherk, Documents 35; Polyb. xxi.ii. 76 Cic. Rab. Post. 27.

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(his wife assisted at religious ceremonies in great state 77 ); he clearly gave
his son, who was to write a history in Greek and whose superior doctrina
we have seen Cicero note, something of a Greek education - more
remarkably, perhaps his daughter too, for she was later a patroness of
learned men.

Scipio was perhaps regarded during his own lifetime as almost super-
human, and in direct touch with J upiter in a way that was not traditional
at Rome. Certainly after his death it would seem that Ennius, the Italian
from near Tarentum who had become a Roman poet, and who had
praised Scipio in a special work bearing his name, suggested in an epitaph
that his great deeds had opened to him the gates of heaven. 78 Heroization
such as this implies was not really a Roman conception, but, as has been
pointed out, Ennius was not a Roman. 79 Certainly no actual cult was set
up to Scipio in Rome, though by the time of his death generals in the east,
above all Flamininus, had even been hailed there as saviour-gods in the
Hellenistic fashion. Scipio and the other great generals often made
dedications at Greek shrines, but Greek deities are not predominant
among the gods of all kinds, traditional and less traditional, to whom
they set up temples in Rome as a result of vows made on campaign. True,
a second temple of Venus Erycina was built in 1 8 1 b.c., this one outside
the pomerium , and at least a place where prostitutes made offerings,
though there were still no temple prostitutes proper; 80 one or two other
new cults might be mentioned. And a few old ones seem to have changed
their nature; the goddess Salus, who to Plautus still typifies Safety in
political or military contexts, by the time of Terence has become,
sometimes at least, Health, the Greek Hygeia. 81

The rather younger Fulvius Nobilior probably had more interest in
Greek art and literature than Scipio. In a fashion that was to be a portent
for the future, it led him in fact to ill-treat the Greeks; he enslaved the
inhabitants of Same, and it was doubtful if he should have sacked
Ambracia in 189, as the city had not been stormed. It had been Pyrrhus’
capital, and its fall will have impressed Roman opinion; it was full of
works of art, all of which Fulvius carried off (except the sculptures of
terracotta, though some of these were by Zeuxis; Fulvius was obviously
still unable to judge work at its true value, and associated terracotta with
the despised Italian tradition 82 ). His opponents, who included M.
Aemilius Lepidus and Cato, got the Senate to vote that the Ambracians
should get their objects back. It is doubtful if they did; at all events the
statues of the Muses that remained in Fulvius’ temple of Hercules

77 Polyb. xxxi. 26. 78 Vahlcn 1928, 216: (b 57A).

79 Walbank, PCPS 13 (1967) 57. 80 Livy XL.34.4, Ov. Fast. iv.86jff.

81 Ter. Htc. 338. 82 Pliny, HN xxxv.9.66.

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442 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

Musarum came from Ambracia . 83 We do not know whether there had
been an odd cult of Hercules and the Muses there, or whether it was
Fulvius who associated them, perhaps as symbols of the union of warlike
valour and poetic fame; atall events, Ennius had accompanied Fulvius to
Greece, as Greek poets had accompanied Alexander and later kings on
campaign, and he celebrated his patron’s deeds in the Ambracia, perhaps
a play, as well as in his epic Annales. Poetry, if now under the protection
of the Muses, did not deny its earlier roots; an ancient shrine of the
Camenae was moved to Fulvius’ temple, and Ennius, who unlike
Naevius did not directly invoke these Italian goddesses, may possibly
have asserted their identity with the Muses. The new precinct was no
Museum in the Alexandrian sense - for example we hear nothing of a
library — but we do have evidence for poets later giving readings there,
and some sort of collegium poetarum meeting, while the tragic poet Accius
was to dedicate a statue of himself in the temple . 84 Perhaps the poets, or
some of them, with Fulvius’ approval, now detached themselves from
scribes and/or actors and the low and mercenary associations ofMinerva,
goddess of crafts, and met henceforth in this temple. If so, it was a mark
of their increasing status. Fulvius probably set up an inscribed calendar
in the temple (rather than depositing a book in it, though the Latin of our
source is ambiguous), which also contained would-be learned notes,
such as naive etymologies of the names of the Roman months ; 85 he, or
whoever compiled it for him, must have had some knowledge of Greek
antiquarian scholarship, possibly only as it appeared in so many Greek
historians, and perhaps also some knowledge of astronomy. It has been
argued that the probably Pythagorean statement that studying the
heavens increases devotion to the ineffable god, attributed by a late
source to a Fulvius, also goes back to this work (here conceived as a
book), and that the Muses stand for a Pythagorean harmony . 86 It is at
least true that Pythagorean views, as we shall see, would not be out of
place in a Roman of this generation. More certainly, Fulvius celebrated
with splendour, and with the aid of artists collected from Greece, the
games that he had vowed on campaign . 87 There were athletic contests for
the first time, says Livy, no doubt meaning contests strictly on the Greek
model, but a troupe of ‘artists of Dionysus’ was probably also imported
to give plays in Greek. It is likely that others followed Fulvius’ lead in
this . 88

Fulvius’ campaign marked the break with Rome by her earliest Greek

83 Cic. Arch. 11.27. 84 Val. Max. ni.7.11; Pliny, HN xxxiv.19.

85 Gramm. Rom. Frag. 15. 86 Boyance 1955: (h 172); Martina 1981: (h 209).

87 Livy xxxix. 2 2. 2.

88 Livy xxxix. 22. 10, from the unreliable Valerius Antias again, says that in this very year L. Scipio
imported artists from Asia for his games.

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allies, the Aetolians. One by one, her relations with other Greek states
began to turn sour; the Greeks did not always realize that the gift of
freedom was, in Roman eyes, a beneficium which implied a corresponding
sense of officium, or obligation, on the part of the beneficiary, and the
Romans often behaved in a disingenuous and brutal fashion, while
themselves being shocked at the intrigue and corruption endemic among
the factious Greeks. In the 170s in particular, a period of unease and
disputes among the Roman aristocracy, and of the build-up to and start
of the war with Perseus of Macedon, Macedonians and Greeks were
shockingly treated at the hands of Machiavellian diplomats like Q.
Marcius Philippus, and greedy and savage commanders like the praetors
Lucretius, Hortensius, Octavius and others. The idea that the Greeks
needed to be terrorized into submission had been put into the heads of
such Romans by the sort of Greek politician loathed by Polybius. There
was a reaction against this nova sapientia , new-style wisdom, among the
older Romans, says Livy, who felt that it was a betrayal of ‘ancient
custom’, 89 and there was some attempt to check and punish abuses both
in the east and the west. These dubious new figures seem to have been, in
several cases at least, hellenizers - at least to the extent of desiring Greek
objects of art and luxury with which they could make a figure at Rome
(including no doubt slaves: they were quick to enslave Greek popula-
tions, though indeed even the best Romans only had occasional qualms
about this). Marcius Philippus stressed his Greek cognomen and links with
the royal house of Macedon. But the clearest case is Cn. Octavius, who
had a Greek doctor in his suite, could translate a Latin speech by
Aemilius Paullus into Greek off the cuff, made a dedication at Delos and
was honoured at Olympia and elsewhere, and was finally murdered in
Syria — actually while anointing himself in the gymnasium -- for his
Roman arrogance, by anti-Roman elements. 90 Little better, it seems, was
Sulpicius Galus, who studied Greek literature more deeply than any
other noble of his time, says Cicero, and was particularly interested in
astronomy, being able to explain eclipses to the Roman army (though
pace Livy probably not to predict them): we are told of his ‘many arrogant
words and deeds towards the Greek race’, especially to the famous states
of Sparta and Argos, and then to Eumenes of Pergamum (it appears that
in most of this he was carrying out the orders of the Senate, and Polybius
may be somewhat biased). 91 But this takes us into a slightly later period.

The peak of serious hellenization in Rome in the earlier part of the
second century is represented, without a doubt, by Ennius. He was not
only the greatest poet but in many ways also the most significant cultural

89 Livy XLii.47.4-9, Diod. Sic. xxx.7.1. 90 Pit? xvu.2.1810.

91 Cic. brut. 20.78, Rep. 1. 14.2 1-3, &xr. 14-49; Paus. vn.11.1-2, Polyb. xxxr.6.

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ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

influence of his time, a figure of impressive scope and considerable
sophistication, but clearly not a typical Roman, though he ended as a
Roman citizen. His case should remind us that much Greek influence
doubtless reached Rome indirectly, via immigrants from parts of the
peninsula that were in some ways more thoroughly hellenized than
Rome, either because they lay close to surviving Greek colonies, or
because they were now sending at least proportionately larger numbers
of negotiators to the east. There was money, from the profits of these men
or from booty, in many Latin and Italian states, as the monumental
building schemes from before the mid-second century, and later, show;
in several places in Campania, Samnium and Latium such schemes
included permanent theatres based on Greek models, which were prob-
ably sometimes used, as in Greece, not only for plays but for poetic
recitations, lectures and rhetorical encomia and displays in Greek or
sometimes Latin (and perhaps Oscan). This is perhaps reflected in the
flattering tales of Greek legendary founders so many towns had by Cato’s
day (though some may be much older). Cicero tells us that in his boyhood
‘Italy was devoted to the arts of Greece’, and that the Latin cities pursued
literary studies more energetically than did Rome 92 - possibly in part
because of the demands of war and politics on the Roman upper class.
What he says probably applies to a rather earlier period as well.

Ennius himself was born at Rudiae in the heel of Italy, a Messapian
town but so hellenized that Strabo was to call it a Greek city, and he may
have had a fully Greek education there or at Tarentum - a rather old-
fashioned education perhaps, probably with some kind of rhetoric as
well as grammatice, but not the main-stream Greek philosophy centred on
Athens. He tells us he spoke Oscan, however, as well as Greek and
Latin 93 (he may have learnt the last young - his sister married in the
nearby Latin colony of Brundisium - or else when serving in the army
during the Hannibalic War); and he perhaps also knew the ancient
Messapian language. He did visit Greece proper, but it is not known how
extensively, with Fulvius Nobilior, whose campaigns did not take him
far from the Adriatic. If Ennius was a man of much greater genius than
Livius Andronicus, he could also surely do much more because Rome
was now more receptive. His works are more Greek than those of Livius,
but also more Roman; Ennius, genuinely at the same time a Greek, an
Italian and a Roman, seems to have felt no conflict between those roles
(which is not evidence that a Roman aristocrat might not have felt some),
but only great pride when a relative, perhaps the son, of his patron
Fulvius Nobilior obtained Roman citizenship for him in 1 84. 94 He died in
169, at the age of seventy.

92 Cic. De Or. 3.43: Arch. 5. Wiseman 1983: (h 66 ). 93 Cell. NA xvn.17.1.

94 Annals 5 2 5 Sk,; Cic. Brut. 20.79.

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He naturalized in Latin (a slower and heavier language) various Greek
metres, but above all the heroic hexameter, which he could wield with
great power, if sometimes still awkwardly . 95 The ancient Saturnians
persisted for a time, but mainly in the traditional contexts of triumphal or
funerary inscriptions, and there is some slight evidence that a hexameter
version of Livius Andronicus’ Odyssey was soon found necessary, per-
haps for educational purposes (Horace was still brought up on Livius, in
what version we do not know ). 96 At any event Ennius considered the
Saturnian verse of Livius and Naevius rustic and primitive; he himself
was a poeta , a ‘maker’ or craftsman, he wrote poemata , not carmina (the
latter word evoked all sorts of antique spells and formulae ). 97 He was the
first man in Rome, he claimed, to be died studiosus, which has been
thought to translate the Greek philologos , and imply a newly serious study
of language and literature . 98 But the basis of his claim to be, by the
Annales, a new Homer, or rather, according to Pythagorean principles,
the actual re-incarnation of Homer, was a celebration of the Roman
historical tradition that Cicero was still to find satisfying; and it was he
who formulated the line that stamped itself on the Roman consciousness
(perhaps it originally referred primarily to military discipline) about
Rome’s dependence on the customs of ancient days and men of ancient
mark:

moribus antiquis res stat Korn ana virisqueA

His view of virtus , too, is the Roman view of Plautus and the Scipionic
elogia, the sustaining of family honour, especially in war - though he
tends to put sapientia, wisdom, at least as high as vis , force.

Ennius perhaps began his career in Rome by writing for the stage; his
comedies were of no moment, but his tragedies developed the specifi-
cally Latin metrical patterns and diction of his predecessors. Though he
bases many of his plays on Euripides, perhaps shows some traces of
Greek rhetoric, and more than once didactically explains a Greek term, in
a semi-philosophical digression, yet his plays have a Roman grandeur (or
sometimes bombast) and he wrote a couple of praetextae, on themes from
Roman history. In his dramatic works too, if less than in the Annals ,
values tend to be Roman rather than Greek, let alone truly Euripidean;
for example he stresses social rather than moral distinctions or equates
the two. We can compare the opening of his Medea with that of Euripides’

95 Conceivably the prophetic Carmina Marciana, circulating at the time of the Hannibalic War,
were in hexameters, the metre used in Greek for oracles; and, from some date, the sortes issued at
various oracular shrines. 96 FPL Bu. frs. 37-40; Hor. Epist. 11.1.69.

97 The Greek word poeta had, however, already been used by Naevius and Plautus.

98 Annals 2098k. 99 Annals i$6Sk.

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446 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

play; here he has left out the obscurer geographical references, doubtless
beyond his Roman audience.

His knowledge of other Greek authors seems to have been wide, if odd
by later standards, and he produced translations or adaptations of
various kinds. He was alert to the Pythagorean traditions of his South
Italian homeland, of which the Romans had probably long had some
superficial awareness, and which seem to have been still acceptable to
them, in spite of not coming directly from ‘real Greece’. Though the
Pythagorean philosophic circles in Magna Graecia had been broken up
and scattered long before, some memory of them and their beliefs
persisted (and the Romans could read of the history of the sect in
Timaeus’ work). One should note that the astronomy of Sulpicius Galus
seems to have been strongly Pythagorizing; his neatly schematic dis-
tances for moon, sun and stars from the earth are certainly so and, at this
stage in the history of Greek science, are markedly naive and old-
fashioned . 100 Apart from allowing Homer, in the dream at the start of the
Annals , to lecture him on Pythagorean cosmology, Ennius seems in his
Eptcharmus to have expounded natural philosophy as put forward in a
popular poem falsely attributed to this early fifth-century Sicilian poet,
who was regarded as a Pythagorean. He based his Hedypbagetica on
another Sicilian work, the gastronomic poem of the fourth-century
Archestratus of Gela. The Romans were becoming interested in fine
cookery, as Cato complains (there is no evidence that the work was a
moralizing parody). But one observes that Ennius did not try to intro-
duce them to Sicilian pastoral verse.

He also made known some of the Hellenistic literature of which there
had been little awareness yet in Rome. His Euhemerus recounted that -
again Sicilian - author’s imaginary voyage, which was intended to show
that most of the gods, even Zeus, were in origin only great men, a view
which, perhaps surprisingly, was to find some favour in Rome. This
work was perhaps in prose, of a notably primitive and simple kind; as in
many societies, poetry had been earlier in developing its expressive
powers. But possibly our quotations are from a prose paraphrase of
verse. The Sola was probably based on the light-hearted iambics of the
third-century poet Sotades, who worked in Alexandria; if so, this is the
first sign of literary influence from that great cultural centre, in spite ofits
long-standing diplomatic contacts with Rome. The mixed verse of the
Saturae included fables and moralizing; though the name perhaps harks
back to Roman semi-dramatic traditions, the influence of the Greek
diatribe and of Menippean Satire have been suggested in the work itself.
And Ennius is explicitly said to have introduced elegiac metre to

100 Pliny, HiV 11.83.

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447

Rome , 101 perhaps by means of the epigram; his epitaph for Scipio was in
this form. The elegiac epigram, though ancient by origin, was of course a
dominant Hellenistic genre. It is interesting, however, that when the
Romans gave up using Saturnians for epitaphs, as they now began to do,
they often, as inscriptions show, used iambic metre, familiar from the
stage, not elegiacs; this is very unGreek.

Ennius’ Protrepticus perhaps recommended the study of philosophy.
But Ennius’ philosophy, as far as we can see, only deserves the title by
courtesy, consisting as it does of semi-religious, semi-scientific specula-
tion, such as the identification of different gods with natural phenomena.
There is no certain influence from any of the great schools of the
Hellenistic period. Though he puts it into the mouth of a character in a
play, Ennius may have approved of the claim that one should philoso-
phize to a certain extent only; this was undoubtedly a usual Roman
standpoint at a later period. In ours, there was obviously much suspicion
of the activity. Cicero suggests that Sulpicius Galus, even though he
combined his scientific interests with a full political career, could be
criticized by a leading figure of the previous generation for spending too
much time on useless studies.

Scholars have recently stressed, perhaps over-stressed, Ennius’ posi-
tion as a member of the fraternity of Hellenistic learned poets; they have
tried to trace an awareness of scholiastic interpretations in his knowledge
of Greek poets, and found Hellenistic patterns in his work, arguing for
example that the dream that opens the Annals , in which Ennius meets
Homer, looks back not only to Pythagoras and Hesiod, but to
Callimachus’ dream at the beginning of the Aitia, and is even an answer
to Callimachus’ argument that no one can write epic now: Ennius, as
Homer himself redivivus , is exempt from the ban . 102 If so, surely few of
Ennius’ readers will have appreciated this fine point. He is also some-
times thought to have had great influence on the language, like a true
Alexandrian scholar-poet, introducing for example double consonants
in spelling; but the first century b.c. was uncertain if technical grammati-
cal works were not by a younger figure of the same name, and Suetonius
certainly thought tru e. grammatice was only expounded in Latin after his
time . 103 But Ennius did divide his Annals , as Naevius had not done his
Bellnm Punicum , into books of the length normal in the Greek book-trade,
which suggests that he looked to some form of publication, rather than
simply to reading his own verse to friends or pupils.

Certainly Suetonius believed that Ennius did teach, both his own
poems and Greek literature. One Roman scholar also saw some kind of

101 Isid. E/jm. 1.J9. 14—15.

102 Skutsch 1967 esp. 1 19#.: (b 35), 1985, 1 4 7 flf. : (b 3 ja); Wiilfing-von Martitz 1972: (h 221) (and
others ibid.). 103 Suet. Gram. 1 .

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448 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

self-portrait in the faithful friend of lower rank to whom a Roman
general turns in the Annals , whose secrecy and reliability are combined
with learning, especially concerning the manners and laws of the past . 104
Here too Hellenistic models have been adduced, but the possibility of at
least imagining such a figure in a Roman context points to a significant
social development, and though self-portraiture may not have been in
Ennius’ mind one suspects that such indeed was his relation to the
nobles, sometimes perhaps his pupils, whom Cicero pictures calling
informally at the poet’s humble menage, or walking with him in
Rome . 105 The story that on his death he was commemorated by a statue in
the tomb of the Scipios is probably untrue — Cicero does not assert it as a
fact 106 — but it may be fairly early, and we may take it to indicate the
remarkable position that a poet had now been able to make for himself in
Rome.

IV. REACTION AND ACCEPTANCE

The transformation of Roman society under the impact of new wealth
and new customs, mostly from the Greek world (though trade and
mining in the west, like booty, especially slaves, from it, contributed to
prosperity) can hardly be exaggerated. It has often been believed that in
certain quarters there was violent rejection of Greek influence in favour
of the old ways; but it has also been argued that the Romans, intellect-
ually unsophisticated as they were, in spite of lamenting the decline of
mores antiqui as they had doubtless always done, did not realize how far it
was Greek influence that was transforming their society, and did not take
up conscious attitudes towards this influence as something to be wel-
comed or resisted. According to this view, not only was there no simple
clash between a definable philhellene party on the one hand, inspired by
love for Greek art and literature as well as aping Greek ways of life, and
favourable on a political level to the Greeks, and on the other a
hellenophobe one, desirous of keeping out of political and miltary
entanglements in the east as well as of preserving Roman traditions (few
would in fact now argue for so simple a conflict); but Greek ways seeped
into Rome without much of an issue being made of them - some slight
prejudice in some minds against some Greek customs has to be admitted.

It has also been suggested that if a few members of the intensely
competitive Roman oligarchy took up Greek luxury and culture ostenta-
tiously, the rest were forced to do the same through fear of being left
behind in the race for influence. Certainly Greece could suggest profit-

,<M Annals 268ff.Sk. 105 Cic. De or. 11.68.276, Acad. 11.16.j1.

106 Cic. Arch. 9.22; cf. Livy xxxvm.56.4.

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able new methods of stressing individual or family achievements - poetic
tributes, sculptural or other monuments, new ways of suggesting divine
favour or even the blurring of the line between human and divine. But if
it is true that the Roman upper class was, as has been stressed of late,
innovative and flexible (Polybius observes Rome’s willingness to learn
and borrow from other nations 107 ), yet there were strong pressures for
conservatism as well, largely rooted in the reverence for the ancestors,
the maiores , which had its religious as well as social aspects. For some at
least, moral authority, which was important in Roman public life, might
seem to lie in preserving the old ways; and might the ruling class as a
whole not have some sense of its role as the guardian of national
tradition, especially in religion, where neglect of accustomed cults could
anger the gods?

It is certainly not easy to document conscious awareness of and debate
about the clash of traditions in the earlier part of the second century.
Many of the arguments used in the past are too weak to support the
superstructure erected on them. For example, it is far from clear how
seriously the Senate really opposed foreign, including Greek, religion as
such. In 1 86, when the Bacchic mysteries were strictly regulated
throughout Italy, it seems to have been not the long-established devo-
tion itself, but the strong organization that congregations were develop-
ing, with lay officials, private funds and so on, which provoked action
(perhaps also a somewhat hysterical belief in the vices and scandals
attributed to these as to so many secret religious groups throughout
history). If Livy is to be trusted, however, some prejudice could be raised
by pointing out that magistrates had often been told to prevent sacra
external In 1 81 the ‘Books ofNuma’, supposedly recently found in the
king’s grave, were also suppressed by the civil authorities — there is no
mention of the priestly colleges - but in this case it is unclear whether
there was anything felt to be really alien, as opposed to dangerously
unofficial, about their content, described by our earliest sources as
Pythagorean and as destroyed because they were philosophical (specula-
tion has been active; possibly rationalizing explanations of Numaic rites
were given). 109 On the other hand Etruscan divination, which was still
felt as foreign, was encouraged, at some time probably in our period,
though it was put under the control of the college of decemviri , who also
dealt with Greek cults. 110 Astrology, an art of oriental origin but given a
Greek dress, was beginning to be known; Ennius perhaps made an attack
on it in his Iphigeneia , doubtless thinking this more likely to be received

107 Polyb. v1.25.11, Cf. North 1976, 12: (h 107); Crawford 1978, 84: (a 12).
m xxxix. 16.8-9. 109 Pl* n y» HiV xm. 84#.; Livy XL.29.

1,0 Torelli, Elogia Tarquiniensia (Florence 1975) 108.

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450 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

with favour than Euripides’ assault on conventional divination, 111 and
Cato forbade his bailiff to have anything to do with ‘Chaldaei’. But
astrology was probably still mainly confined to foreigners, especially
slaves, like the Graeco-Egyptian cult of Isis, which Ennius may perhaps
also have found occasion to mention. 112 The Senate was not to take steps
against either Chaldaei or the Egyptian rites till after our period, and then
perhaps largely, again, because they were unofficial and socially disturb-
ing. It allowed generals to vow temples to whatever gods they pleased;
some ancient deities such as Vejovis received new shrines in this manner,
but we cannot tell if they were set up as a demonstration of traditional
attitudes, and other such divinities seem to decline in importance.

There is no actual evidence of alarm at the sceptical or unorthodox
religious views sometimes put forward on the stage, or in some of
Ennius’ works, though it is hard to suppose that traditionalists approved
of them. It had probably always been legitimate, however, to make fun of
the gods (on certain occasions); and it was the traditionalist Cato who
said that a haruspex ought to laugh when he saw another haruspex. There
seems to be little consciousness in the second century of a great religious
crisis as postulated by modern scholars. However, there is nothing to
parallel the procession of Greek divinities introduced to Rome on the
command of the Sibylline books in the third century, and it is interesting
that we know of no official delegation to question the Delphic oracle;
while favour was shown to the town, and the free status conferred on it
by Acilius Glabrio was ratified, the oracle’s decline is thought to have
been hastened by Rome’s preference for her own, or Etruscan, methods
of divination. 113 It does look, then, as if the Senate was at least now
cautious about the official introduction or patronage of foreign rites.

There was little Greek influence on Roman political institutions (or
legal ones, unless the setting up, perhaps in ourperiod, of the court of the
centumviri reflects the Greek custom of empanelling very large juries).
However, we may observe the rumpus over restricting the vote of
freedmen to the four urban tribes, out of the full thirty-five. There must
have been more freedmen now than ever before- there were simply more
slaves, and especially more skilled and educated slaves for whose services
freedom might seem a proper reward. Should such men, however, wield
the considerable political power that enrolment in any tribe where they
had property might give them? In 174 (and probably earlier) freedmen

1.1 Jph. xcv, Jocelyn 1967: (h 196)- but astrologi may be astronomers. Africanus’ arch with seven
gilt statues (Livy xxxvn.3.7, 190 b.c.) has been thought to honour the seven planetary gods, but is
perhaps a little early for this to be likely: G. Spano, MA L 8, iii (1951) 175—205.

1.2 If Cic. Div. 1. 1 52 is quoting him: Salem 1938: (b 31).

1.3 De Sanctis 1907-64, 1v.ii.36 iff.: (a 14); Latte 1967, 223-4 (decline of old Roman religion,
264#.): (h 205). Guesthouse for Romans at Delphi, SIG 609 with commentary ( = Shcrk, Documents ,
37); cf. for Sparta, E. Zicbarth, Rh. Mus. 64 (1909) 335.

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REACTION AND ACCEPTANCE 451

with a son or with substantial property were allowed to register in
whatever tribe they wished; in 169 this was reversed for the first
category, and Ti. Gracchus, father of the tribunes and later regarded as a
severe character, tried unsuccessfully to disenfranchize entirely all freed-
men except those in the top property class, whose existence is worth
noting. (It is also worth noting that Gracchus was one of the Senate’s
experts on eastern affairs, and was willing to report favourably on the
situation there; he left a speech in Greek that he had delivered to the
Rhodians. 114 As usual, simple philhellenism or its opposite is not in
question.) But there is no evidence that prejudice against Greeks, rather
than against foreigners in general, including pretty uncivilized ones, or
against those who had gone through the debasing experience of slavery,
was involved, and indeed the power which great men, their patrons,
might exercise through their freedmen may have been part of the
question at issue.

It seems less easy to deny that there may have been some conscious
rejection of Greek influence in matters of morality and education.
Argument here has to centre on the elder Cato, the one figure of the time
of whose ideas we can really know something, since extensive fragments
of his speeches and other writings survive, with the whole of his treatise
on agriculture. He was a man whose opinions clearly impressed his
contemporaries - even the Greek Polybius finds them worth quoting. If
the possessor of the most forceful and versatile mind of any Roman of his
time did not reach out to general judgements on the changes of his epoch,
few others are likely to have done so.

Scholars have presented us with many Catos. The representative of
opposition by peasants, or at least rural landowners, to the hellenized
ruling aristocracy appears less often nowadays; the spokesman of the
aristocracy into which he had made his way, intent as such on curbing the
threat posed to it by great individuals who saw themselves as Hellenistic
rulers or even kings, is still to be found. The idea that Cato was a simple,
comprehensive hellenophobe cannot survive a glance at his fragments;
the belief that he was deeply opposed to many aspects of Greek influence,
but felt that it was necessary to learn from Greece in building up a sound
educational literature in Latin, is more tenacious, and may go with a
belief that Cato shows in his historical work, the Origines, a special value
for Italian traditions and perhaps for peoples of the western Mediterra-
nean in general. But recently he has been presented merely as a novus homo,
who inevitably as such came at times into conflict with members of the
aristocracy, though he had no lasting or principled hostility to the
hellenizing Scipio Africanus or Fulvius Nobilior; as a man who cared (as

1,4 Treggiari 1969, 45: (h 118). Greek speech: Cic. Brut. 20.79.

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452 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

he clearly did) primarily for law, service to the state, and thrift - one
should increase not dissipate one’s property, but not make money out of
public office; one should devote one’s efforts to agriculture and warfare -
and whose literary works, written to some extent for amusement,
involved at times vigorous and lively overstatement, but were too naive
and chaotic seriously to put forward any general views. 115 It is, however,
probably better to think that Cato did have some real convictions about
the dangers to the Romans in Greek civilization, but was ready to make
some use of some sides of it, though without being quite the far-seeing
eclectic with great literary and educational schemes that he has some-
times been assumed to be.

His long career spanned almost the whole of our period, from the
Hannibalic War to the fall of Carthage, for which last event he was partly
responsible. Some of the apparent contradictions in this career perhaps
stem from its length. As we saw, he had little formal education in youth,
but he perhaps learnt Greek, or some Greek, on service in Sicily and
(probably) at Tarentum during the war. Cicero’s statement that he
lodged at Tarentum with a pro-Roman Greek named Nearchus may rest,
as so much else in the De Senectute does, on Cato’s own statements, and in
reporting the Pythagorean doctrines that Cato supposedly learnt from
Nearchus, Cicero was probably at least building on signs of Pythagorean
influence in Cato’s works (we can still see, in the De Agricultura, a
Pythagorean regard for cabbage). 116 It is unnecessary to reject the story
that he later brought Ennius to Rome, and studied Greek literature with
him, though it is disquieting that Cicero does not mention it. 117 A later
break between the two men may have been caused as much by Ennius’
readiness to celebrate other patrons, notably Scipio and Fulvius
Nobilior, whom Cato disliked (and in verse too - Cato had no opinion of
verse) as by his transmitting to Rome aspects of Greek thought and
literature of which Cato will certainly have disapproved.

Cato reached Greece proper with the Roman army in 1 9 1 . He played a
part in the battle of Thermopylae which suggests that he and his
commander knew the course of events in 480, though they may have
been told of them on the spot. And he passed some time at Athens, which
he claimed to have spent discovering what Greek culture was about. 118
He must have continued thereafter to study Greek literature, as indeed
Nepos’ biography states, though it is not likely that the educated slave,
Chilo, whom he kept in Rome in the 1 80s, helped his master, as so many
educated slaves did in the first century, for he is described as a
grammatistes or elementary teacher. 119 But acquaintance with Homer,

1,5 Astin 1978: (h 68). 1,6 Cic. Sen. 41; Cato, Agr. 157. 1,7 Badian 1972: (h 70).

1,8 Pliny, HN xxix. 13. 1,9 Nep. Cato 3.2; Plut. Cat. Mai. 20.3.

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Demosthenes and probably Xenophon, with leading figures of Greek
history and famous Greek institutions, can be traced in Cato’s fragments
or is attested in anecdotes, not all from his last years. Xenophon was to
become popular at Rome; 120 one wonders if his easy Greek, as well as his
practical outlook, had something to do with this. On the other hand,
though Plutarch says that Cato took some things from Thucydides, as
well as much from Demosthenes, 121 it seems unlikely that he was able to
come to real grips with either the language or the thought of the great
historian at least.

Cato had made his mark politically by soldiering and by pleading in
court, in the traditional Roman fashion. In 195 he was consul, with his
old patron L. Valerius Flaccus, and his views on luxury were revealed by
his unsuccessful opposition to the repeal of the lex Oppia, a sumptuary
measure of war-time origin; to try as he and others were doing to retain
such controls in peace was significant. Now or earlier, as praetor, he
passed a law limiting a provincial governor’s expenditure. He himself
governed Spain, and fought there, vowing a temple to Victoria Virgo,
whom he perhaps did not feel to be a Greek divinity, though Greek and
Roman elements combine in the conception of Victoria. He insisted that
he had lived in Spain in strict simplicity, without causing the state
expense. 122 Returning, he began his career of prosecuting officials for
peculation, extortion from provincials and other crimes supposedly
hitherto strange to public life. In particular, he had some part in the
attacks on Scipio and his brother, in the 1 Bos, which seem to have turned
on accountability for public money, though the course of events is
irrecoverable. But his greatest moment was his censorship in 184, with
Flaccus; he revised the rolls of the Senate and cavalry with extreme
strictness, in particular excluding from the former T. Flamininus’
brother, whom he accused of murdering a Gallic prisoner to gratify the
whim of a catamite. He registered, as censors had to do, the property of
all citizens, inventing an ingenious way to tax luxury items, and punish-
ing those who neglected their fields.

It is true that the iniquitous practices that Cato combated are not
actually stated in our wretched fragments of his speeches to be Greek
(though they are in the speech that Livy puts into his mouth a propos of
the lex Oppia), i2i but simplicity of life is repeatedly associated with ‘our
ancestors’, and it is paradoxical to suppose that the other term of the
contrast was not sometimes present in Cato’s mind, whether he was
inveighing against the erection of statues to effeminate cooks, or to
women in the provinces (this apparently in an attack on Fulvius

120 Munscher 1920, 708".: (b 21). 121 Plut. Cat. Mai. 2.4.

122 ORF 4 Cato frs. 51, 53, 54. 123 Livy xxxiv.4.

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Nobilior), or the placing of images of the gods in private houses ‘as if
they were furniture’, or taking poets on campaign (Fulvius again), or
indeed of reciting Greek verses as well as indulging in other undignified
actions. Cato did not stand entirely alone; Pliny tells us thatthe censors of
189 forbade the import of foreign perfumes; Plautus’ Trinummus, which
may date from the eighties, reflects anxiety about mali mores 124 and the
non-observance of laws, and a statue of Cato was set up in the temple of
Salus praising him for saving Rome from decline (though possibly
Plutarch is wrong to suppose the statue and censorship con-
temporary 125 ).

But Cato’s censorship could not escape the paradoxicality to which he
was always condemned, or the Greek influence of which he had to admit
a certain measure. The heavy spending on useful public building works
(1,000 talents on the sewage system) helped to turn Rome into something
more like a Hellenistic city. In particular the Basilica Porcia introduced a
Greek architectural form, under a Greek name (and his own), for a
building designed for legal and commercial activities. Nevertheless,
some years later, after more building had taken place, anti-Roman
Macedonians could still poke fun at the unpretentious and old-fashioned
public and private edifices in the city (as well as at individual leading
citizens and, comprehensively, Roman customs, institutions and
history). 126

The most significant achievement of Cato’s later life was to be in
literary work, though he continued to be litigious in the extreme and a
watchdog of official behaviour. Here above all he was inevitably to a
considerable extent dependent on the Greeks. His first objective seems to
have been the proper education of his delicate but talented son by his
aristocratic first wife; the boy will have been about ten in the late 180s.
The Greek slave Chilo was allowed to teach a large class of other boys
(whether freeborn or more likely the slaves Cato encouraged other
servants of his to train for sale); 127 young Cato was his father’s care. We
know that a Roman history in specially large letters was produced for the
boy; 128 this was perhaps the first history in Latin of any kind (though the
date of a Latin version of Pictor’s history is problematic), but though it
may be the genesis of, it cannot be identical with, the Origines, on which
Cato was at work in the last years of his life. It was perhaps Roman rather
than Greek to give the history of one’s country so central a part in
elementary education. Possibly a few years later than this first work came
the libri ad Marcum filium , of which we know too little, for example
whether they were in any sense ‘published’ by Cato. Rather than a proper

124 Pliny, HiV xiii. 24; Plain. Trin. 28fT. 125 Plut. Cat. Mai. 19.3.

126 Livy XL. 5. 7. 127 Plut. Cat. Mai. 20.3, 21.7. 128 Plut. Cat. Mai. 20.5.

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Greek-style encyclopaedia reflecting a more practical and Roman ver-
sion of the Greek liberal education ( enkyklios paideia), with separate
books on different subjects, they may have been a rather disorganized
collection of advice of different kinds . 129 They certainly forbade Marcus
to have anything to do with Greek doctors, to whom Cato pronounced
himself unambiguously hostile, on the grounds that they were sworn to
do away with every barbarian they treated, and for pay at that . 130 Plutarch
supposes that this shows that Cato knew the story of Hippocrates’ refusal
to treat the Persian King, and it appears from Pliny that Greek doctors at
Rome in the second century had acquired a bad reputation for savage and
dangerous remedies . 131 It was, besides, traditionally the duty of the pater
familiar to look after his household (Cato had a notebook with a
collection of prescriptions for this purpose ), 132 and the idea of healing for
pay was alien. Nonetheless, it is clear that there were numerous Greek
doctors in Rome by now.

In the same (somewhat ill-organized) passage Cato told his son that he
would explain suo loco , in its right place, that the import of Greek
literature to Rome would prove the city’s ruin; Marcus might look into
this, though not study it thoroughly. Cato clearly means Greek literature
in general, not medical literature only; and we have no right to say that he
did not mean these words seriously, or the sweeping condemnation of
the Greeks as nequissimum et indocile genus, a completely worthless and
unruly race. We do not know whether he in fact dealt with the whole
subject suo loco , but the promise reveals that he took the matter to be an
important one.

Cato also taught his son about the laws of his country, the old staple of
Roman upper-class education. He may have written on the subject, either
in the libri ad Marcum filium or separately, but he may have felt that it was
already in safe hands. The first Roman legal work we know of is the
Tripertita of Sex. Aelius Catus, perhaps of about zoo b.c.; the three parts
consisted of the Twelve Tables, a commentary on its archaic language,
and a collection of legal formulae or procedures . 133 If one enquires as to
the results of Cato’s intensive education of his son, one finds that the
latter continued to evoke his father’s approval; he was noted for courage,
and became a well-regarded writer on the subject of law . 134

All Cato’s treatises were doubtless basically didactic; Cicero com-
ments on his passion for teaching as well as learning. He doubtless took
the view that public men at least must write only for serious purposes (the
introduction to the De Agricultura, possibly inspired by Xenophon, says
that one must give account of one’s leisure, as well as one’s active hours).

129 Astin 1978, 532: (h 68). 130 Pliny, HN x.xi.x.13.

131 Plut. Cat. Mai. xxni- 3; Pliny xxvi- 12—20. 132 Plut. Cat. Mai. 23.4.

133 Pompon. Dig. 1.2.2.38. 134 Gcil. NA xm.20.9.

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456 ROMAN TRADTTrON AND THE GREEK WORLD

But the De Re Militari, for example, was presumably not written for his
son, as it addressed the supreme commander in the second person
singular . 135 Perhaps it was designed in the first instance for a specific
person or persons; but Cato envisages it becoming more widely known,
and as a result unfairly criticized . 136 Probably there was no proper
publication or sale of books, but manuscripts inevitably circulated and
were copied. If the subject of this work was Roman enough, to write
about it was of course Greek. In particular it was to follow in the
footsteps of King Pyrrhus and his adviser Cineas, whose works may well
have been already familiar to the Romans, who were interested in their
authors. Little is known of Cato’s work, which was used, but much
mangled, by the late author Vegetius; changes in organization and
equipment probably made it rapidly out of date.

The De Agricultura, of uncertain date, survives to us and is of interest
both for what it does and does not do. What it does do is to accept
without discussion that its subject is a form of modern agriculture: it is
addressed to the owner (in a few passages apparently to the slave bailiff or
vilicus) of a fair-sized estate run mainly by slaves and selling its surplus of
specialized produce, wine or oil, on the market. There is no hankering,
except in the rather irrelevant preface, after the old-fashioned small
peasant farm; though neither does it deal with the great ranches probably
already to be found in parts of southern Italy, in spite of the fact that on
one occasion Cato claimed that pasture was far and away the most
profitable type of land ; 137 nor with the fulling establishments,
pitchworks and other forms of real estate which Plutarch says in his old
age Cato found more lucrative than agricultural property . 138

The book opens with a formal preface very much on the Greek literary
model (though the maiores and military prowess add a Roman note). But
though it attempts to go through the process of acquiring and develop-
ing a farm in due order - one notes that this farm is not thought of as
inherited - it soon degenerates into a hodge-podge of maxims, charms,
recipes, prescriptions and Best Buys, the confusion of which is unlikely
to be entirely the result of a lack of final polish, or textual corruption or
interpolation. In spite of Cato’s dislike of Greek doctors, a good deal of
Greek druggists’ terminology appears , 139 along with popular medicine,
not all of it unmixed with superstition. Acquaintance with the proce-
dures of Greek technical literature is also sporadically betrayed - ‘there
are three kinds of cabbage, and I will show their nature and effect’ — but
only sporadically.

A Greek treatise on almost any subject, a techne or, as the Romans were

135 Fr. 13 Jordan. 136 Pliny, HN xxx praej. 137 Cic. Off. 11.89.
S3S Plut. Cat. Mai. 21.5. 139 Boscherini 1970: (h 170).

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to say, an ars (as both subject and treatise were known) first defines its
subject, and then subdivides it, going on to deal separately and in order
with the various parts, kinds or aspects. This is a method that goes back
through the great philosophers to the sophists, who first taught the
Greeks to think and speak in an orderly fashion. In the first century b.c.
at Rome Varro treated agriculture on this model, criticizing all his
predecessors, including Cato, for not starting with an accurate definition
of the subject and for including irrelevant material. In fact, it seems
pretty clear that it was only from the start of the first century that Greek
method was used by the Romans for organizing treatises on any subject —
rhetoric, grammar and the rest. 140 Cato’s failure shows how unsophisti-
cated Rome still was; the prose writings of many comparatively primitive
peoples show a similar tendency to hodge-podge. The early Romans also
found it hard to generalize; Cato’s farm is clearly in southern Latium or
northern Campania (he is certainly not writing of the Sabine or Alban
hills where his original estates were), and particular craftsmen in that area
are recommended for brooms, tools and the like. Similarly, till even later,
Roman legal writers often seem to have found it hard to do other than
record or comment on particular cases. And the lack of a clear sense of
form is visible in other contexts as well; Plautus, in comparison with his
originals, thinks in terms of separate scenes, not of the play as a whole,
and the sc. de Bacchanalibus at least ends chaotically.

Parallel to an inability to organize material clearly in a treatise is the
inability, in a society still only superficially influenced by Greek grammar
and rhetoric, to organize a speech coherently, or to produce a clear
narrative line with proper logical and syntactical subordination of sec-
ondary elements. Cicero thought that all the oratorical virtues except
polish and rhythm, but including good examples of tropes and figures,
were to be found in Cato’s speeches, 141 and Plutarch believed that all his
work showed Greek influence. But Cicero also says that Cato was not yet
doctus or eruditus and lacked ‘foreign and imported art’. 142 As it happens,
Cicero’s freedman Tiro wrote a long criticism of Cato’s speech ‘For the
Rhodians’ of 167, and this is partly preserved to us by A. Gellius. 143 Since
Tiro is criticizing a speech made in the Senate (and so by Greek
classification deliberative in genre) as though it were a forensic one, most
of his technical criticisms seem misconceived, though Gellius, writing in
the archaizing period, springs too readily to Cato’s support. Gellius does,
however, twice suggest that Cato’s arguments were not well organized,
and this rings true. But the reflections on justice, honour and expediency
recall the stock heads of Greek deliberative oratory, the tendency to

i4o Rawson 1978: (h 213). 141 Cic. Brut. 69.

142 Cic. De or. in. 135. 143 Gell. NA vi.3.

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458 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

argument rather than pathos or abuse has been seen as Greek, like the
stress on the idea of arrogance and the frank recognition that states act
from self-interest. Most of the figures of speech, however, especially
alliteration and repetition, seem native to the earliest Latin we know, that
of prayers and religious formulae, and indeed some of them were
positively discouraged by Greek teachers. A general awareness of Greek
oratory, read and heard, but not formal teaching in rhetoric, would
explain Cato’s style in his speeches, much more elevated than that of the
De Agricultura, often vigorous, amusing or cutting. A substantial frag-
ment of another speech represents Cato as working on it seriously
beforehand, with a secretary and an earlier speech of his own to help him,
and is a sustained and amusing example of the figure of praeteritio ,
perhaps a conscious one. 144 Cato obviously kept his speeches carefully;
we do not know if he published any, except those that he included in his
historical work.

In fact some rhetorical training may have been available in Rome by
the eighties or seventies of the second century; Ennius speaks of those
who practise rhetoric (though not necessarily in a Roman context) 145 and
Suetonius says the early grammatics also taught rhetoric (though he may
be thinking of a slightly later date). 146 Cicero, however, in the Brutus only
sees real signs of Greek training in the speeches of public men active in
the second half of the century, 147 and the Epicurean Philodemus is
probably quoting a mid second-century source when he says that the
Spartans and Romans carry on their political life successfully without any
use of rhetoric. 148 Cato noted how brief his own speech to the Athenians
in 19 1 was, compared with what the interpreter made of it, 149 and indeed
all his speeches were short by Greek or later standards (so were what
Cicero calls the oratiunculae of some at least of his contemporaries) and all
began piously with invocations to the gods. 150 Cato also said that the
words of the Greeks came from their lips, but those of the Romans from
their hearts, 151 and laughed at the lengthy training of Isocrates’ pupils,
fully prepared to speak by the time they came before Minos the judge of
Hades. 152 He probably did not write a separate work on rhetoric, but in
the libri ad {ilium or elsewhere gave his well-known advice to stick to the
subject as the words would follow, rem tern verba sequentur , 153 and defined
the orator as ‘a good man skilled in speaking’, vir bonus dicetidi peritus , 154
Whether this last owes anything to Greek works in defence of rhetoric
against those philosophers who attacked it as immoral, or not, it helped

144 ORF 4 fr. 173. 145 Vahlen 1928, 217: (b 37 a). 146 Suet. Gram. 4.6.

147 Cic. brut. 96fF.; Galba, Scipio and Laclius docti, Cato only studiosus: Tusc. 1.3.1.

148 Phld. R bet. 1.14, 11.65 and 85 Sudhaus. 149 Plut. Cat. Mai. 12.5.

150 Cic. Brut. 63. 151 Plut. Cat. Mai. 12.5. 152 Pint. Cat. Mai. 23.2.

153 Fr. 15 Jordan. 154 Fr. 14 Jordan.

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point the way for Cicero’s conception of the orator as a true statesman.
But Cato himself, where rhetoric was concerned, probably followed his
own advice to look into, but not study in detail, Greek literature.

How efficiently Fabius Pictor and the other Roman senators who
wrote histories in Greek articulated their narratives in that language we
do not know (and they may have had help from Greek slaves or
freedmen). Cato’s late work, the Origines, was perhaps the first real
historical work in Latin, for the brief notices preserved for each year on
whitened boards by the pontifices, and elaborated later, do not deserve the
title. Slight as the fragments of Cato’s work are, we can see the heavy,
redundant, paratactic sentence structure; and the overall plan of the
work, though interesting, was inelegant. The first book dealt, conven-
tionally enough by Greek standards, with the prehistory and early
history of Rome; but Cato, who was not himself a Romano di Roma , went
on to shatter the traditional historiographical model. Books n and in
turned to the foundation and origins of all other Italian states and tribes,
even the Gauls of the northern plains which had perhaps been regarded
as part of Italy since the late third century and had been extensively
colonized by Rome. It has been suggested that Cato was simply influ-
enced by Timaeus, who began his history with much ethnography of the
peoples of the western Mediterranean; but it may be significant that Cato
noted that some cities were older than Rome, and praised various peoples
for their warlike qualities, and perhaps in general lauded the Italian way
of life, Italiae disciplinam et vitam , 155 It is interesting that we know by
chance that when in Greece Cato particularly trusted and favoured the
troops of the Latin colony of Firmum . 156 He may even have felt that
Rome did not always reward her allies as she should; one fragment
laments that only the leader of a Tusculan force that saved Rome from a
Sabine coup in the fifth century had been rewarded with the citizenship , 157
though this may mainly reflect his belief that it was armies not generals
who won victories, and the variety of languages and cultures still
surviving in Italy makes it unlikely that he thought of a wide extension of
citizenship. Some pro-Italian feeling there must be; even those who
cannot organize their thoughts well may have strongly held convictions.

But in spite of this regard for Italy, the early history of many of her
communities had to mean the Greek legends that they, or the Greeks for
them, had produced to explain their institutions or for cultural respect-
ability. Cato seems to have had no hesitation in chronicling tales which
made half the population of Italy - including the Sabines, supposed to be
Spartans by origin - descended from Greeks. (It is perhaps chance that
no fragments deal with Hercules or Evander in Latium, though a

155 Peter, HR Re I. frs. 7}, 76, cf. 21. 156 Plut. Cat. Mai. ij.$.

157 Peter, HRRel. fr. zy

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460 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

number involve Aeneas; but for Cato the Romans certainly inherit Greek
blood through the Aborigines and the Sabines.) In fact Cato is contemp-
tuous of the ignorance of a tribe that cannot produce a story of this
kind . 158 Whether he tried to reconcile his views by contrasting warlike
and moral ancient Greeks with their decadent modern successors, as
some later Roman writers do, we do not know. His research must have
been quite extensive; his sources were probably both written and oral.
Among the former Italiote and Siceliote historians will have bulked
large. There is some evidence that he even looked out for inscriptions,
which he could have learnt to do from Timaeus . 159 He uses the Greek
scholarly weapons of etymology and aetiology, and though on the whole
avoiding the miraculous, reports natural wonders, what the Greeks call
paradoxa. In this last field his biographer Nepos noted his diligentia , but
denied him doctrina, perhaps Greek scientific learning . 160 Cato has an eye
here for agricultural and legal points of interest , 161 however, that perhaps
betray the Roman behind the at least superficially hellenizing scholar.

Passing quickly, it seems, over the early Republic though perhaps not
omitting it entirely, Cato then recounted the great wars in which Rome
(and her Italian allies - their part may have been stressed) conquered the
Mediterranean world. If he seems to have been brief on the wars in the
east, it has been rightly observed that Polybius, who was specially
interested in them, and Livy, who used Polybius, have biased us; though
Cato may well have had a particular interest in Spain, and certainly
retailed his own campaigns there. He stressed the role of the legions as a
whole, and omitted the very names of individual generals, referring to
them, at least usually, simply by their official rank ; 162 this perhaps had
roots in archaic Latin usage, but must have been purposely extended. It is
perhaps illegitimate, however, to transfer the attitude to the internal
political life of Rome, and argue that Cato was consciously aware that the
rule of the oligarchy was threatened by the emergence of over-great
individuals, usually generals and usually hellenizing. He did note,
however, that the Roman constitution was not the work of a single law-
giver (as so many Greek ones of course were), but of long ages . 163 On the
other hand, his belief that Roman history provided exempla superior to
the most renowned episodes in Greek history becomes explicit in his
account of the military tribune Caedicius, author of a greater exploit than
that of Leonidas at Thermopylae, but meeting with less eloquent
praise . 164 Here an individual (though not a general) did step forth.

158 Peter, HRRt/. fr. 31.

159 Peter, HRRe/. fr. 58 is often thought to rest on an archaic inscription; cf. Cic. Sen. 21.

160 Nep. Cato 3.4. im Peter, HRRel. frs. 39, 43, 57, 61.

162 Nep. Cato 3.4; Pliny, HN vm.11. 163 Cic. Rep. 1 1.1.2.

164 Peter, HRRe/. fr. 83. It is conceivable that Cato did not give even this name, as it appears
differently in other sources.

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Further formal incongruity will have been caused by Cato’s insertion
of some of his own speeches, apparently in extenso, into the last books of
the Origines. l6S Short by later standards, they were probably still too long
for their place. Cato presumably knew that speeches were a feature of
Greek historiography, but had not grasped their proper function.

Cato is at his most Greek in the Origines, but it was perhaps at the same
time, late in his life, that he rejected Greek philosophy uncompromis-
ingly; it was only at this period that it was really becoming known in
Rome. It seemed to him mera mortualia , probably ‘mere funeral-dirges’,
which were proverbially near-nonsense. 166 He is said by Plutarch to have
declared that Socrates’ teaching (of which he may have known
something from Xenophon’s Memorabilia) was destructive of his
country’s laws and that the man’s only recommendation was that he was
a patient husband and father. 167 With some untechnical political
philosophy he was acquainted; he knew the idea that Carthage, if not
Rome too, was an example of the mixed or at least a tripartite
constitution. 168 But if two Epicurean philosophers were really expelled
from Rome as early as 173, for ‘teaching the young pleasures’, Cato no
doubt approved, as he will have done for the expulsion of philosophers
and rhetors in 1 61 - indeed Pliny says that he thought all Greeks should
be expelled from Italy, though this can hardly be serious. 169 In 155 he
strongly deprecated the upsetting effect on the young of the ‘philosophic
embassy’ from Athens (see below). Let the young men of Rome return to
listening to the laws and the magistrates, he said, and let the philosophers
give their immoral lectures to the youth of Greece. 170 He was still
concerned with education, and his views on it were still largely
traditional.

It remains to deal with Cato’s foreign policy, if he had one. It certainly
seems uncertain whether he steadily advocated any sort of disengage-
ment from the Greek East, which was in reality hardly practicable. He is
not said to have disapproved of Rome’s earlier campaigns, or even (for
certain) of the war against Perseus, though we can be sure he disliked the
rush to enlist for that war in hopes of personal enrichment. He did
thereafter approve of the ‘freeing’ of Macedon, on the grounds that it
could not be protected by Rome, 171 and he opposed the attempt to
declare war on Rhodes for sympathizing with Perseus, and for tactlessly
trying to arbitrate between him and Rome. Here he put forward a whole
collection of reasons, but he was perhaps greatly influenced by the fact
that once again the proponents of war were much moved by thoughts of

165 Peter, HRRef. frs. 95, 106. 166 Cell. NA xvm.7.3.

167 Plut. Cat. Mai. 23,1, 168 Peter, HRRe/. fr. 80.

169 Ath. xn. 5 47a -now or, perhaps more likely, in 1 5 4 (an L. Postumius was consul in both years):
Pliny, HN vu.113. 170 Plut. Cat. Mai. 22.5. 171 ORF* fr. 162.

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462 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

gain. 172 These two cases are not enough for us to build far-reaching
theories upon; and on both occasions Cato had a majority in the Senate.
He expressed on several occasions a Roman and republican distaste for
kings, but he could also praise an eastern monarch if need be. 173 It is
worth noting, however, that in spite of his early experience of both war
and diplomacy in Greece, he never went back as an ambassador in later
years (as he did to Africa), and that there is no sign that he had any sort of
clientela in the area (as he did in Spain). He must have been regarded as
unusually unsympathetic to Greeks, and unwilling to have more to do
with them than he must.

Cato stands, to some extent, nonetheless, for a synthesis of Greek and
Roman elements. Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Perseus, represents
another synthesis, with stronger Greek elements, which was perhaps
more significant for the future. Born about 230 b.c., he was doubtless
brought up, as we would expect in that period, largely in the Roman
tradition. He remained till his death an exceedingly conscientious augur,
and a strict disciplinarian to his army at a time when (says Plutarch) most
generals were trying to win the favour of their men as a step to a further
command. 174 But he was, unlike Cato, anxious that his sons should have
both a traditional and a Greek education. They were provided with
Greek grammarians, ‘sophists’ (probably philosophers), rhetoricians,
sculptors, painters and huntsmen. Some of these were perhaps only
recruited after the defeat of Perseus and when the two elder sons were
already grown up; we know that Paullus’ son Scipio Aemilianus was
introduced to hunting in Macedonia, and it was when Paullus was in
Athens that he boldly asked the Athenians for a philosopher and a
painter. The Athenians combined the two in the person of one
Metrodorus, and though Paullus thought he had a great catch, the
Athenians probably did not consider sending anyone of eminence.
Metrodorus’ philosophical school is not recorded; Paullus had appar-
ently not specified what he wanted. 175

We are told that Paullus attended his sons’ lessons when he could, and
he must at least have read some Homer, if he was able when at Olympia to
comment that Pheidias’ Zeus there was the Zeus of Homer; 176 he
somehow got hold of an Athena by Pheidias to dedicate at Rome.
Otherwise, what struck him on his sightseeing tour of Greece seem to
have been mainly strategic possibilities.

172 OR/ 74 frs. 163-71. Cf. Sail. Cat. 31.5.

173 Plut. Cat. Mai. 8.8; OR/ 74 frs. 58, 1 80. Note that it was after a speech by Eumenes that Cato said
that kings were carnivorous animals: perhaps when Eumenes had urged war with Perseus? Possibly,
in backing Ptolemy Eucrgetes’ claim to Cyprus, Cato was showing disapproval also of intervening
in the affairs of Egypt (ORF 4 frs. i77ff).

174 Plut. Atm. 3-4. The main source for this life is probably Polybius.

175 Plut. Aem. 6.4—5. 176 Polyb. xxx.10.6.

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FROM THE BATTLE OF PYDNA TO THE FALL OF CORINTH 463

After his Macedonian victory, he discoursed on the power of Fortune,
the Greek Tyche, and Perseus’ punishment by Nemesis — Greek ideas, if
popular and superficial ones . 177 He behaved in many ways as a Hellenistic
king victorious over a rival might be expected to behave; he set up his
own statue on the pillar that Perseus had prepared for himself at Delphi,
and sailed up the Tiber on the royal galley . 178 The claim that the Aemilii
were descended from Pythagoras perhaps dates from this period (as
other bogus genealogies of great Roman families, usually involving
figures of Greek mythology, may do). But Paullus showed a Roman
severity too. He rebuked Sulpicius Galus for lax discipline, though a
friend of this student of Greek science ; 179 perhaps from him he learned to
understand eclipses, but he sacrificed piously when one occurred. He
threw deserters to wild beasts, enslaved the whole population of Epirus
(though on the Senate’s orders and perhaps unwillingly), claimed that it
was military experience that allowed him to organize games in Greece
efficiently, and died a martyr to his augural duties . 180 His funeral was
celebrated with the performance of plays by Terence and Pacuvius; and
by the savage gladiatorial games, probably of Etruscan origin, that were
becoming increasingly popular.

Faute de mieux, perhaps, Cato approved of Paullus, marrying his
beloved son to the latter’s daughter. And he was to look with favour on
Paullus’ son, Scipio Aemilianus (adopted by Scipio), who was much
influenced by his father and whose combination of Greek and Roman
traditions probably owed much to him.

V. FROM THE BATTLE OF PYDNA TO THE FALL OF CORINTH

The end of the Third Macedonian War brought a new flood of educated
Greeks to Rome and Italy. The whole Macedonian court was deported
(Perseus’ son Alexander was kept in Rome, learnt metal-work and Latin,
and became a scriba - he at least should have been able to translate legal
Latin into decent Greek ). 181 So were the thousand hostages from Achaea,
of whom Polybius was one; he too, exceptionally, was allowed to remain
in Rome. King Genthius of Illyria, with all his family, was confined in
Umbria . 182

Events had altered the pattern of Rome’s relationships in the Greek
world; Macedon was eliminated, Rhodes weakened, and compensatory
favour to Athens, which led to a revival of prosperity there, may have
helped cause the movement towards classicism, in the visual arts at least,
discernible a little later in Italy. If this favour was mainly owing to

177 Plut. Atm. 26.J-27.4. 178 Plut. Atm. 28.2, jo.i. 1,9 J_j V y xi.v.28.9.

180 Plut. Atm. 59.2. 181 Plut. Atm. 57.5. 182 Livy xlv.4).9.

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464 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

Athens’ loyalty to Rome, it may be that the Romans’ respect for her great
past did play some part. To Delos, now a free port under Athenian
control, Roman and Italian businessmen began to flock in numbers
unknown before; it became a great entrepot for the slave trade. The flood
of embassies to Rome from Greek states continued (it was to decline,
though not disappear, when, later, Roman governors were on the spot).
It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the extent to which Greek states felt
unable to take any action without getting Rome’s approval: even King
Attalus of Pergamum, favoured and distant, was persuaded by a
councillor that it would be wise ‘to send at all times to Rome to make
continual report’ about his military and political problems with the
Galatians, in order to avoid Roman jealousy and suspicion . 183

The war also brought to Rome the books of the Macedonian royal
library, given by Aemilius Paullus to his sons, Scipio and Fabius
Aemilianus , 184 but probably made freely available by them to other
readers, as the great libraries of Lucullus and others were in the next
century. It has been suggested that the library was not very up-to-date,
and this might be one reason for the Roman tendency to look to Greek
literature of the classical rather than the Hellenistic period. Certainly
Perseus and his immediate predecessors had not had literary tastes, but
the library may have had a nucleus going back to Archelaus, the patron of
Euripides and other Greek poets, and then reflecting the links of the
court in the fourth century with the Academy and with Aristotle. It is not
known if it was in this library that young Scipio found Xenophon’s
Cyropaedeia, certainly known to Alexander the Great; it may have reached
Italy earlier, but at all events Scipio became devoted to it 185 (indeed the
only authors that Scipio is recorded as praising or quoting are the in a
sense elementary Homer and Xenophon, though his reading will not
have been restricted to these). We may guess with some plausibility that
the Macedonian library also possessed the works of Antigonus Gonatas’
Stoic protege Persaeus (we know he wrote on kingship and the Spartan
constitution) and the other Stoics admired by Antigonus, like Cynics
such as Bion; though Cynicism was too subversive to have much
influence on the Romans, the arrival of the library may have paved the
way for the coming impact of philosophy, and especially of a more up-to-
date Stoicism. Another visitor to the court of Macedon had been the
astronomical poet Aratus, and Cicero suggests that his work was or
could have been known to Scipio and his friends, and even to Sulpicius
Galus; it was certainly later much read in Rome.

For this period it is certain, from Polybius, what was only highly

183 IGRom. in. 222; Welles 1934, no. 61: (b 74); cf. Polyb xxni.17.4 agreeing that the Romans
wanted everything submitted to them. 184 Plut. Aem. 28.6.

185 Cic. QFr. 1.1.23, Tusc. 11.62; Sen. 59 includes Scipio’s friend Laclius.

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FROM THE BATTLE OF PYDNA TO THE FALL OF CORINTH 465

probable in the preceding one, that there was much consciousness of the
difference between ‘the Greek way of life’ and ‘the Roman way of life’ —
Polybius uses the word hairesis. He describes A. Postumius Albinus, a
young man of distinguished family who first appears as a junior officer in
the war with Perseus, as one whose enthusiasm from boyhood for Greek
studies, the Greek language and the less worthy aspects of Greek culture
— love of pleasure and hatred of toil — turned the older and more
distinguished Romans against Greek ways. 186 Cato may be among
these, for Polybius shows him rebuking Albinus for apologizing in case
the style and organization of his history in Greek were faulty; there was
no need to write one at all. (Albinus even wrote a poem in Greek as well.)
Polybius also looked back to the fall of Syracuse and regretted that the
Romans had carried off its spoils, especially the works of art. To imitate
the habits of the conquered had been an error, and hatred had been
created among the subject population. 187 Young Scipio Aemilianus, who
spent his time in study and hunting, instead of pleading in the Forum,
was unhappy at being regarded as unRoman, though he did not indulge
in the ‘Greek laxity’ that Polybius says infected Roman youths during the
war with Macedon, and ran riot with the transference of Macedonian
wealth to Rome 188 - affairs with boys and courtesans, concerts and stage
performances ( acroamata ), drinking parties: ‘many paid a talent for a
catamite or three hundred drachmas for a jar of caviare’. Here Polybius is
using a speech of Cato’s which contrasted such spending with that on
agricultural land. Polybius’ views are in fact probably much influenced
by those of his Roman friends, and perhaps even by Cato’s. He strongly
approves of those who were disgusted by the flattery of King Prusias of
Bithynia on his visit to Rome, 189 and those, notably M. Aemilius
Lepidus, pontifex maximus and princeps senatus (later to insist on a simple
funeral), and Aemilius Paullus, who closed their doors to the murderous
Charops of Epirus. 190 It may be that the occasional aping of Roman
habits by foreign potentates - Prusias was not the only example - helped
the Romans to be conscious of their own way of life.

In 161, as we saw, philosophers and rhetors were actually expelled
from Rome, though it has been doubted whether the measure was strictly
enforced against those living with a patron, and one observes that the
grammatici, who taught the language and some literature, seem to have
been exempted (people did have to learn Greek). 191 In the same year a

186 Polyb. xxxix. 1. 187 Polyb. ix.io.

las Polyb. xxxi. 25.4. If it is true that commercial bakers only became known at the time of the war
with Perseus (Pliny, HN xvm.197) this is another index of changing ways; Plautus has the word
artopta, Aul. 400, but does not use pistor in the sense of baker.

189 Polyb. xxx. 1 8; Braund (1982): (e 125) on Prusias’ pose as a Roman freedman.

190 Polyb. xxxi 1.6. j. 191 Suet. Gram. 25.

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466 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

sumptuary law regulating expense at dinners was introduced. On the
other hand, in 164 the Romans acquired an accurate public sundial from
the censor Marcius Philippus; in the third century they had ignorantly
supposed that one carried off from Sicily would work in Rome too. A
few years later Scipio Nasica set up a public water-clock. Civilization was
advancing.

The period after Pydna would have been called, till a few years back,
by anyone writing on the cultural and intellectual traditions of the time,
the age of the Scipionic Circle. But the concept has recently become
discredited, as largely a creation of Cicero, who, in a desire for dramatic
concentration, gathered together most of the intellectuals of this or
rather a slightly later period in his De Republica, of which Scipio is the
central figure. It is true, however, that the period between Pydna and the
fall of Carthage is that of Scipio’s younger manhood, and that he and his
friends Laelius and Furius Philus are among the most interesting figures
of their time. They, and particularly Scipio, may be seen as the heirs of
Aemilius Paullus, who had found it possible to combine what he saw as
best in both Greek and Roman traditions. Polybius in fact does not find it
paradoxical that Scipio should ask a Greek to help him become more
worthy of his ancestors. Indeed Polybius ‘believed that there was no one
more suitable than he was himself to do this’, there being as he pointed
out plenty of teachers of mere school subjects flooding into Rome at this
time. 192 Polybius encouraged Scipio to seek a reputation for temperance
(the idea if not the practice was Greek), financial generosity (unRoman)
and courage (with preparation in the hunting field, where the Romans
did not usually seek it). 193 The young man’s qualities were seen in 15 1,
when it was impossible to recruit for the Spanish War, owing to an
unexampled panic that shocked the older generation; he volunteered to
serve, and then distinguished himself in single combat. 194 He was later to
show himself a strict disciplinarian in the field, like his father, and at
Rome a positively Catonian scourge of lax morals - as well as a friend of
learned Greeks.

Whether, as ancient tradition has it, Scipio, Furius and Laelius were in
their youth friends and patrons of Terence, whose brief career was
traditionally run in the 1 60s, is uncertain. The nobles whom Terence tells
us were accused of helping to write his comedies must, it was already
thought by a scholar of the first century b.c., have been older, as they
were described as having been made use of by the people in war and in
peace. 195 This may imply some advance in the cursus honorum, though
Scipio had fought bravely, young as he was, against Perseus. The scholar
concerned suggested the names of Q. Fabius Labeo and M. Popillius,

192 Polyb. xxxi. 24. 5— 6. 193 Polyb. xxxi.25.2, 29.

194 Polyb. xxxv. 4. 8, 5.1-2. 195 Ter. Ad. 1 5ff. ; Gramm. Rom. Frag. 387.

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FROM THE BATTLE OF PYDNA TO THE FALL OF CORINTH 467

both consulars, and, as he reveals, poets; or else that of Sulpicius Galus,
who did perhaps have an interest in the stage, for several plays are
recorded as produced in his magistracies. However, some connection on
Terence’s part with Paullus’ family is suggested by the choice of one of
his comedies for representation at Paullus’ funeral.

At any rate, what is significant is that it is now conceivable that Roman
nobles might be secretly writing verse, and that Terence does not feel it
necessary, from loyalty to them, flatly to deny the rumour; and also that
Terence, though a slave by origin, should frequent aristocratic circles
simply on the basis of his talent. His art, so much more refined than that
of Plautus, or indeed than that of Plautus’ successor Caecilius, recently
dead, perhaps partly reflects the growing sophistication of taste of his
patrons. But his lack of popular success, with most of his plays, suggests
that audiences had not changed much since Plautus’ time; though
Terence must have thought that they would sit through prologues
(rather rhetorical in style and organization) about literary disputes and
the nature of translation. This was a subject for which the Romans could
not find assistance among the basically monoglot Greeks, though they
may have been influenced by Greek ideas of ‘imitation’ of an earlier
work. But to say that bene vertere is male scribere, good translating is bad
writing, can only be a Roman formulation . 196 Whether any earlier
playwrights had used the prologue for such discussions we do not know;
the prologue to the Hecjra suggests theatrical quarrels in which Caecilius
was involved.

Compared with Plautus, Terence seems at first sight to be far more
Greek. He keeps Greek titles for his plays (as Caecilius often did), though
the Romans did not worry about the accurate transliteration of Greek
names until, at the end of the century, some of the newly self-conscious
Roman grammatici demanded it. He does not despise philosophy, indeed
represents it as - in moderation - a proper activity for a young man, in
Greece at least. The lyrical element in his plays is smaller and the farcical
additions and the exuberant play with the Latin language are reduced,
though not wholly done away with: Terence’s diction is still richer than
Menander’s elegantly transparent Greek, and, as was to be so often the
case in Roman poetry, pathos and emotion are brought out, at the
expense, in this case, of gnomic detachment. There is some desire, it
seems, for a measure of realism - the language is more colloquial
(educatedly colloquial) than that of Plautus, offering ellipses, interjec-
tions, and so on, while Terence avoids breaking theatrical illusion by
patently Roman insertions, by direct addresses to the audience, of which
there were many in Greek New Comedy, and by the formal prologues,

>*■ Ter. Eun. 7.

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468 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

favoured by the Athenian dramatists, that explain the plot beforehand.
Scholars have recently stressed his comparative individuality as an artist.
By free use and combination of models he enlivens plot and action (his
beloved Menander might sometimes seem rather slight); more interest-
ingly, he minimizes Greek local colour, thus giving his characters a
universal humanity, if also some lack of individuality. It might be wrong
to deduce too much about Roman culture in his time from this
universality, for Terence was an ex-slave, probably from Africa, and will
have had neither a strong Roman patriotism nor roots in the Italian
theatrical tradition. But it may be that he and his patrons could take
Greek details for granted now, and he possibly foreshadows the
acceptance, in some quarters at Rome, of cosmopolitan Stoicism. He is
said, however, to have died on a study-tour of Greece, the first that we
know of a Roman writer taking . 197

There has recently been much disagreement whether his Adelpboe
reflects contemporary interest in Rome in the proper education of young
men. Some find a Roman preference for severity in the final unexpected
condemnation of the hitherto sympathetically liberal old Micio, and
think that this, or at least Demea’s speech justifying a father’s right to
correct extravagant and inexperienced youth, is a Terentian addition.
This is disputed; certainly attempts to identify Demea with Cato, and so
on, are misconceived . 198 But it is possible that Terence’s endings do tend
to be more serious and moral than those of his models; and even that his
plays are apt to be concerned with relations between fathers and sons,
which must often have been difficult in Rome in this period. And if it is
true that Terence lays less stress than his Greek models on the weakness
of man, and more on his worth and dignity, this perhaps has something
to do with Roman self-confidence and gravitas, and adumbrates a real
humanism that is inconceivable without the civilizing influence of
Greece, but is not itself purely Greek.

With the other comic poets of the time we suffer from miserable
fragments and uncertain chronology. Titinius, who introduced the
togata, still based on New Comedy but set in the country towns of south
Latium or (probably) Rome, was at one time seen as representing a post-
Terentian reaction against the Greek atmosphere of the palliate, but in
fact his date is probably considerably earlier in the century 199 and his
work influenced by traditions and tastes in southern Latium, where he
may have been born and his plays may conceivably have been first
produced, rather than by attitudes in Rome itself. It is interesting that
characters from these towns seem to be laughed at for aping Greek ways.
In the togata free women were more prominently represented than in the

197 Suet. Vit. Ter. 5. 198 Buchner 1974, 412^.: (h 174).

t 99 Weinstock, PIT' 2.VI.2.1540.

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FROM THE BATTLE OF PYDNA TO THE FALL OF CORINTH

palliata, in accordance with the comparative freedom they enjoyed in
Italy, and we are told that slaves were not allowed to appear cleverer than
their masters, as they so often did in the latter . 200 The prologue to the
Casina of Plautus reveals that, perhaps in or soon after Terence’s time,
there was a demand for the revival of earlier plays; the Casina is one of
Plautus’ most lively and indecent comedies, and we may suspect that the
tastes of the educated and the uneducated were now drawing apart. The
next prominent composer of palliatae, Turpilius, was probably to write
more in the Plautine than the Terentian tradition.

Polybius speaks with crushing contempt of Roman audiences even in
this period. At the time of L. Anicius’ games celebrating his victory over
Genthius some time in the mid sixties, several distinguished Greek flute-
players brought over for the occasion were put all together onto the great
stage that had been built in the circus, together with a chorus, and to liven
things up were made to lead mock fights between various groups. There
was great applause. Two dancers, their accompanists, and four boxers,
with buglers and trumpeters, joined in. ‘As for the tragic actors’, says
Polybius, ‘whatever I said of them I would seem to be making fun of my
readers .’ 201 What on earth happened we are left to wonder; perhaps the
audience expected a larger musical element in the dialogue, and doubtless
few could follow fifth-century tragic language. (Plays in Greek, which
continued to be produced in Rome, were never a great success, implies
Cicero. 202 ) One recalls Terence’s audience, which preferred to watch
boxers, gladiators or rope-dancers . 203

And yet tragedy in Latin, though Polybius does not deign to mention
it, was still successful. This is the age of Ennius’ nephew Pacuvius
(though he may have begun producing somewhat earlier). He was born
in the Latin colony of Brundisium, but retired at the end of his long life to
nearby Greek Tarentum ; 204 he may, like Ennius, have had a Greek
education. Cicero, perhaps embroidering, notes a friendship with
Laelius . 205 With the art of tragedy, Pacuvius practised that of painting, a
reminder perhaps of the incomplete specialization still obtaining in
Rome. He was perhaps the earliest poet to be regarded in the classical
period as doctus, though Horace and Quintilian, reporting the judgement,
reject it . 206 Various explanations of the term have been offered - the semi-
philosophical disquisitions, such as that on terra and aether , based on
Euripides, in his Chrjses, or the possibility that some of his plays were
based on relatively unknown post-Euripidean models. The choice of
obscure legends of a romantic or pathetic kind has been seen as
Hellenistic. Pacuvius’ style is more elaborate than his uncle’s, though it is

200 Donat, ap. Ter. Hun. 57. 201 Polyb. xxx.22. 202 Cic. An. xvi.5.1.

203 Ter. Hec. pro/. 1.4, n.33. 204 Hieron. Chron. 142 h; Gell. NA xm.2.2.

205 Cic. Amic. 24. 206 Hor. Bpist. n.1.5 5; Quint. Inst. x. 1.97.

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ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

hard to decide to what extent he is attempting effects based on the Greek;
with his heavy compound adjectives he must be doing so. But early first-
century rhetorical writers complained that his argumentative passages
were incoherent and did not follow rhetorical rules. 207 And Cicero
observes that he cut down the lamentation that Sophocles had given the
wounded Odysseus in his Niptra ; 208 this was doubtless in deference to
Roman taste. It would be useful to know more of his Antiope, based on
Euripides, where Amphion defends a life of study against his brother’s
preference for action; how far did Pacuvius feel he could go? There is
elsewhere an attack on divination as such, which is probably bolder than
Ennius’ assault on unofficial votes and harioli, and marks a movement of
opinion in Rome, though the play may have shown the speaker as
mistaken.

In 154 the censors apparently began to build a permanent stone
theatre, the first in Rome. The Senate was persuaded shortly thereafter
by Scipio Nasica Corculum to have it destroyed and all seating at the
games was forbidden for a time, though seats at plays had, it is quite clear,
been usual. This seems to have been a cause celebre, and it is often
suggested that conservatives feared that a permanent theatre might be
used, as theatres often were in Greek cities, for political assemblies.
There were no seats in the Roman comitium , or in its imitations elsewhere
in Italy, and this must have helped to cut meetings short; might not a
comfortably seated populace demand a larger political role? The
evidence suggests, however, that the opposition saw the idea of seats at
any sort of ludi as soft and unmilitary; if Augustine is right, Scipio
Corculum argued that Graeco luxuria was ruining manly ancestral
practices. 209 Cicero’s Brutus suggests that no speech of Corculum
survived, and Augustine’s wording may be influenced by a later
historian, but anxiety about a decline in Rome’s military standards was
clearly prevalent in the years after the fall of Macedon.

Feeling against the Senate was developing, over the levy in particular.
It is just possible that politicians of what one may call a ptoto-popularis
tendency looked back not only to the Struggle of the Orders in Rome,
but found support in Greek political traditions, even those of a
somewhat democratic kind. Cicero’s De Repablica suggests that by 129
there was an interest in the moderate democracy of Rhodes, 210 and the
Gracchi may have been affected by the reformist ideas of the Spartan
kings, Agis and Cleomenes, while they were compared, perhaps already
in their own day (but with hostile intent?) to Athenian democratic

207 Rhet . Her . 11.27.43; cf. Cic. Inu . 1.94. 208 Cic. Tusc . 11.21.48.

209 Livy, Per . xlviii; Cic. Brut . 79; August. Civ . D . 1.3 1. Taylor 1966, 29#.: (h 30).
2,0 Cic. Rep . 1.47, 111.48.

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FROM THE BATTLE OF PYDNA TO THE FALL OF CORINTH 47I

politicians and orators. This takes us outside our period, but there may
have been debates within it that we cannot reconstruct.

The great debate that we do know of, that about the declaration of war
with Carthage, may have taken place in somewhat Greek terms, if the
theory that fear of an external enemy is necessary to keep a state from
luxury and decay was really put forward by Scipio Nasica. 211 Certainly
the effect that the war would have on foreign, no doubt primarily Greek,
opinion was, says Polybius, seriously taken into account. 212 Something
of political and intellectual interest may also be extracted from the tiny
fragments of a historian of this time. Cassius Hemina, who seems to have
composed at least part of his history (in Latin) before the Third Punic
War, wrote with brevity, but with a more complex sentence-structure
than Cato’s Origines, or indeed some later historical works, can boast. 213
He could produce commonplaces of Greek philosophy, quoted Greek
phrases, and may have criticized a merely literary historian, without
practical experience, in a way that recalls Polybius on Timaeus. 214 To
write in Latin was surely not a polemical act for him, as it may have been
for Cato. But in spite of Greek influences he was one of the first Roman
historians to subordinate the origin-stories and the recent wars to the
reconstruction, of interest only to Romans, of the internal history of the
early Republic. However, he deployed the traditional weapons of Greek
antiquarianism, etymology and aetiology, with unsophisticated enthusi-
asm (the Latin towns Crustumerium and Aricia were founded by ‘Sicels’
called Clytemnestra and Archilochus 215 ). He rationalized and
euhemerized the early legends; he gave a cool explanation, possibly
under Stoic or Cynic influence, of the ill-fame attaching to suicide; 216 at
the same time he shows an interest in Greek mystery religions and, still,
Pythagoreanism - he was not yet aware that it was chronologically
impossible that King Numa should have been a pupil of Pythagoras, 217
and in fact the Romans had no convenient instruments for comparing
dates of Greek and Latin history till the mid first century.

Cassius combines naivete with some sophisticated Greek influences.
Rome had been having some distinguished visitors of late, though they
came primarily as envoys rather than to teach (some intellectuals had
done so earlier, like Antiochus’ ambassador Hegesianax in the 190s, but
there is no evidence that the Romans took anything from them). Perhaps
in 168, or possibly some years later, 218 the great grammaticus Crates of
Mallos arrived. It was only because he broke his leg in an open drain that
he stayed to give lectures, which Suetonius thought introduced true

2,1 Gelzcr 1962-4, 11.39: (a 19). 2,2 Polyb. xxxvi.z. 2,3 Leeman 1963, 72: (h 207).

2,4 Peter, HRRel. fr. 28. 215 Peter, HRRe/. frs. 2 and 3. 2,6 Peter, HRRe/. fr. 15.

2,7 Peter, HRRe/. fr. 37. 2,8 Suet. Gram. 2.2 is confused.

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472 ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

grammatical learning into Rome; before that the poetae and semi-Graeci
Livius Andronicus and Ennius had simply read Greek poetry, and their
own, with their pupils (Suetonius cannot be literally accurate). Crates
perhaps lectured both on what we would call grammatical theory and on
Homer, on whom he wrote extensively. Cassius may have been
influenced by Crates’ Stoic faith in etymology.

Suetonius tells us that it was owing to Crates’ influence that certain
Romans began to bring forward Latin poems ‘by their friends or others’,
which had not been widely circulated, and to lecture on them, reading
and commenting. 219 It may be that at least C. Octavius Lampadio,
whom Suetonius seems to regard as definitely the first of the true Roman
grammatici , did this for Naevius’ helium Punicum very soon after Crates’
visit: he also divided the work into seven books, in other words
producing an edition, which copyists could use. (One would like to see
him as a freedman of the hellenizing senator Octavius, but he does not
bear the same praenomen, as one would expect in that case; but a freedman,
probably of Greek background, he almost certainly is.) Crates is said by a
late source to have advised the export of parchment to Italy from
Pergamum (whence the material derived its name); 220 though papyrus
was no doubt normally used for writing, Crates may have seen that there
was scope for developing the book-trade now in Rome. It is also
remarkable that Crates’ visit to Rome seems to be the first sign of Rome
receiving any intellectual or cultural influence from Pergamum, with
which there had so long been friendly political relations, though the
kings of Pergamum were great patrons of philosophy and learning. In
fact certain Pergamene scholars seem markedly to ignore Rome, like
Polemon of Ilium, who wrote about the foundation legends of Greek
towns in southern Italy, or to be unsympathetic to her, like Demetrius of
Scepsis, who denied that Aeneas ever left Asia. Nor is there any clear
evidence yet of cultural influence from Rhodes, another considerable
centre for things of the mind, though with her again Rome had long been
associated.

In 1 5 5 the famous philosophic embassy arrived in Rome from Athens
(the point at issue was the fine imposed on Athens for destroying the
border-town of Oropus). In sending the heads of the main philosophic
schools (Epicurus’ Garden significantly excepted), the Athenians must
have thought that they would now carry weight in Rome. They all gave
public lectures. Their different styles of eloquence made a vast
impression, and Plutarch says that many young men ran wild for
philosophy, and many older men were happy to see this. 221 The praetor
C. Acilius (author of a history in Greek) begged to interpret for the

2,9 Suet. Gram. 2.3—4. 220 Lydus, Mens. 14. n \V. 221 Plut. Cat. Mai. 22.

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FROM THE BATTLE OF PYDNA TO THE FALL OF CORINTH

ambassadors, and essayed a philosophic joke in which he perhaps
confused Academic Scepticism and Stoic paradox. But the great Sceptic
Carneades caused a furore by arguing one day for the importance of
justice in politics, and the next for that of injustice. 222 If the Romans were
truly just, they would give up all their conquests and return to shepherds’
huts. The Romans were shocked; they always tried to persuade
themselves and others that all their wars were just, undertaken in defence
of themselves or their allies. Cato, as we saw, recommended the Senate to
conclude the envoys’ business as soon as possible.

Whether Carneades started the Romans looking consciously for a
moral justification of Empire (and whether this was to be given them by
the later philosophers Panaetius or Poseidonius) is uncertain. More
permanent effect was perhaps produced by the Stoic Diogenes of
Babylon (Critolaus the Peripatetic seems to have had less impact; the
school was not very vital at the time). We know that Laelius and others
became to some extent genuine disciples, presumably getting further
than the superficial acquaintance with a few leading doctrines that may
have been becoming reasonably common, and gaining some knowledge
of the way in which philosophers actually argue. But it is only on a few
members of the next generation - such as Q. Tubero and Rutilius Rufus -
that Stoicism had a serious practical effect. Even so, the works which
Greek philosophers began to dedicate to their aristocratic Roman pupils
seem markedly untechnical, while the Index Stoicorum lists no Romans
(though two obscure Samnites) as professional philosophers at this time.
Laelius was to be most famous as a conscientious augur, and his speech
on the religion of Numa in 145 was archaizing in language and highly
conservative in tendency. 223

Scipio Aemilianus almost certainly listened to the philosophers. Some
time in the forties the Stoic Panaetius was to come to Rome, and on
repeated visits spent much time with Scipio and his friends. It is unlikely
that he arrived before 148, and so it is not our task to decide whether he,
or other prominent Athenians, shocked by Rome’s destruction of
Corinth and Carthage, felt that a conscious effort must be made to civilize
her leading men — perhaps it is not very probable; nor whether Panaetius’
modified Stoic doctrine, humane and shorn of paradox, was produced
for Roman consumption, or, as is more likely, developed in answer to
attacks on Stoicism by the Sceptics, especially Carneades. The main
Greek influence on Scipio in the years before 148 was probably still that
of Polybius, no great intellectual, indeed opposed to the Sceptics, rather
an intelligent, soldierly, not unbookish man from a political family. The
relationship between them, and the position gained by Polybius at Rome,

222 Lactant. Oiv. Inst. v. 14.3-5. 223 Cic. brut. 21.83.

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ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

was significant for the future, however. Polybius seems to be the first
Greek public man to be really trusted in Rome and, having partially
detached himself from his background, to have been used as an adviser
and assistant by great Romans. He was with Scipio at Carthage, primarily
perhaps as a technical expert in military matters; he was with Mummius
in Greece, helping to re-organize the country politically after her final
disaster.

On the fall of Carthage, Scipio, conscious like his father of the power
of Tyche, and aware of the Greek belief that all empires pass away, shed
tears and quoted Homer 224 (in the first century famous Romans seem
more inclined to quote Greek drama in moments of stress). But he also
accompanied the capture of the city with traditional Roman rites,
including perhaps the resurrection of the rite of evocatio , by which Punic
Tanit or Juno was summoned to leave the city which had been hers, as
Camillus had summoned Juno of Veii long before. Scipio’s friend Furius
Philus, doubtless another pupil of the philosophic embassy, was
probably the author of a handbook on this ancient rite , 225 and may thus
have opened the era of the antiquarian monograph in Rome. Laelius’
famous speech on Numaic religion, and some evidence from a rather
later period, do suggest that Scipio and his friends were interested in the
revival of traditional Roman rites that had decayed.

Mummius, the destroyer of Corinth, was a man who, says Cicero, used
a simple and old-fashioned style in his speeches, and he was to set up a
record of his victories in the now archaic Saturnian metre ; 226 but, though
stories circulated of his ignorance of the value of the masterworks of art
taken in the sack of Corinth, neither he nor his brother (who loathed
rhetors and democracy, but had studied Stoicism, which may partly
account for the dislike of rhetors, and wrote verse epistles from Greece to
his friends 227 ) was totally hostile to the Greeks and Greek ways; the
hellenomaniac Albinus was on his staff. Plutarch has a story of Mummius
weeping when a boy in the stricken city quoted Homer to him ; 228 Tacitus
has a mysterious reference to the introduction of new tbeatrales artes, by
which he may mean citharoedic contests, a wholly Greek event, at
Mummius’ triumphal games . 229 It was then not only Scipio and his
friends who were now able to take what they wanted, without strain,
from both the Roman and Greek traditions. It is an over-simplification
to say that in war, politics and religion they remained largely Roman, and
filled their otium, their leisure, with Greek studies and amusements,

224 Polyb. xxxvm. 22. 225 Macrob. Satur. 111.9.6. Rawson 1973, 168: (h 289).

226 Cic. Brut. 94; ILLR P 1 22 - irregular, even for Saturnians; if this is what they are meant to be,
perhaps few now knew how to write them.

227 Cic. Brut. 94, Alt. xm.6a, Rep. hi. 34.46-7, v.9.11.

228 Plut . Quaes t. conv. rx.737a. 229 Tac. Ann. xiv.zi.

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CONCLUSION

475

though there is some truth in it; in fact rhetoric and philosophy were
beginning to have a real effect on public life. There were, perhaps, as
many different syntheses of Greek and Roman traditions as there were
intelligent and educated Romans.

VI. CONCLUSION

The distance which Rome had travelled in less than a century was
enormous. But there was still a long way to go. In 148 probably no
Roman, of the upper class at least, had thought to pay an extended visit to
Athens or Rhodes for serious study with the best Greek masters of
rhetoric or philosophy, or, unless he happened to be there already on
public business, had gone sightseeing in Greece. Exiles withdrew to the
cities of Latium or Etruria, not to the Greek East. It was barely
respectable for a noble to write verse, certainly not for him to abandon
public ambitions altogether for a life of study, as a few men of prominent
family did in the first century. If philosophy was beginning to be known,
Academic Scepticism, Epicureanism and Cynicism were probably still all
distrusted. In 146, when political developments disrupted the Museum at
Alexandria, it seems that none of the scholars who had worked there fled
to Rome, though we are told that ‘Greece and the islands’ were filled with
refugee intellectuals of every kind 230 (it is true that there was an
Alexandrian painter in Rome somewhat earlier 231 ). It was not till the first
century that, as Philodemus shows, a visit to Rome became the normal
ambition of a Greek teacher, 232 partly owing to the extinction of the
various royal courts that had offered patronage, and to the impoverish-
ment of many Greek cities, partly perhaps to the fact that by now so many
famous Greek libraries had come to Rome, mainly as spoils of war, that
scholarly activity could be carried on there as well as anywhere else, and
Rome and Alexandria could be spoken of in the same breath as
intellectual centres.

It was only in the first century, too, that Cicero and others began
consciously to measure Roman against Greek literary and intellectual
achievements, in the attempt, that no longer seemed ridiculous, to equal
or outdo them. It was only then that Latin verse, in spite of its already
long history, reached the ease and elegance of maturity; it was certainly
only then that prose became supple and expressive, and indeed that
grammatici and practising writers forced some consistency and regularity
on the language. Historical works uniting moral and political analysis

230 Ath. iv. i84b-c (from Andron of Alexandria and Menecles of Barca).

231 Diod. Sic. xxxi. 1 8; cf. Val. Max. v. i - a topographos , either a scene-painter or one who painted
the pictures of cities etc. carried in triumphs. 232 Phld. Rj bet. 11.14$ Sudhaus.

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ROMAN TRADITION AND THE GREEK WORLD

with literary polish began to appear; treatises on almost every subject
started to use the procedures of Greek logical organization, forging also
a language in which to discuss rhetoric and ‘grammar’, and ultimately in
the hands of Cicero and others, for philosophy too (though not, as Cicero
points out, for mathematics). Medicine was not naturalized, but much of
the prejudice against Greek doctors gave way. In religion, the forms of
divination and the cults that the Greeks had adapted from the east
proved, in this adapted form, irresistible even to many members of the
upper class; on the other hand, many of this class now turned to
Epicureanism, which rejected divination and all divine intervention. In
politics, almost every great man with interests in the east now had an
entourage of Greek advisers and assistants.

But the earlier period, as we have seen, had laid the foundations for
most of these developments. Above all, it had on the one hand provided
the basis for a real civilization that should be something more than a pale
copy of a Greek model, but should preserve and develop much that was
genuinely Roman or Italian. And, on the other, though it ultimately
distanced the educated or wealthy Roman from his humbler fellow-
countrymen (not that all of these were completely untouched by any sort
of Greek influence), it allowed and initiated that possibility of
understanding and co-operation between the Latin- and Greek-speaking
elites, which was to be one of the most important factors in the long
survival of the Roman Empire.

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CHAPTER 13

THE TRANSFORMATION OF ITALY,
300-133 B.C.

THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

JEAN-PAUL MOREL

The central issue in the development of Italy during the third and second
centuries b.c. is without doubt that of its hellenization; nevertheless it
would be a mistake to relate everything to this factor. In the first place,
hellenization, particularly in Rome, had been in progress since the early
years of the city and it continued after the period now under consider-
ation. It assumed numerous aspects, the variants among which must be
noted, but was not in itself enough to be entirely responsible for the
character of the period. Secondly, the process of hellenization encoun-
tered obstacles, was halted by boundaries and provoked reactions.
Lastly, certain of the phenomena which are to be analysed - and those not
the least important - clearly lay outside the problematical area of
hellenization. Prominent among such phenomena are those relating to
the production of goods for domestic consumption and for trade.
Indeed, an enquiry confined to art and architecture would be unaccept-
able in the light of the approach taken recently by archaeology:
‘antiquarianism’ and ‘material culture’ have also, thanks to the progress
of research, acquired an importance which must be taken into account.

The subject is not without its difficulties. The period in question is one
which has inspired the least concerted study, in contrast with archaic and
‘mid-Republican’ Rome on the one hand and Rome after the Gracchi on
the other. Moreover, many of the works of art or groups of objects on
which the present observations must be based are still very insecurely
dated and highly conjectural in their attributions (though remarkable
advances have been made in this direction).

The orderly presentation of the subject requires that within the overall
period several distinct ‘sub-periods’ be identified. Although in fact these
correspond with the main lines of development, the necessarily some-
what artificial nature of such a subdivision into periods has to be
acknowledged, with its inherent risk of giving prominence to disruption
at the expense of the elements of continuity. Inevitably wars, and
particularly the Second Punic War, appear, not only a priori but also on
examination, as essential landmarks: in all the fields under discussion
they were a period of standstill, it is true, but also of new opportunities
and new incentives, in short, of fundamental changes.

477

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Map i6. Italy and Sicilv.

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

479

I. BEFORE THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

a. The first quarter of the third century
(i) Introduction

The evidence leaves no doubt that the beginning of the third century and
even the end of the fourth century constituted an intensely creative
period in Italy. Less obvious, perhaps, is the concept of the central part
played at this time by Rome, which was long believed to have developed
its artistic and economic powers of production rather later. As a corol-
lary, it would seem necessary to reduce to more realistic proportions the
vitality, at least in commercial matters, attributed to other regions of
Italy, especially Magna Graecia. In short, at the turn of the fourth century
and the beginning of the third century, Rome was in no way behind the
rest of Italy in production and in art, and was at the same time taking a
more vigorous initiative than the remainder of the peninsula in marking
out the first outlines of an economic expansionism which was to be
consolidated in the second century.

At first sight, however, the predominant impression is of an Italian
koine with a certain uniformity in the nature and standard of its artistic
expression and production of artifacts. Models circulated in large num-
bers and were adopted without reserve. There appears at that time to
have been no radical difference in quality or concept of either artistic or
material culture between Southern Italy and Central Italy or between
Magna Graecia and the Italian ‘natives’, from Lucania to Rome and
Etruria. This unity makes the disruptive effects of the Pyrrhic War and of
the surrender of Tarentum in 272 appear all the more striking: what
followed was an interruption in the flood of civilizing influences which
had been spreading from the south of Italy and the creation of disparities
between the various regions. It was to be the end of the close dependence
of Central Italy on Magna Graecia in the sphere of cultural development.

( ii ) Production and trade

During the first part of the third century the production of artifacts in all
the regions of Central and Southern Italy is impressive both for its range
and for its quality - a quality which calls for many of their bronzes,
ceramics and terracottas to be regarded as works of art, and as such they
will be discussed later. In this context pottery was a particularly sensitive
barometer, requiring as it did only raw materials which were widely
available and technical skills which had already been exercised in penin-
sular Italy for a long time; moreover, pottery served a host of different
needs that made it a basic necessity. The variations which occur over and

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

above these constant factors are therefore very significant. In fact, the
ceramic products of Italy at the beginning of the third century are
characterized by their very high average quality, both of technique and of
decoration, compared with those of the preceding and the succeeding
periods . 1 Such pottery as that of Gnathia in Apulia, of Capua and Teano
in Northern Campania and of Malacena in Northern Etruria is remark-
able for its originality of design and its meticulous craftsmanship. Ideas
which caught on widely did not, however, reappear as slavish imitations:
each region, each workshop even, preserved its own individuality, in
which both local trends and ethnic traditions were amply represented.
Thus in the pottery of Malacena, produced in the neighbourhood of
Volterra, shapes borrowed from the Greek repertoire were given details
of form and relief decoration derived from Etruscan tradition. Similarly
the pocola of Rome and of Southern Etruria combined shapes which were
typically regional with painted decoration taken directly from Tarentine
models.

It is important to emphasize one fact which runs counter to accepted
opinion, particularly in relation to Magna Graecia: Southern Italy at the
beginning of the Hellenistic period has been credited with having had
tremendous vitality, not only in respect of arts and crafts but also in the
commercial sphere, which would presumably have been reflected in
large quantities of exports. There is, however, no such evidence, at least
so far as pottery is concerned . 2 Despite their originality and their quality,
the products of this period were distributed over a range of only a few
kilometres, or a few dozen kilometres in the case of the most successful.

There was nevertheless one important exception, namely the products
of Rome and, in particular, the black-glazed vessels from the 'atelier des
petites estampilles ’ . 3 These vessels, admittedly carefully made but by no
means remarkable for their artistic qualities, were widely distributed
over Central Italy, from the Garigliano to the Adriatic and to Northern
Etruria, an area centred on Rome. They were, moreover, exported
overseas to Aleria in Corsica, throughout the coastal region extending
from Liguria to Catalonia and in the territories dominated by Carthage
(Africa, Western Sicily and Sardinia). Modest as they are, they bear
witness to the growing commercial ambitions of Rome, which were
exceptional in Italy at that time and which are confirmed by other
indications such as the renewal of the treaty between Rome and Carthage
and the development of the port of Ostia. From that era can be traced the
formation of the Rome— Marseille— Carthage commercial triangle, which
was to be strengthened, but with a quite different impetus, at the
beginning of the second century.

1 Characteristic examples in Forti 1965: (b 167); Montagna Pasquinucci 1972: (h 253); Morel,
Torelli and Coarelli 1973: (b i86). 2 Morel 1980: (b 184). 3 Morel 1969: (h 254).

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BEFORE THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

481

( in ) Art and architecture

Models and ideas spread more vigorously in the field of art than in that of
ordinary craft products, which Central Italy had no great need to import.
In art and at the highest levels of craft production (not easily distinguish-
able from art at the time) Rome in particular took part, perhaps especially
actively, in a Central Italian koine which had numerous links with
Southern Italy and Sicily. Reference has already been made to the pocola ,
which were vessels bearing the name of a divinity in Latin, often
combined with a graceful and imaginative painted decoration - decora-
tion which was also found, but with no accompanying inscription, on
other vessels which must be classified under the same heading. 4 Like the
vases of Malacena, pocola combined a Central Italian basis (as regards
shape) with unmistakably Greek influence (as regards painted decora-
tion, which was similar to that on Gnathian ware and was probably the
work of Tarentine artists). This phenomenon occurs in numerous exam-
ples of artistic or decorative work of this same period from Latium and
Etruria, such as ornamental painting (in Etruria, black-glazed vessels of
the Hesse group, or mural decoration like that of the Tomba dei Festoni
at Tarquinia), or even, at the opposite extreme, ‘triumphal’ painting.
This last type, of which only the most meagre traces remain, was
probably very important in the tradition of Etruria (the Fran<;ois tomb),
of Samnium (tombs at Paestum) and of Rome. In Rome it has survived
only in one fragment found in a tomb on the Esquiline, 5 but a splendidly
revealing example. The features which were always to typify Roman
commemorative art (such as continuous narrative, the size of the figures
proportionate to their rank, concern for detail and a didactic purpose
expressed in this instance by written captions) are here combined with a
high standard of execution which shows familiarity with the most recent
advances in major Greek painting, such as the use of ‘lights’.

Every aspect of art and artistic craftsmanship was involved in this
renaissance, which took over the mastery of form and sometimes the
moral purpose of Greek art. The small terracotta altars ( arulae ) often
borrowed their iconographical and stylistic models from Southern Italy. 6
At the very time when the Athenians, in 280/79, erected in their agora a
statue of Demosthenes as a symbol of intellectual conviction dedicated to
the service of a great political cause, the Romans set up in their Forum
statues of Alcibiades and of Pythagoras, respectively ‘the bravest and the
wisest of the Greeks’. 7 Numerous other statues, of great variety, reveal a
high artistic standard and often similar influences, from the famous

4 More!, Torelli and Coarelli 1973, 57-69: (b 186).

5 Coarelli, RAfR, 200-8; id. 1976: (b 159).

6 Ricciotti, RAfR, 72-5. 7 Pliny, HN xxxiv.26. See also Baity 1978: (h 224).

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

‘Brutus’ - difficult to interpret because so unusual but which it is
tempting, despite controversy, 8 to attribute to this period — to the
thousands of terracotta heads excavated from dozens of votive deposits
thereabout Central Italy. These terracottas are particularly interesting,
inasmuch as they were modelled by local artists with a freedom permitted
by a complete mastery of their material, but also often with a fairly strong
desire to emulate examples of Greek art of high quality. They thus reflect
the diversity of the Italian reaction to these models. It remains none the
less true that almost all of them indicate a facility, a solidity of construc-
tion and a care for detail which were not to be lost until the end of the
third century, when they gave way to a degeneracy of style that revealed
unmistakable signs of the gulf which was then opening up between
‘great’ and ‘popular’ art. Some of these votive offerings, temple decora-
tions and portrait heads are of a quality which does indeed bring them
very close to contemporary Greek art: among them the Fortnum head in
Rome - ‘one of the first examples, and perhaps the most indicative, of the
close contact between Rome and non-colonial Greek culture’; 9 the large
and ambitious terracotta busts in the style of Praxiteles found at Ariccia,
where the influence of Sicily and of Magna Graecia is clearly visible; 10 or
again the pediment decoration of the great temple of the Scasato at Falerii
Veteres, with the eclectic features typical of art in outlying areas. 11

Also by the early third century Roman coinage included series of silver
coins distinguishable from Greek coinage only by the legend,
ROMANO, so hellenic was their style at that date, though it was soon to
develop into something more truly ‘Roman’. 12

Greek influence is less apparent in architecture, where plans, elevations,
decoration and materials remained very traditional. Marble, for example,
continued to be totally unknown in the architecture of Central Italy.
Rome at this time distinguished itself more by utilitarian achievements,
such as roads and aqueducts, in which her genius was to continue to be
outstanding. In 312 Appius Claudius Caecus marked out the Appian
Way and constructed the first Roman aqueduct, the Aqua Appia, to be
followed in 272 by the Anio Vetus.

The Greek style of architectural decoration, however, adapted to the
local tufa, made a tentative and marginal appearance in a notable monu-
ment: the sarcophagus of Lucius Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (Fig. 1),
which demonstrates an evident desire among the ruling class for a break
with the Central Italian tradition. Such a break applied not only to
decoration, in which there is obvious hellenic - and especially Syracusan

8 Gross, HIM, 11.564—75: (h 192), with Torelli, ibid. 575-7.

9 La Rocca, RA1R , 197-9. 10 Zevi Gallina, RMR, 321-4. 11 La Rocca, RAfR, 330-2.

12 Crawford 1974, 1.44, and 11.745: (b 88).

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BEFORE THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

483

CORNELIVSlVCIVS-SCiridBARBATVSCNAIVOp-rATRE

ROCNATVSFORTIS-VlRSAriEN<QVE-aV01VSFORMAVIRTVTEIf‘AR!SVMA

VlT— CONSOUCENSoRAIDILlS-QVEIFVrr/pVfrVOS-TAVRASIACISAVNA

A/ .NIOC E PIT— 5 V Bi C IT-OMNE- Q>VCANAA.\ OPSfOE S QVEA BD OVC I T

Fig. i. The inscription on the sarcophagus of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus. (After F.

Coarelli, il sepolcro degli Scipioni (Rome, 1972), 9. fig. 1.)

— inspiration, but also to the concept of the tomb itself as analogous to an
altar, and no longer to a house, which brought it into line with the Greek
Heroa. (In fact rock-tombs were no longer to be the rule, even in Etruria,
after the third century.) Similarly the elogium which was later inscribed on
this sarcophagus was consistent with the typically Greek idea of the
physical beauty of the person honoured, ‘whose good looks were equal
to his valour’: quoins forma virtutei parisuma fuit , 13

b. From the surrender of Tarentum to the beginning of
the Second Punic War, 272-218 b.c.

The surrender of Tarentum in 272, following closely on the ravages
caused in Southern Italy by the Pyrrhic War, is not merely a symbolic
date. Whatever may have been the fate of the city itself afterwards (a
much debated point, but it seems hard to deny that it experienced a
fundamental decline), its fall coincided with the end of the supremacy of
the culture of Magna Graecia, which during the preceding decades had
spread its influence across Central Italy. Subsequently, by contrast, each
Italian region tended rather to fall back on itself, either because it had
been hard hit, as in the case of the South, or because, generally speaking,
competition with Magna Graecia was less of a factor. At the same time,
however, another model was not slow to emerge - that of Rome. In this
connection, one year earlier, the date 273 marks a turning-point as
important as that of 272, for it was the year when the two Latin colonies
of Paestum and Cosa were founded, which were to set the imprint of
Rome on a Magna Graecia and on an Etruria both equally in decline.
From this time forward it must be noted that Roman models were being
implanted throughout Italy, especially in the sphere of town planning
and of architecture. These models did not necessarily have a wide impact,
but they already proclaimed, on these carefully chosen sites, a new type of
supremacy. A concomitant movement was the convergence on Rome,
and only on Rome, to a much greater extent than before, of the contribu-
tions of the most highly cultivated centres - no longer solely or even
principally through the medium of ideas or artists or craftsmen, but in
the form of objects or works of art plundered or taken from cities of

13 Cl L i z . 7 = vi. 1 285. On the sarcophagus: Zevi, RAiR, 256-9.

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

cultural brilliance. Two symbolic examples may be adduced, the first of
which is provided by the 2,000 statues brought back from Volsinii to
Rome in 264 by Marcus Fulvius Flaccus (a proportion of these signa
Tuscanica was to adorn the donaria erected on the area sacra of S. Omobono
in Rome, traces of which have been recovered 14 ). This was the first of a
long series of spoils which, during the third century, were progressively
to empty Italy and Sicily of their substance, before it became the turn of
Greece and of Asia Minor in the following century. The second example,
which is perhaps even more symbolic of the desire of Rome at that time to
appropriate the emblems of an artistic and scientific culture superior to
her own although not yet capable of assimilating it, is the sundial
brought in 263 from Catana by the consul Manius Valerius Messalla, who
set it up on the Comitium without, however, adjusting it to the new
latitude. 15

The increasing hold of Rome on Italy can be observed in the network
of new roads scoring the countryside and disturbing the established
features of human geography (Map 16). The series had been inaugurated
with the Via Appia in 312, to be followed by the Aurelia in 241, the
Amerina at about the same time, the Flaminia and perhaps the Clodia in
about 220 and others still to come - the Aemilia and the Cassia, the dates
of which are controversial. 16 Designed to serve the needs of Rome’s
expansion, the movements of its army and the communications with its
colonies, these roads often bypassed ancient cities, which thenceforward
fell into decay.

It is easy to gain the impression that Italy at this period was sealed off
into restricted areas between which there was little circulation of pro-
ducts or models. (This same applies, in a more general way, to the whole
of the western basin of the Mediterranean at this same time, including
Punic Africa and the Massaliote world.) It is an impression which rests,
as will be seen, on valid evidence, but it must not obscure another
process, at least equally important, which was then getting under way -
the Romanization of Italy.

(i) Production and trade

Black-glazed pottery 17 once more provides a guideline, for reasons
already mentioned. Compared with the preceding and subsequent
periods, the years now under consideration are typified by more marked
regional differences in Italy. Not only was Italy importing less than ever
from Greece, but there was practically no trade even between one region

14 Pliny, HN xxxiv.34. On the donaria see Mercando 1963-4: (h 251); Torelli 1968: (h 267).

15 Varro ap. Pliny, HN vn.214; cf. Poccetti 1979, 77: (b 60).

16 So Harris 1971, passim: (h i 36), who tends to bring forward many generally accepted dates.

17 Morel 1980, 94—9: (h 258); see also Morel, Torelli and Coarelli 1973, 49—50: (b 186).

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and another. This state of affairs, too often forgotten, was the one which
normally obtained with regard to pottery in Republican Italy. It had,
however, been modified in earlier times and was to be modified still
further in the next period by striking exceptions (mention has already
been made of the ‘ atelier des petites estampiUes’). Between the first two
Punic Wars, by contrast, there was no sign of any real exception. It is true
that pottery decorated in relief known as ‘Cales ware’ is to be found on
sites quite widely dispersed throughout Italy, chiefly in Northern
Campania and in Etruria, and also on several sites overseas, but this was a
type of pottery of exceptional technical and aesthetic qualities and even in
this case the quantities recorded are insignificant. In other words, it is an
exception which is of practically no account.

The regional differentiation of types of pottery makes a study of the
products of this period very difficult, and they are probably among the
least well known. However, this apparent differentiation must be quali-
fied by certain observations. Pottery like the Cales ware mentioned
above, manufactured at least to a large extent in Northern Campania,
clearly took its inspiration from Etruscan traditions. On the other hand
there is a common fund of styles to be noted among the local products of
sites like Rome, Rimini, Cosaor Minturnae-a sign, among others, of the
influence which Rome was then beginning to exercise in this field also.

The break with Greece proper and with Magna Graecia seems hence-
forward to have been complete. One archaic feature persisted,
however, which brought Italy closer to Greek ‘ceramic’ culture: it was
the survival of categories of terracotta vessels of a votive or ritual
character. Thus there are the phialai mesomphaloi of Cales, certain vessels
of Rome on which a painted ‘H’ denotes a dedication to Hercules, the
‘Heraklesschalen’ of Latium referring to the same god, and inscribed
vessels from Rimini evoking various deities. Nevertheless, although
these series reveal a dignity which pottery was to lose completely in the
next century, each of them comprised only a negligible number of vessels
and was frequently of no economic importance.

The pottery of the last three-quarters of the third century often
presents another interesting aspect: quite a large number of black-glazed
vessels (and, more seldom, ordinary vases or even objects of bronze) bear
makers’ marks (Fig. 2). 18 This phenomenon occurs regularly at all
periods on amphoras and bricks, perhaps because these products of the
opus doliare, being regarded as a sort of adjunct to agricultural produc-
tion, were not demeaning to those who made them. It seems to have been
otherwise with the semi-fine pottery, which, under the Republic, was
hardly ever marked. The relative abundance of exceptions in the period

18 Morel 1985, 22-4: (h 260).

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Fig. 2. Potters’ marks from Calcs, third century B.c. (After C. L. Woolley, JRS t
(1911) 2, p. 203, fig. 39.)

under consideration is thus all the more striking. These signatures,
whoever they designate (owners of workshops, managers, foremen,
workers, or any of these as the case might be), throw some light on the
working conditions of the time. In particular they reveal or confirm: (i) a
certain pride or an attachment to their work on the part of the craftsmen,
who were not yet reduced to the status of anonymous cog-wheels; (ii) a
considerable partitioning of production (in one group of 159 marked
fragments found at Cales there were 34 different marks with 17 different
names - moreover, it is quite the exception to find a mark which is
characteristic of pottery of one site on another site, however close at
hand); (iii) the inclusion among these craftsmen of free men alongside
slaves and perhaps freedmen. Thus the relief-ware from Cales was signed
alike by a L ( uaus ) Canoleius L(ucii) f(ilius) T(iti) n(epos) and by a
K(aeso) Serponius V ( ibii) s(ervus) (Fig. 3). In short, it was a system of
small workshops with slaves forming only a part of the workforce, which
is consistent with the state of affairs in agriculture at the same period,
where the peasant smallholding predominated and where slavery contri-
buted only subsidiary or complementary labour. A fact which must be
noted also, although not easy to interpret, is that the use of marks
remained confined to that same region - Tyrrhenian Central Italy -
where methods of production by slave labour were to flourish during the
following century.

Towards the end of this period there are some signs of a resumption,
still very tentative, of the export of Italian artifacts, including the Cales
ware already mentioned and perhaps also the archaic Campanian A ware
(a product of Naples) which is to be found still in remarkably small
quantities in the Marseille area.

Exports of agricultural produce are more obvious and show that in
certain areas of Italy a more vigorous system of agriculture was being
instituted, especially in the cultivation of vines. It is possible to learn
something about these exports from the so-called ‘Graeco-Italic’
anaphoras, 19 spindle-shaped receptacles which were still very hellenic in

19 Hesnard and Lemoine 1981, 243—8, 255, 257: (b 172); Manacorda 1981, 22—4: (h 248).

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before the SECOND PUNIC war

487

CA/Voi^fioS-V-F-FEC iT'CApE/Vo S

K-2/iR Ponio caluB fvcn vho/:o- f<2Qm//vo

8ETV5 -<5Aft/w^o Gi . C/\ LEftl/S- reciTf

Fig. 3. Potters’ marks on relief-ware from Cales.

their general shape (Fig. 4). Some of them unquestionably go back to the
third century, and a whole series of workshops has been located on the
borders of Campania and Latium, in the plain of Fondi and in the
neighbourhood of Sinuessa, near Cosa, mostly on coastal sites, which fits
with what is known from other sources about the maritime export of
these containers. Apart from their distribution within Tyrrhenian Italy,
they were exported in the third century to localities and regions as
various as the Adriatic coast, Vercelli (probably via Liguria) and Pech
Maho in the Languedoc. 20 They provide evidence of the first export
trading in agricultural produce from Italy of which there is tangible
proof since the Etruscan wine amphoras of the seventh and sixth
centuries. The fact that overseas trade had begun at this time to present
an economic and political problem and was the basis of rivalry between
factions is confirmed by the vote, at the very end of the period under
consideration, of the Claudian plebiscite of 220/19. This vote restricted
the capacity of ships owned by senators and their sons to ‘300 amphoras’
- amphoras most probably of the Graeco-Italian type.

( ii ) Architecture and town planning

From this time it was particularly Rome which dominated the interplay
of loans and influences in central Italy. In the realms of commerce and
politics, the Urhs endowed itself with new facilities. The first market
conceived as such ( macellum ) in Rome probably dates from this period. At
the beginning of the First Punic War a complete reconstruction of the
Comitium gave it the appearance which it was to retain, essentially, until
the end of the Republic: that of a circular place of assembly, with tiers on
the inside, in imitation of the Greek and perhaps more specifically the
Sicilian ekklesiasteria. (It was from Catana, as has been noted, that Manius
Valerius Messalla took the sundial which he set up in the Comitium.)
New techniques for decoration and for comfort were borrowed from the
worlds of Greece and Carthage, such as the opus signinum, a kind of mosaic
flooring which was in use in Rome and in Ostia from the middle of the
third century at latest. 21 But when it was a question of refurbishing
buildings of a ritualistic or religious character, such as the Regia (in 240),

20 Baldacci 1972, 19: (h 225); Solier 1979, 90, 95, 119-20: (b 200).

21 Rebuilding in 209 of an earlier macellum-. Livy xxvii.11.16; Comitium: Coarelli 1977, 203'-}:
(b 160); opus signinum: Zcvi 1973, 509: (h 123).

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Fig. 4. Profiles of ‘Greco-Italic’ amphoras. (After Morel 1976, 477, fig. 5: (h 256).)

there was a tendency to respect the traditional designs. Tufa, with the
addition of travertine, still continued to be the standard material when
the area sacra of S. Omobono was rebuilt in 264 (it was then that Marcus
Fulvius Flaccus erected an ex-voto adorned with statues taken from
Volsinii), as it was for the temples erected during the First Punic War in
the Forum Olitorium by Gaius Duilius or Aulus Atilius Calatinus.

The Latin colonies founded at this time (of which Cosa and Paestum are
the best examples) received at the outset fora containing copies of models
provided by Rome: temples of Jupiter, circular comitia and tabernae (Fig.
5). This was a particularly striking innovation in a city already as ancient
and as well laid out as Paestum, where the planning of a forum with a
square measuring 1 5 7 m by 5 7 m could be achieved only by cutting deep
into the existing urban fabric, to the detriment of part of the sanctuary of
Hera. The hypothesis cannot be excluded that the celebrated ground-plan
of this city, as revealed by excavation and by aerial photography, may date
from this period. As for Cosa, it represents an exception in Central-
Southern Etruria and extends northward the ekpansion-zone of the great
architectural innovations from Latium and Campania. In Roman
colonies, too, such as Minturnae and Ostia, the fora reflected the ‘will to
power’ of Rome and her unifying influence. 22

Other towns, although not colonies, likewise bear witness to the hold
which Rome had on Italy and the standstill brought about in the
development of local cultures. A very significant instance is the
transplantation of the ancient Etruscan and Faliscan centres of Volsinii
and Falerii to the new sites of Volsinii Novi and Falerii Novi, selected in

22 Drerup, HIM , 11.40 1-4: (b 163). Paestum: Greco and Theodorcscu 1980, ro and 22: (b 168).
Cosa: Brown 1979: (h 231).

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BEFORE THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

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Fig. j. Plan of the forum of Paescum. (After Greco and Thcodorescu 1980, 48, fig. 2:

(b 168).)

KEY: A: amphitheatre; AE: acrarium (public treasury); C: curia\ F: forum; G:
gymnasium; GR: 'Roman garden’; H: capitolium\ I: comitium\ M: macellum\ PS, PW, PN:
porticoes (south, west, north); S: Heracum (sanctuary of Hera); St: stoa; Th; thermal
baths; TG: Greek temple; Tl: Italic temple; 1 — 1 8 tabernae (shops).

compliance with the interests of Rome - interests shortly to be
consolidated by the planning of the new Roman roads, the Via Amerina to
Falerii Novi and the Via Cassia to Volsinii Novi. It may be said of Falerii
Novi in particular, built as it was on virgin ground to be the new centre of
the region, that it constituted ‘an impressive symbol of Romanitas ’ , 23
Apart from towns which were so to speak the show-case of Roman

23 Potter 1979, 99: (b 188).

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Fig, 6. Plan of the sanctuary of Pietrabbondantc. (After StrazzuHa 1971, *1, fig- 1- (h

z6 5 ).)

colonization or conquest, town planning and architectural activity
proceeded very unevenly in the various regions. Magna Graecia had not
recovered from the wars "of the first decades of the third century; Central
and Southern Etruria had been severely tried. Northern Campania, on the
other hand, at sites like Teano or Cales, showed a vitality attested not by

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BEFORE THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 49 1

dwellings, about which very little is yet known, but by sanctuaries with
rich votive deposits. However, what must be noted especially is the
emergence of a region like Samnium, which henceforth became receptive
to Greek influence. On the future site of the great temple of
Pietrabbondante (temple B), erected towards the end of the second
century, there was constructed in the second half of the third century a
sanctuary of a very highly developed type, composed of porticoes around
a temple with Ionic capitals (Fig. 6 ). The terracotta elements of these have
been recovered and a Javissa containing, among others, arms which were
probably of Tarentine origin. This sanctuary was being built at the very
time when in the Latin colony of Isernia, quite close at hand, Italian
models which were unmistakably archaic were still being adopted for the
podium of the principal temple . 24

Generally speaking, it is important to observe at this time the use -
which was largely to disappear subsequently in the face of a certain
tendency towards unification - of local and traditional methods of
construction, such as a structure of dry stone at Bolsena, or the opus
craticium at Aufidena, which consisted of a clay structure supported by an
armature of wood, on a stone base . 25 Again, the Circus Flaminius, built by
Gaius Flaminius who was censor in 221/20, is a reminder, with its
probably wooden structure , 26 that technical innovations and new
materials still remained the exceptions, even in the Urbs.

(Hi) Art

The last three-quarters of the third century were not, in Italy, a particularly
brilliant period for art; it did not even benefit from the thrust of Roman
expansion, which spread architectural achievements throughout Italy at
the same time. Moreover, it was not long before the rare art-forms which,
about the middle of the century, still testified to the competence and
originality of certain regions of Italy, began to decline or to disappear. The
second half of the third century saw the extinction of the soft-stone reliefs
of Tarentum and of the Etruscan cistaand carved mirrors, and the decline
of the painted tombs of Tarquinia, the rock cemeteries of inner Etruria
and the limestone busts of Praeneste. The capitals with human or divine
figures to be seen then at Paestum, Teggiano, Sovana and Vulci
disappeared at the end of the century . 27 At this period there was no longer
much pottery of any artistic pretensions, apart from the last off-shoots of

24 Stra/.zulla 1972, 42—4: (h 265); La Regina, HIM, 1.225-6: (h 142).

25 Bolsena: Balland and others 1971, 5 5: (b 148); Alfedcna: La Regina, H/Af, 1.219: (h 142).

26 This is at least the view of Zcvi 1976, 1048-9: (b 208).

27 On these various kinds of evidence, see in particular Bianchi Bandinelli, RIGS, 547; Carter,
Atti Taranto x (1970) 288; Coarelli, RIGS, 299; id. 1977, 55-6: (h 259); Colonna Di Paolo and
Colonna 1978, 511: (b 162). Greco Pontrandolfoand Greco 198 1, 1.50: (h 95); Torelli, RIGS , joi and
457: (h 268); id. H/Af, 1. 100: (h 269).

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

North Etruscan production called ‘Malacena’ ware, sometimes decorated
in relief, and the Cales ware, also in the Etruscan tradition despite its place
of manufacture - of considerable interest, but numerically insignificant.

One of the most widely distributed forms of artistic expression, often
the most significant of this period, is represented by the ex-voto of the
innumerable votive deposits dispersed about Central Italy. These
terracotta statues, heads and statuettes, in all their diversity, are evidence
that their creators, the craftsmen of the small towns of Campania, Latium
and Samnium, possessed if not great originality at least an effective
assimilation of the Hellenistic forms which had invaded Italy at the end of
the fourth century and at the beginning of the third century. 28 In the
course of the third century, however, these naturalistic forms tended to
disintegrate and a preference became apparent for an Italic canon which
flattened the heads, making them almost two-dimensional, stiffened
postures and merged the lines of bodies into vague masses -developments
which are to be observed also in the Etruscan and Italic ‘bronzetti’ with
their increasingly elongated and unreal shapes. In both instances,
compared with what had preceded them, ‘it was, in short, something
different’. 29

It was as if, since the Magna Graecia models had ceased to exist and the
new models to be presented by Greece and the eastern world were not yet
easily available, there was a kind of pause or a period of confusion in
artistic creation - at least if measured by the standard of hellenization.
Pliny dates the ‘death of art’ to 296; R. Bianchi Bandinelli adduces good
reasons for preferring to set the essential tu rning-point in the midd le of the
third century. 30

This void is to be observed even in the case of Rome, where artistic
activity was almost confined to ‘borrowings’ or rather plunder, as with the
2,000 statues from Volsinii. The few genuinely Roman works known
from texts to date to this period, from which hardly any concrete evidence
has survived in the realm of art, belong to the most traditional form of
Roman ‘triumphal’ art, designed to commemorate. Examples include the
battle-scene, tabula proelii, set up in the Curia of the Senate by Manius
Valerius Maximus Messalla, the consul of 262, to celebrate his victory
over Hiero II of Syracuse, the statues of imperatores, such as the one of
himself which Gaius Duilius caused to be erected after 260, or the famous
rostrated column of that same Duilius, which shows the direction taken by
the Roman quest for originality in architectural ornamentation at that
time. 31

28 Bonghi Jovino 1976: (h 230).

29 Torelli, RIGS , 301. For a clear synthesis of the development of Italian bronzes see Colonna

1971: (h 236). 30 Pliny, HN xxxiv.52; Bianchi Bandinelli 1977, 490: (h 229).

31 Pliny, HiV xxxiv. 20, xxxv.22; Quint. 1.7, 12; Serv. Georg, hi . 29; Martina 1980, 143-4: (h 50).

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

493

II. FROM THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE GRACCHI,
218-133 BC -

a. A new context

The year 200 or, more exactly, the end of the Second Punic War might well
be considered a crucial turning-point in the history and consequently in
the archaeology of Italy. On closer scrutiny, however, it might be more
proper to trace back to the actual outbreak of this war, in 2 1 8, the origin of
the numerous upheavals which affected both economic conditions and
art, and the beginning of what P. Veyne has called the ‘second
hellenization’ of Rome. 32

It is well known what major social changes took place during these
critical years, characterized notably by the widening of the gulf between
an oligarchy, which from this time was closing its ranks ever more
completely, and the most exposed and proletarian social strata, by the
recrudescence of the ‘triumphal’ ideology, by the slave mode of
production, by the severe blows inflicted on smallholdings and by the
conflicts between tradition and innovation, between religio and superstitio.
The question to be resolved here is how these new conditions are revealed
in the archaeological evidence.

These changes were essentially attributable to the oncoming trium-
phant tide of Roman imperialism. Devicta Asia (Pliny) and Graecia capta
(Horace) were recognized by Romans of later generations as the most
obvious causes of the cultural upheaval attending the end of the
Republic. 33 The conquests achieved by Rome made their impact in a surge
of new possibilities and incentives, firstly in the form of material riches at
its disposal (primarily in money, but also in precious ores or materials
hitherto almost unavailable, like marble). Cultural wealth also resulted
from the convergence on Rome of the spoils of war and the plundering of
celebrated cities and regions of ancient civilization, from Syracuse, Capua
and Tarentum to Corinth and Carthage, not to mention Macedonia and
Asia Minor. 34 Some key dates established by the historians are reflected in
the archaeological evidence: for example, the end of the Third
Macedonian War in 1 68 had its echo a year later in the construction of the
PorticHsOctavia, which introduced ahellenicstyleofarchitectureto Rome.
The year 1 46 marked the fall of Corinth and of Carthage (the concurrence
of these two events was given a symbolic sanction, so to speak, by the joint
censorship of Scipio AemilianusandLuciusMummiusin 142); it was also,

32 Veyne 1979, 11: (h 216).

33 Pliny, HN xxxiv.34 (see also xxxm.148, and Livy xxxix.6.7-9); Hor. Epist. if. 1.156.

34 Bianchi Bandinelli 1969, 36—9: (h 226); for Syracuse see Gros 1979: (h 1 9 1 )-

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

as will be seen, the date of the construction of the first marble temple in
Rome, that of Jupiter Stator.

The forcible importation of works of art and the arrival of Greek artists
(for whom henceforth Rome was to be the most reliable and most
profitable source of patronage) brought to Rome a great range of
examples and models; and this diversity was to stamp Roman art indelibly
with the seal of eclecticism. At the same time an unprecedented traffic in
slaves 35 (the number of captives increasing tenfold between the third and
the second centuries, with Delos becoming the hub from 167 onwards)
caused the convergence on Rome both of experts in various art-forms and
of a miscellaneous workforce which in certain fields was to revolutionize
conditions of production.

Rome did not confine herself to accepting merchandise, prototypes and
craftsmanship. Having become by degrees mistress of the western and
then of the eastern Mediterranean, she multiplied her ventures there;
perhaps the most characteristic instance was the activity on Delos of the
R homaioi, in the widest sense of the term. They demonstrated the power of
penetration of the Italian economy and in return were themselves
subjected to influences which, in some cases, affected even rather modest
social strata - manifested above all in a certain type of portrait or a certain
type of house.

As mistress of the Mediterranean, Rome was more than ever disposed
to exercise her predominance in Italy, and archaeological evidence makes
this quite clear. For example, modern scholarship agrees in dating the
introduction of the denarius to the period of the Second Punic War. The
denarius initially circulated alongside the victoriatus, a lighter denomination
struck in debased silver, and these coins were minted in widely dispersed
workshops. However, the victoriatushad ceased to be struck by 1 65 , which
resulted in the denarius circulating throughout Italy , while at the same time
the provincial workshops were being gradually closed down and the
whole of the minting concentrated in Rome 36 — an obvious indication, in
this sphere, of the primacy of the Urbs.

In certain regions of Italy, some of which had already suffered hardship
at the time of the Pyrrhic War, the Second Punic War marked the
beginning, or the renewal, of a deep recession, attested by a complete gap
in archaeological documentation — a gap which has perhaps been
sometimes exaggerated, but which it would be even more misleading to
try to deny too systematically (as often happens through failure to take
account of pottery dating). It is the case in Apulia, for sites such as Monte
Sannace, Herdonea, Tarentum, Venusia. It is the case in Bruttium as a

35 Hoffmann, R ICS, 501: (h 98).

36 Zehnacker 1976, 1042—3: (b 147). For a general review of this period see Zehnacker 1973,
1.323-476: (b 146).

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FROM THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE GRACCHI 495

whole, at Picentia in Southern Campania, and finally in Southern or
Central-Southern Etruria, for sites such as Tarquinia (at least from the
middle of the second century) and Lucus Feroniae.

At the same time, here and there and occasionally even in regions
affected by the post-Hannibalic Italiae so/itudo, islands of prosperity
survived or asserted themselves, as for example Canusium, Brundisium,
Luceria and Lupiae in Apulia or Volterra in Northern Etruria. 37 Among
them were isolated pockets of hellenism, including Naples, of course, but
also Ancona, where archaeology has uncovered funerary deposits that
show some astonishingly original features for an increasingly Romanized
Central Italy. 38

The second century b.c. marked in Italy the beginning and, with the
following century, also the culmination of the slave mode of production,
which was obviously favoured by the incredible influx of slaves already
mentioned and by the growing class-differentiation at the heart of Roman
society which in turn it tended to promote. At the same time as this
innovation there appeared another, indissolubly linked with it and
resulting from the same social climate: this was the development of
luxuria , with all the reactions and controversies arising from it. The period
extending from the Second Punic War to the middle of the second century
witnessed a proliferation of sumptuary laws, from the lex Oppia of 2 1 5 to
the lex Licinia of 140, 39 and these were indicative of an intense debate
within a ruling class divided in face of the innovations which were
invading the Urbs. Expenditure was encouraged only forpublicpurposes.
It remains to examine the archaeological data for traces of all these
changes.

b. Production

(i) Agricultural production

Despite its preponderant importance in the economy ofancient Italy, little
is yet known about agriculture in its specific aspects, especially for the
period under review. Of three possible approaches to the subject - nature
of landed property, agrarian technique and trade in agricultural products
- only the last has been made the subject of relatively extensive study.
The villa of the Catonian type where, thanks to slave labour, fairly

37 For examples of opposing views on the decadence or prosperity of these various zones see
Coarelli, Atti Taranto x (1970) 201-2 (Taranto); Harris 1977: (h 96) (a carefully differentiated
account of Northern Etruria); Mertens 1965: (b 183); Morel, Atti Taranto x (1970) 412 (Taranto);
Potter 1 979 y passim-, (b 1 88) (with perhaps too optimistic a view of the state of Southern Etru ria in the
second century); Sgubini Moretti and Bordcnache Battaglia 1975, 95: (b 199) (Lucus Feroniae);
Torelli, R/CJ, 439 (Apulia); id. HIM , 1. 103-4: (h 269) (Volterra).

38 Mercando, HIM , 1.161-70: (h 252). 39 Clemente 1981, in. 1-14: (h 85).

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specialized agriculture was practised on quite a large scale and the
products in great measure sold, is beginning to be familiar to
archaeologists, but chiefly in relation to subsequent periods. No attempt
will be made here to embark on a discussion as to whether in the second
century the smallholding was driven out by the large estate 40 - a question
which obviously must receive varying answers in different decades and
different regions. Moreover, a form of co-existence may have persisted for
some time here and there. (There remains, however, an archaeological
problem which it is hard to solve with certainty, for a farm of which traces
can be discovered in the ground, whether walls or potsherds, may equally
well represent the whole of a small property or part of a large one.) In any
case, the limited persistence of the smallholding is much less significant
than the innovation represented by the appearance, sometimes concur-
rently with the former system, of large-scale cultivation based on slave
labour.

What in fact seems certain is that in some regions, dating from the second
century and perhaps even from the end of the third century, there are
remains of viltae which can be described as Catonian in type and which
existed on the one hand in Campania and on its borders (at Buccino, at
Pompeii, in the Sarno valley, in th eager Campanus, in the ager Falermts and
at Venafrum) and on the other hand in coastal Etruria (at Castrum
Novum and at Cosa). Such archaeological evidence, together with the
literary sources confirmed and completed by it, provides grounds for
conjecturing that there occurred an ‘extraordinary development of Ital-
ian agriculture in the second century b.c.’. 41

Cato is insistent that the landowner whose property he describes must
seek to sell his produce: he must be vendax , 42 and it is on this precise point
that archaeology is now able to supply the most detailed information, as a
result of the study of wrecks and of amphoras.

The ships in which Italian agricultural produce was exported overseas
are a perfect illustration of this new or at any rate consolidated tendency
(the Graeco-Italic amphoras must not be forgotten which, as already
mentioned, had their origins in the third century) to regard agricultural
produce as merchandise intended primarily for sale. The examination of
wrecks found in the western Mediterranean in fact reveals the unques-
tionable predominance of those which can be dated to the second and
first centuries b.c. (representing, as they do, more than half of the

40 See especially Frederiksen, RIGS, 530-57: (h 41); and the general discussion at 559-62.

41 Torelli 1977, 541: (h 270). On the whole subject of archaeological traces of the existence of villae
see e.g. Frederiksen, RIGS, 359-62 (to be treated sometimes with reserve in the matter of dating);
Holloway 1974, 25~32:(b 1 73); Johannowsky 1981, 307:(h 245); Torelli, R/CJ',435: (h 268); cf. also
Polyb. hi. 91. 2-3 and 92; Livy xxii.15. 42 Cato, Agr. n. 7.

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497

Fig. 7. Profiles of Dressel I amphoras. (After Morel 1976, 476, fig. 4: (h 256).)

discoveries), and among them an overwhelming majority of wrecks with
a cargo mainly of wine amphoras . 43

It is in fact these amphoras, whether found on land or under the sea,
which must now be examined and they indicate a change of trend in the
first decades of the second century. Hitherto, Italy had already been
exporting wine, in Graeco-Italic amphoras, but in very small quantities.
She was also importing wine, in amphoras chiefly from Rhodes but some
also from Cos. Now, these latter disappeared, except perhaps from
certain more conservative regions like the Adriatic coast and its hinter-
land, after the beginning of the second century . 44 Conversely, the pro-
duction — and export - of Italian wine amphoras (and naturally of their
contents) increased at a bewildering rate. The amphoras were at first
Graeco-Italic and then of the type known as Dressel 1 (Fig. 7 ). The
manner and the chronology of the change from one type to the other are
not yet known exactly, but it appears certain that, until the end of the
Republican era, the Dressel I amphora was to provide the most tangible
evidence of Italian agriculture based on slave labour and of its ability to
secure distant markets, especially in Africa and in Gaul. Now it must be
noted that this amphora, which was clearly created to symbolize an
increasingly successful product of Tyrrhenian Italy, represents in its

43 Lequement and Liou 1975: (h 162). 44 Baldacci, RIGS , 525.

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498

whole form the very antithesis of amphoras of the hellenic type. It has
been established that the Dressel I type amphoras were produced in the
second and first centuries at numerous sites in Campania, Southern
Latium and Etruria, not to mention imitations of it manufactured
overseas . 45

A similar and contemporary development was that certain regions of
peninsular Italy began at that time to export oil. Archaeological evidence
shows this particularly for Apulia 46 or, more precisely, for certain coastal
areas around Brundisium - evidence again based on amphoras, which
were in use particularly for supplying the markets for Cisalpine Gaul.

There was, on the one hand, an intensive system of agriculture,
directed towards the large-scale commercialization of produce requiring
complex processing. In complete contrast, there also existed in many
regions of Italy — those which have been described above as undergoing
recession and decline in the third century, comprising, essentially,
Bruttium, the interior of Lucaniaand a large part of Apulia - an economy
founded on extensive stock-rearing and on the development of forests
yielding timber for construction and for heating, charcoal and pitch . 47
These activities are difficult to detect except by means of negative
evidence, that is to say by the gap in the archaeological record which they
leave in the areas concerned. It is, however, certain that some of the
indications which can be mustered here and there by a cross-checking of
the few available sources apply also to the second century B.C., and these
affirm that never was the contrast so marked as at this time and in the
following century between regions practising advanced agricultural
techniques and that other Italy, colonized so to speak from within.

(ii) Craft production

For craft products, the pattern remained that of scattered small work-
shops; archaeological traces of them have survived here and there, but
little progress has been made with the study of them. Against this
background, which changed very little from one period to another, it is
easier to distinguish the few exceptions which in themselves reveal the
peculiarities of this period: several important manufacturing centres
producing goods largely for export.

With regard to metalwork, an essential activity, for which archaeol-
ogical evidence is all too often elusive (since objects disappear over the
centuries as a result of melting-down or oxydization), it is necessary to
have recourse to a body of literary, epigraphical and archaeological

45 Hcsnardand Lcmoine 1981, 243-8 and 257: (b 172); Manacorda 1981, 13—24: (h 248). On the
stylistic tendencies of the Dressel I amphoras sec Morel, HIM, n. 477-80: (h 256).

46 Baldacci 1972, 9: (h 223).

47 Morel 1975, 301-4: (h 255); Giardina 1981, 1.87—113: (h 94).

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information which often leaves much to be desired, especially in the
matterof chronology. At Pozzuoli the working of iron with ore from the
island of Elba presents all the appearance of a highly organized and
standardized industry, the products of which were widely exported . 48
The geographical concentration, the juxtaposition of numerous workers
and the distribution of functions (between groups of workmen, between
middlemen and traders) are all indications of an organization that went
far beyond craft level. It is possible that the production of the famous
bronzes of Capua was accomplished in such conditions at this same
period (which also, incidentally, saw the increasing use of furniture and
dishes made of bronze). However, the actual chronology is still poorly
attested. What is certain in any case is the regrouping of the coinage
workshops, which from this time onward were concentrated in Rome,
for silver as well as for bronze, as has been indicated. But once again it is
pottery which gives the best insight into the development of Italy in
about the year 200, thanks to its having been better preserved over the
centuries. (Texts, on the other hand, contain nothing on the subject,
which shows what gaps exist in the information available on the Roman
economy.)

As in the third century, there is evidence of a host of small pottery
workshops over the whole of Italy, the products of each being distribu-
ted within a radius of only a few kilometres. These conditions were the
same for all types of pottery - black-glazed, red-glazed, utilitarian, etc.
The fame of some of them may be misleading in relation to the insignifi-
cance of their economic and commercial impact. A typical case is that of
the ‘Popiliusbecher’, bowls ornamented in relief which were manufac-
tured in Umbria . 49 These vessels are interesting for their marks, which
represent both free men and slaves, and also for their patterns. It would,
however, be quite wrong to regard them as indicating an ‘important
industrial development' in Umbria at the end of the third century and at
the beginning of the second century , 50 for their number remains negli-
gible. The same argument applies to the production of other bowls
decorated in relief which have been discovered at various places in Italy:
in all cases only a few examples are known, or at most only a few dozen.
Certain workshops producing black-glazed ware, by contrast, have left
signs of immeasurably greater activity, as will be seen later.

Pottery production in second-century Italy confirms the break with
hellenic tradition which has already been noted in respect of the second
half of the third century. This applies a contrario to bowls decorated in
relief, which were very Greek in appearance (though not without some

48 Diod. Sic. v.ij. On metallurgical production see Morel 1975, 287-9 j: ( H 2 Jj)-

49 See most recently Verzar, HIM , 1.121-2: (h 272); Morel, ibid. 11.486-8: (h 256). On this and

other similar products see Marabini Mocvs 1980: (h 250). 50 Verzar 1981, 1.576: (h 275).

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Fig. 8. Typical profiles of thin-wallcd pottery of the Republican period. (After
Marrabini Moevs, 1973: (h 249).)

important points of difference) but which did not properly take root in
the Italian environment at the time when they were plentiful in Greece. It
applies also, as has been observed, to the Dressel I amphoras. It applies to
lamps, which are black-glazed products, turned on a wheel, undecorated
and usually unsigned, as distinct from the grey-glazed, moulded, decor-
ated and signed lamps prevalent among the Greeks. Finally, it applies to
those thin-walled vases which made their appearance in the first half of
the second century and which also departed from the secular traditions of
hellenism both in decoration and in shape (Fig. 8). These last, in
particular, were reunited with continental traditions, ‘Nordic’ and espe-
cially ‘Celtic’, thus providing a typical example of the appropriation by
Italian workshops of a new market in full swing. 51

However, the originality of the second century - and of the first
century — is revealed most of all in two or three important series of black-
glazed pottery. 52 The most characteristic of them is the ‘Campanian Type
A’, manufactured, with clay obtained from Ischia, in Naples (where a
workshop has been discovered) and possibly also in Ischia. Without
going into details, the essential features may be noted as follows. With
regard to technique, a non-calcareous paste was used, a process which
was relatively elementary for that period. In the matter of shape and
decoration, there were simple outlines not requiring an elaborate finish
and the shapes were generally ‘open’, with few vessels designed for
pouring or for drinking (with a view to convenience not only of
manufacture but also of transport, since such vessels could be stacked in
piles without difficulty); patterns were repeated indefinitely, without
major variations. As for production there was an absolute geographical
concentration for more than a century and a half (from 200 to 40 b.c.

51 On these various types of potter)' see Marabini Moevs 1973: (h 249); Morel, HIM , 11.491—7:
(h 256); Torclli, ibid. 11.497; Pavolini 1981, 11.144-52: (h 262); Ricci 1981, n. 126-7: (h 264).

52 For general information on these products see Morel 1980, 100-5: (h 258); Morel 1981,11.87-
97: (h 259).

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FROM THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE GRACCHI 501

approximately); total anonymity, no mark having been observed on any
one of tens of thousands of fragments; a high degree of standardization;
and an enormous output. With regard to trade, the exports went almost
exclusively overseas, being shipped as merchandise accompanying agri-
cultural produce, a practice which considerably reduced the cost of
transport; and they were distributed on a large scale, were being trans-
ported over great distances throughout the whole of the western Medi-
terranean, and even - most exceptionally for products of Italian
manufacture - reaching Delos.

Campanian Type A pottery thus presents in exemplary fashion the
characteristics of production methods based on slave labour. It is a
typical instance of a product regarded primarily as merchandise, that is to
say, considered in terms of its exchange value rather than its usage value.
At the same time, however, it must be realized that it remained an
exception among Italian ceramic products, to which it continued to be
subsidiary in Italy itself except in certain coastal locations.

There existed other black-glazed pottery similar to it, but with less
pronounced features, as, for example, Campanian Type C, manufactured
in Syracuse or its neighbourhood, the export of which to distant markets
began at some time yet to be determined in the second century (but in
much smaller quantities than Type A). More important was a group
centred around Campanian Type B, which was a black-glazed ware from
the north or north-central coastal area of Etruria, later to be imitated by
workshops in various regions of Italy and particularly in Northern
Campania. (It is probable that of these workshops some were branch
establishments of the original manufacturers, others competitors imitat-
ing a successful product.) However, this pottery, although manifesting
many of the characteristics which have been defined above as belonging
to Campanian Type A, nevertheless departs from the latter in certain
other features which in some respects place it in another world and which
presage a turning-point to be amply confirmed in the Augustan era
(perfection of technique, more varied shapes, distribution less exclus-
ively by sea, etc.). Campanian Type A thus remains as unique as it is
indicative of the changes which took place in certain Italian communities
in about the year 200.

It may be noted that the most important of the products just described
(Campanian Type B and its imitations, Campanian Type A) came from
areas where at the same time agriculture specializing in wine production
was being developed with the greatest success, that is to say the central
and northern parts of the Etrurian coast, Southern Latium and Northern
Campania. It was in these areas that production by means of slave labour
(and this, applies to other forms of craftsmanship also) was most preva-
lent, surrounding the city of Rome which was inclined to confine herself

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THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

to more traditional activities, and to a role as a consumer rather than a
producer of goods for profit.

On another plane there is also a marked break between two types of
craft product: luxury artifacts and artifacts for daily use, a distinction
often still difficult to make a century earlier. Thus pottery renounced all
pretensions to art or luxury, except in products which were dying out
(the last pieces of ceramic ware from Cales or Malacena) or which were
strictly marginal (the bowls decorated in relief). At the same time the use
of bronze and silver vessels (and also of valuable furniture) became more
general among the well-to-do social classes, even in ordinary daily life.

The Romans were well aware of the upheavals of this kind brought
about by conquest, in Italy and elsewhere. Luxuria was expressed in
terms of craftsmanship (and, as will be seen, the same applied to art), not
so much by general raising of the standard of products as by the disparity
between luxury objects, notable for the sometimes dazzling opulence of
materials or workmanship, and miscellaneous objects devoid of all
artistic pretensions (thus objects in ‘popular’ use ceased to imitate luxury
objects, such for example as metal drinking vessels of typical and
complex shape ). 53 This division was to continue until the Augustan era,
when the sigdlata of Arretium were to mark a rehabilitation of ceramic
craftsmanship (though only for a few decades).

c. Architecture and art
(i) General observations

In this field also the Second Punic War signalled a fundamental break
with the preceding period. The reasons were mainly the same as applied
to the development of craft and agricultural production, but the visible
results were different.

Italy, which at this time played an active pioneering part in economic
affairs, was much more receptive (which does not mean passive) in
respect of art and architecture, where the influx of specialists and of
extra-Italian models was most noticeable. After the closing years of the
third century these came not so much from Magna Graecia and Sicily -
henceforth mere shadows of themselves, although the plundering of
Verres demonstrated that their resources would continue to attract the
covetous for a long time to come — as from Greece proper, Macedonia,
the Aegean islands and Asia Minor. Booty flowed in from Greece and the
Near East, together with the artists whom conquering generals brought
back with them or who were drawn by the numerous commissions

offered by Rome, now predominant in Italy and even in the Mediterra-

►

53 On this whole question see Coarelli, RIGS , 264—5; Morel 1981, 503—8: (b 185).

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FROM THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE GRACCHI 503

nean world as a whole. Italians of all social classes and all types of
specialization (including architects such as Dekmos Kossoutios Popliou
Rhomaios who in 174 was working on the construction of the Athens
Olympieium) were circulating throughout the countries of the eastern
Mediterranean. These were all factors which combined to open up for
Italy the range of opportunities and of novel experiences. 54

This process of hellenization was a very complex phenomenon —
complex in its motivation, in which were united a sense of frustration at
the spectacle of a dazzling civilization and, on the part of certain
members of the nobilitas , an ‘arrogant desire for a break with tradition’ 55
(an element which served appreciably to accentuate the split between
academic art and everyday artistic production, analogous, mutatis
mutandis , to that which has been indicated in relation to the craftsmen,
and also to create a gulf between ‘urban’ art and that of the Italic
communities). It was also complex in its modes of application, so that
pure and simple transpositions of hellenic models in Italy (and in this case
the graft was not usually very successful) were to be found side by side
with adaptations of these models to the new conditions. It was symbolic
of this process of adaptation, and also of its slowness, that while in 263
the first sundial introduced into Rome was - as has been described - left
with the same setting as had been required for the latitude of Catana,
whence it came, it was necessary to wait until 164 for Rome to be at last
provided, by the censor Quintus Marcius Philippus, with a correctly
regulated sundial. 56

(ii) Architecture

Techniques and materials; marble and ‘opus caementicium’ There are two
innovations which adequately sum up this mixture of loans of Hellenic
origin and strictly Roman innovations which characterized second-
century architecture: the use of marble and the introduction of opus
caementicium.

Marble, which in Italy was always an import until such time as the
quarries of Luna (Carrara) began to be exploited under Augustus, came
to be used in Rome only at a late date (a marble cist of the fifth century
being merely the exception which proves the rule). 57 Not until 1 90 were
two marble fountain-basins ( labra ) installed in the Urbs by Publius
Cornelius Scipio Africanus. 58 In 173 the theft - or, if preferred, the
impounding — of the marble tiles from the sanctuary of Hera Lacinia at

M On spoils and on artists see Bianchi Bandinelli, RIGS , 215: (h 228); Coarelli, ibid. 249-50:
(h z 3 5); also Livy xxxix.22.2 and 10; on Cossutius: Cassola, RIGS, 306; Torelli 1980: (h 118).
55 Gros 1976,402: (h 241). 56 Pliny, HN vn.214.

57 Colini, RAfR, 196-7. 58 Livy xxxvn.3.7.

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504 THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Croton by the censor Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, who wished to use them
to adorn the temple of Fortuna Equestris which he was building in
Rome, illustrates simultaneously the envious fascination which this
material aroused in the Romans of that time, the dearth of it which
prevailed on the banks of the Tiber and, generally speaking, the lack of
experts in Italy. In fact, there was no one capable of putting these tiles
back into place when at last the scandalized Roman Senate had ordered
their restitution. 59 Marble became relatively familiar in Central Italy, and
particularly in Rome, only as one kind of booty among others accruing
from conquests in Greece and in Asia Minor. In this connection it is
highly significant that the first temple to be constructed entirely of
marble, the temple of Jupiter Stator, coincided in date with the capture of
Corinth.

Opus caementicium, on the other hand, was an Italian innovation — one
of those which were to have most productive results. This method of
construction consisted of dipping into a mortar of lime and sand small
pieces of stone of irregular shapes, within a wooden casing which could
be removed as soon as the filling had set. If the surface of the wall was to
be visible, the stones, although irregular, could be given a smoother,
more compact finish. It was a case then of opus incertum, in which the
degree of finish might be variable.

The date and the exact place of the advent of this new technique in Italy
have given rise to discussion. Campania and Latium are the two possible
candidates for the region of origin. As to date, the podium of the temple
of Cybele on the Palatine, constructed between 204 and 191, is probably
one of the first, if not the very first, examples of the use of opus
caementicium. In any case it has to be conceded that this technique
originated in Central Italy at about the end of the third or the beginning
of the second centuries. 60

This was an innovation of very great importance, being easy and
adaptable in use. For its application, and especially in the preparation of
the materials, it required a less highly qualified, less specialized
workforce than did the opus quadratum , which used dressed blocks of
stone. Opus caementicium was also, perhaps, a more rapid process, though
it was none the less used in general with the greatest care, as is attested by
the fussily detailed provisions of the lex parieti faciendo drawn up at
Pozzuoli in 108 b.c. 61 It could be effected with materials which were less
difficult to obtain - since the stones required were small and of irregular
shapes — and, if necessary, with reclaimed materials. As a method, it
permitted new feats of daring in the realm of the arch and the vault, and it
achieved economies of time and means in the execution of large-scale

59 Livy XLH.3.

60 Coarelli 1977, 9—16: (h 36); Johannowsky, HIM , 1.270: (h 244); Rakob, ibid. 11.570— 2: (h 265).

61 CIL i 2 . 5 77 = x. 1 78 1.

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FROM THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE GRACCHI 505

building schemes with repetitive components, thanks to the employment
of wooden casings which could be re-used many times. In short, it made
possible the flourishing development of ‘moulded architecture’ which,
over the centuries, was to endow the Roman world with so many bold
constructions. In the distinctive manner in which it brought together
technique, economy and art, opus caementicium not only marked a total
break with Greek models and decisive progress in comparison with the
traditional Italian construction types, whether in dry stone or polygonal
blocks, or in opus quadrature, it also represented a ‘creation of Roman
capitalism’, 62 which was to establish itself first not only in Rome and its
vicinity but also in those regions of Tyrrhenian Italy where other forms
of slave-labour production were being developed.

At the same time there appeared, though more tentatively, another
innovation which afterwards was also to have a spectacular spread: the
intensive use of baked bricks, employed particularly in Northern Italy,
as, for example, in the first perimeter wall with which Aquileia was
provided after its foundation in 181. 63

The new infrastructure of Rome and Italy The economic and political hold
of Rome on Italy demanded and inspired a certain number of large-scale
public works relating to the needs of land, sea and river communications
and the provisioning of Rome. The network of roads continued to weave
its web, centred more than ever on Rome and conceived more than ever
in terms of her requirements or, which amounted to the same thing, to
those of her colonies. These roads often disregarded the ancient centres,
thus condemning them to decline (or sometimes, conversely, reviving
certain cities which, hitherto somnolent, found themselves on the new
highway - a phenomenon which has been closely studied in Southern
Etruria and also in Bolsena, where the creation of the Via Cassia brought
new life to the city together with a complete revolution in its urban plan,
which had to be differently orientated in order to cope with the new
conditions to which its activities were subjected. 64

Within the framework of the Urbs, it was again the requirements of
communication or transport which led to the building of the first stone
bridge, the Pons Aemi/ius, begun in 179 and completed in 142, and the
construction of new aqueducts in 1 79, in 144 (the Aqua Marcia, with an
output of some 190,000 cubic metres a day) and in 125 (the Aqua
Tepula ). 65 However, the works which best revealed the opening-up of
Rome to the Mediterranean world were those of a new port and of new
commercial infrastructures. 66

62 Delbriick 1907-12, 180: (h 258). This expression is however modified by Torelli, HIM, 11.377.

63 Strazzulla 1981, 11.194: (h 266). 64 Gros 1981, 25-4: (b 169).

65 Livy xl. 5 1.6; Coarclli, HIM, 24: (h 234).

66 Coarclli, ibid. 23: (h 234 );/</. 1980, 348-}o:(b i6i);Gabba, HIM, 11.316: (h 91); Gros 1978, 12-
17: (h 242).

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506 the evidence of archaeology

The ancient Forum Boarium, for many years the centre of Roman
business, had been repeatedly ravaged by water and fire. After a major
fire in 213 and various floodings, it became the object of important
works to raise it higher, but the site was too central and also too much
encumbered with sanctuaries to be suitable for adequate extension. The
magistrates of 1 9 3 chose the level area on the left bank of the Tiber, sou th
of the Aventine, for the creation of new port installations to which Latin
authors gave the significant name of emporium (this occurred, it should be
noted, a year after the foundation of a colony at Pozzuoli, another ‘lung’
of Rome). The new installations were flanked by an enormous dock-
warehouse, the Portions Aemilia, begun in the same year and resumed in
174. This market-hall, 487 m long and 60 m wide, covering an area of
almost 30,000 m 2 , was composed of fifty vaulted aisles, each of them
8.50 m wide, the arches of which rested on 294 pillars. It was the first
application of opus caementicium on such a grand scale, which exploited to
the full the potentialities of moulded architecture of a repetitive charac-
ter. At about the same time and slightly to the rear of the new port, Monte
Testaccio may have begun to take shape, an immense dump of imported
amphoras which was to become one of the most striking examples of the
way in which Rome attracted the trade of the Mediterranean countries. It
should be noted also that the censors of 1 79 reconstructed the market
{macellum) of Rome, on the future site of the Forum Pads. 67

Finally, it was to the new use that Rome made of it, as its principal port,
that Pozzuoli, frequented by the Romans since 215/14, owed its prodi-
gious development from the time of the Second Punic War, whereas
archaeology has not succeeded in discovering consistent traces of
Samnite Pozzuoli.

Temples and the architecture of the nobilitas The construction of sacred
buildings was one of the activities pursued in Rome with the least
interruption throughout the third and the second centuries, which makes
the changes in the divinities honoured and the designs used all the more
apparent. Thus, as an extension of the economic infrastructure just
described, certain temples of the second century, especially a group in the
area of the Forum Boarium, 68 were to acquire a definitely economic
connotation. One example was the temple of Hercules Olivarius (the
famous round ‘Temple of Vesta’), which was built during the last
decades of the second century by the rich oil merchant Octavius
Herrenus and is the most ancient marble temple in Rome to have
survived to the present day; another was the temple of Portunus, the so-
called Temple of Fortuna Virilis. A different trend can be seen in the

67 Coarelli, HIM , 11.364—5. 68 Coarelli 1980, 313—22: (b 161); Rakob 1969: (b 190).

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FROM THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE GRACCHI 507

erection on the Palatine of a sanctuary in honour of Cybele and Attis,
reflecting the upheavals at the time of the Second Punic War that induced
the Romans to admit into the pomerium cults apparently quite alien to the
Roman tradition.

In design, certain of these temples were faithful copies of Greek
models. In fact Strabo describes the temple of Venus Erycina, dedicated
in 181 by Lucius Porcius Licinus in Rome, as a copy ( aphidryma ) of the
temple on Mount Eryx. 69 Moreover, it may be noted that the stone
entablature was introduced in Rome and superseded the traditional
Italian use of timber beams.

It was the southern part of the Campus Martius which especially
became, in the second century, the show-case and the trial ground of new
architectural styles, introduced from the shores of the Aegean to the
banks of the Tiber by an elite of viri triumphales eager to parade new riches
and a new type of culture. 70

In 221/20, as has been mentioned, Gaius Flaminius had created in this
district, which was still on the outskirts of the city with ample space
available, a new circus which was to be named after him. It was probably
constructed in wood and no archaeological traces of it remain. Its exact
site, which has long been a matter of controversy, is now thought to have
been north-west of the Theatre of Marcellus, by the Tiber; indeed it was
in relation to it that numerous monuments were subsequently sited in
this district in Circo, and a plan of the whole lay-out can now be traced
with reasonable probability and completeness. First, there were isolated
temples and then - and this is the real innovation - groups of buildings
combining porticoes and temples, which before long had converted the
southern part of the Campus Martius into a truly Greek quarter of Rome.
The first of these complexes was the Porticus Octavia (Gnaeus Octavius,
cos. 165, with the mamtbiae of the Third Macedonian War); it consisted of a
porticus duplex , probably a portico with a double nave, apparently with
capitals of that Corinthian type which was to establish itself in Rome in
the course of the century (in this case they were capitals covered in bronze
and brought from Greece: this use of spolia makes it clear that this type of
architecture had not yet become established in Rome). It was followed by
the Porticus Mete/li, begun in 146 (Quintus Metellus Macedonicus, cos.
143, likewise with the manubiae of Macedonia). This was a four-sided
portico - ‘the first Greek temenos in Rome’, 71 though a similar plan, but
with a portico on only three sides, had possibly made its appearance at
Minturnae in the first decades of the century. Inside this enclosure there

69 Strabo vi. 2.5 .

70 Coarelli, R/G 5 *, 262: (h 2 5 3 ); id . 1980, 266-84: (b i6i);Gros 1976, 3 88—9^ : (h 241); Martina
1981: (h 209); Zevi 1976, 1061: (b 208); id . tHM , 11.54-6: (b 209).

71 Gros 1976, 595: (h 241).

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508 the evidence of archaeology

was built the first marble temple to be constructed within the Urbs, the
temple of J upiter Stator, created by the Cypriot architect Hermodorus of
Salamis, whose activity and influence were of importance in Rome
during the second half of the century. 72 This peripteral building, Greek
in type and made of Pentelicon marble, was erected shortly after the fall
of Corinth and well illustrates the famous maxim Graecia capta ferum
victorem cepit, which does not become any the less true for being fre-
quently quoted. 73 Other temples in Greek marble were to follow, includ-
ing the temple of Mars in Circo Flaminio beneath the church of S.
Salvatore in Campo (Decimus Brutus Callaicus, cos. 138) and that of
Hercules Olivarius already mentioned. In their plan (peripteral or tholos
as the case might be), their materials, their decoration and cult statues
(which will be discussed later) and their architectural detail, these build-
ings were, despite small variations, purely and simply Greek temples
transplanted to the banks of the Tiber.

Other new architectural forms are also related to the triumphal and
commemorative spirit which was so much alive in Rome at this time,
after she had become ‘an important Mediterranean capital’. 74 We may
mention the first triumphal arches, erected in 196 in the Forum Boarium
and the Circus Maximus by Lucius Stertinius, or the facade added about
the middle of the second century to the ancient tomb of the Scipios,
which had originally simply been dug out of the tufa along the Via Appia.
Ornamented with marble statues, it is one of the first known examples of
this order of arches and attached half-columns which was subsequently
to be developed on a spectacular scale in Roman architecture. 75 It
remains, however, an exception in a period that still admired most of all
‘Hallenfassaden’ of Hellenistic type with pediment and rectilinear
entablature, regarded as being better suited to the purposes of prestige
and public display. 76

In other regions of Italy which, as a result of participation of several
great families in the profit of maritime trade, collected a share of the by-
products of the Roman conquest, the sanctuaries built in the second
century played, on a local scale, a part analogous to that of the new
complexes of the Campus Martius; they were places for ‘religious assem-
bly, propaganda and political persuasion’. 77 This phenomenon has been
studied in relation to the region of the Samnite Pentri, who enjoyed at
this period, under the impetus of certain enterprising^ew/er, a recovery of

72 Veil. Pat. i.ii.j; Vitr. m.2. 5; Gros 1973: (h 190).

73 Hor. Epist. 11.1.156, and Nenci’s commentary, 1978: (h 210).

74 Torelli 1977, 539: (h 270). 75 Coarelli 1972, 62-82: (b 158); id. HIM, 25-6: (h 234).

76 Kraus, RIGS , 228: (h 204). 77 La Regina, HIM, 1.243; see a ^ so 2*9 _ 30' (h 142).

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prosperity, the archaeological traces of which can be seen at
Pietrabbondante and other sites. 78

Innovation and resistance to change in Rome and throughout Italy Other
innovations made their appearance in this very fruitful century, resulting
in a mixture of new techniques applied to buildings of ancient type and
well-tried techniques applied to new types of plans and elevations, as has
been already noted in relation to temples. In the former category are the
carceres, probably in opus caementicium (and no longer in wood), with
which the ancient Circus Maximus was provided in 174. 79 The second
category is exemplified in Rome by the construction, in an opus quadratum
of tufa, of several buildings of a new type, the basilica 80 (Basilica Porcia,
1 84; Basilica Aemilia et Fulvia, 1 79; Basilica Sempronia , 1 70/69). However
controversial their origin may be, the evidence shows that they owe
much, and not least their name, to Greek inspiration.

Generally speaking, it was exceptional for innovation of plan, archi-
tectural ornament, materials or building technique to be introduced
without some modification or blending in of other elements. Thus in all
spheres there are hybrid monuments, to mention only the moulded
decoration of an Etruscan altar at Bolsena or of ‘Samnite’ temples of the
second century, where hellenic styles and native Italian survivals existed
side by side; a sanctuary in Buccino, which combines a very traditional
base of polygonal blocks with a temple constructed according to princi-
ples which are clearly Greek, a ‘phenomenon neither purely Greek nor
purely Roman’; and certain temples in Campania which were of Etrus-
can-Italic type, but provided with hellenic architectural decoration. 81

New ideas were accepted more or less readily according to the field in
which they were applied. Private dwellings presented hardly any prob-
lems in this respect. Plautus in certain passages describes with envy some
amenities and comforts still unknown to the Roman audience, which
were already quite commonplace in Greece during the fourth and third
centuries, such as baths, covered walks, colonnades and the versatile
design of buildings to suit all times of year. 82 These Greek prototypes,
particularly that of the house with peristyle, appeared in Campania
during the first half of the second century and were to be adopted in Italy
without much opposition. Luxurious town-houses were then being built
(remains have been discovered particularly in Paestum and Pompeii) and

78 Sannio, passim: (h 153). 79 Livy XLI.27.6.

80 Rakob, HIM , 11.369: (h 263); Drerup, ibid. 11.376: (b 163).

81 Balland and others 1971, 259: (b 148) (Bolsena); Morel, HIM, 1.259: (h 257) (Samnium);

Holloway 1974 * 25-32: ( B *73) (Buccino); Johannowskv, HIM, 1.273: (h 244) (Campania). In
general: Bianchi Bandinelli, RIGS, 298. 82 Grimal 1976, 371-86: (h 189).

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510 THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

these were provided with tetrastyled atria and with peristyles; essentially
they differed very little from the contemporary Hellenistic palaces. 83 At
about the same time there appeared the first leisure villae. SA

On the other hand, innovations were less acceptable, especially in
Rome, insofar as they impinged on what might be called public morality.
The most striking example is that of the permanent theatre-buildings. 85
From about the middle of the second century (or a little later?), Campania
was provided, in Sarno and in Pompeii, with theatres constructed in
masonry, which were to multiply rapidly in the ensuing decades. Even
the Samnite site of Pietrabbondante was equipped before the Social War
with a complete theatre. Rome too acquired her first stone-built theatre
in 154, erected by the censor Gaius Cassius Longinus, and traces of it
have possibly been discovered in front of the temple of Magna Mater, on
the south-west slope of the Palatine. However, Publius Cornelius Scipio
Nasica immediately persuaded the Senate to order its demolition in the
name of pudicitia, thus demonstrating, before an innovation which was
contrary to standi virilitas and conducive to desidia, a reserve which was
not to be finally overcome - and in any case not without difficulty - until
a century later, with the theatre of Pompey. 86 It appears that public
thermal baths may also have been introduced more readily in Campania,
where they are known to have existed in Capua, Cumae and Pompeii
from the end of the third century or the beginning of the following
century, than in the Urbs itself. 87

An analogous trend is apparent in the religious or politico-religious
sphere, which was essentially traditionalist. When the Regia was recon-
structed in 148, its traditional plan, regarded as sacred, was respected
scrupulously. After the cult of Cybele was introduced into Rome, the
goddess was housed in a temple which certainly contained an innovation
in respect of its opus caementicium podium, as has been mentioned, but
which followed the traditional native Italian prostyle plan. A subterra-
nean area laid out at Bolsena for the celebration of the Bacchic mysteries,
which well conveyed the atmosphere of this cult, abhorrent to the
Roman moral code, was destroyed, most probably at the time of the great
repression which followed the senatus consultant of 186 relating to the
Bacchanalia. 88 Just as the theatre was regarded as an enervating influ-

83 The exact date of the first appearance of houses with peristyles is controversial. See e.g.
Johannowsky, HIM, 1.275: (h 244); Rakob, ibid. 11.370: (h 263).

84 Here too the chronology is still uncertain. Coarelli, RIGS, 476 and 478; Frederiksen 1981,
1.272: (h 89); Johannowsky, R IGS, 461-2: (h 243); id. HIM, 1.276: (h 244).

85 Johannowsky, RIGS , 469: (h 243); Lauter, HIM, 11. 41 3-22: (h 246).

86 Livy, Per. xlviii; Val. Max. 11.4.2; Veil. Pat. 1.15.3; App. B.Civ. 1.28.125; Aug. Civ.D. 1.51-3;

Oros. iv. 2 1.4. 87 Johannowsky, R/Gj", 468: (h 243).

88 Pailier 1976, 739—42: (h 109); Gros 1981, 65: (b 169). On the reconstruction of the Regia see
Coarelli 1980, 80: (b 161).

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FROM THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE GRACCHI 5 I I

ence, so Dionysiac practices were held to be incompatible with the
Roman tradition.

( Hi ) Plastic arts

In the domain of art, the second century saw a polarization similar to that
which has been noted in the economy between the production using
slave labour and more traditional production, and in architecture be-
tween innovations (in themselves very varied) and obstinate survivals.
The gulf deepened between art that was ‘aristocratic’ and ‘urban’ and
impoverished popular art. This impoverishment was symbolized by the
falling standards of offerings - statues, statuettes and heads - assembled
in the votive deposits of the sanctuaries. The most characteristic decora-
tive elements, architectural terracottas, declined in number and in
quality throughout the whole of Italy, the best examples to be found
henceforward being concentrated among the products of Rome. It has
been said of this period that it was one in which a general spread of
hellenization could have been expected a priori, but in fact it did not take
place . 89 There was without question at that time a break in Italian art,
though it had its antecedents largely in the preceding era.

Greek influence was in fact limited to the circle of the nobilitas (which
amounts in essence to saying that it was therefore restricted to the urban
art of Rome). It is important at this point to emphasize the part played by
patronage in the development of a Roman Hellenistic art. The artists of
this period may well have been mostly, if not almost entirely, Greeks; the
critical factor was the patron who commissioned the work and who often
influenced it in accordance with his personal ideology. ‘The monument
of Aemilius Paullus’, as later ‘Trajan’s column’, was spoken of without
reference to the identity and origin of the artists and workmen, just as the
portraits of the viri triumpbales of the time, although Greek in inspiration,
are in fact Roman portraits.

As a result of the conquest of the eastern Mediterranean, Rome had at
her disposal a vast reservoir of artists and models which caused Italy to be
flooded with a variety of influences, with eclectic results. It remains none
the less true that the artistic current for which the nobilitas as a whole
showed a preference was neo-Attic. During these decades Rome main-
tained continuous links with Athens, either directly or through Delos as
the intermediary, an island of which she had taken control and which the
Italians visited in large numbers. At a deeper level, neo-Attic art, in
essence scholarly, academic and faultless, was in accord with the new
political and ideological demands of the nobilitas, who had appropriated
it to define more clearly the gulf between itself and the common people.

89 Coareili, H/Af, 11.498.

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512 THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

It was, in fact, the art-form that was the most remote from the spontane-
ous trends of native Italian expression and, in consequence, the one best
calculated to highlight the ‘difference’ of the elite, who borrowed from it
the artistic themes for self-celebration. Roman patrons set to work in
their own service whole dynasties of artists of the neo-Attic school, the
most studied and probably the most characteristic of them being the one
which throughout the second century provided the succession of sculp-
tors named Timarchides, Polycles, Dionysius and Scopas. 90 These art-
ists, and others like them, filled with their works the porticoes and
temples erected by the imperatores to immortalize their conquests, to
dazzle their fellow-citizens and to show their desire to break with an
artistic past which, whether sincerely or not, for reasons of taste,
ingenuousness or pride, they regarded as mediocre and outdated.

Two fields which would appear to reflect these tendencies more than
others are reliefs and statuary. Less is known about painting and mosaic,
whatever significance they too may have had.

The first half of the second century saw the parallel development of
marble relief, already Roman through its patrons although situated in
Greece (monument of Aemilius Paullus), and of terracotta relief, shaped
in Italy from models which were Hellenistic in style (represented by a
series of friezes and decorated pediments). These two currents con-
verged, several decades later, in marble reliefs, now carved in Italy itself,
of which the ‘altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus’ is the earliest example still
preserved. Once more it may be observed how slowly these newly
acquired features were absorbed and what a mixture of models prevailed
at the beginning.

It was at Delphi that the first ‘Roman’ bas-relief recording an historical
event was created. Aemilius Paullus converted to his own use there, in
167, an unfinished carved pillar in Pentelicon marble, being erected in
honour of Perseus whom he had just defeated at Pydna. The general
inspiration, the style and the material were entirely Greek, but the
inscription which the Roman general caused to be added to it, (L(ucius)
Aimilius L(ucii) J(ilius) inperator de rege Perse Macedonibusque cepet ), 91
shows clearly who is its titulary owner and accordingly, in the Roman
view, its true originator — a concept which continued to be prevalent in
the future.

In Italy itself a whole series of decorative reliefs belonging to the first
three-quarters of the second century honoured the gods or celebrated
victories. They were executed in terracotta, a traditional material of
native Italian art, but unmistakable Hellenistic influence is perceptible in

90 Coarelli 1970: (b 157); id., RIGS, 250-8: (h 233). 91 CIL, i 2 .6 z 2 = in. 14203 22 .

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PROM THE SECOND PUNIC WAR TO THE GRACCHI 5 I 3

them, sometimes of neo-Attic origin (as in the pediments of S. Gregorio
in Rome and of Luna) and sometimes - especially in works of the first
half of the century - deriving from Asia Minor (as in the reliefs of
Talamone, Civitalba and Pozzuoli, and also in the immense series of
alabaster urns from Volterra). 92 These examples show once again the
variety of influences at this period of artistic ferment. Ultimately, how-
ever, the neo-Attic stream predominated, for the reasons explained
above.

It culminated, just at the close of the period under review, in a
significant monument known as the ‘altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus’, 93
which is probably a carved base from the temple of Mars in Circo Flam into
mentioned earlier. On three of its sides a marine procession advances,
carved in marble with virtuosity and elegance. The fourth side, in
contrast, reproduces with many precise details the scene of a census, in a
style which is far more stiff and awkward. This last relief calls to mind ‘an
administrative prose following on the academic lyricism of the proces-
sion of Amphitrite’, and it could be said to mark the first appearance of
Roman or even Western art. 94 Nothing could appear more different than
these two groups of reliefs; nevertheless it has been forcefully demon-
strated that they are almost certainly the products of the same workshop.
There could be no clearer sign of the effort made by artists of the neo-
Attic stream to adapt themselves to the demands of a Roman patron,
anxious to have an exact representation of events in which he was
illustriously involved. In this case the patron was probably Decimus
Junius Brutus Callaicus, cos. 1 38 and conqueror of Lusitania, who erected
the temple to Mars in 132.

If Pliny is to be believed, there can have been hardly any statues in
Rome before the conquest of Asia Minor apart from those in wood or
terracotta. 95 The odds are that this statement is fairly close to the truth;
nevertheless it underestimates an important aspect of Italian sculpture:
statues in bronze. Whereas in 207 the Roman matrons carried in proces-
sion in honour of Juno two statues of cypress-wood, it was a bronze
statue which they had offered to the goddess in 217. 96 Portraits of
eminent personages were also executed in bronze occasionally, and this
had been so for a long time. The ‘Brutus’ in the Museo dei Conservatori
has already been mentioned in this connection. The fine male head from
S. Giovanni Scipioni, of the second century, is scarcely inferior to it in

92 Coarelli 1970, 85-6: (b 157); /</• HIM, 25-6: (h 254); id. 1977, 57-8: (h 235); Johannowsky,
HIM , 1. 1 30; Torelli 1977, 341: (h 270). With special reference to the urns of Volterra: CDfc; and
Pairault 1972: (h 261).

93 Kahler 1966: (h ioi); Zevi 1976, 1063: (a 208); in particular the essential article of Coarelli 1968:

(b 136). 94 Bianchi Bandinelli, RIGS, 217: (h 228); Charbonncaux 1948, 2 3: (i 3).

95 Pliny, HN xxxiv.34. 96 Livy xxvn.37.12 and xxi.62.

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514 THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

quality. However, in the course of the same century many statues and
portraits were still fashioned out of local stone such as tufa (for example
‘Ennius’, Orpheus) or, most frequently, were modelled in clay . 97 This is
probably true of most of those statues of important people, which
became so invasive of the squares ofRome- in the Forum, on the Capitol
- that it was necessary on several occasions, in the first half of the century,
to have them removed by magisterial decree . 98

It is in any case a fact, as stated by Pliny, that marble was beginning to
supersede these traditional materials, both for private portraits like those
of Scipio Africanus, Scipio Asiagenus or Ennius which adorned the new
fagade of the tomb of the Scipios" and also, above all, for the statues of
divinities which occupied the temples erected by the nobilitas. These were
often colossal statues, carved by the sculptors of the neo-Attic school
already mentioned.

The Italians, of course, had long been familiar with the art of portrai-
ture. It is significant, however, that the first portrait of a Roman to be
identified with certainty should be of Greek origin. The subject was
Flamininus, represented on Macedonian gold staters which explicitly
give his name, and this has made it possible, by comparison, to identify
hypothetically as a portrait in the round of this same Flamininus a
celebrated bronze statue which had long been regarded as that of a
Hellenistic prince . 100 In fact, many so-called portraits of ‘Hellenistic
princes’ are probably nothing other than portraits of Roman
aristocrats . 101

These portraits of Flamininus are as Roman (or Greek, according to
the point of view adopted) as the monument of Aemilius Paullus is
Roman (or Greek). The question is whether they opened up a new
avenue for the Romans, and it would seem that they did not, inasmuch as
these staters were an isolated phenomenon, part of a Greek tradition
which created no school in Italy. Indeed, it was necessary to wait until
Caesar, more than a century later, for the next certain portrait of a living
Roman, identified by the legend, this time on coins which were them-
selves Roman. As for the first Roman portraits in the round which can be
identified with confidence, they were those of Pompey - a chronological
disparity with Greece which reveals much about the differences between
the two cultures.

In painting, scarcely any figurative works of this period are known,
except indirectly. We know that the poet Pacuvius, for example, about

97 On the head from S. Giovanni Scipioni sec Bianchi Bandinelli 1969, 75—4: (h 226); for
Orpheus, ibid. 28-9; ‘Ennius’: Coarelli 1972, 97-105: (b 158); id. HIM , 25: (h 234).

98 For example, Pliny, HN xxxiv.30.

99 Cic. Arch. 11. See Coarelli’s observations: 1972, 78, 81-2 and 105: (b 158),

100 Baity 1978: (h 225); id. 1980, 96: (b 149); Crawford 1974, 1 . 5 44: (b 88).

10,1 Zanker, H/M, 11.589: (h 274).

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CONCLUSION

5 ' 5

the middle of the century decorated the Aedes Aemiliana Herculis, one of
the temples erected to Hercules on the Forum Boarium. 102 At about the
same time a Greek painter of the name of Demetrios was living in Rome
(exact dates unknown, but he was certainly there in 1 6 5 ). 103 Such
individuals could have introduced into Italy more varied types of paint-
ing than the purely triumphal, represented by the Esquiline fragment
noted at the beginning of this chapter, and which seems moreover to
have declined after the first decades of the third century. An example
which comes to mind is the pathetic baroque of the Tomb of the Typhon
at Tarquinia. 104 The fact remains that, between the beginning of the third
century and the birth of the ‘second Pompeian style’ in the first century,
existing information on Roman and Italian painting is very incomplete.
As regards mosaic, it was after the period now under review, in the last
quarter of the second century, that masterpieces of Hellenistic inspira-
tion were to be produced in Italy, the most famous of them being the
mosaic of Alexander in the House of the Faun at Pompeii and the great
Nilotic mosaic of Praeneste.

III. CONCLUSION

Rome was the intermediary through which Greek art conquered the
West and fundamentally shaped its civilization. This simple statement is
enough to demonstrate the importance of the third and second centuries,
during which the influence of Greece on Italy was so strong.

It was, however, a more limited phenomenon than might be imagined.
Chronological discrepancies and differences of culture between Greece
and Italy were often considerable and were less the result of the
inadequacy of Rome than of her habitual concern to borrow only what
she wanted to borrow and only to the extent that she wished. In this
respect a useful comparison has been made with modern Japan. 105
Developments deemed to be excessive or too rapid in the progress along
the path of hellenization were unfailingly blocked by counter-action,
which was sometimes violent. In relation to the second century b.c.,
examples may be cited as various as the senatus consultum on the
Bacchanales, the expulsions of rhetoricians and philosophers, the demo-
lition of the first stone theatre and the removals of statues. There was also
the break, or at any rate the slowing-down, in hellenization which
occurred at the end of the period under consideration, at the time of the
Gracchan crisis.

102 Pliny, HN xxxv.19.

103 Diod. Sic. Exf. 31, 18 (that is, if topographos signifies ‘painter’ here).

,tM Torelli, HIM, 1.98: (h 269).

105 Gallini 1975, 180—1: (h 182); Veyne >979, passim: (h 216).

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5 I 6 THE EVIDENCE OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Moreover, hellenization could not of itself be held solely responsible
for all the fundamental changes taking place in Italy in the third and
second centuries. Hellenization cannot explain the profound changes in
economic life: the establishment of production based on slave labour and
of long-distance trade alongside the survivals of smaller-scale activities.
Tyrrhenian Central Italy in the last centuries of the Republic thereby
passed through an economic experience known to few other regions in
the history of humanity, and perhaps to none in a similar way or to the
same degree.

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THREE HELLENISTIC DYNASTIES
{See also the tables appended to Chapter //, pp. 420— i .)

1 . THE SELEUC I DS

Seleucus I Nicator
Antiochus I Soter
Antiochus II Theos
Seleucus II Callinicus
Seleucus III Soter
Antiochus III Megas
Seleucus IV Philopator
Antiochus IV Epiphanes
Antiochus V Eupator
Demetrius I Soter
Alexander Balas
Demetrius II Nicator
Antiochus VI Epiphanes
Antiochus VII (Sidetes)

Demetrius II Nicator (restored)
Cleopatra Thea
Antiochus VIII Grypus
Seleucus V

Antiochus IX Philopator (Cyzicenus)
Seleucus VI

Antiochus X Eusebes Philopator

Demetrius III Philopator Soter

' Antiochus XI Epiphanes

Philadelphus
twins 1

. Philip I

Antiochus XII Dionysus
Philip II

305—281

281—261

261—246

246—226/ 5

226/5—223

223-187

187-175

175-164

1 64—162

162—1 50

150-145

145-140

145-142/1 or 139/8
1 38-129
129-126/5
126/5-125
I 26/5-96

I 26

1 i4/'3-95

95-88 (at Damascus)

> (in Cilicia)

95-84/5 J

87 (at Damascus)
84/3

2. THE ANTIGONIDS

Antigonus 1 (Monophthalmus)

306—301

Demetrius I (Poliorcetes)

307-283

Antigonus II (Gonatas)

283-239

Demetrius II

239-229

Antigonus III (Doson)

229—221

Philip V

221—179

Perseus

1 79—168

5 1 7

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5 i8

HELLENISTIC DYNASTIES

5 . THE ATTALI DS

(Philetaerus 285—263)

(Eumenes I 263—241)

Attalus I Soter 241— 197

Eumenes II Soter 1 9 7 — 159/8

Attalus II 159/8-139/8

Attalus III 139/8-133

(Eumenes III (Aristonicus) 153—129)

GENEALOGICAL TABLES

THE ATTAL 1 DS

Attalus of Tieum
m. Boa, a Paphlagonian

Philetaerus Attalus Eumenes

j m. Satyra

Attalus ? Eumenes Eumenes 1 Philetaerus

m. Antiochis

ATTALUS I SOTER

m. Apollonis of Cyzicus

I 1 1

EUMENES II SOTER ATTALUS II

m. Stratonicc, PHILADELPHUS

d. of Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia m. Stratonicc

i-L ,

[bv a concubine] [by a concubine]

i i

ATTALUS III Aristonicus

PHILOMETOR EUERGETES (EUMENES III)

— “I

Philetaerus

Athenaeus

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

ANT1GONUS I, m. Stratonice

519

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

Antiochus SELliUCUS IV ANTIOCHUS IV Cleopatra I Laodice Antiochis

m. Laodice PHILOPATOR EPIPHANES m. Ptolemy V m. Antiochus m. Ariarathcs IV of Cappadocia

I m. Laodice m. Laodice

5*i

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

The table displays the chronological relationship between selected events which
are mentioned in this volume. A few events which are discussed in other
volumes are included but entries are placed between parentheses.

523

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

237 L. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus Hamilcar Barca goes to Spain.

Q. Fulvius Flaccus (237-229) Hamilcar conquers

much of southern and south-
eastern Spain; he founds Akra
Leuke.

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C. Fulvius Centumalus Maximus Hannibal marches on Rome. The Scipios defeated and killed.

P. Sulpicius Galba Maximus Capua recovered by Rome. Carthaginians regain control of

large areas of Spain.

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Cn. Domirius Ahenobarbus fleet crosses to Greece. Aetolians

invite thcassistanccof Antiochus,
who crosses to Greece.

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Africanus. to Rome.

Eumcncs defeats Prusias and his
allies.

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M. Valerius Mcssala Expulsion of philosophers from ( 1 6 1 or 160) Demetrius defeats

C. Fannius Strabo Rome. Timarchus. Judas defeats

Lex Lannia, sumptuary law. Nicanor and concludes a treaty

with Rome; he is defeated and
killed by Bacchidcs.

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T. Quinctius Flamininus Scr. Sulpicius Galba defeats the Achaean detainees released from

M\ Acilius Balbus Lusitanians and massacres a large Italy and return to Greece.

number of them. Death of Callicrates.

Carthaginian attempts to appease Demetrius defeated and killed in
Rome arc met with evasions. Syria.

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541

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations

A AN Atti dell’ Accademia di Scien-yi morali e politiche della Societa nasfonale di
Science, Lettere ed Arti di Napoli
A Ant. Hung. Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae
A E L’ An nee epigraphique

AFLPad. Annali della Facolta di Lettere e Filosofta di Padova
AlPh Annuaire de ITnstitut de philologie et d'histoire orient ales et slaves
AJAH American journal of Ancient History
A J Arch. American journal of Archaeology
A J Phil. American journal of Philology

AM Annales du Midi

Amer. Hist. Rev. American Historical Review

A N R IF Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt , ed. H. Temporini and
W. Haase. Berlin and New York, 1972-
ANSMN American Numismatic Society, Museum Notes
Ant. Class. L’Antiquite classique

Ant. journ. Antiquaries journal

Arch. An%. Archaologischer An^eiger (in JDA 1 )

Arch. Dell. 'ApyaioXoyiKov AeXn ov

Arch. Eph. 'ApxaioXoyiKTi ’Ejsqpcepls

AS A A Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene e delle Missioni Italiane in
Oriente

ASNSP Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa
Atti Taranto Atti dei Convegni di studi sulla Magna Graecia. Taranto
AvP Altertiimer von Pergamon (Museen zu Berlin and Deutsches Archaolo-
gisches Institut). Berlin, 1885- (13 volumes so far published)

BASOR Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research
BCH Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique
BEFEO Bulletin de I’Ecole franqaise d’ Extreme-Orient
BICS Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (London)

BMQ British Museum Quarterly

BSA Annual of the British School at Athens

BSFN Bulletin de la Societe framboise de Numismatique

Bull. Com. Arch. Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale in Roma
Bull, epigr. J. and L, Robert, Bulletin epigraphique (in REG )

Bull. Rylands Libr. Bulletin of the john Rylands Library

543

544

ABBREVIATIONS

CAH The Cambridge Ancient History
C&M Classics et Mediaevalia

CDE Caratteri dell’ ellenismo nelle urne etrusche (Atti dell’ incontro di studi.

Universita di Siena. 28—30 aprile 1976). Florence, 1977
CE Chronique d’Egypte
CIL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum
C ] Classical journal
CPh Classical Philology
CQ Classical Quarterly

CRAI Comptes rendus de l' Academic des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres
CT Les Cahiers de Tunisie
DArch. Dialoghi di Archeologia

Denkschr. Akad. Wien Denkschrijten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien
Ep. Ind. Epigraphia Indica

ESA R An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome , ed. T. Frank. 6 vols. Baltimore,
1933-40

FD Fouilles de Delphes

FGrH F. Jacoby, F ragmen te der griechischen Historiker. Berlin and Leiden, 1923—
FIRA S. Riccobono, Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani. 3 vols. Florence,
1940-3

GeZrR Greece & Rome

Gramm. Rom. Frag. H. Funaioli, Grammaticae Romanae fragments (Vol. 1 only).
Leipzig, 1907

GRBS Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies
GWU Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht
Harv. Stud. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology

Hesp. Hesperia, journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens
HIM Hellenismus in Mittelitalien ( Kolloquium in Gottingen vom / bis 9 Juni 1974),
ed. P. Zanker. 2 vols. Gottingen, 1976
Hist.-fil. Medd. Kgl. Da. Vid. Selsk. Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser, Kgl.

Danske Videnskabernes Selskab.

HZ Historische Zeitschrift

IBulg. G. Mihailov, Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae. Sofia, 1958-
IC M. Guarducci, Inscriptiones Creticae. 4 vols. Rome, 1935-50
ID L’ltalia Dialettale

IDelos F. Durrbach and others, Inscriptions de Delos. Paris, 1926—50
IG Inscriptiones Graecae

IGCH M. Thompson, O. Morkholm, C. M. Kraay, An Inventory of Greek Coin
Hoards. New York, 1973

IGRom. R. Cagnat and others. Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes.
Paris, 1906-27

I HQ Indian Historical Quarterly

ILampsakos P. Frisch, Die Inschriften von Eampsakos. Bonn, 1978
ILindos Ch. Blinkenberg, Lindos 11: Les inscriptions. 2 vols. Berlin and Copen-
hagen, 1941

ILLRP A. Degrassi, Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae , 2 vols. 2nd edn.
Florence, 1963—5

ABBREVIATIONS

545

ILS H. Dessau, Inscriptions Latinae Selectae. 5 vols. Berlin, 1892-1916
laser. Italiae Inscriptiones Italiae

1 PE B. Latyschev, Inscriptions Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Ponti Euxeni
Graecae et Latinae. 2nd edn. St Petersburg, 1916
IPriene F. Hiller v. Gaertringen, Die Inschriften von Priene. Berlin, 1906
ISyrie L. Jalabert, R. Mouterde and J.P. Rey-Coquais, Inscriptions greques et
latines de la Syrie. Paris, 1929—

IvP M. Frankel, Inschriften von Pergamon. 2 vols. Berlin, 1890—5

IvP hi Ch. Habicht, Inschriften von Pergamon lit: Die Inschriften des Asklepieions.

Berlin, 1969
J A Journal Asiatique

JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society

JDA 1 Jahrbuch des [kaiserlich] deutschen archaologischen Ins/i/u/s

JEg. Arch. Journal of Egyptian Archaeology

JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies

JNG Jahrbruch fur Numismatik und Geldgeschichte

JNSI Journal of the Numismatic Society of India

JOA 1 Jahreshefte des Osterreichischen archaologischen Institute in Wien

JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society

JRS Journal of Roman Studies

JS Journal des Savants

JSHRZ Jiidische Schriften aus hellenistisch-rbmischer Zeit , ed. W.G. Kiimmel.
Giitersloh, 1976

Le arti figurative Storia e civilta dei Greci v: La cultura ellenistica, 10, Le arti
figurative (ed. R. Bianchi Bandinelli). Milan, 1977
EEC Les Etudes classiques

LW Ph. Le Bas, W. H. Waddington, Inscriptions grecques et latines recuei/lies en
Asie-Mineure. 2 vols. Paris, 1870
MAAR Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome
MAL Memorie della classe di Science morali e storiche dell’ Accademia dei Lincei
MDAFA Me moires de la Delegation archeologique fran^aise en Afghanistan
MDAI Mitteilungen des deutschen archaologischen lnstituts
(A) Athenische Abteilung
(I) lnstanbuler Abteilung
(M) Madrider Abteilung

Melanges d’ arch. Melanges d'archeologie et d’histoire de I’Ecole fran^aise de Rome
Melanges Heurgon L’ltalie preromaine et la Rome republicaine, Melanges offerts a
Jacques Heurgon. 2 vols. Rorrfe, 1976
MH Museum Helve tic urn

Michel, Recueil Ch. Michel, Recueil d’ inscriptions grecques. Brussels, 1900
Mi let T. Wiegand, Milet. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersucbungen seit / 899

Moretti, ISE L. Moretti, Iscriyoni storiche ellenistiche. 2 vols. Florence, i967and
1976

MRR T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. 2 vols. and
suppl. New York, 1951—60
NAG Numismatica e antichit a classic he

Neite Jabrb. Neue jahrbiicher (fiir das klassische Alter turn, 1898—1925; fiir
Wissenschaft und jugendbildung , 1925—56)

NNM Numismatic Notes and Monographs, American Numismatic Society,
New Y'ork

Num. Chron. Numismatic Chronicle

0 G 1 S W. Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci Inscriptions Selectae. 2 vols. Leipzig.
1903-5

ORF 4 H. Malcovati, Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta. 2 vols. 4th edn. Turin,

1976-9

PACA Proceedings of the African Classical Association
PBA Proceedings of the British Academy
PBSR Papers of the British School at Rome
PCPS Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society

Peek, GVI W. Peek, Griechische Versinschriftenv. Grabepigramme. Berlin, 1955
PEQ Palestine Exploration Quarterly

Peter, HRRel. H. W. G. Peter, Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae. 2 vols.

Leipzig, 1906-14
PHerc. Papyri Herculanenses
Philol. Philologus
PJ Paldstinajahrbuch
PP La Parola del Passato

Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
PWV A. Pauly, G. YVissowa and W. Kroll, Real-Encyclopddie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft

QC Quaderni Catanesi di Studi classici e medievale

RD Revue historique de droit fran^ais et etranger

REA Revue des etudes anciennes

REG Revue des etudes grecques

RE] Revue des etudes juives

REL Revue des etudes latines

Rend. Inst. Lomb. Cl. Let ter e Rendiconti del Istituto Lombardo, Classe di let t ere,
science morali e storiche
Rev. Arch. Revue archeologique

Rev. Arch. Narbonnaise Revue archeologique de Narbonnaise

Rev. Hist. Rel. Revue de I’histoire des religions

Rev. Num. Revue numismatique

Rev. Phil. Revue de phi/ologie t

Rh. Mus. Rhein isches Museum fiir Philologie *

RIGS Incontro di studi su“Roma e I’ltalia fra i Gracchi e Silla” (Pontignano. 1S—21
settembre yfy). DArch. 4-5 (1970— 1) 3—4, 163—562
R iv. Fit. R'wista di filologia e if istrufione classica

RM R Roma medio repubblicana, aspetti culturali di Roma e del La^io nei secoli IV e
III a.C. Rome, 1973
RSA Ri vista storica dell' Antic hit a

RSI Rivista storica italiana
SCI Scripta Classica Israelica
SCO Studi classici e orientali

ABBREVIATIONS

547

S DA W Sit^ungsberichte der Deutschen Akadtmie der Wissenschaften %u Berlin
Sherk, Documents R. K. Sherk, Roman Documents from the Greek. East.
Baltimore, 1969

SIFC Studi italiani di filologia classica

SIG W. Dittenberger, Sylloge biscriptionum Graecarum. 4 vols. 3rd edn. Leipzig,
1915-24

SRPS Societa romana e produfione schiavistica,ed. A. Giardinaand A. Schiavone.

3 vols. Rome and Bari, 1981
Stud. Clas. Studii c las ice
Stud. Etr. Studi etruschi

TAP A Transactions of the American Philological Association
]/ DI Vestnik Drevnej Istorii

Welles, RC C. B. Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period. New
Haven, 1934

YCIS Yale Classical Studies

ZATW Zeitschrift fur die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
ZD PH Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palastinavereins
ZNTlfZ Zeitschrift fiir die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
ZPE Zeitschrift fiir Papyrologie und Epigraphik

548

A. GENERAL STUDIES

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4. Badian, E. Studies in Greek and Roman History. Oxford, 1 964

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8. Bengtson, H. Die Strategic in der hellenistischen Zeit 11. Munich, 1944

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42. Pfiffig, A. J. ‘Die Haltung Etruriens im 2. Punischen Krieg’, Historia 15
(1966) 193-210

45. Picard, G. Ch. ‘Le traite Romano-Barcide 226 av. J.-C.’, in Melanges offerts
a J. Carcopino, 747-62. Paris, 1966

44. Proctor, D. Hannibal’s March in History. Oxford, 1971

45. Reid, J.S. ‘Problems of the Second Punic War’, JRS 3 (1913) 175—90

560 D. ROME, GREECE AND MACEDONIA

46. Reyniers, F. ‘Remarques sur la topographie de Carthage a 1 ’epoque de la
troisieme guerre punique’, in Melanges d’ archeologie et d’histoire ojferts a
Andre Pigartiol in, 1281-90. Paris, 1966

47. Rollig, W. ‘Das Punische im Romischen Reich’, in Die Sprache im
Romischen Reich der Kaiser^eit — Bonner Jahrbiicher 40 (1980) 285-99

48. Romanelli, P. Storia delle province romane dell’ Africa. Rome, 1959

49. Ruschenbusch, E. ‘Der Beginn des 2. punischen Krieges’, His/oria 27
(1978) 232-4

50. Sancho Royo, A. ‘En tomo al tratado del Ebro entre Roma y Asdrubal’,
Habis 7 (1976) 75 — 110

5 1 . Santos Yanguas, N. ‘El tratado del Ebro y el origen de la segunda guerra
punica’, Hispania 37 (1977) 269—98

5 2. Schnabel, P. ‘Zur Vorgeschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges’, Klio 20
(1920) 1 toff.

53. Schulten, A. Tartessos. Hamburg, 1922

54. Scullard, H. H. ‘Rome’s declaration of war on Carthage in 218’, R h. Mus.
95 (1952) 209-16 (German translation in Christ 1974: (c 9))

55. Sumner, G. V. ‘The chronology of the outbreak of the Second Punic
War’, PACA 9 (1966) 5-30

j 6. Sumner, G. V. ‘Roman policy in Spain before the Hannibalic War’, Harv.
Stud. 72 (1967) 205—46

57. Sumner, G. V. ‘Elections at Rome in 217 b.c.’, Phoenix 29 (1975) 250-9

; 8. Taubler, E. Die Vorgeschichte des 2. punischen Krieges. Berlin, 1921

59. Ungern-Sternberg, J. von. Capua im Zweiten Punischen Krieg: Untersucbungen
%ur romischen Annalistik. Munich, 1975

60. Untermann, J. Sprachrdume und Sprachbewegungen im vorromischen Hispanien.
Wiesbaden, 1961.

61. Vogt, J., ed. Rom und Karthago. Leipzig, 1943

62. Walsh, P. G. ‘Massinissa’, JRS 55 (1965) 149-60

63. Warmington, B. H. Carthage. 2nd edn. London, 1969

64. Welwei, K. W. ‘Die Belagerung Sagunts und die romische Passivitat im
Westen 219 v. Chr.’, Talanta 8-9 (1977) 156—73

65. Whittaker, C. R. ‘The Western Phoenicians. Colonisation and assimila-
tion’, PCPS 20 (1974) 58-79

D. ROME, GREECE AND MACEDONIA

1. Aymard, A. Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la confederation achaienne
(198-89 av.J.-C.). Bordeaux, 1938

2. Aymard, A. Les assemblies de la confederation achaienne. Bordeaux, 1938

3. Aymard, A. ‘Tutelle et usurpation dans les monarchies hellenistiques’,
Aegyptus 12 (1952) 85-96

4. Badian, E. ‘Notes on Roman policy in Illyria (230-201 b.c.)’, PBS R 20
(1952) 72-93 ( = Studies in Greekand Roman History, 1-25. Oxford, 1964)

5. Badian, E. ‘The treaty between Rome and the Achaean League’, JRS 42
(1952)76-80

6. Badian, E. ‘Aetolica’, Latomus 17 (1958) 197— 21 1

D. ROME, GREECE AND MACEDONIA 5 6 1

7. Bernhardt, R. Imperium und Eleutheria: Die rdmische Politik gegenitber den
freien Stddten des griechischen Ostens. Diss. Hamburg, 1971

8. Briscoe, J. ‘Q. Marcius Philippus and nova sapientia’ , JRS 54 (1964) 66—77

9. Briscoe, J. ‘Eastern policy and senatorial politics 168-146 b.c.’, Historia 18
(1969) 49-70

10. Briscoe, J. ‘The Antigonids and the Greek states’, in Imperialism in the
Ancient World 1 , ed. P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker. Cambridge,
1978

1 1 . Cabanes, P. ‘Les inscriptions du theatre de Bouthrotos’, Annales litteraires
de I'universite de Besan^on 163. 1974

12. Cabanes, P. E’Epire de la mort de Pyrrhos a la conquete romaine (272—167).
Paris, 1976

13. Colin, G. Rome et la Grece de 200 a 146 av. J.-C. Paris, 1905

14. Daux, G. ‘Decret de Delphes en reponse a une ambassade de Sardes’, in
Melanges G. Glot £, 289-97. Paris, 1932

1 5 . Daux, G. Delphes au lie et au ler siecle depuis I’abaissement de l’ Etolie jitsqu’a la
paix romaine, ipi—jr av. J.-C. Paris, 1936

16. Deininger, J. Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland 217—86 v.
Chr. Berlin and New York, 1971

17. Dell, H. J. ‘Antigonus III and Rome’, CPh 62 (1964) 94-103

18. Dell, H. J. ‘The origin and nature of Illyrian piracy’, Historia 16 (1967)
344-5 8

19. Derow, P. S. ‘Polybius and the embassy of Kallikrates’, in Essays presented
to C.M. Bowra, 12—24. Oxford, 1970

20. Derow, P. S. ‘Kleemporos’, Phoenix 27 (1973) 118-34

21. Derow, P. S. ‘Polybius, Rome and the East’, JRS 69 (1979) 1-15

22. Derow, P. S. and Forrest, W. G. ‘An inscription from Chios’, BSA 77
(1982) 79-92

23. Errington, R. M. Philopoemen. Oxford, 1969

24. Errington, R. M. ‘The alleged Syro-Macedonian pact and the origins of
the Second Macedonian War’, Athenaeum 49 (1971) 336-54

2 ; . Etienne, R. and Knoepfler, D. Hyettos de Beotie et la chronologie des archontes
federaux entre 2jo et 171 avant J.-C. BCH Suppl. in. Paris, 1976

26. Ferguson, W. S. Hellenistic Athens. London, 1911

27. Fuks, A. ‘The Bellum Achaicum and its social aspect’, JHS 80 (1970)
78-89

28. Giovannini, A. ‘Les origines de la 5e guerre de Macedoine’, BCH 93
(1969)853-61

29. Giovannini, A. ‘Philipp V, Perseus und die Delphische Amphiktyonie’, in
Ancient Macedonia 1, 147—54. Thessalonica, 1970

30. Habicht, Ch. Studien %ur Geschichte Athens in hellenistischer Zeit.
Hypomnemata 75. Gottingen, 1982

31. Hammond, N.G. L. ‘The opening campaigns and the battle of the Aoi
Stena in the Second Macedonian War’, JRS 56 (1966) 39—54

31A. Hammond, N.G. L. Epirus. Oxford, 1967

32. Hammond, N. G. L. ‘Illyris, Rome and Macedon in 229-205 b.c.’, JRS 5 8
(1968) 1-21

562 E. THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS

3 3 . Holleaux, M. Rome, la Grece et les monarchies hellenistiques au llle siecle avant
J.-C. ( 2/J-20J ). Paris, 1921

34. Holleaux, M. ‘Rome and Macedon. The Romans against Philip. Rome
and Antiochus’, in CAH 1 viii, 138-240. Cambridge, 1930

3 5 . Holleaux, M. Etudes d’epigraphie et d'histoire grecques. 6 vols. Paris, 1938-68

36. Hopital, R. G. ‘Le traite romano-aetolien de 212 avant J.-C.’, RD 42
(1964) 18—48, 204—46

37. Klaffenbach, G. Der rbmisch-dtolische Biindnisvertrag vom Jahre 212 v.Chr.
SDAW 1. Berlin, 1954

38. Kramolisch, H. Die Strategen des Thessalischen Bundes vom Jahr 196 v.Chr. bis
Sum Ausgang der romischen Republik. Die deutschen archdologischen Forschungen
in Thessalien: Demetrias 11. Bonn, 1978

39. Lanzilotta, E. ‘Cn. Ottavio egli Argivi’, in Sesta Miscellanea Greca e Romana
(1978) 2 3 3 47

40. Larsen, J.A.O. ‘Roman Greece’, in ESAR iv. Baltimore, 1940

41. Larsen, J.A.O. Greek Federal States. Oxford, 1968

42. Launey, M. Recherches sar les armies hellenistiques. 2 vols. Paris, 1949-50

43. Mattingly, H. B. ‘Some problems in second-century Attic
prosopography’, Historia 20 (1971) 24-46

44. McDonald, A. H. and Walbank, F. W. ‘The origins of the Second Mac-
edonian War’, JRS 27 (1937) 180—207

45. Meloni, P. Perseo e la fine della monarchia macedone. Rome, 1953

46. Niese, B. Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht
bei Chaeronea in. Gotha, 1910

47. Oost, S. L Roman Policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the Age of the Roman
Conquest of Greece. Dallas, 1954

48. Oost, S. I. ‘Amynander, Athamania, and Rome’, CPh 52 (1957) 1-15

49. Petzold, K.-E. ‘Rom und Illyrien’, Histroria 20 (1971) 199-223

;o. Schleussner, B. ‘Zur Frage der geheimen pergamenisch— makedonischen
Kontakte im Perseuskrieg’, Historia 22 (1973) 119-23

51. Schwertfeger, T. Der Achaiische Bund von 146 bis 27 v. Chr. Vestigia 19.
Munich, 1974

52. Sder, H. E. Roms Aufstieg %ur Weltmacht und die griechische Welt. Cologne,
r 9 5 7

53. Thompson, H. A. ‘Athens and the Hellenistic princes’, Proc. Amer. Phil.
Soc. 97 (1953) 254-61

54. Walbank, F. W. Philip V of Macedon. Cambridge, 1940

55. Werner, R. ‘Quellenkritische Bemerkungen zu den Ursachen des
Perseuskrieges’, Grader Beitrdge 6 (1977) 149—216

E. THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS
a. Seleucids and the Seltucid kingdom

1 . Baldus, H. R. ‘Der Helm des Tryphon und die seleukidische Chronologie
der Jahre 146-138 v. Chr .’,JNG 20 (1970) 217-39

2. Bar-Kochva, B. The Seleucid Army. Organisation and Tactics in the Great
Campaigns. Cambridge, 1976

a. SELEUCIDS AND THE SELEUC1D KINGDOM 563

3. Bellinger, A. R. ‘The end of the Seleucids’, Transactions of the Connecticut
Academy of Arts and Sciences 38 (1949) 51-102

4. Bevan, E. R. The House of Seleucus n. London, 1902

5. Bickerman, E. ‘Notes sur Polybe. 1. Le statut des villesd’Asieapres la paix
d’Apamee’, REG 50 (1937) 217—39

6. Bickerman, E. Institutions des Seleucides. Paris, 1938

7. Bickerman, E. ‘Sur la chronologie de la sixieme guerre de Syrie’, CE 27
(1952) 396-403

8. Bouche-Leclerq, A. Histoire de Seleucides 1. Paris, 1913

9. Bunge, J.G. ‘“Theos Epiphanes” in den ersten fiinf Regierungsjahren
des Antiochos IV. Epiphanes’, Historia 23 (1974) 57-85

10. Bunge, J.G. “‘Antiochos Helios”’, Historia 24 (1975) 164-88

1 1. Bunge, J. G. ‘Die Feiern Antiochos’ IV. in Daphne im Herbst 166’, Chiron

6(1976)53-71

1 2. Burstein, S. M. ‘The aftermath of the Peace of Apamea’, A JAH 5 (1980)
1— 12

13. Charbonneaux, J. and Laumonier, A. ‘Trois portraits d’Alexandre Balas’,
BCH 79 (1955) 528 - 3 8

14. Cohen, G. M. The Seleucid Colonies. Studies in Founding, Administration and
Organisation. Wiesbaden, 1978

1 5 . Downey, G. A History of Antioch in Syria from Seleucus to the Arab Conquest.
Princeton, 1961

1 6. Edson, Ch. ‘Macedonicum Imperium: the Seleucid empire and the literary
evidence’, CPh 53 (1958) 153-70

17. El-Zein, M. Geschichte der Stadt Apameia am Orontes von den Anfdngen bis
Augustus. Diss. Heidelberg, 1972

18. Fischer, Th. Untersuchungen sum Partherkrieg Antiochos’ VII. im Rahmen der
Seleukidengeschichte. Diss. Munich, 1970

19. Fischer, Th. ‘Zu Tryphon’, Chiron 2 (1972) 201-13

20. Gruen, E. ‘Rome and the Seleucids in the aftermath of Pydna’, Chiron 6
(1976) 73-95

21. Habicht, Ch. ‘Der Stratege Hegemonides’, Historia 7 (1958) 376-8

22. Helliesen, J. M. ‘Demetrius I Soter: a Seleucid king with an Antigonid
name’, in Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson, ed. H.
Dell, 219-29. Thessalonica, 1981

23. Holleaux, M. ‘La mort d’ Antiochos IV Epiphanes’, REA 18 (1916)
77-102

24. Holleaux, M. ‘Le decret de Bargyiia en 1 ’honneur de Poseidonios’, REA
21 (1919) 1-19

2;. Houghton, A. ‘Timarchus as king of Babylonia’, Rev. Num . 6 21 (1979)
215-17

26. Houghton, A. ‘The second reign of Demetrius II of Syria at Tarsus’,
ANSMN 24 (1979) 211—16

27. Jansen, H. L. Die Politik Antiochos’ IV. Oslo, 1943

28. Kiechle, F. ‘Antiochos IV. und der letzte Versuch einer Konsolidierung
des Seleukidenreiches’, GIVU 14 (1963) 159—70

564 E. THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS

29. Mendels, D. ‘A note on the tradition of Antiochus IV’ death’, Israel
Exploration journal 31 (1981) 51—6

30. Mendels, D. ‘The Five Empires: a note on a propagandistic topos’,
AjPhil. 102 (1981) 330-3

3 1 . Mooren, L. ‘ Antiochos IV. Epiphanes und das ptolemaische Konigtum’,
in Actes du XVe Congr. Internat. de Papyrologie, 78ft Brussels, 1978

32. Morkholm, O. ‘The accession of Antiochos IV of Syria’, ANSMN 11
(1964) 63-76

33. Morkholm, O. Antiochus IV of Syria. Copenhagen, 1966

34. Musti, D. ‘Lo stato dei Seleucidi’, SCO 15 (1966) 59—201

3 5 . Paltiel, E. ‘The treaty of Apamea and the later Seleucids’, Antichtbon 1 3
(1979) 30-41

36. Paltiel, E. ‘Antiochus IV and Demetrius of Syria’, Antichtbon 13 (1979)
42-7

37. Paltiel, E. ‘Antiochus Epiphanes and Roman politics’, Latomus 41 (1982)
229-54

38. Reuter, F. Beitrdge opcr Beur/eilung des Antiochos Epiphanes. Diss. Munster,
1938

39. Rigsby, K. J. ‘Seleucid notes’, TAP A 110 (1980) 233-54

40. Swain, J. W. ‘Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt’, CPh 39 (1944) 73-94

41. Will, Ed. ‘Rome et les Seleucides’, ANRIV 1.1 (1972) 590-632

b. Antiochus the Great and the war with Rome

42. Errington, R. M. ‘Rom, Antiochos der Grosse und die Asylie von Teos’,
ZPE 39 (1980) 279-84

43. Giovannini, A. ‘La clause territoriale de la paix d’Apamee’, Athenaeum 60
(1982) 224-36

44. Giovannini, A. ‘Teos, Antiochos III et Attale Ier’, MH 40 (1983) 178—84

45 . Herrmann, P. ‘Antiochos der Grosse und Teos’, Anado/uc) (1965) 29-1 59

46. Holleaux, M. ‘Un pretendu decret d’Antioche sur l’Oronte’, REG 13
(1900) 258—80

47. McDonald, A. H. ‘The treaty of Apamea (188 b.c .)’,JRS 57 (1967) 1—8

48. McDonald, A. H. and Walbank, F. W. ‘The treaty of Apamea (188 b.c.):
the naval clauses’, JRS 59 (1969) 30—9

49. Pagnon, B. ‘Le recit de [’expedition de Cn. Manlius Vulso contre les
Gallo-Grecs et de ses prolongements dans le livre 38 de Tite-Live’, EEC
50 (1982) 11 5-28

5 o. Schmitt, H. H. Untersuchungen spcr Geschichte Antiochos’ des Grossen und seiner
Zeit. Historia, Einzelschriften 6. Wiesbaden, 1964

51. Walser, G. ‘Die Ursachen des ersten romisch-illyrischen Krieges’,
Historia 2 (1954) 308-18

c. The Attalid kingdom (including Aristonicus)

52. Allen, R. E. The Attalid Kingdom. A Constitutional Historj. Oxford, 1983

53. Cardinali, G. II regno di Pergamo. Turin, 1906

e. PALESTINE AND THE MACCABEES

565

54. Dunst, G. ‘Die Bestimmungen des Vertrages zwischen Eumenes II. und
den kretischen Stadten vom Jahre 181 v. Chr.’, Philo!. 100 (1.956) 305-1 1

55. Fontenrose, J. ‘The crucified Daphidas’, TAP A 91 (i960) 83—99

56. Habicht, Ch. ‘Uber die Kriege zwischen Pergamon und Bithynien’,
Hermes 84 (1956) 90—110

57. Hansen, E. V. The Attalids of Pergamum. 2nd edn. Ithaca, 1971

58. Herrmann, P. ‘Der Brief Attalos’ II. an die Ephesier’, ZPE 22 (1976)
2 3 3 4

5 9. Holleaux, M. ‘Le decret des Ioniens en l’honneur d’Eumenes II’, R EG 3 7
(1924) 305-30, 478-9

60. Hopp, J. LJntersucbungen %ur Geschichte der let^ten Attaliden. Munich, 1977

61. Jones, C. P. ‘Diodoros Pasparosand the Nikephoria of Pergamon’, Chiron
4 (1974) 183-205

62. McShane, R. B. The Foreign Po/icj of the Attalids of Pergamon. Urbana, 1964

63. Ohlemutz, E. Die Kulte und Heiligtiimer der Goiter in Pergamon. Diss.
Giessen, 1940

64. Rohde, E. Pergamon. Burgberg und Altar. Munich, 1982

65. RostovtzefF, M. ‘Pergamum’, in CAH' vm, 590-618. Cambridge, 1930

66. Schleussner, B. ‘Die Gesandtschaftsreise des P. Scipio Nasica im Jahre
133/2 v. Chr. und die Provinzialisierung des Konigreichs Pergamon’,
Chiron 6 (1976) 97-1 12

67. Segre, M. ‘L’institution des Nikephoria de Pergame’, in L. Robert,
Hellenica v (1948) 87-128

68. van Looy, H. ‘Apollonis, reine de Pergame’, Ancient Society 9 (1976)
Di-76

69. Vavrinek, V. La revolte d’ Aristonicos. Prague, 1957

70. Vavrinek, V. ‘Aristonicus of Pergamon: pretender to the throne or leader
of a slave revolt?’, Eirene 13 (1975) 109—29

71. Virgilio, B. ‘Strabone e la storia di Pergamo e degli Attalidi’, Studi
Ellen is tici 1 (1984) 21—37

72. Vogt, J. ‘Pergamon und Aristonikos’, in Atti del ter^o congresso
Internationale di epigrafia Greca e Latina, 45—54. Rome, 1959

d. Rhodes

73. Berthold, R. M. Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age. Ithaca, NY, 1984

74. Borker, Chr. ‘Der rhodische Kalender’, ZPE 31 (1978) 193-218

75 . Fraser, P. M. and Bean, G. E. The Rhodian Peraea and Islands. Oxford, 1954

76. Gruen, E. ‘Rome and Rhodes in the second century b.c.: a
historiographical inquiry’, Cjg 25 (1975) 58-81

77. Schmitt, H, H. Rom und Rhodos. Munich, 1957

e. Palestine and the Maccabees

78. Abel, F.-M. Geographic de la Palestine n. Paris, 1938

79. Abel, F.-M. Les livres des Maccabees. Paris, 1949

E. THE SELEUCIDS AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS

566

80. Abel, F.-M. Histoire de la Palestine depuis le conquete d’ Alexandre a l’ invasion
arabe 1. Paris, 1952

81. Arenhoevel, D. Die Theokratie nach dem 1. und 2. Makkabaerbuch. Mainz,
1967

82. A vi- Y onah, M. The Holy Land. From the Persian to the A rab Conquests (jj6
b.c. to a.d. 640). A Historical Geography. Grand Rapids, Mich., 1966

83. Bevan, E. R. ‘Syria and the Jews’, in CAH ] vm, 495—533- Cambridge,
1950

84. Bickermann, E. ‘Ein jiidischer Festbrief vom Jahre 124 v. Chr.’, ZNTW
3 2 (i933) 2 3 3-54

85. Bickerman, E. ‘La charte seleucide de Jerusalem’, REJ 100 (1935) 4-35

86. Bickerman, E. Der Gott der Makkabaer. Untersuchungen iiber Sinn and
Ur sprung der makkabdischen Erhebung. Berlin, 1937

87. Bickerman, E. ‘Un document relatif a la persecution d’Antiochos IV
Epiphane’, Rev. Hist. R el. 115 (1937) 188—223

88. Bickerman, E. ‘Heliodore au temple de Jerusalem’, AlPh 7 (1939/44)
7-40

89. Bickerman, E. ‘Une proclamation seleucide relative au temple de Jerusa-
lem’, Syria 25 (1946-8) 67-88

90. Bickerman, E. Studies in Jewish and Christian History 11. Leiden, 1980

9 1 . Bringmann, K. ‘Die Verfolgung der jiidischen Religion durch Antiochos
IV. Ein Konflikt zwischen Judentum und Hellenismus?’, Antike und
Abendland 26 (1980) 176-90

92. Bringmann, K. Hel/enistische Reform und Religionsverfolgung in Judiia. Eine
Untersuchung %ur judisch-hellenistischen Geschichte ( 174-16 ) v. Chr.).
Gottingen, 1983

93. Cardauns, B. ‘Juden und Spartaner’, Hermes 97 (1967) 117-24

94. Fischer, Th. ‘Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Rom und den Juden im 2.
Jhdt. v. Chr.’, ZATW 86 (1974) 90-3

95. Fischer, Th. Seleukiden und Makkabaer. Beitrage %ur Seleukidengeschichte und .
%u den politischen Ereignissen in Judaa wahrend der ersten Halfte des 2. Jhdts. v.
Chr. Bochum, 1980

96. Fischer, Th. ‘Rom und die Hasmonaer’, Gymnasium 88 (1981) 139—50

97. Galling, K. ‘Judaa, Galilaa und der Osten im Jahre 164/3 v - Chr.’, PJ 36
(1940) 43-77

98. Giovannini, A. and Muller, H. ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und den
Juden im 2. Jhdt. v. Chr.’, MH 28 (1971) 156-71

99. Goldstein, J. A. ‘The tales of the Tobiads’, in Studies in Judaism and Late
Antiquity xn, vol. 3 (1975) 85-123

100. Habicht, Ch. ‘Hellenismus und Judentum in der Zeit des Judas
Makkabaus’, Jahrbuch Heidelberger Akademie 1974, 97-1 10

101. Habicht, Ch. ‘Royal documents in II Maccabees’, Harv. Stud. 80 (1976)
1-18

102. Hengel, M. Judentum und Hellenismus. Studien %u ihrer Begegnung unter
besonderer Beriicksichtigung Paldstinas bis %ur Mitte des 2. Jhdts. v. Chr. 2nd edn.
Tubingen, 1973

103. Kolbe, W. Beitrage \ur syrischen und jiidischen Geschichte. Kritische

f. OTHER 567

Untersuchungen yur Seleukidenliste and yu den beiden ersten M akkabaerbitchern .
Stuttgart, 1935

104. Liebmann-Frankfort, Th. ‘Rome et le conflict judeo-syrien (164-161
avant notre ere)’, Ant. Class. 38 (1969) 101—20

105 . Momigliano, A. Prime linee di storia della tradi^ione maccabaica. Rome, 1930
ro6. Momigliano, A. ‘Ricerche sull’organizzazione della Giudea sotto il

dominio Romano (63 a.C.-yo d.C.)’, ASNSP 2 3 (1934) 183—221

107. Ploger, O. ‘Hyrkan im Ostjordanland’, ZDPV 71 (1955) 70-81

108. Ploger, O. ‘Die makkabaischen Burgen’, ZDPV 71 (1955) 141-72

109. Ploger, O. ‘Die Feldziige der Seleukiden gegen den Makkabaer Judas’,
ZDPV 74 (1958) 155—88

1 10. Rajak, T. ‘Roman intervention in a Seleucid siege of Jerusalem?’, GRBS
22 (1981) 65-81

111. Schaumberger, H. B. ‘Die neue Seleukidenliste BM 35603 und die
makkabaische Chronologic’, Biblica 36 (1955) 423—35

112. Schurer, E. A History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (iyj b. c. -
a.d. 13 j) 1, revised and edited by G. Vermes and F. Millar. Edinburgh,
1973

113. Sevenster, J. N. The Roots of Pagan Antisemitism in the Ancient World.
Leiden, 1975

1 14. Stiehl, R. ‘DasBuch Esther’, Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes
53 (1956) 4-22

115. Tcherikover, V. Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews. Philadelphia, 1961

1 16. Timpe, D. ‘Der romische Vertrag mit den Juden 161 v. Chr.’, Chiron 4
(•974) 13 3-5 2

1 17. Tushingham, A. D. ‘A hellenistic inscription from Samaria Sebaste’, PEQ
104 (1972) 59-63

1 18. Vidal-Naquet, P. ‘Les Juifs entre 1’etat et l’apocalypse’, in Rome et la
conquete du monde mediterraneen 11, ed. C. Nicolet, 846—82. Paris, 1978

1 1 9. Wacholder, B. Z. ‘The date of the death of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and I
Macc. 6:16-17’, in Panhellenica. Essays in Ancient History and Historiography
in Honor of Truesdell S. Brown , ed. S. M. Burnstein and C. A. Okin, 129—32.
Kansas, 1980

120. Wirgin, W. ‘Simon Maccabaeus’ embassy to Rome - its purpose and
outcome’, PEf) 106 (1974) 141—6

1 2 1. Zambelli, M. ‘La composizione del secondo libro dei Maccabei e la nuova
cronologiadi Antioco Epifane’, MiscellaneaGreca e Romana { 1965) 195—299

f. Other

122. Altheim, F. Weltgeschichte Asiens im griechischen Zeitalter. 2 vols. Halle,
1947-8

123. Astin, A. E. ‘Diodorus and the date of the embassy to the East of Scipio
Aemilianus’, CPh 54 (1959) 321-7

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140. Sedlar, J. W. India and the Greek World. A Study in the Transmission of
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1 4 1 . Senior, R. C. Sale List 4. Somerset, England, January 1983

142. Sharma, G. R. Reh Inscription of Menander and the Indo-Greek Invasion of the
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143. Simonetta, A. ‘An essay on the so-called “Indo-Greek” coinage’. East and
West 8 (1957) 44-66

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144. Simonetta, A. ‘A new essay on the Indo-Greeks, the Sakas and the
Pahlavas’, East and West 9 (1958) 1 54—83

145. Simonetta, A. ‘Some hypotheses on the military and political structure of
the Indo-Greek kingdom JNSI 22 (i960) 56-62

146. Smith, R. M. ‘On the ancient chronology of India (in )’,JAOS 78.3 (1958)
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147. Smith, R. M. ‘Greek kings in India: a synopsis’, Annals of Bhandrakar
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148. Smith, V. A. A Catalogue of Coins in the Indian Museum 1. Oxford, 1906

149. Staviski, B. J. ‘The capitals of Ancient Bactria’, East and West 23 (1973)
265-77

150. Taranatha. Taranathas Geschichte des Buddhismus in India , ed. A. Schiefner. St
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15 1. Tarn, W. W. Alexander the Great. 2 vols-. Cambridge, 1948

152. Tarn, W. W. The Greeks in Bactria and India. 2nd edn. Cambridge, 1951
(reprinted with an introductory note by F. L. Holt, Chicago, 1984)

153. Thomas, F. W. ‘Notes on “The Scythian Period” }RAS (1952) 108—16

1 5 3A. Tottossy, C. ‘Graeco-Indo-Iranica’, AAnt. Hung. 25 (1977) 129-35

154. Trever, K. B. Pamyatniki Greko-Baktriyskogo Iskusstva. Moscow and
Leningrad, 1940

155. Verma, T. P. ‘A note on the Reh Inscription’, in R angavalli, Recent
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156. Von Sallet, A. Die Nachfolger Alexanders des Grossen in Baktrien und lndien.
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157. Walbank, F. W. Review of A. K. Narain, The Indo-Greeks, in History ( 1958)
125-6

158. Walbank, F.W. The Hellenistic World, Cambridge, Mass, 1982

1 5 8a. Walbank, F. W. ‘Monarchies and Monarchic ideas’, ch. 3 in The Cambridge
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1 59. Wheeler, R. M. Charsada , A Metropolis of the North-west Frontier. Oxford,
1962

160. Whitehead, R. B. Catalogue of the Coins in the Punjab Museum, Eahore 1: Indo-
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1 6 1 . Whitehead, R. B. ‘Notes on Indo-Greek numismatics’, Num. ChronP 3
(1923) 294-343

162. Whitehead, R.B. ‘Notes on the Indo-Greeks’, Num. Chronp 20 (1940)
89—122

163. Whitehead, R. B. ‘The dynasty of the General Aspavarma’, Num. Chronk
4 (i944) 99~ io 4

164. Whitehead, R.B. Indo-Greek Numismatics. Chicago, 1970

165. Widemann, F. ‘Une surfrappede Gondopharessur Hermaios et une autre
de Kozoulo Kadphises sur Gondophares qui apportent deux jalons
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l’empire Kouchans’, Bulletin de la Societe franqaise de Numismatique 27.1
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165 a. Wolski, J. ‘L’effondrement de la domination des Seleucides en Iran au Ille

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Suppl. v, 13—70. Cracow, 1947

66. Wolski, J. ‘The decay of the Iranian empire of the Seleucids and the
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67. Wolski, J. ‘Le probleme de la fondation de I’etat greco-bactrien’, lranica
Antiqua 17 (1982) 131-46

68. Woodcock, G. The Greeks in India. London, 1966

G. THE ROMANS IN SPAIN

1. Albertini, E. Les divisions administratives de l' Espagne romaine. Paris, 1923

2. Astin, A. E. ‘The Roman commander in Hispania Ulterior in 142 b.c.’,
Historia 13 (1964) 245-54

3. Badian, E. ‘The prefect at Gades’, CPh 49 (1954) 250-2

4. Balil, A. ‘Un factor difusor de la Romanizacion: las tropas hispanicas al
servicio de Roma (siglos III— I a. de J.C.)’, Emeriia 24 (1956) 108—34

5. Bernhardt, R. ‘Die Entwicklung romischer amici et socii zu civitates
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6. Blazquez, J. M. ‘El impacto de la conquista de Hispania en Roma
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8. Blazquez, J.M. ‘Causas de la Romanizacion de Hispania’, Hispania 24
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1 3. Dominguez Arranz, A. L as cecas ibericas del Valle del Ebro. Saragossa, 1979

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18. Garcia y Bellido, A. ‘Die Latinisierung Hispaniens’, ^JiVRlP'i.i (1972)
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19. Griffin, M. ‘The Elder Seneca and Spain’, fRS 62 (1972) 1-19

20. Knapp, R. C. Aspects of the Roman Experience in Iberia, 206—100 b.c.
Valladolid, 1977

2 1 . Maluquer de Motes, J . E pigrafia prelatina de la Peninsula iberica. Barcelona,
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22. Martinez Gazquez, J. La campana de Caton en Hispania. Barcelona, 1974

23. Menendez Pidal, R., ed. Historia de Espana 1. 3; 11, 4th edn. Madrid, 1954
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24. Richardson, J. S. ‘The Spanish mines and the development of provincial
taxation in the second century b.c.’, JRS 66 (1976) 139-52

25 . Richardson, J. S. ‘The Tabula Contrebiensis: Roman law in Spain in the
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26. Rickard, T. A. ‘The mining of the Romans in Spain’, JRS 18 (1928)
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27. Sanchez-Albornoz, C. ‘Proceso de la romanizacion de Espana desde los
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28. Schulten, A. ‘The Romans in Spain’, in CAH 1 vm, 306-25. Cambridge,
1930

29. Simon, H. Roms Kriege in Spanien, 144-1 jj v. Chr. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1962

30. Sumner, G. V. ‘Proconsuls and Provinciae in Spain, 218/17-196/5 b.c.’,
Arethusa 3 (1970) 85-102

31. Sumner, G. V. ‘Notes on Provinciae in Spain (197-1 33 b.c.)’, CPh 72 (1977)
126-30

32. Torres, C. ‘La fundacion de Valencia’, Ampurias 13 (1951) 113-21

33. Van Nostrand, J.J. ‘Roman Spain’, in ESA R in, 119-224

34. Wattenberg, F. La region vaccea. Celtiberismoy romanizacion en la Cuenca media
del Duero. Madrid, 1959

3 5 . Wiegels, R. ‘Liv. per. 5 5 und die Griindung von Valentia’, Chiron 4 (1974)
153-76

36. Wiegels, R. ‘Iliturgi und der “deductor” Ti. Sempronius Gracchus’,
MDA 1 (M) 23 (1982) 152—221

H. ROME AND ITALY
a. Constitutional studies and the nature of Roman politics

1. Afzelius, A. ‘Zur Definition der romischen Nobilitat vor der Zeit
Ciceros’, C&M 7 (1945) 150-200

2. Astin, A. E. The Lex Annalis before Sulla. Collection Latomus xxxii.
Brussels, 1958

3. Astin, A. E. Politics and Policies in the Roman Republic (Inaugural lecture).
Belfast, 1968

4. Broughton, T. R. S. ‘Senate and senators of the Roman Republic: the
prosopographical approach’, ANRIE 1.1 (1972) 250—65

5. Brunt, P. A. ‘Amicitia in the Late Roman Republic’, PCPS 191 (1965)
1—20

b. POLITICAL AND PUBLIC LIFE 5 79

6. Brunt, P. A. ‘Nobilitas and novitas’, JRS 72 (1982) 1-17

7. Finley, M.I. Politics in the Ancient World. Cambridge, 1983

8. Gelzer, M. Die Nobilitdt der romischen Repub/ik. Leipzig and Berlin, 1912

9. Gelzer, M. and Seager, R. The Roman Nobility (trans. of Gelzer 1912:
(h 8)). Oxford, 1969

10. Greenidge, A. H. J. Roman Public Life. London, 1901

1 1. Gruen, E. S. Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 b.c. Cambridge,
Mass, 1968

1 2. Jashemski, W. F. The Origins and History of the Proconsular and Propraetorian
Imperium to 27 b.c. Diss. Chicago, 1950

13. Lippold, A. Consules. Bonn, 1963

14. Millar, F. G. B. ‘The political character of the classical Roman Republic,
200— 15 1 b.c.’, JRS 74 (1984) 1 — 19

15. Miinzer, F. Romische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien. Stuttgart, 1920

16. Nicolet, C. ‘Polybe et les institutions romaines’, in Polybe (Entretiens sur
l’antiquite classique, Fondation Hardt, 20), 209-65. Geneva, 1973

17. Nowak, M. Die S trafverhangungen der Censoren. Breslau, 1909

18. Pieri, G. L’histoire du cens jusqu'a la fin de la republique romaine. Paris, 1968

19. Poeschl, V. Romischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero. Berlin,
1936

20. Rich, J. W. Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine
Expansion. Collection Latomus cxlix. Brussels, 1976

21. Rilinger, R. Der Einfluss des Wahlleiters bei den romischen Konsulwahlen von j66
bis jo v. Chr. Munich, 1976

22. Schleussner, B. Die Legaten der romischen Republik. Munich, 1978

23. Schmahling, E. Die Sittenaufsicht der Censoren. Stuttgart, 1938

24. Scullard, H. H. ‘Roman politics’, BICS 2 (1955) 15-21

25. Shatzman, I. ‘The Roman general’s authority over booty’, Historia 21
(1972) i77- 2 °5

26. Staveley, E. S. ‘The conduct of elections during an interregnum’, Historia
3 (1954-5) 193-21 1

27. Staveley, E. S. Greek and Roman Voting and Elections. London, 1966

28. Suolahti, J. The Roman Censors. Helsinki, 1963

29. Taylor, L. R. The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic. Rome, i960

30. Taylor, L. R. Roman Voting Assemblies. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966

b. Political and public life

31. Albert, S. Bellum lustum. Kallmiinz, 1980

32. Badian, E. Publicans and Sinners. Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman
Republic. Oxford, 1972

33. Badian, E. ‘Tiberius Gracchus and the beginnings of the Roman revol-
ution’, ANRW 1. 1 (1972) 608-731

34. Calboli, G. Marci Porcii Catonis Oratio pro Rhodiensibus: Catone, l’ oriente greco
e gli imprenditori Romani. Bologna, 1978

35. Cassola, F. I gruppi politici romani nel III secolo a.C. Trieste, 1962

580 H. ROME AND ITALY

3 6. Coarelli, F. ‘Public buildings in Rome between the Second Punic War and
Sylla’, PBS R 45 (1977) 1-23

37. Cova, P. V. ‘Livio e la tepressione dei Baccanali’, Athenaeum 52 (1974)
82-109

38. Dihle, A. ‘Zum s.c. de Bacchanalibus’, Hermes 90 (1962) 376—9

39. Earl, D. C. ‘Political terminology in Plautus’, Historia 9 (i960) 235—43

40. Earl, D. C. ‘Terence and Roman politics’, Historia 11 (1962) 469-85

41. Frederiksen, M. ‘The contribution of archaeology to the agrarian prob-
lem in the Gracchan period’, in RIGS, 330-57

42. Gabba, E. Republican Rome. The Army and the Allies. Oxford, 1976

43. Gabba, E. ‘Esercito e fiscalita a Roma in eta repubblicana’, in Armies el
fiscalite dans le monde antique, 15—33. Paris, 1977

44. Gabba, E. ‘Richezza e classe dirigente romana fra II e I sec. a.C.’, RSI 93
0 9 Sl ) 54 ,_ 5 8

45. Gelzer, M. ‘Romische Politik bei Fabius Pictor’, Hermes 68 (1933) 129—66

Kl. Schr. hi, 51-92. Wiesbaden, 1964)

46. Gelzer, M. ‘Die Unterdriickung der Bacchanalia bei Livius’, Hermes 71
(1936) 275—87 = {Kl. Schr. hi, 256—69. Wiesbaden, 1964)

47. Fleuss, A. Die vblkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der romischen Aussenpolitik in
republikanischer Zeit. Leipzig, 1933

48. Hill, H. The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period. Oxford, 1952

49. Hopkins, K. Death and Renewal. Sociological Studies in Roman History 2.
Cambridge, 1983

50. Martina, M. ‘I censori del 258 a.C.’ , Quaderni di S toria 1 2 (July-December
1980) 143-70

5 1. Nicolet, C. The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome. London, 1980

52. Rawson, E. ‘The eastern clientelae of Clodius and the patrician Clodii’,
Historia 22 (1973) 219-39

53. R ich, J . W. ‘The supposed Roman manpower shortage of the later second
century b.c.’, Historia 32 (1985) 287-331

54. Scullard, H. H. Roman Politics, 220-1/0 b.c. 2nd edn. Oxford, 1973

55. Shatzman, I. Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics. Collection Latomus
cxLii. Brussels, 1975

56. Sherwin-White, A. N. ‘The date of the Lex Repetundarum and its conse-
quences’, JRS 62 (1972) 83-99

57. Sordi, M. ‘La tradizione storiografica su Tiberio Sempronio Graeco e la
propaganda con tempo ranea’, Miscellanea Greca e Romana 6 (1978) 299—3 30

58. Tarditi, G. ‘La questionedei Baccanali a Roma nel 186 a.C.’, PP 9 (1954)
265-87

59. Taylor, L. R. ‘Forerunners of the Gracchi’, JRS 52 (1962) 19-27

60. Thiel, J. H. Studies on the History of Roman Sea-power in Republican Times.
Amsterdam, 1946

61. Venturini, C. Studi sul ‘crimen repetundarum' nell’eta repubblicana. Milan,
■979

62. Walbank, F. W. ‘Political morality and the friends of Scipio’, JRS 5 5
(1965) 1-16

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63. Wiseman, T. P. ‘Roman Republican road-building’, PBS R 38 (1970)
122—5 2

64. Wiseman, T. P. New Men in the Roman Senate rjt> b.c.-i 4 a.d. Oxford, 197 1

65. Wiseman, T. P. ‘Legendary genealogies in late-Republican Rome’, G& R
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66. Wiseman, T. P. ‘Domi Nobiles and the Roman cultural elite’, in Les
‘Bourgeoisies’ municipals italiennes aux He et ler siecles avant J.-C., 299—307.
Naples, 1983

c. Biographical studies

67. Astin, A. E. Scipio Aemilianus. Oxford, 1967

68. Astin, A. E. Cato the Censor. Oxford, 1978

69. Badian, E. T . Quinctius F/amminus: Philhellenism and Realpolitik (Lectures
in Memory of Louise Taft Semple). Cincinnati, 1970

70. Badian, E. ‘Ennius and his Friends’, in Ennius (Entretiens sur l’antiquite
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71. Della Corte, F. Catone Censore: La vita e la fortuna. Florence, 1969

72. Haffter, H. ‘Cato der Altere in Politik und Kultur seiner Zeit’, in R dmische
Politik und Politiker. Heidelberg, 1967

73. Kammer, U. Vntersuchungen %u Ciceros Bild von Cato Censorius. Diss. Frank-
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74. Kienast, D. Cato der Zensor, seine Personlicbkeit und seine Zeit. Heidelberg,
054

75. Nicolet, C. ‘Arpinum, Aemilius Scaurus et les Tullii Cicerones’, REL 45
(1967) 276-304

76. Scullard, H. H. ‘Scipio Aemilianus and Roman politics’, JRS 50 (i960)
59-74

77. Scullard, H. H. Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician. London, 1970

78. Strasburger, H. ‘Der “Scipionenkreis”’, Hermes 94 (1966) 60—72

79. Walbank, F. W. ‘The Scipionic Legend’, PCPS n.s. 13 (1967) 54—69

d. Social life and institutions

80. Afzelius, A. Die romische Kriegsmacht. Copenhagen, 1944

81. Bonner, S. F. Education in Ancient Rome. London, 1977

82. Brunt, P. A. Italian Manpower 22; b.c.—a.d. 14. Oxford, 1971

83. Carandini, A. ‘Sviluppo e crisi delle manifatture rurali e urbane’, in SRPS
11, 249-60

84. Castagnoli, F. ‘Note al Liber Coioniarum’, Bull. Com. Arch. 41 (1946—8)
Appendice, 49-58

85. Clemente, G. ‘Le leggi sul lussoe lasocieta romana tra III e II secoloa.C.’,
in AREA in, 1-14

86. Dahlheim, W. Struktur und Entwicklung des romischen Volkerrechts im ). und
2. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Munich, 1968

87. Evans, J. K. ‘Plebs rustica. The peasantry of Classical Italy’, AJAH 5
(1980) 19-47, 134-73

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88. Frederiksen, M. ‘Changes in the patterns of settlement’, in HIMu , 341 — 5 5

89. Frederiksen, M. ‘I cambiamenti delle strutture agrarie nella tarda
repubblica: la Campania’, in SRPS 1, 265-87

90. Gabba, E. Esercito e societa nella tarda repubblica romana. Florence, 1973

9 1 . Gabba, E. ‘Considerazioni politiche ed economiche sullo sviluppo urbano
in Italia sui secoli II e I a.C.’, in HIM n, 315-26

92. Gabba, E. ‘Riflessioni antiche e moderne sulle attivita commercialia
Roma nei secoli II e I a.C.’, in The Seaborne Commerce of Ancient Rome, ed.
J. H. D’Arms and E. C. Kopff, 91—102. MAAR 36. Rome, 1980

9 3 . Gabba, E. and Pasquinucci, M. Strutture agrarie allevamento transumante nell’
Italia romana (III— I sec. a.C.). Pisa, 1979

94. Giardina, A. ‘Allevamento ed economia della selva in Italia meridionale:
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9 5 . Giardina, A. and Schiavone, A., eds. Societa romana e produfione schiavistica.
3 vols. Rome and Bari, 1981. ( SRPS)

96. Harris, W. V. ‘Economic conditions in Northern Etruria in the second
century b.c.’, in CDE, 56-63

97. Heurgon, J. ‘Classes et ordres chez les Etrusques’, in Re cherches sur les
structures sociales dans I’antiquite classique (Caen 25-26 April 1969), 29—41.
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98. Hoffmann, W. ‘Probleme der Sklaverei und ihre Bedeutung fur die
inneritalische Entwicklung um die Wende von 2. zum 1. Jhdt. v.Z.’, in
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99. Hopkins, K. Conquerors and Slaves. Cambridge, 1978

100. Jory, E. J. ‘Associations of actors in Rome’, Hermes 98 (1970) 224—53

101. Kahler, H. Seethiasos und Census. Berlin, 1966

102. Laffi, U. Adtributio e contributio. Pisa, 1966

103. Maroti, E. ‘The vilicus and the villa-system in ancient Italy’, Oikoumene 1
(1976) 109-24

104. Neeve, P. W. de. Colonus. Private Farm-tenancj in Roman Italy during the
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105 . Neeve, P. W. de. Peasants in Peril. Eocation and Economy in Italy in the Second
Century b.c. Amsterdam, 1984

106. Nicolet, C. ‘Armee et societe a Rome sous la republique: a propos de
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Paris and The Hague, 1969

107. North, J. ‘Conservation and change in Roman religion’, PBS R 44 (1976)
1—12

108. North, J. ‘Religious toleration in Republican Rome’, PCPS 205 (1979)
85-103

109. Pailler, J.-M. ‘ “Raptos a diis homines dici . . .” (Tite-Live xxxix, 1 3). Les
bacchanales et la possession par les nymphes’. Melanges Heurgon 11, 73 1—42

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111. Schiavone, A. Nascita della giurispruden^a. Bari, T976

112. Schilling, R. La religion romaine de Venus depuis les origines jusqu’au temps
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1 1 3. Sherwin-VVhite, A. N. The Roman Citizenship. 2nd edn. Oxford, 1973

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1 14. Smith, R. E. ‘Latins and the Roman citizenship in Roman colonies: Livy,
34, 42, 5-6’, JRS 44 (i 954 ) >8-20

1 1 5 . Tibiletti, G. ‘II possesso dell’ aget publicus e le norme de modo agrorum
sino ai Gracchi’, Athenaeum 26 (1948) 173—236; 27 (1949) 3-42

1 16. Tibiletti, G. ‘Ricerche di storia agraria romana’, Athenaeum 28 (1950)
183—266

1 17. Tibiletti, G. ‘Lo sviluppo del latifondo dall’ epoca graccana al principio
dell’ impero’, in X Congresso Internationale di Science Storiche, Rela^ioni 11.
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1 18. Torelli, M. ‘Industria estrattiva, lavoro artigianale, interessi economici:
qualche appunto’, in The Seaborne Commerce of Ancient Rome: Studies in
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1 1 8 a. Treggiari, S. Roman Freedmen during the Fate Republic. Oxford, 1969

1 19. Watson, A. Rome of the XII Tables. Persons and Property. Princeton, 1975

120. White, K. D. Roman Farming. London, 1970

121. Wilson, A.J.N. Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome.
Manchester, 1966

122. Wissowa, G. Religion und Kultus der Romer. 2nd edn. Munich, 1912

123. Zevi, F. ‘Ostia’, Stud. Etr. 41 (1973) 507-29

e. Rome and the Italians

124. Badian, E. ‘Roman politics and the Italians (133-91 b.c.)’, in RIGS,
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125. Beloch, K. J. Der italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie. Leipzig, 1880

126. Bernardi, A. Nomen Latinum. Pavia, 1973

127. Brunt, P. A. ‘Italian aims at the time of the Social War’, JRS 5 5 (1965)
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128. Cassola, F. ‘Romani e italici in oriente’, in RIGS, 305—22

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130. Gabba, E. ‘Le origini della Guerra Sociale e la vita politica romana dopo
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1 3 1 . Gabba, E. ‘II problema dell’unita dell’Italia romana’, in Ea cultura italica.
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132. Galsterer, H. Herrschaft und Verwaltung im repub likanischen Italien. Munich,
1976

133. Ghinatti, F. ‘Economia e romanizzazione della Campania’, AFLPad. 2
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134. Giuffre, V. ‘Esigenze militari romane ed Italici’, Labeo 21 (1975) 215—38

135. Gohler, J. Rom und Italien. Breslau, 1939

136. Harris, W. V. Rome in Etruria and Umbria. Oxford, 1971

137. Harris, W. V. ‘Was Roman law imposed on the Italian allies?’, Historia 24
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138. Humbert, M. ‘Libertas id est civitas. Autour d’un conflit negatif de
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139. Humbert, M. Municipium et civitas sine suffragio. Rome, 1978

140. Ilari, V. Gli Italici nelle strutture militari romane. Miian, 1974

14 1. Klingner, F. ‘Italien, Name, Begriff und Idee im Altertum’, in Romische
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142. La Regina, A. ‘II Sannio’, in HIM 1, 219-44

143. Luraschi, G. Foedus Jus Fatii Civitas. Pavia, 1979

144. Luraschi, G. ‘A proposito dei Ligures Statellates transducti trans Padum
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145. McDonald, A. H. ‘Rome and the Italian Confederation (200-186 b.c.)’,
JRS 34 (1944) 11-33

146. Nagle, D. B. ‘An allied view of the Social War’, A] Arch. 72 (1973) 367—78

147. Nicolet, C. ‘Le stipendium des allies italiens avant la Guerre Sociale’, PBSR
46 (1978) 1-1 1

148. Pais, E. ‘La persistenza delle stirpi sannitiche nell’eta romana e la
participazione di genti sabelliche alia colonizzazione romana e latina’,
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149. Richardson, J. S. ‘The ownership of Roman lands: Tiberius Gracchus and
the Italians’, JRS 70 (1980) 1-11

150. Salmon, E. T. ‘The “Coloniae Maritimae”’, Athenaeum 41 (1963) 30-8

15 1. Salmon, E. T. Samnium and the Samnites. Cambridge, 1967

152. Salmon, E. T. Roman Colonisation under the Republic. London, 1970

153. Sannio. Pentri e Frentani dal VI al I sec. a.C. Catalogo della Mostra della
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154. Sartori, F. T praefecti Capuam Cumas’, in I Campi Flegrei, Atti dei Convegni
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155. Tibiletti, G. ‘La politica delle coloniae e citta latine nella guerra sociale’,
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156. Wegner, M. Unter such ungen s u den lateinischen Begriffen socius und societas.
Gottingen, 1969

f. Cisalpine Gaul

157. Arslan, E. A. ‘Spunti per lo studio del celtismo cisalpino’, Notice dal
Chios tro del Monas tero Maggiore 7-10 (1971-4) 43-57

158. Arslan, E. A. ‘Centi e romani in Transpadana’, Etudes Celtiques 1 5 (1976—8)
441-81

159. Chilver, G. E. F. Cisalpine Gaul. Oxford, 1941

160. Gabba, E. ‘Caio Flaminio e la sua legge sulla colonizzazione dell’agro
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1 6 1 . Hoyos, B. D. ‘Roman strategy in Cisalpina, 224-222 and 203-191 b.c.’,
Antichthon 10 (1976) 44-55

162. Lequement, R. and Liou, B. ‘Lesepavesdela cote de Transalpine. Essai de
denombrement, suivi de quelques observations sur le trafic maritime aux
lie et Ier siecles avant J.-C.’, Cahiers Figures de Prehistoire et d’ Archeologie 24
(1975) 76-82

g. GREEK INFLUENCES ON LITERATURE AND CULTURE 585

163. Mansuelli, G. A. ‘La civilta gallica nell’ area lombardo-piemontese’, in
Arte e civilta romana nell’ Italia settentrionale 11, 45—55. Bologna, 1965

164. Peyre, C. La cisalpine gauloise du Ille siecle av. J.-C. Paris, 1979

165. Robson, D.O. ‘The Samnites in the Po Valley’, CJ 29 (1934) 599-608

166. Tozzi, P. Storia padana antica. Milan, 1972

167. Tozzi, P. ‘L’ltalia settentrionale nell’ eta antica’. Athenaeum , Fascicolo
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g. Roman literature and culture: Greek influences

168. Besanfon, A. Les adversaires de I’hellenisme a Rome pendant la periode
republicaine. Paris and Lausanne, 1910

169. Bilinski, B. De veterum tragicorum Romanorum notitiis geographicis
observations . Wroclaw, 1952

170. Boscherini, L. Lingua e scien^a greca nel'De agri cultural di Catone. Rome,
1970

171. Bowra, C. M. ‘Orpheus and Eurydice’, CQ n.s. 2 (1952) 113—26

172. Boyance, P. ‘Fulvius Nobilior et le dieu ineffable’, Rev. Phil. 29 (1955)
172-92

173. Brink, C. O. ‘Ennius and the Hellenistic worship of Homer’, AJPhil. 93
(1972) 547-67

174. Buchner, K. Das Theater des Teren Heidelberg, 1974

175. Chalmers, W. R. ‘Plautus and his audience’, in Roman Drama, ed. T. A.
Dorey and D. K. Dudley, 21—50. London, 1965

176. Delatte, A. ‘Les doctrines pythagoriciennes des Livres de Numa’, Bull, de
l’ Acad, royale de Belg. 22 (1936) 19-40

177. Della Corte, F. La fllologia latina dalle origini a Varrone. Turin, 1937

1 78. Della Corte, F. ‘Stoicismo in Macedonia e in Roma’, in Opuscula 1, 173-83.
Genoa, 1971

179. Fraenkel, E. ‘Some aspects of the structure of Aeneid vn’, JRS 35 (1945)

1— 14

180. Fraenkel, E. Elementi Plautini in Plauto. Florence, i960 (translation, with
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1 8 1 . Gage, J. Apollon romain. Essai sur le culte d’ Apollon et le developpement du‘ ritus
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182. Gallini, C. ‘Che cosa intendere per ellenizzazione. Problemi di metodo’,
DArch. 7 (1973) 2-3, 175-91

183. Garbarino, G. Roma e la filosofia greca dalle origini alia fine del II secolo. Turin,
>975

184. Gelzer, M. ‘Der Anfang romischer Geschichtsschreibung’, Hermes 69
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185. Gelzer, M. ‘Nochmals iiber den Anfang der romischen Geschichts-
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186. Gigante, M. ‘L’epicureismo a Roma da Alcio e Filisco a Fedro’, in Ricerche
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187. Graillot, H. Le culte de Cybele mere des dieux a Rome et dans l’ empire romain.
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1 88. Grimal, P. Ee siecle dts Scipions: Rome et I’hellenisme au temps ties guerre s
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189. Grimal, P. ‘La maison de Simon et celle de Theopropides dans la
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190. Gros, P. ‘Hermodoros et Vitruve’, Melanges d’arch. 85 (1973) 137-61

19 1. Gros, P. ‘Les statues de Syracuse et les “dieux” de Tarente (la classe
politique devant Part grec a la fin du Hie siecle avant J.-C.)’, REL 57

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192. Gross, W. H. ‘Zum sogennanten Brutus’, in HIM 11, 504-75

193. Haffter, H. Teren^ und seine kiinstlerische Eigenart. Darmstadt, 1967

194. Heurgon, J. ‘Caton et la Gaule Cisalpine’, in Melanges IP". Seston, 231-47.
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195. Horsfall, N. ‘The Collegium Poetarum’, BICS 23 (1976) 79-95

196. Jocelyn, H. D. The Tragedies 0/ Ennius. Cambridge, 1967

197. Jocelyn, H. D. ‘The poems of Q. Ennius’, ANRW 1.2 (1972) 987-1026

198. Jocelyn, H. D. ‘The ruling class of the Roman Republic and Greek
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199. Kennedy, G. The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World. Princeton, 1972

200. Kierdorf, W. ‘Catos “Origines” und die Anfange der romischen
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20 1 . Klingner, F. ‘Cato Censorius und die Krisis Roms’, in R omische Geisteswelt,
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202. Kolendo, J. Le traite d’agronomie de Saserna. Wroclaw, 1973

203. Koves, T. ‘Zum Empfang der Magna Mater in Rom’, Historia 1 2 (1963)
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204. Kraus, Th. ‘Stromungen hellenistischer Kunst’, in RIGS, 224-40

205. Latte, K. R omische Religionsgeschichte. Munich, i960

206. Laughton, E. ‘The prose of Ennius’, Eranos 49 (1951) 35-46 (with
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207. Leeman, A. D. Orationis Ratio. Amsterdam, 1963

208. Letta, C. ‘L’ltalia dei mores romani nelle Origines di Catone’, Athenaeum 62
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209. Martina, M. ‘Aedes Herculis Musarum’, DArch. n.s. 3 (1981) 49-68

210. Nenci, G. ‘Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit’, ASNSP i 8 (1978) 1007—

21 1. Rawson, E. ‘Architecture and sculpture: the activities of the Cossutii’,
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212. Rawson, E. ‘The first Latin annalists’, L atomus 35 (1976) 689-71

213. Rawson, E. ‘The introduction of logical organization into Roman prose
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214. Traina, A. V or tit barhare. Rome, 1970

215. Trankle, H. ‘Micio und Demea in den Terenzischen Adelphen’, MH 29
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216. Veyne, P. ‘L’hellenisation de Rome et la problematique des accultura-
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217. Wardman, A. Rome’s Debt to Greece. London, 1976

h. ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 587

2 1 8. Weber, E. ‘Die Trojanische Abstammung der Romer als politisches
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219. Webster, T. B. L. Hellenistic Poetry and Art. London, 1964

220. Weippert, O. A lexander-imitatio und romische Politik in republikanischer Zeit.
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221. Wiilfing-von Martitz, P. ‘Ennius als hellenistischer Dichter’, in Ennius
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222. Zetzel, J. E. G. ‘Cicero and the Scipionic circle’, Harv. Stud. 76 (1972)
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h. Roman and Italian culture: archaeological evidence
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225. Baldacci, P. ‘Importazioni cisalpine e produzioni apule’, in Recherches sur
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224. Baity, J.-Ch. ‘Une nouvelle replique du Demosthene de Polyeuctes’, Bull,
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225. Baity, J.-Ch. ‘La statue de bronze de T. Quinctius Flamininusat/ Apollinis
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226. Bevilacqua, G. Tituli 11: Miscellanea. Rome, 1980

227. Bianchi Bandinelli, R. Rome: le centre du pouvoir. Paris, 1969

228. Bianchi Bandinelli, R. ‘‘Problemi dell’arte figurativa’, in RIGS, 213-23

229. Bianchi Bandinelli, R. ‘La pittura’, in Ee arti figurative, 461—53. Milan,
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230. Bonghi Jovino, M. ‘Breve nota in margine al problema dell’ellenismo
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231 . Brown, F. E. Cosa: The Makingof a Roman Town. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1979

232. Cianfarani, V. Santuari nel Sannio. Rome, i960

233. Coarelli, F. ‘Classe dirigente romana e arti figurative’, in RIGS, 241-65

234. Coarelli, F. ‘Architetturae arti figurative in Roma: 1 5o-5oa.C.’, in HIMo,
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235. Coarelli, F. ‘Arte ellenistica e arte romana: la cultura figurativa in Roma
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236. Colonna, G. ‘Problemi dell’arte figurativa di eta ellenistica nell’ Italia
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237. Conta Haller, G. Ricerche su alcuni centri fortificati in opera poligonale in area
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238. Delbriick, R. Heltenistische Bauten in Eatium. Strasbourg, 1907—12

239. Greco Pontrandolfo, A. and Greco, E. ‘L’Agro Picentino e la Lucania
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240. Grelle, F. ‘Canosa. Le istituzioni, la societa’, in SRPS 1, 181-226

241. Gros, P. ‘Les premieres generations d’architectes hellenistiques a Rome’,
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243. Johannowsky, W. ‘Contributo dell’archeologia alia storia sociale: la
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244. Johannowsky, W. ‘La situazione in Campania’, in HIM 1, 267-99

245. Johannowsky, W. ‘Testimonianze materiali del modo di produzione
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246. Lauter, H. ‘Die hellenistischen Theater der Samniten und Latiner in ihrer
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247. Luchi, O. ‘I territori di Volterra e di Chiusi’, in SRPS r, 413-20

248. Manacorda, D. ‘Produzione agricola, produzione ceramica e proprietari
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249. Marabini Moevs, M.T. The Roman Thin-walled Pottery from Cosa
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250. Marabini Moevs, M.T. ltalo-Megarian Ware at Cosa. MAAR 34,
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251. Mercando, L. ‘Area sacra di S. Omobono, esplorazione della fase
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254. Morel, J.-P- ‘Etudes de ceramique campanienne. 1. L’atelier des petites
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255. Morel, J.-P. ‘Aspects del’artisanat dans la Grande Grece romaine’, in Atti
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256. Morel, J.-P. ‘Ceramiques d’ltalieet ceramiques hellenistiques’, in HIM 11,
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257. Morel, J.-P. ‘Le sanctuaire de Vastogirardi (Molise) et les influences
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258. Morel, J.-P. ‘La ceramique companienne: acquis et problemes’, in
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259. Morel, J.-P. ‘La produzione della ceramica campana: aspetti economici e
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260. Morel, J.-P. ‘Les producteurs de biens artisanaux en Italie a la fin de la
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26 1 . Pairault, F.-H. Recherches sur quelques series cT urnes de Volterra a representa-
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262. Pavolini, C. ‘Le lucerne nell’Italia romana’, in SRPS 11, 139-85

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264. Ricci, A. ‘I vasi potori a pared sottili’, in SRPS 11, 123—38

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i. OTH ER 589

267. Torelli, M. ‘II donario di M. Fulvio Flacco nell’area di S. Omobono’, in
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268. Torelli, M. ‘Contributo dell’archeologia alia storia sociale: l’Etruria e
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i. Other

275. Alfoldi, A. Rbmische Friihgeschichte. Heidelberg, 1976

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279. Cristofani, M. ‘Societa e istituzioni nell’Italia preromana’, Popoli e civilta
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280. Dahlheim, W. Gewalt und Herrschaft. Das provinciate Herrschaftssystem der
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285. Lazzeroni, R. ‘Le piu antiche attestazioni del nom. pi. -as in latino e la
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286. Lejeune, M. L’antbroponomie osque. Paris, 1976

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290. Rix, H. Die etruskischen Cognomen. Wiesbaden, 1953

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I. MISCELLANEOUS

59 °

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29. Olshausen, E. Prosopographie der hellenistischen Konigsgesandten i. Louvain,
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30. Pritchett, W. K. Studies in Ancient Greek Topography II. Berkeley, 1969

31. Ritter, H.-W. Diadem und Konigsherrschaft. Munich, 1965

32. Seibert, J. Historische Beitrdge den dynastischen V erbindungen in
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33. Simon, E. Pergamon und Hesiod. Mainz, 1975

34. Swain, J. W. ‘The theory of the four monarchies’, CPh 35 (1940) 1— 21

35. Tcherikower, V. Die hellenistischen S iadtegriindungen von Alexander dem
Grossen bis auf die Romer^eit. Leipzig, 1927

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